

FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH IN MOSCOW: Progress and Pitfalls

by Mark Kramer

The British writer and literary critic Lytton Strachey once remarked that “ignorance is the first requisite of the historian — ignorance, which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits.”¹ By this criterion, historians studying the Soviet Union were remarkably lucky until very recently. Unlike scholars of American politics and foreign policy, who had the daunting task each year of poring through thousands of newly declassified documents, specialists on the Soviet Union normally were forced to go about their work without reading a single item from the Soviet archives. Soviet authorities exercised tight control over all official documents and archival repositories, and no procedures were in place to release any of these materials to the public. For nearly 75 years, the information available about Soviet policy-making was so sparse that Western scholars often had to rely exclusively on published sources, supplemented by a few interviews.

Now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, several of the key Soviet archives have finally been opened — if only on a limited and sporadic basis — for scholarly research. This development has brought both benefits and drawbacks. The focus here will be mainly on the drawbacks, but that does not mean the benefits have been negligible. As recently as three to four years ago, the notion that Western and Russian scholars would be permitted to examine sensitive postwar documents in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry or the Central Committee of the

continued on page 18

NEW FINDINGS ON THE KOREAN WAR

Translation and Commentary by Kathryn Weathersby

While the opening of Soviet archives brought high expectations for quick answers to long-standing questions about the Cold War, those of us working in the Soviet archives have found that they are like other historical collections; individual documents contain only fragments of the information we seek. It is only after laboriously sifting through a great and varied mass of records that we can begin to piece together even one part of the intricate story of the Cold War.

Occasionally, however, we come upon a single document that directly answers a major question. The document excerpted below, “On the Korean

War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations,” is one such find. It is a survey of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Korean War that was compiled in 1966 by so far unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. The apparent purpose of this internal history was to provide background information for the small group of Soviet officials who were at that time engaged in discussions with the People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam over possible Soviet assistance to the Viet Cong in their war with the United States.¹ This document thus tells us something about Soviet atti-

continued on page 14

Soviet Foreign Policy During the Cold War:

A DOCUMENTARY SAMPLER

On 12-15 January 1993, in the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences building in Moscow, the Cold War International History Project sponsored the first scholarly conference on Cold War history to be based on newly available archival sources in the former Soviet Union. CWIHP organized the conference in collaboration with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its Russian acronym), which houses the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee. Over four days Russian and American scholars presented roughly three dozen papers, on topics ranging from the Cold War’s origins to the Sino-Soviet split to the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the superpower crises over Suez, Berlin, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba. (Several of these papers have since been published by CWIHP in revised form as Working Papers—by Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-62, and by Kathryn Weathersby on Soviet policy and the origins of the Korean War, 1945-50—and more are slated to appear as working papers and in a forthcoming edited volume.)

An essential precondition to the holding of the conference was a written agreement by SCCD that all participants, whether Russian or foreign, would receive equal access to released materials, that all materials released for the conference would be made available to the world scholarly community, and that “no restric-

continued on page 55

INSIDE:

Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Part 2)	2
Russian Foreign Ministry Archives	26, 27
Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Exchange	40, 41
Warsaw Pact Planning: A Response	51
Update	70

**THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE
SOVIET INVASION OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
New Interpretations**

by **Mark Kramer**
(*Second of two parts*)

The first part of this two-part article provided a brief review of the vast amount of material that has been released over the past few years regarding the Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.¹ The aim of this part is to offer a preliminary look at some of the new interpretations that can be derived from the wealth of fresh evidence, including newly available materials from East European and former Soviet archives.

The first question to be asked is whether the documents and memoirs that have recently become available or soon will be available are likely to force drastic changes in the historical record. Does the new evidence compel Western scholars to rethink their whole understanding of the Czechoslovak crisis? Will older analyses of the subject have to be discarded? Occasionally, historical disclosures do bring about fundamental changes in traditional interpretations of events. Such was the case, for example, with the revelations in the mid-1970s about the crucial role of code-breaking and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in the U.S. and British efforts in World War II.² Military histories that had failed to take due account of this factor — which is to say, all histories up to that point — were suddenly rendered obsolete, or at least were in need of major revision. Will the same hold true for existing accounts of the 1968 crisis and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?

For now, no definitive answer to this question is possible because not all the evidence is yet in. In particular, there are still several key archives in Moscow — the Presidential Archive, the KGB archives, and the military archives — with reams of crucial documents about the crisis that are still almost wholly untapped. If these items are released, they may produce revelations that will necessitate far-reaching changes in previous accounts, especially about the process of consensus-building in the Soviet Politburo during the spring and summer of 1968. A good deal of caution is therefore in order. Nevertheless, the evidence that has

emerged up to now suggests that, for the most part, the best analyses produced by Western scholars in the pre-glasnost era will stand up very well. There are, of course, innumerable details that have to be revised, and, as indicated below, details can often be important. But except for a few more sweeping changes that may be necessary (as will be discussed in the final section of this article), prevailing conceptions of the crisis and of the Soviet-led invasion have not been greatly altered thus far by the declassified documents, new memoirs, and other evidence that has recently come to light.

The fact that drastic changes have not been required in the broad historical record is in part attributable to the insight and meticulous research that Western scholars earlier brought to bear on the topic. The events of 1968 attracted some of the best analysts in the field, and it shows in the quality of their work. Another reason that pre-glasnost scholarship has stood up well, however, is that Western observers had access to far more primary material about the Czechoslovak crisis than they normally had about key events in Soviet foreign policy. Scholars were able to make good use, for example, of documents that were brought out of Czechoslovakia shortly after the invasion.³ They also were able to draw on the first-hand observations contained in published interviews with and commentaries by leading figures in the crisis, such as Josef Smrkovsky, Jiri Hajek, Jiri Pelikan, and Zdenek Hejzlar.⁴ Moreover, by the mid- to late 1970s a growing number of memoirs by former Czechoslovak officials were available in the West. Books by Hajek, Zdenek Mlynar, and Pelikan, among others, and accounts by senior Czechoslovak intelligence agents who fled to the West, provided Western scholars with valuable evidence that they could not otherwise have hoped to obtain, short of gaining access to Soviet and East European archives.⁵ Indeed, to cite but one example, it is striking how accurate Smrkovsky's and Mlynar's versions of the Cierna nad Tisou, Bratislava, and Moscow negotiations proved to be when judged against actual documents and transcripts from those meetings. The same high standards are evident in retrospective accounts written in the late 1960s and early 1970s by East European and Soviet emigres who had served as interpreters at one or more of the conferences and meetings in 1968.⁶

All these different sources may not have

been a substitute for materials contained in archives, but, taken cumulatively, they gave Western scholars a body of evidence incomparably richer than the meager details known about most other Soviet foreign policy decisions. It is not wholly surprising, then, that pre-glasnost analyses of the Czechoslovak crisis have fared remarkably well amidst the flood of post-Communist revelations.

Still, if it is true that documents released since 1989 have not undermined our basic understanding of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it is also true that earlier treatments of certain key aspects of the crisis need to be revised to take account of new evidence. The revised interpretations of these matters can help provide a clearer picture of the crisis as a whole. Obviously, the discussion that follows is not intended to be an exhaustive compilation of changes necessitated by evidence that has emerged over the past few years, but it should give a reasonable idea of the importance that seemingly narrow aspects of the crisis can have when seen in a new light. Many other topics not discussed here—including the influence of hard-line East European leaders; the role of prominent officials such as Janos Kadar, Aleksei Kosygin, and Yurii Andropov; East-West military and diplomatic relations before and during the invasion; Soviet/East European military preparations; Brezhnev's contacts with Dubcek; and the post-invasion talks between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia—will be covered in other analyses by the present author scheduled for publication in the near future.⁷

1. The "Letters of Invitation" to Brezhnev

During the latter stages of the 1968 crisis, a small group of hard-line officials in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), led by the Slovak Communist Party chief, Vasil Bil'ak, did their best to promote Soviet military intervention, though without being so overt about the matter (until the invasion occurred) that they would provoke a backlash and charges of treason against themselves. Bil'ak and his two main colleagues, Alois Indra and Drahomir Kolder, secretly passed on information to Leonid Brezhnev and others in the Soviet Politburo, depicting the situation in the most alarming terms possible. They and their allies in the Czechoslovak army and state security (StB, for *Statni bezpecnost*) organs were the ones who

first informed the Soviet authorities about the interest that General Vaclav Prchlik, the head of the KSC's Military Administrative Department, had expressed in organizing armed resistance to a possible invasion. Newly released evidence also confirms that Bil'ak's group colluded with senior East European officials, especially the East German and Polish leaders, Walter Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka, in forming a wider anti-Dubcek coalition.⁸ Their aim throughout was to persuade the Soviet Union to remove the KSC First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, and put an end to the Prague Spring.

Yet, despite these efforts, Bil'ak acknowledged in his memoirs that as late as mid-August he and the other hard-liners feared that the Soviet Union might refrain from intervening and instead cut some sort of deal with Dubcek.⁹ To forestall any arrangement that would leave even a semi-reformist government in place, one of Bil'ak's associates, Antonin Kapek, wrote a letter to Brezhnev during the Cierna nad Tisou meeting at the end of July. Kapek urged the Soviet leader to "extend fraternal assistance to our Party and our whole nation in dealing a rebuff" to the "anti-socialist and anti-Soviet" forces that had taken over the KSC and were posing a "serious danger to the very fate of socialism" in Czechoslovakia.¹⁰ Because Kapek was the lone signatory of the letter and only a candidate member of the KSC Presidium, his appeal presumably carried relatively little weight. It is not clear when or even whether the letter was transmitted to Brezhnev, or what the Soviet leader did with it if in fact he received it.

