

Decolonization of Taxation: Indigenous Peasants and the Civil War of 1895 in Peru

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Introduction

In 1536 Francisco Pizarro found himself in a tenuous position in the newly established City of Kings. A force of tens of thousands of rebels had circled Lima and planned to take the city by force. Manco Inca, a monarch that Pizarro had personally appointed to legitimize his own rule on the empire, led these forces. Yet, shortly after his appointment, Manco Inca turned on Pizarro because of the abuses and excesses the Spanish committed against Manco Inca's people. Now, Manco Inca was bent on eliminating the Spanish and destroying their colonial project. Given their numbers, less than 200 men, it was only a matter of time before Manco Inca took over Lima; even the Spanish feared this would be their end. Before all was lost to the Spanish, however, Pizarro's political and personal ties to other lines of Inca nobility paid off. His romantic relationship with Inés Huaylas Yupanqui helped him overcome this quagmire. Ines was the daughter of Huayna Capac, Manco Inca's father, and Contarhucho, a noble woman from Huaylas, a region located within the modern-day department of Ancash and situated directly north of Lima. Concerned for the welfare of her daughter, Contarhucho sent thousands of Indian auxiliary units to help the Spaniards repel Manco Inca's attack.¹ This military support was successful; Manco Inca withdrew

¹ David Marley, *Wars of the Americas: A Chronology of Armed Conflict in the New World, 1492 to the Present* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 35; María del Carmen Martín Rubio, *Francisco Pizarro: El Hombre Desconocido* (Oviedo: Ediciones Novel, 2014), 280; Rafael Varon-Gabai, *Francisco Pizarro and His Brothers: The Illusion of Power in Sixteenth-Century Peru* (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 185-

his forces and the Spanish resumed a colonization project that would last until the early nineteenth century.

By the end of nineteenth century, more precisely, on March 17, 1895, amidst a civil war that engulfed much of the country, president and war hero Andrés Avelino Cáceres faced a similar situation. The armies of Nicolás de Piérola, leader of the insurgents, had surrounded Cáceres's forces in Lima; the president's future seemed bleak without military support from nearby departments. This time, however, Ancash did not send military reinforcements to help the beleaguered president. Quite to the contrary, just as Cáceres was fighting to secure his position in Lima, Ancash fell into the hands of Carlos de Piérola, brother of the wily *caudillo*. For months, Carlos de Piérola had led an armed resistance with the support of *montoneras*, irregular armies mostly composed of indigenous peasants recruited from *haciendas* and other rural areas, against the Prefect Federico Herrera, the highest authority of the *Cacerista* government in the department. Many indigenous peasants had joined Piérola's side because he promised to abolish the *contribución personal*, a poll-tax established in the colonial times that primarily extracted surplus from indigenous peasants. While in the nineteenth century the republican state attempted to extract revenue from social classes in an attempt to modernize itself, the poll-tax remained colonial in nature. Encircled and without military support from nearby departments, Cáceres was soon forced to enter negotiations with the insurgents, promptly left the country, and Nicolás de Piérola became first *de facto* leader and then president of Peru on September 8.² However, the political demands that compelled indigenous peasants to fight on the side of Piérola were not immediately fulfilled once he became president.

² Peter F. Klarén, *Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 183-202; Nils Jacobsen, "Populism Avant La Lettre in Peru: Rebuilding Power in Nicolás de Piérola Mid-Career, 1884-1895," *Jahrbuch für die Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* 51 (2014): 35-58.

In both historical accounts, the participation of indigenous peasants was crucial in Peruvian history. Following this line of inquiry, this paper aims to shed light on several theoretical, empirical and historiographical inquiries on violence, state formation, politics and war, citizenship, and revolutions by looking at the war of 1894-95 as a case study. Firstly, it will highlight the instrumental role of civil wars in state formation. Secondly, it will conceptualize war as an episode in national politics. Through participation in war, indigenous peasants in Ancash engaged in politics, reaffirmed their citizenship, redefined their political demands, made claims to state power, and influenced state policy. Lastly, this essay will posit that given the outcomes of the armed conflict in 1894-95 it was not merely a civil war but also a revolution. Historians and contemporaries have forced this interpretation upon the civil war of 1894-95, but they have not been contextualized it in wider discussions on revolutions or argued that political demands from below made this conflict revolutionary. Also, historians have overlooked that the “revolution” was inextricably tied to local demands from the peasantry that first came into collision with the state in 1885 in Ancash. In short, the essay will argue that indigenous peasants’ participation in the Revolution of 1895 was a culmination of a ten-year political struggle that persuaded a reluctant Piérola to abolish the *contribución personal*. The abolition of this four-century old oppressive legislation was an important pre-condition for the development of other political demands that characterized peasant mobilization the twentieth century Peru.

Theory and Historiography

Political science’s theoretical perspectives on civil wars are particularly useful for the analysis of the civil war of 1895. Stathis Kalyvas defines a civil war as a state-building process

and an “armed conflict within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities.” These factions, however, are not necessarily uniform political entities and may be divided within, especially when a coalition of different political actors, classes or ethnic groups, each with their own political demands, come together under one banner. The interventions of external actors, those that lie outside the political community, further complicate the cohesiveness of belligerent groups in civil wars. However, as Kalyvas points out, factions in a civil war usually tend to rely on local actors and resources. For this reason, civil war violence tends to be more intimate, and since most of the violence takes place in rural areas, the mobilization of resources and manpower puts more pressure on local communities than international conflicts. Despite the multiple political demands within a coalition, the quintessential goal of belligerents in a civil war revolves around securing control of the state.³ By the “state,” this will essay will refer to the body of polity that monopolizes violence and the entity in charge of overseeing the welfare of the population.

Whilst the civil of 1895 is not an exception to Kalyvas’ conceptualization of civil wars, scholars have not interpreted indigenous peasants’ participation in this conflict as state-making. The fact that in Peru civil wars of the nineteenth century have generally received less attention than other countries in Latin America further compounds this silence in the historiography.⁴ Those scholars who have engaged with the civil war of 1895 have been pivotal in moving away from narratives that focus on exclusively on Lima, and instead, have explored political developments in other regions. For instance, Florencia Mallon’s “Nationalist and Anti-state

³ Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5, 18, 23, 31-39, 389.

⁴ See Cecilia Méndez, “La Guerra Que no Cesa: Guerras Civiles, Imaginario Nacional y la Formación del Estado en el Perú” in *L’Atlantique Revolutionnaire: Une Perspective Ibéro-Americaine*, ed. by Clément Thibaud, Gabriel Entin, Alejandro Gómez and Federica Morelli (Bécherel: Editions Les Perséides, 2013).

Coalitions in the War of the Pacific” provides an interpretation of the war of 1895 in the departments of Junín and Cajamarca, but she is concerned with showing the alternative nationalisms indigenous peasants developed in this conflict and not their role in state-making.⁵ Nils Jacobsen and Alejandro Díez Hurtado provide an important account of the violence and the civil war in the department of Piura, but remark that local peasantry’s participation in this conflict was minimal.⁶ In the case of Ancash, literature on this department, such as the work of Augusto Alba Herrera describe the war in a lineal fashion and lays out key events from August 1894 to March 1895. However, his narrative does not fully engage with war as state-making either.⁷ Given these absences in the national and regional historiography, the war of 1895 in Ancash seems fertile ground to follow this line of inquiry.

The analysis of the civil war in Ancash will draw inspiration from the work of Cecilia Méndez and Fernando López Alves. As they have posed, war was not only a mean to capture the state but also a legitimate political tool in nineteenth century Latin America. In the case of Peru, Boliva and Ecuador, to name a few, where the state had not yet established professional armies and geographical terrain made the mobilization of armies difficult, the alliance between those in power or those that sought power and local peasantry was key in securing and maintaining control of the state.⁸ In these top-down struggles for power, indigenous peasants managed to insert their

⁵ See Florencia Mallon, “Nationalistic and Anti-State Coalitions in the War of the Pacific, Junín and Cajamarca, 1879-1902,” in *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World: 18th to 20th centuries*, edited by Steve J. Stern, 232-279 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

⁶ Nils Jacobsen and Alejandro Díez Hurtado, “Montoneras, la comuna de Chalaco y la revolución de Pierola: la sierra piurana entre el clientismo y la sociedad civil, 1868-1895” in *Los Ejes de la Disputa: Movimientos Sociales y Actores Colectivos en América Latina, Siglo XIX*, edited by Antonio Escobar Ohmstede and Romana Falcón (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2002), 123.

⁷ Augusto Alba Herrera, *Huaras: Historia de un Pueblo en Transformacion* (Caras: Ediciones El Inca, 1996.)

⁸ Fernando López Alves *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 2-5 ; Cecilia Méndez, “La Guerra Que no Cesa: Guerras Civiles, Imaginario Nacional y la

own sensibilities and justifications for war. In other words, indigenous peasants actively participated in national politics through war but had their own reasons for doing so. For indigenous peasants in Ancash during the civil war of 1895, in the words of Clausewitz, “war [was] not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, carried on with other means.”⁹ This suggests that indigenous peasants were engaged in politics, and war was a strategy, not necessarily the norm, to reach specific political goals.

While indigenous peasants participated in politics through war, I do not posit that they aimed to secure control of the state. As Kalyvas asserts, civil wars are about securing control of the state. However, aims of the peasantry in this conflict may be better explained through Max Weber’s definition of politics. For Weber, politics is “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.”¹⁰

Indigenous peasants in Ancash joined Pierola’s side, but they had specific goals in mind, such as the abolition of the *contribución personal*. They needed not capture the state but rather influence the distribution of power within it. Skewing the distribution of power in their favor meant persuading the state to meet their demands. The action of indigenous peasants on the ground suggests that they viewed the abolition of this legislation as a responsibility of the body of polity in charge of nurturing their well-being.

Formación del Estado en el Perú” in *L’Atlantique Revolutionnaire: Une Perspective Ibéro-Americaine*, ed. by Clément Thibaud, Gabriel Entin, Alejandro Gómez and Federica Morelli (Bécherel: Editions Les Perséides, 2013), 388. Also see Méndez, *The Plebeian Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820-1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

⁹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

¹⁰ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans., and eds., 77-128 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78.

A historical analysis of the *contribución personal* sheds light on why indigenous peasants in Ancash fought in the civil war of 1895 to abolish this taxation. As Carlos Contreras shows, it was a poll-tax the Spanish imposed on indigenous peoples during the sixteenth century. In return for paying tribute, the colonial state protected the communal lands of indigenous peasants from other landowners. With the advent of independence in the nineteenth century, Simón Bolívar abolished this taxation. Yet, several governments revived and abolished the tax numerous times throughout the nineteenth century.¹¹ Yet, unlike the colonial period, as Mark Thurner argues, indigenous peasants' payment of the *contribución personal* in the republican era did not guarantee the protection of communal lands.¹² For Contreras, the *contribución personal* in the nineteenth century was both a liberal attempt to establish a universal form of taxation for all citizens, Indians, mestizo and white, and a legislation that bore the marks of a colonial past.¹³ While official legislations on the nineteenth century supports this notion, in practice, the *contribución personal* was more aligned with its colonial origins if one analyzes what populations were mainly targeted and opposed most resistance to its collection. Indigenous peasants, particularly in Ancash, remained the main tributaries, or better put, the state attempted to collect revenue primarily from them. In other words, they were compelled to pay a poll-tax that dated back to the colonial era but that did not confer communal land protection. For this reason, indigenous peasants in Ancash first took arms to end this legislation in 1885 when Prefect Noriega doubled the contributions that had to be paid, continued to resist in subsequent years through evasion and political engagement, and finally, through war in 1895.

¹¹ Carlos Contreras, "El Impuesto de la Contribución Personal en el Perú del Siglo XIX," *Historica* XXIX.2 (2005): 67-106.

¹² Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One United: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 44-53.

¹³ Carlos Contreras, 102-105.

In order to influence the distribution of power to abolish this anachronistic legislation, indigenous peasants in Ancash then engaged in politics through war and this doubtlessly meant resorting to violence. The use of violence, however, as Hannah Arendt reminds scholars, is two-fold. For the philosopher, “violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.” Simply put, violence destroys power and does not create it. In the case of Cáceres’ government in the years leading up to the civil war of 1895, this is particularly true. The more his regime upped the use of violence to silence his critics and dissidents, the more he galvanized the opposition. Yet, Arendt also justifies the use of violence “under certain circumstances” that pertained to social justice. In the case of indigenous peasants and their ten-year struggle to abolish the *contribución personal*, I would argue, in the words of Arendt, violence was “the only way to set the scales of justice again.¹⁴” This is not to say that indigenous peasants’ struggle for social justice, one that continues today, was resolved after the abolition of the tax. Rather, the end of this legislation was achieved under one of those special circumstances where, in a Arendtian sense, violence was justified.

With regards to my argument that the civil war of 1894-5 was in fact a revolution, the fact that historical actors and scholars refer to this civil war as a revolution is not sufficient. Theoretical perspectives on revolutions by Hannah Arendt, Theda Skocpol, and Wim Klooster is particularly helpful here. In her assessment of the American and French Revolutions, Arendt stresses that “the words ‘revolutionary’ can be applied only to revolutions whose aim is freedom.” Moreover, she posits, “the experience of a new beginning should coincide.¹⁵” In the case of indigenous peasants in Ancash, they sought freedom from a four-century old taxation that

¹⁴ Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (1969; repr., Seattle: Stellar Classics, 2014), 56, 64.

¹⁵ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (1963; repr., New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 19.

extracted their surplus and chained them to perpetual poverty and a colonial past. In this sense, the abolition of this legislation may be interpreted as a “new beginning,” one that decolonized their citizenship and refashioned their relationship with the state. Moreover, for those in power, namely Piérola, and for historians, the civil war of 1895 was also a new beginning. For Piérola, his capture of the state was in fact a revolution; his followers also viewed it in this light. For historians, the victory of Piérola led to the consolidation of state power, the end of a period of civil wars, the modernization of the army and the demilitarization of the peasantry, establishment of oligarch rule, Peru’s re-entry into the world economy and transition to industrial capitalism, a period called *La República Aristocrática* (1895-1919). In other words, whether one analyzes the war of 1895 from below or above, it appears revolutionary if one takes into consideration Arendt’s remarks on revolutions.