Far more significant was a collective "letter of invitation" that Bil'ak's hard-line group addressed to Brezhnev a few days later, during the multilateral conference at Bratislava on 3 August. This second letter, which was signed by Bil'ak, Indra, Kolder, Kapek, and another senior KSC official, Oldrich Svestka, echoed Kapek's initial letter in warning that "the very existence of socialism in our country is in danger." The five signatories called on the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) to "use all means at your disposal," including military force, to "prevent the imminent threat of counterrevolution."¹¹ Rather than risk giving the letter to Brezhnev directly, Bil'ak decided it would be best to approach another member of the Soviet Politburo, Pyotr Shelest, who had been acting as an informal

liaison with the hard-line members of the KSC.¹² The KGB station chief in Bratislava helped Bil'ak arrange to meet with Shelest alone in strict secrecy. During a break in the negotiations just before 7 p.m. the two officials met in a men's lavatory, and Bil'ak handed an envelope to Shelest, who opened it, read the letter, and profusely thanked the Slovak Party leader. Shelest immediately went to Brezhnev's suite and gave him the letter, explaining what it was. Brezhnev expressed deep gratitude, but for the time being he offered no direct reply in writing.

When the Bratislava conference ended and tensions briefly subsided in both Moscow and Prague, Bil'ak realized he had to act quickly to ensure that Soviet "fraternal assistance" would be forthcoming. If he waited too long, he would likely find himself removed from office at the upcoming Slovak Party congress, making it far more difficult for him to act effectively. Because the date for the Slovak Congress had recently been moved up to 26 August, only three sessions of the KSC Presidium—on 6, 13, and 20 August—were due to take place before the Congress opened. The optimal time for an invasion was during one of those three sessions, when all the top KSC officials would be in the same place and could be rounded up at once, precluding any chance of organized resistance. Moreover, a Presidium meeting was the only appropriate venue for Bil'ak to seek a vote of no-confidence in Dubcek and establish a new, hard-line government that could welcome the incoming Soviet troops. Thus, the KSC Presidium meeting on 20 August became a deadline for Soviet military intervention, giving Bil'ak, Kolder, and Indra barely two weeks to follow up on their "letter of invitation."

On 10 August, Bil'ak had a lengthy telephone conversation with Brezhnev, who had spoken by phone the previous day with Dubcek.¹³ The conversation enabled Bil'ak to denounce the KSC leader for having done nothing to redress the situation. Through other channels as well, the anti-reformist group continued passing on fresh reports to Moscow about Dubcek's purported failure to live up to the Bratislava accords; and they began preparing to seize power with Soviet military support.¹⁴ On 14-15 August, Indra and another KSC hard-liner, Oldrich Pavlovsky, met clandestinely with the Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Stepan Chervonenko, and assured him that as soon

as Soviet "troops move into action on the night of 20 August," the "healthy forces" in the KSC would proceed with their "plan of action" to oust Dubcek and set up a "provisional revolutionary government of workers and peasants." Indra said he could "guarantee" that a majority of the KSC Presidium, the KSC Central Committee, the National Assembly, and the Czechoslovak government would formally align themselves with the "healthy forces."¹⁵ Chervonenko promptly relayed these assurances to the CPSU Politburo, which had begun a three-day meeting on 15 August to make a final decision about the invasion.

On 17 August, the same day that the Soviet Politburo wrapped up its deliberations, the group led by Bil'ak and Indra—who as yet apparently had not been apprised of Moscow's final decision—dispatched a message to Brezhnev reaffirming what Indra had told Chervonenko. They warned that urgent action was needed and called on the Soviet authorities to respond to the collective "letter of invitation" by 19 August, the day before the effective deadline for military intervention.¹⁶ They also claimed, as Indra had in his meeting with Chervonenko, that six of the eleven members of the KSC Presidium and 50 additional members of the KSC Central Committee would side with the anti-reformists, enabling them to form an alternative regime by the time the invading forces arrived, with Kolder to be the new KSC First Secretary. Bil'ak and Indra offered Brezhnev further assurances along these lines over the next two days.¹⁷ The pro-Soviet faction intended, among other things, to order the arrest of some 40,000 people who were to be brought before a "special tribunal," with penalties meted out according to degree of "guilt." High-ranking officials, including those on the KSC Central Committee and certain others, would have been subject to the death penalty.¹⁸ All these plans fell through, however, when two of Bil'ak's and Indra's presumed allies on the KSC Presidium, Jan Piller and Frantisek Barbirek, decided at the last minute to support Dubcek and oppose the invasion. The anti-reformists were unable to make good on any of their promises, and the Soviet Union ended up having to reinstate Dubcek's government for several months.

Soon after the invasion, on 25 September 1968, the two "letters of invitation" were locked away in Special Dossier No. 255 in

the CPSU Politburo archives. The folder containing the letters was stamped “TOP SECRET” and was personally sealed by the head of the CPSU General Department, Konstantin Chernenko, with the following instructions: “To be preserved in the Politburo Archive. Not to be opened without my express permission.” Rumors about these “letters of invitation” circulated for many years after August 1968, but in the absence of the documents themselves, it was unclear whether such letters had actually existed. Not until July 1989, when a posthumous interview with the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, mentioned the collective appeal, was the existence of the “letters of invitation” officially confirmed (though Kadar incorrectly claimed there had been 18 signatories).¹⁹ The whereabouts of the two letters was kept secret for another three years, until July 1992, when they were finally turned over to the Czechoslovak government by Russian president Boris Yeltsin.

In retrospect, the significance of the two “letters of invitation” may at times have been overstated. The first one, signed only by Kapek, was apparently of negligible importance, and even the second one was not decisive in provoking the invasion. The hard-liners in the KSC had plenty of other channels through which to communicate their views. Nevertheless, the collective “letters of invitation” did contribute to the CPSU Politburo’s mistaken impression that a viable hard-line alternative existed in Czechoslovakia. In that sense, the letter undoubtedly gave greater weight to Soviet proponents of military intervention during the crucial two weeks of deliberations that followed the Bratislava meeting. Moreover, both “letters of invitation” offered a convenient pretext for the Soviet authorities to claim to be acting on behalf of a legitimate alternative government. Indeed, the lengthy “appeal” for “fraternal assistance” that was published in the Soviet press on 22 August 1968—an appeal supposedly issued by unnamed “officials from the KSC Central Committee, the Czechoslovak government, and the National Assembly”—was based in part on the letters that Kapek and the others had written.²⁰

Thus, the discovery of the two “letters of invitation” in the Soviet archives has shed important light on the way Bil’ak’s and Indra’s anti-reformist coalition tried to sway Soviet decision-making in 1968.

2. Todor Zhivkov’s Position

It has long been known that Gomulka and Ulbricht were vehemently opposed to the Prague Spring from the outset and were among the earliest proponents of military intervention. But until recently, it had not been as clear when the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, began expressing similar concerns about the events in Czechoslovakia. Traditionally, most Western analysts surmised that it was not until the Warsaw meeting in mid-July 1968, which brought together leaders from the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria, that Zhivkov clearly joined ranks with Ulbricht and Gomulka. At that meeting, Zhivkov declared that the Warsaw Pact countries had an obligation to forestall the victory of “counterrevolution” in Czechoslovakia, if necessary by providing direct “military assistance” to the “forces of socialism.”²¹ For lack of evidence to the contrary, Western scholars assumed that until Zhivkov felt the need to issue this stern warning, he had “adopted a wait-and-see attitude on the question of military intervention.”²²

The notion that Zhivkov displayed “belated antagonism” toward the Prague Spring (to use H. Gordon Skilling’s phrase) has recently come under challenge, however.²³ Since 1989, two alternative—though mutually incompatible—interpretations of Bulgaria’s position have emerged. One of these new interpretations implies that Zhivkov’s “antagonism” in 1968 was uncompromising from the very start, whereas the other interpretation suggests that Zhivkov harbored no “antagonism” at all. The former interpretation was actually put forth two decades ago, but it did not come to light until late 1990, when the transcript of a July 1973 Central Committee plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party was declassified. At the plenum the Bulgarian foreign minister, Petur Mladenov, lauded Zhivkov for having been “*the first* among leaders of the fraternal parties to define the situation [in Czechoslovakia in 1968] as an open counterrevolution and to recommend the measures that all of us now assess as having been the only possible and correct ones.”²⁴ If true, Mladenov’s statement obviously would mean that Zhivkov embraced the extreme hard-line stance of Gomulka and Ulbricht much earlier than Western scholars had assumed.

The other new explanation of Zhivkov’s

position comes, not surprisingly, from Zhivkov himself. In an interview with several Western newspapers in late 1990, he argued that he had supported the reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and had been extremely reluctant to go along with the “totally unjustified” invasion. Zhivkov insisted that the only reason he ordered the Bulgarian army to take part was that Moscow had threatened to impose economic sanctions otherwise.²⁵ Throughout the interview Zhivkov stressed that he, unlike Gomulka and Ulbricht, was never ideologically opposed to the Prague Spring.

Attempts to sort out these three conflicting interpretations—“early antagonism” versus “belated antagonism” versus “no antagonism”—would have been futile in the past, but enough new evidence about Zhivkov’s role has emerged that one can piece together a fourth version of events that differs from all of the above. The real situation, it turns out, was more complicated than either the traditional Western version or the two more recent interpretations imply. The fourth version incorporates certain elements from both the traditional Western interpretation (“belated antagonism”) and the version put forth by Mladenov (“early antagonism”), but is not wholly consonant with either. Zhivkov’s own recent interpretation (“no antagonism”) is the only version that should be dismissed outright. The evidence, both in the public record and in newly declassified materials, confirms that Zhivkov displayed profound “antagonism” toward the Prague Spring, and that he did so earlier than most Western analysts had thought.