For Theda Skocpol’s structural approach on the French revolution, “transnational relations have contributed to the emergence of all social-revolutionary crisis and have invariably helped to shape revolutionary struggles and outcomes.¹⁶” For France, international wars such as the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War and the American Revolution played a key role in the subsequent revolution of 1789. The author also stresses the important role French peasantry played in the revolution and some of the goals they achieved, such as the abolition of dues and tithes that drained ten percent of their income prior to 1793.¹⁷ In the case of Peru, the war effort against Chile and the loss of nitrate-rich soil in the south, the country’s main source of capital prior to 1879, also undermined the power of the state—leading to violence—crippled the economy and weakened local elite. These conditions first lead to civil war in 1885 and persisted,

¹⁶ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 112-127.

despite Cáceres attempts' to overcome them, in the period leading up to the civil war of 1895. Much like the French counterpart, indigenous peasants also managed to influence state power in their favor by achieving the abolition of the *contribución personal*, a legislation that had traditionally drained their incomes, much like the French peasantry in 1793.

Wim Klooster's analysis on the process and outcomes of the paradigmatic revolutions of the Atlantic world and a review of U.S. historiography on the revolution also suggests casting the civil war of 1895 as a revolution. For instance, the Atlantic revolutions were a long civil war where the interests of "previously voiceless subaltern classes" in cross-class alliances did not necessarily mirror those of the elite. For the author, the outcome of the Atlantic revolutions also led to authoritarian post-revolutionary rule.¹⁸ In France, the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and the first French Empire, and in Spanish America, Simon Bolivar's self-appointment as a dictator for life illustrates this point. In the United States, historiographical debates on the radicalism, the freedoms achieved, or the moderate nature of the revolution, the persistence of a colonial aristocracy, have long concerned historians since George Bancroft, Charles A. Beard, Gordon Wood, and more recently, Alan Taylor.¹⁹ In Peru, members of the cross-class coalition in 1895 also had different political goals. For Piérola and his allies seizing state power remained a priority. For indigenous peasants in Ancash, the abolition of the *contribución personal* was the reason behind their participation in the war. Moreover, Piérola's victory in 1895 led to

¹⁸ Wim Klooster, *Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 162, 162-172.

¹⁹ See Francis G. Couvares, Martha Saxton, Gerald N. Grob and George Athan Billias, eds., *Interpretations of American History, Volume one, Through Reconstruction* (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2009), 127-144. Also see George Bancroft, *History of the United States of America*, 10 vols. (Boston, 1852); Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States and History of the United States* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1913); Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); and Alan Taylor, *American Revolutions: A Continental History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016).

“democratic” election where he was the only candidate running for office. Four years later, Piérola handpicked his successor in another controversial and undemocratic presidential election. In addition, as Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo have suggested on the *República Aristocrática*, it was an “oligarch state whose rule rested on a dictatorship (in violence) rather than consensus.”²⁰

By engaging with theoretical perspectives on other revolutions, this work does not intend to mar or downplay their historical impact in their respective countries and global revolutionary discourse. The purpose of presenting these interpretations, however, has more to do with showing that scholars are still debating the nature and legacy of “revolutions” even in paradigmatic cases such as the U.S. or French Revolution. What is important to use the framework of revolutions presented above, this study also suggests understanding revolutions in late nineteenth century Latin America in the context they took place and judging the social changes they brought upon in their own right, whether they led to new forms of social justice or coercion.²¹ In other words, it seeks to draw from established theoretical perspectives on revolutions while at the same time “provincializing” them. Scholars in the Subaltern School, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty, have long stressed “the burden of European thought and history” entrenched in concepts such as “citizenship, the state, civil society, [and] the public sphere,” to name a few.²²

²⁰ Manuel Burga and Alberto Flores Galindo, *Apogeo y Crisis de la República Aristocrática*, 3rd ed. (Lima: Rikchay, 1984), 83.

²¹ For instance, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley propose understanding changes in German society in the second half of the nineteenth century as a “silent bourgeoisie revolution.” They also remark how revolutions in France and Britain have silenced other forms of understating what a revolution implies. See *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

²² Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 4. In *The Magical State*, Fernando Coronil provides a reinterpretation of Marxism and capitalism in accordance to conditions in Latin America, more specifically, Venezuela. See Fernando Coronil, *The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

Chakrabarty does not include “revolutions” in his list of concepts dominated by European thought, but Nils Jacobsen echoes on his remarks by claiming that Marxist revolutions have become the paradigm of revolutions in the twentieth century. In other words, civil wars or armed conflicts that have not bore the mark of Marxism are usually not considered “true revolutions.” For this reason, he posits, the revolution of 1895 in Peru has been denied a privileged place among other twentieth century revolutions. While I do not disagree with this assessment, I will argue that the civil war of 1895 was a revolution because it was a ten-year political struggle that ultimately freed indigenous peasants from a tax legislation that had existed in Peru since the arrival of the Spanish.

By interpreting the 1895 Revolution as a ten year process, the analysis in this essay builds on the work of William Stein and departs from Mark Thurner. Stein argued that events in 1885 were anti-fiscal in nature while Thurner underplays the importance of the *contribución personal* in this conflict. While I agree with Stein, I posit that the struggle for the abolition of the *contribución personal* did not end in 1885 but carried for ten years more. Indigenous peasants achieved their political goals in the Revolution of 1894-5.

Geography and Ethnography of Ancash and its People

Much like other departments along the coast in Peru, Ancash is composed of two regions: the coast and the highlands. In this department, however, the highlands are divided into the western and eastern Andes. The coastal areas are mainly dry except for areas where rivers descend from the highlands. Important towns along the coast include Chimbote and Casma, the

primary port town from which military units typically arrived from Lima by boat. While the majority of the population today lives along the coast, especially in Chimbote, this was not the case in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. Most of the population in Ancash lived in the western highlands. For this reason, most of the political conflicts took place in this area. In case the central government in the department needed supplies and men from Lima, such as in the civil war of 1885 or the Revolution of 1895, soldiers had to follow the path carved by rivers and head east into the Andes, a trek that could take anywhere from four days to a week on foot. Aside from facing a rugged terrain, soldiers quickly had to contend with increasing altitudes on their journey to the central Andean region in Ancash, where the capital, and most of the towns were located. Before they could arrive to the center of political power in the region, soldiers coming from the Casma had to pass a chain of steep mountains that separate the coast from the highlands, called *Cordillera Negra*, where peaks easily reach 16,000 feet above sea level. After this climb, soldiers finally arrived to the central area of Ancash, also called *El Callejón de Huaylas* (the Valley of Huaylas). Along this ninety-mile valley, the river Santa flows down into the towns of Recuay, Huaraz (the capital city), Carhuaz, Yungay and Caraz. Elevation in this valley typically ranges anywhere from 9000 to 13,000 feet above sea level.²³