Mladenov’s contention that Zhivkov led the way in denouncing the Prague Spring and in calling for military intervention is not as far-fetched as it may at first seem. New evidence reveals that Bulgarian leaders reacted “with great anxiety and apprehension” to the removal of Antonin Novotny as KSC First Secretary and the election of Dubcek as his replacement in January 1968.²⁶ Bulgaria was the only Warsaw Pact country whose newspapers did not feature the lengthy biography and portrait of Dubcek supplied by the Czechoslovak Press Agency (CTK). The only mention made of Dubcek’s election in the Bulgarian press was in a brief CTK news release about the plenum and in some cursory biographical data prepared by the Bulgarian News Agency. Furthermore, the congratulatory telegram from Bulgaria to

Dubcek was handled in an unorthodox manner. Contrary to normal procedures, the telegram was not directly addressed to anyone and was not signed by Zhivkov. The coolness of Bulgaria's response to Dubcek's election was conspicuous enough that it even drew a protest from Soviet diplomats, who called the Bulgarian actions "hasty and basically improper" and urged the Bulgarian authorities "to treat [Dubcek's] election the same way we have treated changes of leadership in other fraternal parties."²⁷

Nevertheless, it seems clear that the unease felt by Zhivkov and other Bulgarian officials about Dubcek's election was not due to any forebodings of drastic policy changes to come in Czechoslovakia. Instead, the Bulgarian leader was apparently discomfited by the manner in which Novotny was replaced. Normally, such a step would have been "recommended" by the KSC Presidium and then obediently ratified by the Central Committee; but in late 1967 and early 1968 the KSC Presidium was deadlocked. Consequently, Novotny's fate was determined by a vote of the full KSC Central Committee. For understandable reasons, this unusual way of ousting the long-time KSC First Secretary was disconcerting for Zhivkov, who had come to power at around the same time that Novotny did in the early 1950s. Although some Bulgarian officials may have had genuine concerns about Dubcek's "bourgeois nationalism" (a charge leveled by Novotny), the real motivation behind Bulgaria's less-than-friendly response to the events in Czechoslovakia in early 1968 was undoubtedly Zhivkov's fear that a similar leadership change could occur in Bulgaria.

Hence, the initial Bulgarian response to Dubcek's election does not in itself bear out Mladenov's claim about "early antagonism." Only if Bulgarian officials had continued to express deep hostility toward the events in Czechoslovakia during the first few months of 1968 would Mladenov's interpretation be vindicated. Yet the evidence on this score, rather than confirming Mladenov's view, undercuts it. The public record shows that Gomulka was the first East-bloc leader to declare, in a lengthy speech on 19 March, that "imperialist reaction and enemies of socialism" were behind the Prague Spring.²⁸ No comparable public statements from Zhivkov appeared until several months later, in mid-July.²⁹ The tightly-controlled Bul-

garian press, in fact, was notable for its favorable coverage of Dubcek and the Prague Spring during the first half of 1968. Bulgarian leaders eschewed polemics long after scathing commentaries had begun appearing regularly in the media of both Poland and East Germany.³⁰

The belatedness of Bulgaria's "antagonism" toward the Prague Spring is also evident in newly declassified materials from former Soviet and East European archives. During the first few months of 1968, Bulgarian officials voiced almost no misgivings at all about the reforms in Czechoslovakia; and the one or two complaints they did have were muted.³¹ Not until April and May did Bulgarian assessments of the Prague Spring take on a somewhat more negative tone.³² Although it might be argued that Bulgaria's low-key approach to the Czechoslovak reforms during the first few months of 1968 was simply a matter of discretion, new archival materials do not bear this out. After all, Bulgarian leaders at the time were never hesitant about expressing harsh criticism of events in both Romania and Yugoslavia.³³

A similar picture of Bulgarian policy vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia emerges from the once-secret transcripts and summaries of the multilateral East-bloc conferences at Dresden and Moscow in the spring of 1968. These documents confirm that Gomulka and Ulbricht, not Zhivkov, led the way in opposing the Czechoslovak reforms. At the Dresden conference in late March, which Zhivkov did not attend because of a scheduling conflict, Gomulka and Ulbricht vehemently depicted the events in Czechoslovakia as outright "counterrevolution."³⁴ No one else at the conference, not even Bil'ak, was yet ready to go that far. Certainly there is no evidence that Zhivkov's representatives at the conference joined—much less preceded—Gomulka and Ulbricht in portraying the situation in such dire terms. On the contrary, the Bulgarian participants' brief remarks at the Dresden conference seemed moderate compared to the harsh statements made by their East German, Polish, and even Soviet colleagues. Much the same was true of the Moscow conference in early May, where Ulbricht and Gomulka stepped up their previous denunciations of the "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia and demanded that immediate action be taken.³⁵ Zhivkov, by contrast, was still not willing to resort to such strident language, despite the

misgivings he was feeling by that time. His scattered comments at the meeting were notable only for how little they revealed about his position.

In short, there is no evidence that substantiates—and much new evidence that contravenes—Mladenov's assertion that Zhivkov was out in front of all his Warsaw Pact colleagues in advocating the use of military force against Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, evidence that has recently come to light suggesting that Zhivkov did begin shifting to a hard-line position earlier than most Western scholars had assumed. In late May 1968, two weeks after the conference in Moscow, Zhivkov transmitted a secret "Report Concerning the Situation in Czechoslovakia" and an "information bulletin" on the same topic to the Soviet ambassador in Sofia, A. M. Puzanov.³⁶ The report and the bulletin were prepared by the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense and the Bulgarian State Security forces, respectively, and both items received Zhivkov's official endorsement. The two documents expressed strong opposition to the reforms in Czechoslovakia, often in crudely anti-Semitic terms, and adverted several times to the possible need for military intervention. To be sure, except for the anti-Semitic remarks, the tone of the two reports was not as hysterical as some of the statements that Ulbricht and Gomulka had been making; among other things, Bulgarian officials still expressed confidence that "healthy forces" (i.e., orthodox Communists) could prevail in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, unlike the strident criticisms voiced by East German and Polish leaders, neither of the Bulgarian documents was intended for public consumption. Nevertheless, anyone in Moscow who read the materials would have had little doubt that as of May, Zhivkov had become decidedly hostile to the Prague Spring and to Dubcek personally.

By the time of the Warsaw conference several weeks later, Zhivkov had aligned himself unambiguously with the extreme Ulbricht-Gomulka point of view.³⁷ Even then, however, the Bulgarian leader was not as vitriolic or obsessive in his condemnations of the Prague Spring as either Ulbricht or Gomulka was. Moreover, it is unlikely that Zhivkov's adoption of an uncompromising stance had any real influence on his Soviet or East European counterparts. Judging from transcripts of the multilateral con-

ferences in 1968, it does not seem that the other Warsaw Pact leaders ever took Zhivkov particularly seriously or looked to him for advice. Kadar, in fact, had not even wanted Bulgaria to participate in the conferences at all, lest the assembled Warsaw Pact states give the impression that they were trying to isolate Romania. Kadar urged that attendance at the meetings be limited to the four East-bloc countries bordering on Czechoslovakia.³⁸ Ultimately, this suggestion was not heeded, and Bulgarian leaders ended up taking part in all the multilateral conferences; but that was only because Brezhnev approved their attendance, presumably believing he could use the Bulgarian representatives as a wedge for his own views. The fact that some of the participants were willing to exclude the Bulgarians altogether provides ample confirmation of the peripheral nature of Zhivkov's role.

It is not surprising, then, that Zhivkov would have been disinclined to stake out a firm position during the first several months of 1968, until he had a better idea of where the prevailing sentiment in Moscow would lead. Ulbricht and Gomulka could fulminate all they wished about the situation in Czechoslovakia, but it would not have mattered from Bulgaria's standpoint unless Brezhnev eventually moved in their direction as well. Not until the five-power conference in Moscow in early May was the extent of Soviet displeasure with Dubcek and the Prague Spring fully evident to Zhivkov. By the time of the Warsaw meeting in mid-July, as Kadar later acknowledged, "the ranks of the supporters of military intervention had increased" on the Soviet Politburo;³⁹ hence, it was only natural that at this point Zhivkov, too, placed himself squarely on the interventionists' side.

From then on, any qualms or hesitation that Zhivkov may have had in the first part of 1968 were cast aside. As the sentiment in Moscow shifted steadily in favor of military intervention, Zhivkov shifted his own position accordingly, adding his own peculiar anti-Semitic twists. This pattern belies the claim he made many years later, in the interview in 1990, about his supposed aversion to using military force in August 1968. All evidence suggests that Zhivkov's recent attempts to portray Bulgaria as a reluctant participant in the invasion cannot be taken seriously. The Bulgarian leader's real attitude at the time can be gauged from a secret

message he transmitted to the CPSU Politburo in early August 1968, just before the Bratislava meeting:

Despite the results of the bilateral negotiations at Cierna nad Tisou [which had just concluded], the situation in Czechoslovakia and the entire history and development of events give no reason to believe that the current leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party will be able to change things for the better. . . . To improve the situation in Czechoslovakia and save the Communist party and socialist achievements, we must use all possible and necessary means, including the Warsaw Pact's armed forces. . . . If we do not manage to turn events around, it will be a catastrophe — a blow against the Soviet Union, against our socialist countries, against the international Communist movement, and against the development of our socialist countries. . . . The Warsaw Pact forces will be severely weakened, and that will be a grave threat to the GDR, Hungary, and Poland. . . . Our opinion [in Bulgaria] is: Force the Czechoslovak leadership to capitulate. If they refuse to give in, then take other extreme measures.⁴⁰

Although Zhivkov may not have been the earliest advocate of military intervention in 1968, he was certainly ready to embrace that option enthusiastically when the time came, especially if it would earn him Moscow's approval. In this matter, as in most others, the Bulgarian leader's main objective was to support whatever position would ingratiate him with his Soviet counterparts.