If local government needed to send soldiers into the eastern region of Ancash from the *Callejón de Huaylas*, they had to pass through the other mountain chain that ran parallel to the *Cordillera Negra* along the valley: the *Cordillera Blanca*. Known for its snow-covered peaks, these chains of mountains include *El Huascarán*, a summit located at 22, 205 feet above sea level and Peru's highest mountain. Crossing into the other side typically takes three to four days on

²³ Paul L. Doughty, *Huaylas: An Andean District in Search of Progress* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1968), 5.; Antonio Raimondi, *Colección Estudios Geológicos y Mineros para la Obra "El Peru", Volumen II: El Departamento de Ancash y sus Riquezas Naturales, 1873*, 103-155.

foot. On the eastern highlands, also known as the *Callejón of Conchucos*, important towns include Huari, Chavín de Huántar, Pomabamba and Sihuas. The elevation along this area is between 9,000 to 10,000 feet above sea level.²⁴

The vast majority of indigenous peasants in Ancash lived between these two high-altitude valleys. They were the descendants of the Native American groups that predated Pizarro's march through the region on his way to Cuzco in 1533. In the nineteenth century, a number of indigenous peasants spoke both Spanish and Quechua. Yet, the majority spoke solely Quechua and could not read or write. Indigenous peasants shared additional cultural ties, such as religion and foods, but most importantly, they also farmed communal lands. Under this system, two or more families shared a plot of land to farm. All members shared responsibilities and privileges vis-à-vis the land. By 1895, although numerous *comuneros* farmed under this system in Ancash, and much of Peru for that matter, only a number of them actually had land titles that officially recognized their right to the land. For this reason, many *hacendados*, large landowners, sought to exploit this juridical vulnerability and acquire more land from the *comuneros* through legal action, coercion and force.²⁵ As stated previously, indigenous peasants historically had paid the *contribución personal* so the state would protect their legal claim to their lands. By the late nineteenth century, the absence of this reciprocity further strained the socioeconomic conditions of indigenous peasants. It is imperative to note that by indigenous peasants this work also refers both to those that farmed and did not work on communal lands. A number of indigenous peasants also farmed lands that belonged to local *haciendas* as sharecroppers. Others worked for wages grazing animals and tending crops for their patrons.²⁶

²⁴ Doughty, 5-10; Raimondi, 103-155.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Cristóbal Kay, "Achievements and Contradictions of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform," *Journal of Development*

Most people of indigenous descent that did not farm or work in haciendas usually lived in cities such as Huaraz or Yungay performing a variety of labor. In these urban areas, elite landowners, many of them wealthy landowners in rural areas, and middle class also lived. It was also not uncommon for elite to hold a position of power in local government in the form of Prefect, sub-prefect, and local judge, to name a few. Nearly all of these men were descendants of Spaniards. On the other hand, although many middle class such as lawyers, merchants, journalists or shopkeepers were of European descent, this was not always the case. The lower middle class in particular was also composed of peoples of mixed indigenous and Spanish background, also called *mestizos*.²⁷

The Making of the 1894-95 Revolution

The period leading up to the Revolution of 1895 was marked by political instability and economic recession. After the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), the state was in a vulnerable position and a number of military statesmen attempted to seize control of the state. By late 1885, Andrés Avelino Cáceres, the leader of the Constitutional Party, had overthrown the government of Miguel Iglesias after a violent civil war. Although Cáceres was popular among a number of elite and popular sectors, under his leadership the state increasingly turned authoritarian and failed to address the socioeconomic needs of indigenous peasants in Peru. For these reasons, his administration had lost much legitimacy by the end of the decade. Under his handpicked successor, Remigio Morales Bermúdez, conflicts between the Constitutional Party and other

Studies 18, no. 2, (1982): 141-170.

²⁷ William Stein, *El Levantamiento de Atusparia: El Movimiento Popular Ancashino de 1885* (Lima: Mosca Azul Editores, 1988), 159-184.

sectors of society became unsustainable. When Morales Bermúdez died of appendicitis on April 4, 1894 and Cáceres seized power once again, a coalition of political parties and classes rose against Cáceres and the state across Peru. Among these large-scale political developments in this ten-year period, indigenous peasants in Ancash managed to insert their own goals within the discourse of cross-class alliances and used a number of political strategies to influence the distribution of power within the state.

After Chile emerged victorious in Lima after the Battle of Miraflores on January 1881, Chilean Vice-Admiral Patricio Lynch set up a provisional government in an attempt to end officially the war on Chile's terms. Although a number of elite, many of whom had suffered loss of property at the hands of Chilean troops in Lima and other departments, supported this political move, many did not. The diplomat Francisco García Calderon became the first president under occupying forces, however, he did not last long as Chilean armed forces exiled him after he refused to sign a peace treaty that ceded a sizable portion of Peru's southern territories to Chile. After a series of failed negotiation attempts, Chile finally found support in former Army General Miguel Iglesias in 1883.²⁸ Once Iglesias became president, his most immediate task lay in coming to a peace settlement with Chile. However, first he had to make sure organized armed resistance against Chilean forces had ended within the country.

Although García Calderon's refusal to comply with Chile showed how some sectors of the aristocracy resisted Chilean dominance in Peruvian politics, most of the armed resistance and real challenge to Iglesias's government came from the highlands. Due to the geographical nature of the *sierra*, it became a bastion of national resistance, unlike Lima. Cáceres and Piérola, who had self-

²⁸ See Jorge Basadre Grohmann, *Historia de la Republica del Peru: 1822-1933*. Vol. VIII, 8th Ed (Lima: *La Republica* and Universidad Ricardo Palma, 1998); Peter Klaren, *Society and Nationhood in the Andes* (New York University Press, 2000), 183-194; William F. Sater, *Andean Tragedy: Fighting the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 149.

appointed himself as president in 1879, directed much of the effort. By late 1881, however, the conflict between Cáceres and Piérola, a feud that would continue until well after the Revolution of 1895, first came to light. In a turn of events, Cáceres would score his first political victory against his future adversary. He outmaneuvered Piérola and gained control of most of the resistance army. Piérola would go into exile abroad, much discredited and disillusioned. Cáceres on the other hand, became the symbol of Peruvian resistance against Chilean forces, a reputation that endures to this day.²⁹

In the struggle against Chile, indigenous peasants in Ancash made important contributions to the national war effort. It was in this instance that Cáceres first gained the support of the population in the department. When Chilean forces marched into the highlands on June 1883, Cáceres and his armies quickly sought refuge in Ancash. When Cáceres arrived on the town of Chavín, on the eastern side of the *Cordillera Blanca*, he was able to rest, replenish his supplies and increase the size of his army. Since the vast majority of the population and the centers of power were located in the *Callejón de Huaylas*, perhaps he understood that in order to keep the war effort alive it was necessary to cross the Andes and take Huaraz. After easily crossing the mountains through the passage of Arguaycancha, Cáceres made his way into the capital on June 15. Five days later, he marched into the town of Yungay. By this point, his forces had grown by at least a thousand. His ability to speak Quechua helped him persuade many indigenous peasants to join his cause. This irregular militia usually goes by the name of *montonera*. They fought with rudimentary weaponry such as slings, clubs and maces, their knowledge of the terrain and willingness to fight became pivotal for maintaining the national resistance effort.³⁰

²⁹ Klaren, 189; Sater, 149, 265.

³⁰ Basadre, 1946-47; Sater, 265.

While indigenous peasants supported and helped Cáceres outmaneuver Chilean forces in the highlands, the national resistance effort did not last long after his campaign through Ancash. After leaving the department virtually undetected with the help of local recruits, Cáceres marched north in department of La Libertad. Here, after two years of resistance in the highlands, Chilean forces finally defeated the wily *caudillo*. The Battle of Huamanchuco on July 10, 1883 unofficially ended the national resistance. Months after this turning point in the war, Iglesias and Chilean officials came to a peace agreement. Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancon on October 20. This peace settlement ceded much of Peru's sodium nitrate-rich territories of the south to their neighbor. Moreover, Chile maintained a military presence in the country for nearly another year.³¹

Shortly after Chilean troops left the country, Cáceres resumed his plans to capture the state. Due to authoritarian practices and use of violence, the Iglesias administration had grown highly unpopular among elite, middle class, working class and peasants. Cáceres found support among these groups, but he still faced a government that commanded the army and held political control in much of the country. In this new civil war, indigenous peasants' armed resistance against the state played a key role in shifting the balance of power in Cáceres favor. More importantly, it marked the beginning of a ten-year struggle to abolish the *contribución personal*.

While the forces of Cáceres and Iglesias squared off in many regions of the country throughout 1885, political events from March to September in Ancash, due to its proximity to Lima, seriously undermined the power of state. The beginning of indigenous peasant uprising in Ancash may be traced to February 22 when the recently appointed Prefect of Ancash, Francisco Noriega, at the request of Iglesias, doubled the amount indigenous peasants had to pay for the

³¹ Klaren, 191.

contribución personal. In 1885, indigenous populations normally paid 1.00 sol per semester, but the decree increased the amount to 2.00 soles every six months. Failure to pay resulted in jail time or additional doubling of the amount paid. Since the War of the Pacific, the resistance campaign, and a severe famine had drained much of the peasants' resources, many could not meet this tributary obligation.³²

At the same time, the state seemed incapable of fulfilling the end of the bargain. In the years leading up to 1885, landowners had launched an aggressive effort to incorporate communal land that belonged to indigenous peasants. Even if peasants paid the tax, the state seemed incapable of protecting communal lands. The tax no longer embodied its colonial prerogatives and instead, the state collected it for the sake of revenue and war making. In 1879, for instance, Mariano Ignacio Prado reestablished it to cover the expenses of the war with Chile. Similar measures were in effect after Chilean forces left the country and civil war ensued. Through jurisprudence, political influence, coercion, violence, and complicity from the state, a number of elite in Ancash increased the size of their estates to the detriment of communal lands prior to 1885.³³

Despite the lack of attention to the concerns of indigenous peasants, they did not take arms until the state violently suppressed their attempts to negotiate a reduction in the *contribución personal*. In order to have the amount reduced, indigenous peasants turned to the *alcaldes pedáneos* of their districts, local indigenous mayors who spoke for their community and conferred with local governments, in an attempt to find a solution through politics. In Huaraz, the leader of

³² *El Comercio*, March 5, 1885; Klaren, 194-95; Lewis Taylor, "Indigenous Peasant Rebellions in Peru during the 1880s," in *Indigenous Revolts in Chiapas and Andean Highlands*, edited by Kevin Gosner and Arij Ouweneel (Amsterdam: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos, 1998), 200-01.

³³ Carlos Augusto Alba Herrera, *Atusparia y la Revolución Campesina de 1885 en Ancash* (Caras: Ediciones El Inca, 1985), 31-36; Taylor, 200-01.

the *alcaldes* in the district of *La Independencia* was Pedro Pablo Atusparia Ángeles. A few days later, Atusparia sent a petition, signed by twenty-four other *alcaldes pedáneos*, to Prefect Noriega. In their letter, these indigenous leaders, on behalf of their respective peasant communities, asked the Prefect to reduce the amount of the *contribución personal* by half and allow more time to collect the tax. Unfortunately for these men, Noriega disdained the petition and became outraged at the peasants' attempt to negotiate the payment; he interpreted indigenous peasants' political participation as a challenge to his authority in the department. Instead of responding in written form, Noriega ordered those involved in the petition to be beaten, jailed and have their ponytails, a symbol of nobility and authority for indigenous mayors, cut. Outraged by this act of violence and the state's negligence for the welfare of indigenous peasants, they soon reacted with violence. By March 5, at least five thousand insurgents descended into Huaraz and took the city by force. Noriega narrowly escaped but the rest of his officials were beaten, forced into escaping, and in several instances, killed. The rebels also destroyed most of the tax-registries and burned records.³⁴ A civil war within a civil war, a struggle to abolish the *contribución personal*, had begun in Ancash.

Although a vast majority of the rebels were indigenous peasants, much like other civil wars, other classes soon joined the movement albeit for their own political reasons. While Atusparia became the indisputable leader of the rebellion after his release from prison, a number of members of the elite and middle classes joined the rebels after the attack on Huaraz. Men such as Felipe Montestruque, a journalist from Lima, had been local supporters of Cáceres and waited for an opportunity to strike a blow to the Iglesias' administration. Shortly after their success in Huaraz, the coalition of rebels moved to other localities along the *Callejón de Huaylas* and by the

³⁴ Taylor, 200-01; Thurner, 55-56.

end of the month, the entire region was nearly under their control. In the absence of *Iglesista* government, the rebels sought it necessary to appoint new officials to carry out the functions of the state. Atusparia remained the “military leader” of the rebellion, but elite and middle class monopolized positions of power within the new administration. Manuel Mosquera, a mestizo and lawyer, took over Noriega’s vacant position in the prefecture, and Montestruque became the general secretary of the new government.³⁵

The use of violence had been successful on overthrowing Noriega, but it also undermined the legitimacy and power of the new administration indigenous peasants had help create. As they made their way north and south from Huaraz, the rebels committed a number of excesses. Reports of looting, burning of property, and murder besmirched the reputation of the new regime. The takeover of Yungay, the wealthiest town in the *Callejón de Huaylas*, in early April was not exempted from violence. So when counterinsurgent forces arrived from Lima, the elite and middle class, convinced the revolt had spun out of their control, unanimously withdrew their support. In the case of Mosquera, he even entered into secret negotiations to bring the revolt to an end.³⁶

In addition, Iglesias’ military response to the events in Ancash led to the collapse of the newly established rebel government. The decision to send troops and re-establish a monopoly on violence in the department was not easy for Iglesias. He had been waging a war in several fronts throughout the country against Cáceres. Yet, he could not ignore the possibility that given Ancash’s geographical proximity to Lima rebels would soon march on his doorstep. Not long after hearing the reports on Ancash, he appointed Coronel Jose Iraola as the new Prefect of

³⁵ Stein, 78-79.

³⁶ *El Pais*, April 11, 1885; Stein, 194.