3. The Role of the KGB

Recent disclosures have borne out earlier assumptions that the KGB acquired undue influence during the 1968 crisis. It has long been known that senior intelligence officials in both Czechoslovakia and the USSR deliberately offered alarming assessments of the Prague Spring, in part because they feared that NATO was exploiting the situation. In the mid-1970s, former agents from the KGB and the Czechoslovak State Security forces (StB) revealed that accurate information about the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 often was not sent on to the proper authorities in Moscow.⁴¹ These disclosures were recently corroborated by a former KGB station chief in Washington, D.C., Oleg Kalugin, who described the problems he encountered when trying to present

a balanced assessment of the crisis:

It's no secret that the KGB played an important role in many decisions concerning foreign policy matters. This applies to the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. The KGB stirred up fears among the country's leadership that Czechoslovakia could fall victim to NATO aggression or a coup unless certain actions were undertaken promptly. At about the same time, I reported from Washington that the CIA was not involved in the developments of the Prague Spring. But my attempt at an even-handed report simply did not fit in with the KGB's concept of the way events were shaping up in Czechoslovakia, and therefore never got beyond the KGB. My information was wasted.⁴²

Kalugin also reported that he "found out a year later, when [he] went on leave to Moscow, that the leadership of the KGB had given instructions in 1968 that [his] messages should be destroyed and not shown to anyone."⁴³ The same apparently happened with a few other KGB analysts who tried to keep their assessments free of distorted information.

By contrast, dispatches from agents who claimed to offer proof of a "subversive" network in the KSC or of Western involvement in the Prague Spring were immediately transmitted to the highest political levels. Although the KGB's files on the Czechoslovak crisis are still tightly sealed, copies of some of the agency's reports and memoranda were sent to the CPSU archives, and these provide striking evidence of how slanted the KGB's assessments of the situation in Czechoslovakia were all through 1968.⁴⁴ In some cases, KGB officials attributed every negative development they could find in Czechoslovakia (traffic accidents, fires, burglaries, etc.) to the effects of the Prague Spring; in other cases, they simply fabricated events or exaggerated the influence of small reformist groups. The KGB's intelligence assessments coincided with, and reinforced, the biased and distorted cables and reports that Soviet leaders were receiving from the Soviet ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Stepan Chervonenko, as well as from Chervonenko's deputy at the embassy, Ivan Udaltsov, and the head of the Czechoslovakia Sector in the CPSU Central Committee, Sergei Kolesnikov.⁴⁵ During most of the crisis, therefore, the information flowing up to the top levels was skewed, at least to some degree.

Other new disclosures by Oleg Gordievskii, who, like Kalugin, was a high-ranking KGB official until the mid-1980s, indicate that the KGB's role in the Czechoslovak crisis went well beyond the distortion and manipulation of intelligence. Gordievskii confirms earlier reports by a former StB official, Frantisek August, that large numbers of Soviet and pro-Soviet agents were responsible for secretly monitoring the activities of senior KSC officials and employees of the StB from early 1968 on.⁴⁶ Constant surveillance was maintained through a variety of techniques, including wiretaps, eavesdropping devices, signals intelligence, and reports by collaborators in Prague. Among the collaborators were a few top Czechoslovak officials (e.g., the deputy interior minister, Viliam Salgovic) and some well-placed members of the KSC's clerical staff (e.g., one of Smrkovsky's secretaries). Furthermore, according to Gordievskii, nearly three dozen KGB agents posing as Western tourists were dispatched to Czechoslovakia to collect whatever information they could from "counterrevolutionaries" within the KSC.⁴⁷ Other Soviet agents, led by General N. Skripo, who visited Czechoslovakia in May and June for an ostensible reunion with old wartime comrades, performed secret military reconnaissance missions that proved crucial later on.⁴⁸ The political and military intelligence that the KGB gathered from these various sources was useful not only before and during the invasion, but also afterwards in removing the StB and KSC officials who had been supportive of Dubcek.⁴⁹

In addition to keeping close track of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the KGB performed numerous other covert functions during the 1968 crisis. The agents who had been sent as "tourists" to collect information in Czechoslovakia were also responsible for carrying out provocations, such as putting up posters calling on Czechs and Slovaks to rise up against Communism and pull out of the Warsaw Pact, as in Hungary in 1956. The "tourists" also planted caches of American-made arms in western Bohemia near the German border, leaving them to be "discovered" and played up in the Soviet press as "evidence" of an impending CIA-sponsored coup or insurrection.⁵⁰ During the invasion itself, the KGB took on a supporting combat role. Militarized security units accompanied regular army troops into Czechoslova-

kia, though the KGB forces tended to be ill-suited for their missions.⁵¹ The use of these special operations troops (*Spetsnaz*) was still valuable, however, in highlighting improvements that were needed and in drawing lessons for future combat, as in Afghanistan in December 1979, where KGB *Spetsnaz* forces were used effectively.⁵² One final mission for the KGB both during and after the invasion of Czechoslovakia was to monitor and uphold the "ideological maturity, discipline, morale, and political character" of Soviet troops who took part in the operation.⁵³ Responsibility for this task fell to the KGB's Special Departments (*Osobyie otdely*) in the Soviet armed forces, which carefully checked the letters and packages of Soviet soldiers to "determine whether they have any anti-Soviet content." The mail-screening campaign was part of a wider KGB effort in the fall of 1968 to "prevent the dissemination of anti-Soviet publications and other hostile materials from Czechoslovakia within the territory of the USSR."⁵⁴

In short, recent evidence makes clear that the KGB's efforts against the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968 were so diverse and comprehensive that it would be impossible to understand Moscow's response during the crisis without taking full account of the role played by the Soviet security forces. The new evidence also confirms earlier suspicions about why the KGB was so anxious to bring an end to the Prague Spring. It is clear now that the ferment in Czechoslovakia had caused problems for virtually every department and branch of the huge agency. For one thing, Soviet influence over the Czechoslovak security and intelligence apparatus steadily diminished from early 1968 on, as many of the StB agents who were most subservient to Moscow, including the head of the apparatus, General Josef Houska, were removed. In most cases, they were replaced by officials who strongly supported the Prague Spring.⁵⁵ This trend sparked growing apprehension in the First Main Directorate of the KGB (i.e., the foreign intelligence-gathering branch), which had relied heavily on the StB's assistance in the past.

Concerns within the First Main Directorate became even more acute when the new Czechoslovak interior minister, Josef Pavel, took steps to curb the KGB's influence in Czechoslovakia. Among other things, Pavel publicly disclosed that the KGB had

six liaison agents in his office, and he implied that those agents would all soon be removed.⁵⁶ Later on he openly characterized the "discovery" of the arms cache in western Bohemia as a KGB provocation.⁵⁷ The prospect of further revelations about the KGB's activities in Czechoslovakia loomed in July 1968 when articles by Karel Kaplan, the chief researcher for the Piller Commission, began appearing.⁵⁸ The Piller Commission had been set up to investigate the political trials of the 1950s, and Kaplan's articles left no doubt that the final report—which was not released before the invasion, and was then suppressed—would cast the Soviet Union's role in an unsavory light. Some Soviet officials, recalling the experience in Hungary in 1956, may also have feared that the commission's report would lead to harsh reprisals against former StB agents whose chief loyalty had been to Moscow.⁵⁹ Furthermore, as Soviet leaders were well aware, the Piller Commission had recommended that the Czechoslovak secret police be disbanded, and KSC leaders had tentatively accepted this recommendation just before the Cierna nad Tisou conference.⁶⁰ These developments, coupled with the changes of personnel that had already occurred, seemed to be undermining the Soviet Union's whole intelligence network in Czechoslovakia.

To make matters worse, the danger of a "spill-over" from the Prague Spring into the Soviet Union itself, especially in Ukraine, would have greatly complicated efforts by the domestic sections of the KGB to maintain order. Fears about internal unrest in Eastern Europe after 1953 had always been tied, at least to some extent, to Moscow's concerns about the possible eruption of widespread disorder at home. Even the faintest signs that the reformist influence of the Prague Spring was beginning to filter into the Soviet Union by mid-1968 (e.g., in the sub-Carpathian region of Ukraine) had caused panic in some quarters of the Soviet political elite.⁶¹ The inspiration that prominent Soviet dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov took from the Czechoslovak reforms was a further source of anxiety.⁶² Moreover, discussions in Czechoslovakia about the past abuses of the StB gave rise to concerns that similar discussions would eventually take place in Moscow about the Soviet security organs. It is not surprising, then, that by mid-1968 KGB officials who were responsible for internal security viewed the whole

situation in Czechoslovakia with alarm.

The perception within the KGB that the Prague Spring was a threat to both the external and internal security of the Soviet Union helps explain why several high-ranking officials in the agency were among the earliest and most adamant proponents of military intervention in Czechoslovakia.⁶³ To be sure, support for an invasion was by no means unanimous among senior KGB officials, as recent evidence has made clear. Those responsible for foreign operations tended to be especially hesitant about resorting to military force.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, there is little doubt that all top KGB personnel were dismayed by the “excesses” of the Prague Spring, and hoped that the reforms could be halted and reversed. Even officials reluctant to go along with an invasion began to lose patience when Pavel continued removing pro-Soviet agents in the StB and Interior Ministry.

Thus, over time, the number of top-ranking KGB personnel who believed that a military response would be necessary grew substantially. The problem with this trend, however, is that it compromised the agency’s role as a source of (relatively) unbiased information for the highest political authorities. Once senior officials in the KGB, including Yurii Andropov, had decided to press for an invasion, they resorted to the manipulation and distortion of intelligence to bolster their case. In particular, they and Chervonenko badly misled top Soviet officials about the support that a post-invasion regime would command from the Czechoslovak population.⁶⁵ Although a more balanced flow of information would probably not have changed any minds in the CPSU Politburo during the final vote on the invasion, accurate reports from the KGB might have caused Soviet leaders to think more carefully about the enormous difficulty of reestablishing political (as opposed to military) control.

4. Military Motivations and Concerns

Western analysts have long suspected that military-strategic considerations figured prominently in the Soviet Union’s response to the Prague Spring.⁶⁶ Well before the 1968 crisis, Soviet military commanders had believed that the lack of a permanent Soviet troop presence in Czechoslovakia (in contrast to the large deployments in East

Germany, Poland, and Hungary) seriously impeded the Warsaw Pact’s military preparations against NATO. Soviet requests to station a Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia had been turned down on numerous occasions in the 1950s and 1960s by Gottwald and Novotny, but Soviet leaders had not given up their hopes of gaining a permanent presence on Czechoslovak territory, as the events of 1968 revealed. At several points during the crisis, top-ranking Soviet officers such as Marshal Ivan Yakubovskii, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, urged the Czechoslovak government to accept the “temporary” deployment of a Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia.⁶⁷ Officials in Prague rejected these Soviet demands, but Western analysts have long maintained that Moscow’s desire to gain a large-scale troop presence contributed to the Soviet High Command’s implicit and explicit support for armed intervention.⁶⁸ As it turned out, of course, the invasion did result in the establishment of a “Central Group of Soviet Forces” numbering some 75,000-80,000 soldiers, which remained on Czechoslovak soil until July 1991.