Ancash in detriment of Noriega.³⁷ Iraola and his forces, composed of a well-trained and armed professional army, arrived at the port of Casma on April 12, and soon made their way into the Highlands. On April 24, he arrived on the town of Yungay and took it by force. In this battle, a number of leaders of the rebellion, including Montestruque were killed. Atusparia narrowly escaped with a gunshot wound on his leg and sought refuge in Huaraz. As Iraola made his way south in Huaraz, his forces recaptured towns previously held by the rebels. The last direct military confrontation and the end of the rebellion took place on May 3. By this time, the vast majority of elite and middle class who initially supported the rebellion had withdrawn their support. The civil war in the department ended with Iraola's victory and the death of thousands of indigenous peasants in the process. A number of rebels under the leadership of Pedro Cocachín, a miner of indigenous descent, refused to lay down arms and continued harassing towns along the department for months to come. By the end of September, however, Iraola's forces captured Cocachín and executed him, thus finally bringing the rebellion to an end.³⁸

The struggle to abolish the *contribución personal*, however, did not dissipate with the Iraola's victory in Ancash. The leader of the rebellion, Atusparia, survived the attack on Huaraz, and Iraola granted him a save conduct. More importantly, the new Prefect suspended the collection of the *contribución personal*. It was hardly a paramount victory given the number of indigenous peasants that gave their lives during the rebellion; their sacrifice overshadowed the political gains of the peasantry. However, it showed that they could influence the distribution of power within the state to, in this instance, temporarily achieve part of the political goals.

³⁷ *El Comercio*, April 9, 1885.

³⁸ Santiago J. Maguiña, *Atusparia Angeles Pedro Pablo: La Revolución Indígena de 1885 en Huaraz y Ancash* (Huaraz: Ediciones Atusparia, 1974), 10; and Marcos Yauri Montero, "El Movimiento Campesino de 1885," 33-34; Thurner, 70-77.

Even after a change in leadership in the country, the abolition of the *contribución personal* remained a political goal for indigenous peasants in Ancash. It remained a paramount concern for over a decade. By late December, Cáceres had ousted Iglesias after more than a year of civil war. On June 3, 1886, Cáceres officially became president of Peru after defeating Pierola, who had returned from Europe, in a controversial presidential election.³⁹ Days before his inauguration, Cáceres met with Atusparia, the leader of the rebellion, in Lima. The *alcalde* claimed to represent all indigenous peasants in the province of Huaraz, but it is likely that his jurisdiction symbolically extended to other communities in the department given the reason for this visit. In this instance, Atusparia was perhaps aware that demanding the abolition of the *contribución personal* after the violent events in Ancash could prove too bold of a claim. Instead, Atusparia requested a reduction in the payment. After all, he had made a similar claim to Noriega a year before. This time, however, Atusparia received a favorable response and not violence. Cáceres pledged to reduce the 1.00 sol payment of the *contribución personal* until indigenous peasants could get back on their feet and “would not consider it a great burden;” it remains unclear whether or not the president actually told Atusparia how much time (months, years) would pass before the state resumed the *contribución personal*. Cáceres also promised to send a commission to Ancash so the state could demarcate and officially recognize all land that belonged to indigenous communities.⁴⁰ Atusparia returned to Ancash perhaps thinking that his meeting with Cáceres would assuage the concerns of the majority of his people.

This tranquility would not last. After an international war that resulted in destruction of infrastructure, loss of a major source of revenue, Chile had gained control of the nitrate-rich territories of the south, and a civil war that had further drained the sources of the state, Cáceres

³⁹ Basadre, 2026.

⁴⁰ *El Comercio*, June 2, 1886.

either rushed to make a promise he could not keep or never intended to deliver; indigenous peasants did not receive enough time to get back on their feet. In an attempt to generate revenue for the reconstruction of the country, Cáceres reestablished the *contribución personal* on October 25, 1886, merely months after his meeting with Atusparia in Lima.⁴¹ Cáceres restored the *contribución personal* to pre-war levels: indigenous peasants once again had to pay 1.00 soles per semester.

The reestablishment of the *contribución personal* due to the postwar economy received the expected response from indigenous peasants. A number of communities once again appealed to politics to resolve this burden while others resorted to evasion and violence. Atusparia was perhaps one of the first persons to suffer the consequences of the reestablishment of the *contribución personal*. This measure put him at odds with the communities he represented; some even called him a traitor. A number of sources claim that some *alcaldes* poisoned Atusparia at a feast, and he died on August 25, 1887.⁴² While some historians have disputed this event and postulated that Atusparia died of unknown causes, it is highly likely that other indigenous community leaders were disillusioned with their leader given how they responded to the reintroduction of the tax.

The immediate and assertive response from indigenous peasants in Ancash showed a near unanimous opposition to the *contribución personal*. On March 26, 1887, *alcaldes pedaneos* and *alcaldes ordinarios*, indigenous mayors from the smallest settlements, from the districts of La Independencia, La Restauración and Huaraz, a total of 55 individuals, sent a petition to president Cáceres requesting a suspension of the *contribución personal*. The political engagement of

⁴¹ Alba Herrera, *Atusparia*, 218-219.

⁴² Alba Herrera, *Atusparia*, 176; Maguiña, 12-15.

indigenous peasants did not bear fruit as the state answered unfavorably and denied their request nearly a month later.⁴³ However, much like in 1885, most remained committed to avoid paying the tax.

A number of indigenous peasants did not abandon politics through legal means, however, others continued resistance through evasion and violence. Despite support from Lima, local authorities had a difficult time collecting the tax from nearly 50,000 tributaries in the department.⁴⁴ Instead of engaging with the state directly, these indigenous peasants felt other non-violent tactics yielded better results. In Huaraz, for instance, evasion as politics succeeded in 1887 as the state did not collect a single cent from tributaries. At the same time, a number of newspapers from Lima and Ancash, and local authorities voiced their concerns about “another 1885,” particularly after an outbreak of violence in the town of Chacas, located on the eastern side of the *Cordillera Blanca*, on June 1888.⁴⁵ Authorities on Ancash requested additional troops to maintain order in case of an uprising, but the government in Lima could not spare any troops. With the exception of the *Batallón Callao*, a unit of 350 men who arrived on May 1899, local authorities had to fend for themselves in case of an uprising. Given these pressures, the state was compelled to give in to demands from below in Ancash. On June 12, 1889, the communities of Huaraz and Huari received a reduction on the *contribución personal* from 1.00 sol to 0.50 soles per semester.⁴⁶

⁴³ Alba Herrera, *Atusparia*, 216-226; Thurner, 107.

⁴⁴ Alba Herrera, *Atusparia*, 230; “The official census of the province... gives a population of 53, 273 inhabitants... the indigenous believe that [that census] has the purpose of imposing taxes or recruiting, so they try the best they can to hide the existence of the most valuable members of the family; this reduces the numbers counted, often, up to 25 percent. Without a doubt, one may postulate that the numbers in this province easily surpasses sixty thousand,” Antonio Raimondi, 128.

⁴⁵ *El Comercio*, March 12, 1888; Thurner, 117-118.

⁴⁶ Alba Herrera, *Atusparia*, 228-234.

Indigenous peasants resisted paying the *contribución personal* since it put additional pressure on their economies that verged on subsistence, but also because in the second half of the nineteenth century the state diminished its role as the sole protector of communal lands. Prior to 1885, the number of land disputes per year only fills up a page in the archives' general catalog. Per page, the catalog may register anywhere between 8-12 cases all of which do not always pitted landowners against indigenous peasants. From 1885 to 1895, the catalog registers anywhere between two to four pages per year, and a number of these involve indigenous communities. In essence, either the state began keeping better records of land disputes that had always existed, or landowners' encroaching campaign forced indigenous communities to up the use of courts to defend their interests. It is also possible that land encroaching was always present but indigenous communities only recently began making use of the courts and prior to 1885 they either lost their land through extra-legal measures, or defended their lands through resistance and violence.

In any case, the paper trail indicates that the state could no longer directly defend communal lands and indigenous communities instead turned to courts. In some cases such as the one in 1890 that pitted landowner Esteban Rosas Glorio against Rosas Cautivo and other members of the community "China," indigenous peasants managed to defend their lands after lengthy judicial processes.⁴⁷ In other instances, they were not as successful since, as Nils Jacobsen has pointed out, landowners usually had the upper hand in these disputes.⁴⁸ In any case, the state

⁴⁷ *Archivo Departamental de Ancash (ADA)*, Causas Civiles, Legajo 59, Don Esteban Rosas Glorio con Rosas Cautivo y otros sobre partición y division de los terrenos China, 1890. Other cases where indigenous peasant managed to hold on to their land or seriously challenged the power of landowners include: ADA, Causas Civiles, Legajo 57, Benigno Bañez y Juan Rodriguez, sobre despojo de las tierras Rayash, 1886; ADA, Causas Civiles, Legajo 60, Pedro Valverde por los indígenas Juan Torres y compartes en el juicio con Don Manuel Mejia sobre deslinde parcial de las tierras de Recuay, 1890; ADA, Causas Civiles, Legajo 50, Tomas Loli con Agustín y Francisco Osorio sobre despojo de los terrenos de Ranraucru-Huaraz, 1885-1898.

⁴⁸ Jacobsen, Nils. "Liberalism and Indian Communities in Peru, 1821-1920," in *Liberals, The Church and Indians Peasants: Corporate Lands and the Challenge of Reform in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America*, edited by Robert H. Jackson (Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press, 1997), 140.

could not longer fulfill its end of the bargain even if they paid the *contribución personal*. Since communities had to resort to negotiate with a court system where landowners could make use of personal connections, the payment of the tax for protection was redundant.

It is hardly surprising then that when Nicolás de Piérola ran for president on again 1894 and vowed to abolish the *contribución personal*, he received much support in the department from indigenous peasants. He previously ran for president on 1890, but Remigio Bermudez, another member of the Constitutional Party, won in another controversial presidential election. Perhaps, the conditions were not ripe for Pierola's success yet; his platform was not appealing for indigenous peasants in 1890. This changed once he promised to abolish the *contribución personal*. At the same time, his brother, Carlos de Piérola, had managed to slowly gain the favor of some elite and middle class since 1890.⁴⁹ Yet, the fiasco in the 1890 election had showed that their support was insufficient. If Nicolás de Piérola expected to gain control of the state, he needed the favor and support of indigenous peasants.

Prior to the outbreak of the civil war of 1894-5, Cáceres and his Constitutional Party were highly unpopular among political circles in Lima and the departments. Failed economic policies, accusations of corruption, a tense relationship with congress and authoritarian practices discredited the former war hero and his party. On a local level, the Constitutional Party meddled in a number of elections. During the 1893 municipal elections in the *Callejón de Huaylas*, for instance, members of the Constitutional Party harassed and physically assaulted members of the opposition. Violent acts such as this persuaded a number of elite to turn to Piérola. At the same time, local newspapers, such as *La Juventud de Ancash* from Huaraz, denounced the state's inability to build infrastructure, such as a railroad that could potentially unite all three

⁴⁹ El Pais, March 28, 1890.

geographical regions in the department. The newspaper also complained about the education system. Most schools were poorly equipped and most teaching staff was men of some stature within the *hacienda*. The school needed professional teachers to help modernize the department, the press reported. *La Juventud* suspected that past and current unwarranted attacks against indigenous peasants hindered what it considered a necessary social integration.⁵⁰ So when Bermudez died of appendicitis before his term was over and Cáceres assumed power through a fraudulent election in early 1894, many individuals in Ancash and the rest of Peru rose up in arms against the *caudillo*. The Democratic Party and the Civil Party joined forces and formed the *Coalición Nacional*: a political alliance forged with the sole purpose of ousting Cáceres and taking control of the state.

In Ancash, Carlos de Piérola led the coalition with an army of *montoneros*, or irregular militia. Initially appearing during the wars of independence, *montoneras* (band of montoneros) appeared numerous times throughout the nineteenth century civil and international wars, including the War of the Pacific. They were mainly composed of a coalition of classes, many of who were badly dressed and supplied.⁵¹ In the civil war of 1894-5, landowners that supported Piérola usually recruited from their *haciendas*. Indigenous peasants from nearby communities also joined these *montoneros* in the war effort against Cáceres and in their pursuit to abolish the *contribución personal*.⁵²

⁵⁰ *La Juventud de Ancash*, September 15, 1893; *La Juventud de Ancash*, October 16, 1893; *La Juventud de Ancash*, November 1, 1893.

⁵¹ Carlos de Piérola to Nicolás de Piérola, letter, January 16, 1895, Inventario de la Correspondencia de Nicolás de Piérola, Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Lima.

⁵² Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 18; Carmen McEvoy, *La Utopía Republicana: Ideales y Realidades en la Formación de la Cultura Política Peruana, 1871-1919* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1997), 335-337; See also Nelson Manrique, *Las Guerrillas Indígenas en la Guerra con Chile* (Lima: Centro de Investigación y Capacitación/ Ital Perú, 1981).

Though initially successful, the *montoneros* quickly suffered a major loss when they confronted the forces of the state in Huaraz. One of the first *montoneras* in the *Callejón de Huaylas* formed near Caraz on September 24, and quickly gained control of the town. Over the next few days, similar actions took place in the port of Casma and the town of Cajatambo, located in the southern part of the department. By October 2, the *montoneras* from Casma and Caraz had assembled outside Huaraz and numbered two hundred men under the leadership of Carlos de Piérola.⁵³ Aware of this threat, the Prefect of Ancash, Federico Herrera, quickly assembled a defensive perimeter and successfully dealt a crushing blow to the aspirations of the *coalition* in the department.⁵⁴ The *montoneros* launched another attack on the city on December 4, but this too proved unsuccessful.⁵⁵

Subsequent letters to Cáceres from Prefect Federico Herrera and his sub-prefects reflect a general tranquility among members of the Constitutional Party in the department.⁵⁶ Despite requests for supplies and men, *Caceristas* successfully held off *montoneros* throughout Ancash. However, the coalition's strategies began to pay off in the early January 1895. By this time, their aggressive interception of correspondence and disruption of telegraph lines had cut off most communication between the department and Lima.⁵⁷ The rebels continued their attack on the state throughout the department, and at times the *montoneras* numbered three hundred insurgents, most

⁵³ Federico Herrera to Andres Avelino Cáceres, letter, September 26, 1894.