What has become clearer over the last few years, however, is that the primary issue for the Soviet military in 1968 was not simply whether the Czechoslovak government would agree to a Soviet troop presence *per se* (though that was certainly a key matter in its own right), but whether the Prague Spring would disrupt arrangements that had been secretly codified in the early to mid-1960s for “joint” nuclear weapons deployments. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces began receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles from Moscow.⁶⁹ Shortly thereafter, the Bulgarian and Hungarian armies also obtained nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles from the Soviet Union; and even the Romanian military was eventually supplied with nuclear-capable FROG-7 and Scud-B missiles. These new East European weapons were officially described as components of the “Warsaw Pact’s joint nuclear forces” and used for simulated nuclear missions during Pact exercises; but Western analysts have always assumed that nuclear warheads for the delivery systems remained under exclusive Soviet control, and that the delivery vehicles also would have come under direct Soviet command in wartime if they were equipped with nuclear charges. Such

an arrangement would have left East European officials with no say at all in the use of the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal. As for the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that Soviet forces themselves deployed in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary, the lack of East European input was thought to be even more conspicuous, as Soviet leaders rejected all proposals for the establishment of a “dual-key” system along the lines that NATO worked out in the mid-1960s.

Evidence that has recently come to light strongly confirms this earlier speculation about nuclear command-and-control procedures in the Warsaw Pact. It is now known that Moscow secretly arranged in the mid-1960s to station nuclear warheads under strict Soviet control on Polish, East German, and Hungarian territory, where the three extant Groups of Soviet Forces were already firmly entrenched. All the agreements on this matter were bilateral, but were described as being “within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.”⁷⁰ The nuclear warheads were to be fitted to delivery vehicles belonging to Soviet troops stationed in the East European countries; and some of the warheads may also have been intended for weapons employed by the local armies under direct Soviet command. As in the past, all decisions on when to “go nuclear” were reserved for Soviet political and military leaders.⁷¹

In the case of Czechoslovakia, however, the nuclear issue had always seemed more problematic because no Soviet troops had been stationed there since 1945. The presence of several hundred thousand Soviet forces in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary facilitated the closely-guarded deployment of nuclear warheads in those countries. If the Soviet Union had been unable to store nuclear warheads under similar conditions in Czechoslovakia for wartime use, a serious gap would have been left in the center of the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear front line against NATO. Even if plans had been made to ship large quantities of nuclear warheads under Soviet control to Czechoslovakia during a crisis, the execution of such plans would probably have been detected by NATO and might have triggered a preemptive strike against the Warsaw Pact. These considerations led a prominent Western analyst, Lawrence Whetten, to conclude soon after the invasion that “the absence of Soviet troops” in Czechoslovakia had been “a glaring weakness in the Pact’s defenses”

because it resulted in a “lack of nuclear preparedness.”⁷² He surmised that this “weakest link” in the Warsaw Pact—the inability to deploy nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak territory because of the lack of Soviet troops there—was one of the key factors behind the Soviet Politburo’s decision to undertake military intervention. Numerous other Western analysts have concurred with Whetten’s arguments.

There is, to be sure, a good deal of merit to these claims, but classified documents obtained from the Czechoslovak ministry of defense in the spring of 1991 reveal that the matter was more complicated than Whetten implied. It now turns out that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia signed two agreements, one in August 1961 and the other in February 1962, entitling the USSR to dispatch nuclear warheads immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event of an emergency. Those agreements in themselves would not have detracted from Whetten’s analysis, but they were followed in December 1965 by a “Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat Readiness of Missile Forces,” which was signed by the then-Soviet defense minister, Rodion Malinovskii, and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Bohumir Lomsky.⁷³ The treaty provided for the stationing of nuclear warheads at three sites in western Czechoslovakia — at Bela pod Bezdazem, Bilina, and Misov — under exclusive Soviet control. The reinforced storage bunkers for the nuclear warheads and the housing for elite KGB units assigned to guard the weapons were to be constructed jointly by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, with the construction and operating costs of all the facilities to be picked up by the Czechoslovak government. A senior Czechoslovak defense ministry official later confirmed that “the procedures for the defense and protection of these special-purpose storage centers for nuclear weapons were such that no one from our side had permission to enter, and even Soviet officials who were not directly responsible for guarding and operating the buildings were not allowed in.”⁷⁴

Construction of the facilities was originally due to be completed by the end of 1967, but unforeseen delays prevented the storage bunkers from being ready until sometime in 1969.⁷⁵ Work on the buildings was supposed to continue during the Prague

Spring, but Soviet officials obviously worried that the reformist trends would derail plans to finish the construction and to begin storing nuclear warheads. The implications of any such threat to the projected deployment of nuclear weapons in Czechoslovakia were enormous. Before the Prague Spring, the Soviet High Command might have agreed — if only reluctantly — to rely on Czechoslovak forces, rather than Soviet troops, to protect the three nuclear depots in western Bohemia, which were to be kept under tight KGB control as well. After all, until 1968 Soviet commanders had no reason to question the steadfast loyalty of senior officers in the Czechoslovak People’s Army (CLA).⁷⁶ The CLA was the most impressive of the East European armed forces, and Soviet “representatives” were present at all levels of command. These factors might have been enough to induce Soviet military and political leaders to live without a full-fledged Group of Soviet Forces on Czechoslovak territory even after the planned storage of nuclear warheads had begun.

Once the Prague Spring was under way, however, reformist influences quickly spread into the Czechoslovak armed forces. After a campaign by orthodox, pro-Novotny elements in the military against Dubcek in late 1967 and early 1968 was rebuffed, many of the staunchly pro-Soviet commanders and National Defense Ministry personnel were removed. Although a few conservative officers retained their posts, they found themselves increasingly isolated and bereft of influence.⁷⁷ Most of the newly appointed commanders were firm supporters of liberalization in both the society and the army, a trait that caused anxiety in Moscow early on about “certain tendencies in Czechoslovak military circles.”⁷⁸ Soviet concerns were hardly allayed when lively debates ensued in the Czechoslovak military press about the possibility of sharply reducing defense expenditures—and, by implication, the country’s obligations to the Warsaw Pact—and of shifting toward a truly “national” military doctrine, rather than the standardized doctrine of the Eastern bloc. Proposals for bold reforms in the Warsaw Pact also began to appear.

These different themes were incorporated in the so-called “Gottwald Memorandum,” prepared by the staff of the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy in the spring of 1968.⁷⁹ The memorandum recom-

mended a number of far-reaching changes in Czechoslovakia’s defense policy and in the Warsaw Pact, which were widely supported within the Czechoslovak military establishment and just as widely criticized by Soviet officials. Subsequently, a much more radical set of changes was proposed in a comprehensive report on Czechoslovak “External and Internal Security,” which pledged to do away with the country’s “Stalinist security system” once and for all. This document, prepared in the summer of 1968 under the auspices of the KSC Central Committee’s Military-Administrative Department, was to serve as the basis for the military and security policies of the 14th KSC Congress in September 1968. The draft was not made public before (or after) the invasion, but a copy of it was leaked to the Soviet embassy in Prague in August 1968 by “Czechoslovak friends” (presumably in the CLA or StB), and it was then transmitted by Chervonenko to a number of top Soviet political and military officials.⁸⁰

The adverse effects of these proposed changes and of the replacements of military personnel were compounded, in Soviet eyes, by a news conference that General Vaclav Prchlik, the head of the KSC’s military department, gave in mid-July.⁸¹ Prchlik explicitly criticized Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact, condemned the USSR and other Pact members for having “arbitrarily stationed their units on [Czechoslovakia’s] territory,” and called for broad changes in the alliance and in Czechoslovak policy, which might ultimately have affected nuclear weapons deployments. More important than the news conference itself were reports filtering into Moscow around the same time that a group of Czechoslovak officers, under Prchlik’s guidance, were preparing contingency plans to resist a Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion.⁸² These plans never got anywhere because Dubcek immediately vetoed them, but the reports were alarming enough from Moscow’s perspective to make it imperative to get rid of Prchlik. With the news conference as a catalyst, Soviet officials condemned Prchlik’s “malicious fabrications,” “irresponsible ravings,” and “outright lies,” and began openly insisting that he be removed.⁸³

The Soviet response to Prchlik’s news conference would have been harsh even if the question of nuclear weapons had not been involved, but the existence of the secret treaties on nuclear deployments in Czecho-

slovakia gave an even sharper edge than usual to the Soviet attacks. An authoritative article in the main Soviet military newspaper, *Krasnaya zvezda*, claimed that Prchlik was “so blinded by ‘liberalization’ that [he] ... is even prepared to debate publicly the most confidential state and military matters.”⁸⁴ Such matters obviously included Czechoslovakia’s plans to accept Soviet nuclear warheads. The same point was emphasized in classified letters to Dubcek that Marshal Yakubovskii and other Soviet leaders sent to protest Prchlik’s remarks.⁸⁵ They accused the general of having “divulged top-secret information regarding the deployment of the Joint Armed Forces” and of having “revealed top-secret provisions in interstate treaties.” Soviet leaders demanded that Czechoslovakia “immediately live up to its allied obligations” and prevent any further “disclosure of interstate secrets that bear on the security of the socialist countries.”⁸⁶ Those “obligations” to protect “interstate secrets” applied, above all, to the bilateral treaties on nuclear weapons.

The concern that Soviet leaders had about the proposed nuclear weapons sites in Czechoslovakia—and about Czechoslovakia’s policy more generally—increased still further when it turned out that Prchlik, rather than being fired ignominiously, was merely reassigned to other military-related duties. In his new capacity, the general was even able to continue working on drafts of the national security Action Program, an arrangement that infuriated Soviet officials when they found out about it. Soviet leaders were equally dismayed that neither the KSC nor the Czechoslovak defense ministry would formally repudiate any of Prchlik’s comments until 15 August, a month after the general’s news conference. In the meantime, Prchlik received an outpouring of public admiration and expressions of support from many of his colleagues and subordinates in the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry. Needless to say, these reactions produced even greater Soviet consternation and led to serious doubts in Moscow about Czechoslovakia’s military alignment.⁸⁷

Thus, well before the invasion in August 1968, Soviet Army commanders had lost all confidence in their Czechoslovak counterparts and had become convinced that the risks of deploying nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil would be too great

unless the storage sites were converted into larger bases for Soviet forces. Indeed, judging by the location and scale of Soviet troop movements during the crisis, the Pact’s “exercises” seem to have been intended, in part, to protect the three sites chosen as nuclear weapons depots. Soviet concerns about the security of the depots had been growing rapidly since the early spring of 1968, when it was announced that Czechoslovak border guards had dismantled a series of barbed-wire and electrical fences along the border with West Germany.⁸⁸ These concerns gave rise by mid-1968 to “deep anxiety and fear” in Moscow about the “laxity of those responsible for Czechoslovakia’s western frontiers.”⁸⁹ From then on, Soviet leaders were determined to rectify “the absolutely abnormal and dangerous situation on Czechoslovakia’s borders with the FRG and Austria,” which was enabling “imperialist spies and subversive elements to carry out subversive activities in a region where large-scale defense forces of the Warsaw Pact governments are deployed.”⁹⁰ Moscow’s perception that Czechoslovak officials were not “displaying the concern and vigilance needed to protect the common security interests of the socialist countries” hardly boded well for the stringent security arrangements that would soon be required for the USSR’s three proposed nuclear weapons sites in Czechoslovakia.

In retrospect, then, it is clear that the real issue at stake in 1968 was not whether the Soviet Union would be formally entitled to store nuclear munitions in Czechoslovakia. That question had been settled in Moscow’s favor as far back as 1965.⁹¹ What mattered, instead, was whether the Soviet High Command could be confident about the physical security of the weapons without a direct, large-scale Soviet troop presence. Until 1968, Soviet commanders might have had that degree of confidence; but from early 1968 on, their confidence was shattered. Well before the invasion, the situation in Czechoslovakia had become so desperate (from Moscow’s standpoint) that Soviet military officers were no longer willing to accept anything less than the deployment of a “Central Group of Soviet Forces” on Czechoslovak territory.

5. Casualties During the Invasion and Occupation

Western analysts have long known that

several dozen Czechoslovak citizens died during the invasion and that hundreds more were wounded, but the precise figures were not disclosed until very recently. The data were compiled in a lengthy report prepared by the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry in late 1968 at the request of the General Procurator’s office. When the report was completed, it was classified “top secret” and was distributed in only five numbered copies.⁹² The newly published text reveals that “82 Czechoslovak citizens were killed, 300 were severely wounded, and 500 suffered minor wounds at the hands of the occupiers between 21 August and 28 September 1968.” From 29 September through 18 October, an additional 18 Czechoslovak citizens were killed and 35 more were severely wounded by the occupying troops. In short, a total of 100 civilian deaths and 335 severe woundings, as well as hundreds of minor woundings, were caused by the reimposition of Soviet military control over Czechoslovakia. The report, which provided brief biographical information about all the civilians who died, noted that the invading forces had used artillery, machine guns, and sub-machine guns to subdue crowds. It also pointed out that the 435 Czechoslovak citizens who were killed or severely wounded were not “using firearms of their own against the foreign soldiers.”⁹³

As for casualties suffered by the Warsaw Pact forces, a relatively small number (around 20) were killed, but only one of these deaths—that of a Bulgarian soldier—came at the hands of Czechoslovak citizens. Most of the deaths among Soviet troops were caused either by traffic accidents or by “so-called extraordinary events that accompany every large-scale troop movement.”⁹⁴ In addition, a handful of Soviet soldiers were sentenced to death by firing squad for having refused to go along with the invasion; and a few others committed suicide.⁹⁵

Given the scale of “Operation Danube-68” (as the invasion was code-named), the number of casualties on both sides was remarkably low. At the time, even Czechoslovak officials were surprised and pleased at how few civilians died or were wounded. Secret reports prepared for the KSC Presidium several weeks after the invasion had noted the acute tensions that still existed between the occupying soldiers and the Czechoslovak citizenry.⁹⁶ Hence, it came as a relief that the clumsy attempts by Soviet

troops to overcome the peaceful resistance they encountered from ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, and the large number of serious accidents and fights that ensued, did not lead to an “explosion” or to the “massacre” that some in Prague had feared.

ISSUES NEEDING FURTHER EXPLORATION

As new archival materials become available in Moscow and elsewhere, it will be possible to look in much greater depth at several issues that remain largely mysterious even now. No doubt, some of these issues cannot be fully resolved because the requisite documentation either never existed or has been destroyed. Unfortunately, some key materials in the East European archives appear to be missing or to have been tampered with, and the same is undoubtedly true on an even larger scale in Russia.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, as new evidence emerges, Western scholars should be able to develop a clearer understanding of at least some of the key issues listed below. A more elaborate discussion of these issues, and the questions about them that need to be answered, will be included in other works in preparation by the present author.⁹⁸

1. Consensus-Building in Moscow

Precisely how the CPSU Politburo arrived at a consensus in favor of military intervention in the spring and summer of 1968 may never be known with certainty. But if Soviet archives that have been off-limits up to now are rendered more accessible, Western and Russian scholars should gain a better understanding of the process. Among the documents that would be especially valuable in filling in gaps would be the transcript of the CPSU Politburo meeting on 15-17 August, the transcript of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 9-10 April, the full transcript of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 17 July, the transcripts of all CPSU Politburo meetings (whether formal or informal) between mid-June and mid-August, and materials compiled by special “commissions” of the CPSU Politburo that were established to deal with the crisis. Crucial documentation is also likely to exist in the personal files of leaders such as Brezhnev, Suslov, Kosygin, and Podgornyi.

In addition to the question of how the

consensus emerged, a related issue of particular interest is whether anyone on the CPSU Politburo dissented from the final decision to intervene. The fact that a three-day session of the Politburo was required before the decision was reached suggests that at least one or two members, and possibly more, still had serious reservations. In his speech to East European Communist Party leaders just after the conclusion of the CPSU Politburo’s session, Brezhnev averred that he and his colleagues had “considered these questions [about Czechoslovakia] from all angles” during their three-day meeting and had made a “profound analysis” of what should be done.⁹⁹ This formulation certainly implies that at least a few members of the Politburo, at some point, expressed doubts about the wisdom of the invasion. Although Brezhnev went on to say that the Politburo and Secretariat “unanimously adopted the decision to lend military assistance to the healthy forces” in the KSC, the word he used for “unanimously,” *edinodushno*, implies unanimity of spirit and not necessarily unanimity of actual voting. (This ambiguity would not be present if Brezhnev had used the word *edinoglasno*, which also translates into English as “unanimously.”) The distinction is a fine one and it may be reading too much into what Brezhnev said, but his speech does not absolutely foreclose the possibility that dissenting votes were cast. Only if we can gain access to the full transcript of the CPSU Politburo meeting will it be possible to resolve the issue conclusively.

There is no way to tell, unfortunately, when the transcript might be released (assuming it exists), but in the interim scholars need not just sit around waiting. There are several leads, albeit tenuous ones, that are well worth exploring. An important article in 1989 by Pyotr Rodionov, who was then first deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee’s Institute of Marxism-Leninism, stated that at least one member of the Soviet Politburo, Gennadii Voronov, had opposed the decision to intervene, believing it was “deeply mistaken” and “misguided.”¹⁰⁰ Voronov himself subsequently denied that he had voted against the invasion, and his denial has to be taken seriously.¹⁰¹ Because Rodionov argued that Voronov displayed “great personal bravery” in opposing the decision, it must have been tempting for Voronov either to support Rodionov’s claim (assuming that it is accurate) or just to have

said nothing (if it is inaccurate). Voronov had nothing to gain by issuing a denial, apart from wanting to set the record straight. Still, Voronov did acknowledge that he had expressed certain qualms about the decision—“Whom was it really so necessary for us to defend, and from whom?”—in a speech he gave to the Novosibirsk regional Party committee shortly after the invasion.¹⁰² Closer examination of Voronov’s role throughout the crisis is thus very much in order.

2. The Ukrainian Factor

Western analysts have long appreciated that the potential for instability in Ukraine was one of the major factors contributing to the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia.¹⁰³ But there is much about Ukraine’s role in the decision, including the extent to which Ukrainian party chief Petro Shelest was maneuvering for Brezhnev’s job, that will remain unclear until the Soviet and Ukrainian archives are fully opened. The Ukrainian government’s declared intention to release virtually all the records of the Ukrainian Communist Party is encouraging, but it remains to be seen how this will work out in practice. It also remains to be seen whether the requisite documents in Moscow, especially items from the personal files of Shelest, Vladimir Shcherbitskii, and Brezhnev in the Presidential Archive, will be made available.

3. A Nuclear Alert?

Until the late 1980s, Western scholars and government officials had assumed that the Soviet Union had never put its nuclear forces on full combat alert, even during the Cuban missile crisis. In late 1989, however, an excerpt was released from a secret U.S. intelligence report claiming that Brezhnev ordered a nuclear alert during the invasion of Czechoslovakia.¹⁰⁴ That claim has since been endorsed by a leading American specialist on nuclear command-and-control, Bruce Blair, in a lengthy book on nuclear operational procedures. Blair argues that the incident in August 1968 was one of several times that the Soviet Union put its nuclear forces on combat alert.¹⁰⁵ A dissenting view has been expressed, however, by a retired Soviet general, Ivan Ershov, the deputy commander of the 1968 invasion. In an interview in early 1993, Ershov conceded

that “Soviet political and military leaders considered a nuclear alert in 1968,” but added that they “immediately and decisively rejected the idea” because “we knew that NATO wasn’t going to interfere, and no one could figure out any other purpose that an alert would serve.”¹⁰⁶ Ershov also argued that one reason the invading force was so large was that nuclear weapons were excluded from any part in the operation.