⁵⁴ Domingo Cueto to Cáceres, letter, October 7, 1894.

⁵⁵ Alba Herrera, *Huaraz*, 295; Santiago Matos, *Huaylas y Conchucos en la Historia Regional*, 273.

⁵⁶ *El Nacional*, October 5, 1894; Carlos P. Chavani, Captain of Cavalry in Huaraz, to Cáceres, letter, October 8, 1894; Cueto to Cáceres, letter, October 7, 1894; *El Comercio*, April 1, 1895; Alba Herrera, *Huaraz*, 294.

⁵⁷ Cueto to Cáceres, letter, November 19, 1894; Jaramillo to Cáceres, letter, November 6, 1894.

of who were indigenous peasants.⁵⁸ Once again, war seemed the only way to bring social justice for indigenous peasants in the department.

The decisive battle for control of the state in Ancash took place near the end of March. Prior to this date, the rebels had already gained control of the capital. When Prefect Herrera and the forces of order left Huaraz to persecute a group of *montoneros* into the *Callejón of Conchucos* on February 12, Carlos de Piérola and his army marched into the capital virtually unopposed less than a week later. He was named “Revolutionary Prefect” upon his arrival. Three weeks later, Carlos de Piérola assembled a force to persecute the *Cacerista* Prefect Herrera. Just as Cáceres and his army were encircled by the forces of the coalition in Lima, Carlos de Piérola defeated the forces of Herrera and the Constitutional Party on March 19 near Sihuas, located on the eastern side of the *Cordillera Blanca*.⁵⁹ In contrast to Pizarro 370 years before, Cáceres never received an army from Ancash to save him from defeat. Instead, he was forced to negotiate his resignation under Piérola’s terms after two days of intense armed confrontation. He promptly went into exile soon after.

While the end of Cáceres meant the abolition of the *contribución personal* for indigenous peasants that fought on the side of the coalition, Piérola initially had no intention to abolish the tax even after he assumed office on September 8. In Ancash, tax collectors resumed their activities as if blood had not been spilled over that reason in the recent civil war. For this reason, indigenous peasants refused to demobilize their forces and reacted against what they considered a broken promise. Violence and resistance to the *contribución personal* erupted once again, but this time it was aimed towards Piérola’s administration. Indigenous peasants remained mobilized in

⁵⁸ *El Comercio*, January 11, 1895; *La Opinión Nacional*, January 19, 1895; *La Opinión Nacional*, February 1, 1895.

⁵⁹ Alba Herrera, *Huaraz*, 295-96; Carlos de Piérola to Nicolás de Piérola, letter, March 9, 1894, *Inventario de la Correspondencia de Nicolás de Piérola*.

several areas of the department, particularly in towns of Huari and Casma.⁶⁰ Since the state was in no position yet to exercise its power on the department, throughout November and December the new Prefect Cisneros plead the president to abolish the *contribución personal* out of fear for “another 1885.”⁶¹ The actions of indigenous peasants in Ancash finally bore fruit on Christmas Day when the state officially abolished the four-century old taxation. Indigenous peasants were finally free from an obsolete four-century old legislation.

Conclusion

My account of the events in Ancash from 1885 to 1895 differs from interpretations that have focused on top-down analysis of the “Revolution of 1895.” Since indigenous peasants in Ancash had been constantly fighting for the abolition of the taxation since 1885 through politics, other peaceful means of resistance and violence, and they finally achieved their goal ten years later, is it too far fetched to rename the civil war of 1894-95 the “Atusparia’s Revolution” rather than the Revolution of 1895? Perhaps in Ancash it is appropriate, but it is doubtful for the rest of Peru? It should be stressed that most indigenous peasants in the country, as Nils Jacobsen has argued, “hated the *contribución personal*.⁶²” Did the largest peasant insurrection in nineteenth century Peru inspired other indigenous peasants to take action against this measure in other departments? In an introduction to Ernesto Rayna’s novel *El Amauta Atusparia*, based on the life of Atusparia, Jose Carlos Mariátegui, one of Latin America most renowned Marxist, depicts it as

⁶⁰ V. Lezameta to Piérola, September 28, 1895; Jose Marin to Piérola, letter, January 25, 1896.

⁶¹ Cisneros to Piérola, letter, November 25, 1895; Cisneros to Pierola, letter, December 2, 1895.

⁶² LAMULA.PE, Nils Jacobsen: “Piérola era un populista 'avant la lettre',” interview with anthropologist Javier Torres Seoane, <https://elarriero.lamula.pe/2017/04/28/nils-jacobsen-pierola-era-un-populista-avant-la-lettre/javierto/> [accessed May 22, 2017].

the prime example of the struggle indigenous peasants in the country have faced since colonial times, an endless battle for social justice. At least in Ancash, the fervor to achieve social justice did not go away after 1885. Atusparia had died on 1887, but his idea lived on through other indigenous peasants in the department. Further research should be done on whether the survivors of the 1885 rebellion actually participated in the civil war ten years later. Given the constant peasant mobilization against the *contribución personal* during the Cáceres years, this is highly likely. These men took up the cause and continued to fight for what they considered social justice. They inserted their own interests in cross class coalitions and used war as a tool for politics until the state, under pressure from below, finally gave in to their demands and abolished the tax.

Nearly every year on March 3, the day where indigenous peasants freed Atusparia from imprisonment, the city of Huaraz celebrates the anniversary of the *Revolución Campesina de 1885*. *Campesino* was a term the military government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado in the late 1960s used to replace *indígena*. Historical and literary works produced in or by residents born in Ancash also call this event a revolution. Atusparia has also left his name imprinted on schools, travel agencies, streets and public monuments. For residents, these are daily reminders of what they consider a struggle for social justice. However, *Ancashinos* have been celebrating a defeat when in fact the political goals of 1885 were eventually achieved ten years later if the revolution is analyzed as a historical process rather than an event. This does not mean that *Ancashinos* should stop celebrating March 3. Instead, they should acknowledge that this date marked the beginning of a mobilization that ended a legislation that dates back to the conquest. Across the Americas, October 12 has long been decolonized and no longer prompts individuals to celebrate Christopher Columbus' arrival in the New World and the colonization that followed. Perhaps, one day the yearly celebration of the *Revolución Campesina de 1885* will also be freed from historico-

political colonial narratives that depict it merely as a valiant take of arms, and residents of Ancash will embrace its long-lasting accomplishments.

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This article provides a list of wars occurring between 1800 and 1899. Major conflicts include the Napoleonic Wars in Europe, the American Civil War in North America, the Taiping Rebellion in Asia, the Paraguayan War in South America, the First Italo-Ethiopian War in Africa, and the Australian frontier wars in Oceania. Many indigenous peoples protested the sale, arguing that they were the rightful owners of the land and that Russia had no right to sell Alaska. So following the Union victory in the American Civil War, Tsar Alexander II instructed the Russian minister to the United States, Eduard de Stoeckl, to enter into negotiations with the United States Secretary of State William H. Seward in the beginning of March 1867. At the instigation of Seward the United States Senate approved the purchase, known as the Alaska Purchase, from the Russian Empire. War of the Third Coalition. Russo-Persian War (1804–13).