The evidence, in my view, tends to support Ershov’s position, at least so far; but new documents from military and intelligence archives in both East and West, as well as from the Presidential Archive in Moscow, will be needed to clarify and resolve this crucial issue.

4. The Soviet-Romanian Standoff

The Soviet Union’s decision not to invade Romania in late August 1968 is often attributed to the Romanians’ readiness to defend against an invasion.¹⁰⁷ However, newly declassified evidence from both East and West suggests that the standoff between the Soviet Union and Romania just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia was in fact resolved mainly because both sides understood the potential dangers of a confrontation and skillfully defused the crisis. Rather than putting their military forces on full alert to “back up their stated intention to resist invasion,” the Romanian authorities, according to the new evidence, did just the opposite as they sought to avoid any “provocative” steps that would give Moscow a pretext for intervention.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, the Soviet Army refrained from exerting direct military pressure against Romania and from taking other steps that would give the appearance of offensive intent. If the picture emerging from this new evidence is accurate—and there is reason to believe it is—much more research needs to be done on the Soviet-Romanian standoff as a case study in crisis management.

5. Was the Invasion Preventable?

It is still unclear whether Dubcek and his colleagues, or outside powers such as the NATO countries, could have taken steps in 1968 to prevent or deter the invasion while allowing the reform program to continue. Some observers maintain that if Dubcek had gone along with full-scale preparations to

resist an invasion, the Soviet Union would have backed down, as it did in Yugoslavia in 1948 or Poland in 1956.¹⁰⁹ Others believe, however, that any attempt which Dubcek might have made to have the Czechoslovak army prepare a genuine defense against Soviet military intervention would merely have accelerated the timetable for the invasion, leading in the end to a bloodbath.¹¹⁰ Similar differences of view exist about what the influence of NATO, and above all the United States, might have been. These issues, as counterfactuals, can never be fully resolved, but new evidence about Soviet and East European motivations can certainly shed greater light on them and contribute to our understanding of the crisis more generally.

1. Mark Kramer, “New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 1, 4-13.

2. On this point, see Harold C. Deutsch, “The Historical Impact of Revealing the Ultra Secret,” *Parameters* 7:3 (September 1977), 15-32; and Roger J. Spiller, “Some Implications of ULTRA,” *Military Affairs* 40:2 (April 1976), 49-54. For a more guarded view, see Martin Blumenson, “Intelligence and World War II: Will ‘Ultra’ Rewrite History?” *Army* 28:8 (August 1978), 42-48. For further background on the significance of the code-breaking operations, see Ronald Lewin, *Ultra Goes to War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); F. H. Hinsley et al., *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations*, Vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979), 159-90; John Winton, *Ultra at Sea: How Breaking the Nazi Code Affected Allied Naval Strategy* (New York: Morrow, 1988); and Gordon Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *Miracle at Midway* (New York: Penguin, 1983), 383-87. Even now, new evidence continues to emerge about the scope and impact of Operations ULTRA and MAGIC. The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), a body that almost never releases anything about any topic, recently declassified hundreds of pages of documents showing how the United States broke the codes of its wartime allies as well as of its enemies through Operation MAGIC. The historical importance of these documents can hardly be overstated. See Tim Weiner, “U.S. Spied on Its World War II Allies,” *New York Times*, 11 August 1993, A-9. For an invaluable collection of 21 documents on other aspects of Operation MAGIC released earlier (in the 1980s) by the NSA, see Ronald H. Spector, ed., *Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War with Japan* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1988).

3. These documents would include such things as Historicky ustav CSAV, *Sedm prazskych dnu*, 21.-27. srpen 1968: *Dokumentace* (Prague, September 1968); Jiri Pelikan, ed., *The Secret Vysocany Congress: Proceedings and Documents of the Extraordinary Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (London: Allen Lane, 1971); *Rok sedesaty osmy vusnesenicha dokumentech UVKSC* (Prague: Svoboda, 1969); Jiri Pelikan, ed., *The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950-1954: The Suppressed Report of the Dubcek Government Commission of Inquiry, 1968* (London: MacDonald, 1971); and Hanswilhelm Haefs, ed., *Die*

Ereignisse in der Tschechoslowakei, vom 27.6.1967 bis 18.10.1968: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht (Bonn: Siegler and Co. KG. Verlag für Zeitarchive, 1969).

4. The lengthiest interview with Smrkovsky was “Nedokonceny rozhovor: Mluvi Josef Smrkovsky,” *Listy: Casopis ceskoslovenske socialisticke opozice* (Rome) 4:2 (March 1975), 3-25. Among several important interviews with Pelikan, see in particular “Interview with Jiri Pelikan: The Struggle for Socialism in Czechoslovakia,” *New Left Review* 71, (January-February 1972), 3-35. For a useful set of commentaries by Hejzlar from 1970 on, see Zdenek Hejzlar, “*Prazske jaro*” 1968 a jeho odkaz (Köln: Index, 1988).

5. Jiri Hajek, *Dix ans apres — Prague 1968-1978* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978); Zdenek Mlynar, *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus* (Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1978); Zdenek Mlynar, *Ceskoslovensky pokus o reformu, 1968: Analyza jeho teorie a praxe* (Köln: Index-Listy, 1975); and Jiri Pelikan, *Ein Frühling, der nie zu Ende geht: Erinnerungen eines Prager Kommunisten* (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1976). For accounts by ex-intelligence officers, see Josef Frolík, *The Frolík Defection: The Memoirs of an Intelligence Agent* (London: Leo Cooper, 1975); Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare* (New York: Ballantine, 1972); and Frantisek August and David Rees, *Red Star over Prague* (London: Sherwood Press, 1984).

6. See, in particular, Erwin Weit, *Eyewitness: The Autobiography of Gomulka’s Interpreter* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1973), which, as the subtitle implies, provides a first-hand account of the Warsaw summit in mid-July. See also Larisa Sil’nitskaya, “Recollections of Bratislava,” *Radio Liberty Dispatch*, RL 195/74, 2 July 1974, 1-6, which describes the Bratislava meetings from the standpoint of someone who served as an interpreter for top Czechoslovak officials.

7. These include my forthcoming book on *Crisis Management in the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991*, which deals in part with the 1968 crisis; a second book, now being revised, on postwar Soviet-East European relations, which makes more extensive use of archival sources; a lengthy chapter entitled “From Dominance to Hegemony to Collapse: Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe 1945-1991,” in a forthcoming book edited by Sarah M. Terry and Carol Saivetz; and a volume, to be published by the New Press in its series of National Security Archive documents readers of newly declassified Soviet and East European documents that I have been translating, editing, annotating, and introducing. All these materials are due out in 1994. In the somewhat longer term, I will be writing a book about the 1968 crisis, using it as a case study of multi-level bargaining in international relations.

8. See, e.g., “Zapis’ besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditel’yami bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol’shi, 8 maya 1968 goda” (TOP SECRET), 8 May 1968, in Archiv Komise vlady CSFR pro analyzu udalosti let 1967-1970 (hereinafter abbreviated as Archiv Kom.), Z/S 2. See also “Vecny scenar invaze: Rozhovor o pozadi udalosti pred triadvaceti lety,” *Lidove noviny* (Prague), 17 January 1991, 10.

9. *Pameti Vasila Bil’aka: Unikatni svedectvi ze zakulisí KSC*, 2 vols. (Prague: Agentura Cesty, 1991), 2:86-89.

10. “Dopis A. Kapeka,” in Archiv Kom., Z/S 21. The letter is undated, but Kapek’s reference to “our joint meeting” indicates that it was written during the Cierna negotiations.

11. “Kdo pozval okupacni vojska: Dokumenty s razitkem nikdy neotvirat vydaly svedectvi,”

- Hospodarske noviny* (Prague), 17 July 1992, 1-2. The text of the letter was in Russian to ensure that it would be read expeditiously. In his memoirs, Bil'ak forthrightly acknowledges that he passed on a letter at Bratislava urging the CPSU and the Soviet Army to lend "fraternal assistance"; see *Pameti Vasila Bil'aka*, 2:88. An English translation of the letter can be found in the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 35.
12. The account here is based on an interview with Shelest transcribed in Leonid Shinkarev, "Kto priglasil v Pragu sovsietkie tanki? Novye dokumenty o sobytiyakh avgusta 68-go," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 17 July 1992, 7. The fact that Bil'ak and the others chose this indirect and highly secretive method of transmitting the letter to Brezhnev confirms how uncertain they still were that the Soviet Union would actually invade. If the Soviet authorities had agreed in the end to some non-military solution, the hard-liners in the KSC did not want it known that they had been calling for armed intervention. When Bil'ak was questioned about the matter in 1990, he claimed that some sort of letter was passed on to Brezhnev at Bratislava by a covert intermediary, Radko Kaska, who was a member of the KSC Central Committee staff and an aide to Kolder. Bil'ak added, however, that he did not know anything about the letter and had not signed it. The glaring discrepancies in Bil'ak's story undercut his version of how the letter was transmitted and give credence to Shelest's testimony.
13. "Perechen' dokumentov iz arkhiva Politbyuro TsK KPSS o sobytiyakh v Chekhoslovakii, 1968 g." (SECRET) 6 February 1991, in Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii (hereinafter, TsKhSD), the Moscow archive containing the post-1952 CPSU Central Committee records, F. 89, Per. 11, Dok. 76, L. 3. For the transcript of Brezhnev's phone conversation with Dubcek, see "Telefonicky rozhovor L. Brezneva s A. Dubcekem, 9.8.1968," in Archiv Kom., Z/S 8.
14. Among other sources, see "Stenograficky zaznam schuzky Varsavske petky v Moskve dne 18.8.1968 k rozhodnuti o intervencii a projednani planu," in Archiv Kom., Z/S 22, pp. 392-93.
15. *Ibid.*, 393-94. According to Shelest, Bil'ak gave him a list of these "healthy forces" along with the "letter of invitation" on the evening of 3 August. See the interview with Shelest in Leonid Shinkarev, "Avgustovskoe bezumie: K 25-letiyu vvoda voisk v Chekhoslovakiyu," *Izvestiya*, 21 August 1993, 10.
16. "Kdo pozval okupacni vojska," 1-2.
17. "Zvaci dopis: V cele s Indrou a Bil'akem," *Lidove noviny* (Prague), 19 January 1991, 1-2.
18. "Vpad byl neodvratny: V srpnu 1968 melo byt zatceno na ctyricet' tisíc cechu a slovaku," *Mlada fronta* (Prague), 21 August 1990, 1.
19. Interview in *Magyarorszag* (Budapest) 28 (14 July 1989), 5.
20. "Obrashchenie gruppy chlenov TsK KPCh, pravitel'stva i Natsional'nogo sobraniya ChSSR," *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 August 1968, 1, 4. The editor-in-chief of *Pravda* at the time, Mikhail Zimyanin, recently revealed how the appeal from these unnamed "Czechoslovak" officials was composed. On the evening of 20 August, the text of the appeal was dictated over the phone by Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin. Zimyanin and Kosygin then did some editing over the phone, and the revised text was submitted to the CPSU Politburo for approval. Zimyanin received a final go-ahead from the Politburo within a few hours. See the interview with Zimyanin in "Kto priglasil v Pragu sovsietkie tanki?" 7.
21. Weit, *Eyewitness*, 216.
22. Karen Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 101. For similar interpretations, see H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 695-98; Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: The Anatomy of a Decision*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 176; and Fritz Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968*, RM-5909-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, March 1969), 81.
23. This is the title of the section on Bulgaria in Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution*, 695-98.
24. "Stenogramata na proslovutiya plenum na TsK na BKP, proveden na 17. 18 i 19 yuli 1973 g.," Bulgarian Central Party Archives, Fond 58, File No. 81, pp. 127-128 (emphasis added); cited in Dragomir Draganov, "Kusopametstvo ili ...?" *Duma* (Sofia), 2 December 1990, 2.
25. Chuck Sudetic, "Bulgarian Communist Stalwart Says He'd Do It Differently," *New York Times*, 28 November 1990, A-8.
26. "Zapis' besedy s pervym zamestitelem Ministra inostrannykh del NR Bolgarii tov. Gero Grozevym," Cable No. 40 (SECRET) from N. V. Maslennikov, counselor at the Soviet embassy in Bulgaria, 8 January 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 279, Ll. 2-3.
27. *Ibid.*, L. 3.
28. "Vystuplenie tovarishcha V. Gomulki na vstreche s partiinim aktivom Varshavy," *Pravda* (Moscow), 22 March 1968, 3-4.
29. See, e.g., "Zashchitata na sotsializma v Chekhoslovakiya e nashe obshcho delo: Da bude razgromena kontrarevolutsiyata!," *Rabotnicheskodelo* (Sofia), 18 July 1968, 1. The first major attacks in the Bulgarian press appeared about two weeks earlier; see, e.g., Dimcho Sokolov, "'Dve khilyadi dumi' ili prizyv kum kontrarevolutsiya?" *Rabotnicheskodelo* (Sofia), 4 July 1968, 6.
30. See also the recent memoir by a former agent of the Bulgarian security forces who was stationed in Prague in 1968, Vladimir Kostov, *The Bulgarian Umbrella: The Soviet Direction and Operations of the Bulgarian Secret Service in Europe*, trans. by Ben Reynolds (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 124-26.
31. See, e.g., "Zapis' besedy s zam. ministra inostrannykh del NR Bolgarii tov. I. Popovym," Cable No. 214 (TOP SECRET) from N. V. Maslennikov, counselor at the Soviet embassy in Bulgaria, 1 April 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 278, Ll. 23-25; "Zapis' besedy s ministrom inostrannykh del NP Bolgarii tov. Ivanom Bazhevym," Cable No. 274 (TOP SECRET) from A. M. Puzanov, Soviet ambassador in Bulgaria, 8 May 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 278, Ll. 97-100; and "Zapis' besedy s pervym zamestitelem ministra inostrannykh del NRB tov. G. Grozevym i zamestitelem ministra inostrannykh del NRB tov. I. Popovym," Cable No. 263 (SECRET) from A. M. Puzanov, Soviet ambassador in Bulgaria, 4 April 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 278, Ll. 26-29.
32. "Zapis' besedy s ministrom svyazi NR Bolgarii tov. S. Tonchevym," Cable No. 254 (TOP SECRET), from N. V. Maslennikov, counselor at the Soviet embassy in Bulgaria, 12 April 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 279, Ll. 7-11.
33. "Zapis' besedy s ministrom inostrannykh del NR Bolgarii tov. Ivanom Bashevym," Cable No. 118 (TOP SECRET) from A. M. Puzanov, Soviet ambassador in Bulgaria, 16 February 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 278, Ll. 4-6.
34. "Zaznam z porady sest bratrskych stran v Drazdaneech (23.3.1968), vypracovany s. V. Bil'akem" (TOP SECRET), March 1968, in Archiv UV KSC, F. 01, Vol. AJ 131.
35. "Zapis' besedy v TsK KPSS s rukovoditeliyami bratskikh partii Bolgarii, Vengrii, Germanii, Pol'shi, 8 maya 1968 goda" (TOP SECRET), 8 May 1968, in Archiv Kom., Z/S 2. For a published (though abridged) version, see "Dokument: Zapis vystoupeni na setkani prvnykh tajemniku UV Bulharska, Polska a SSSR v Moskve 8. kvetna 1968 (13.00-20.00 hodin)," *Lidove noviny*, 20 February 1991, 9 (Part 1); and "Dokument: Zapis vystoupeni na setkani prvnykh tajemniku UV BLR, MLR, NDR, PLR a SSSR v Moskve 8. kvetna 1968 (13.00-20.00 hodin)," *Lidove noviny* (Prague), 21 February 1991, 9-10 (Part 2), and 22 February 1991, 6 (Part 3).
36. Text reproduced in "Shel avgust 68-go ...: Dokumenty predany glasnosti," *Pravda*, 18 February 1991, 6-7.
37. See "Projev L. Brezneva na schuzi varsavske petky ze 14.7.1968, opakovany na plenu UV KSSS 17.7.1968," in Arkhiv Kom., Z/S 4.
38. "Yanosh Kadar o 'Prazhskoi vesne'," *Kommunist* (Moscow) 13 (July 1990), 98.
39. *Ibid.*, 101.
40. Zhivkov quoted in cable from A.M. Puzanov, Soviet ambassador to Bulgaria, to CPSU secretariat, 1 August 1968, Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereinafter, AVPRF), F. 059, Op. 58, P. 124, D. 573, Ll. 95-96.
41. Bittmann, *The Deception Game*, 186-87; and Frolik, *The Frolik Defection*, 147-52. See also August and Rees, *Red Star Over Prague*, 128-30.
42. Interview in "Otkrovennost' vozmozhna, lish' kogda za toboi zakroetsya dver': General KGB o KGB," *Moskovskie novosti* 25 (24 June 1990), 11. See also Kalugin's article "Razredka i vneshnyaya politika," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow) 5, (May 1989), 61.
43. "'KGB poka ne menyaet printsipov'," *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), 20 June 1990, 2.
44. See, e.g., "Shifrtelgramma" (TOP SECRET — EYES ONLY), 3 April 1968, in Archiv Kom., Z/S, MID 1; Memorandum No. 2500-Ts (TOP SECRET) from S. Tsvigun, deputy chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 29 October 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, Ll. 111-119; and Memorandum No. 2571-Z (TOP SECRET) from N. Zakharov, deputy chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 19 November 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 310, Ll. 52-59. Included with this last item was a resolution solicited by the KGB and signed by 200 agents of the Czechoslovak Interior Ministry who expressed "gratitude, as Communists, to the USSR" for the invasion.
45. For one of numerous examples, see "Informatsiya o nekotorykh otritsateln'nykh sobytiyakh v ChSSR," Cable No. 59 (SECRET), 19 January 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 43-48.
46. August and Rees, *Red Star Over Prague*, 128-30.
47. Andrew and Gordievskii, *KGB*, 482-84.
48. Interview with Czechoslovak deputy interior minister Jan Ruml in "Eshche raz o 'Prazhskom variante': Otvet pervogo zamestitelya ministra vnutrennykh del ChSFR otstavnomu polkovniku KGB," *Moskovskie novosti* 40 (7 October 1990), 11.
49. August and Rees, *Red Star Over Prague*, 128-29.
50. Andrew and Gordievskii, *KGB*, 486. See also August and Rees, *Red Star Over Prague*, 129. The "discovery" of the arms caches was prominently reported

KOREAN WAR*continued from page 1*

tudes toward the PRC in 1966, but more importantly it provides the first documentary evidence of the planning of the North Korean attack on South Korea on 25 June 1950, a pivotal event in the Cold War whose origins have until now remained obscure.

The identification and release of this document was the result of fruitful collaboration between archivists and historians that distinguished the conference held in Moscow last January. Archivists M. Yu. Prozumenshchikov and I.N. Shevchuk of the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (the Central Committee archive for post-1952 documents) cited this document in a footnote to the excellent survey of documentary sources on Sino-Soviet ties in the 1950s they prepared for the conference.² In accordance with the agreement between CWIHP and the archive, which specified that all documents used in the preparation of conference papers would subsequently be made generally available, I was given access to the file.³ Since this report was filed with documents from 1966, among records of routine correspondence between the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), it is unlikely that I would have found it without the bibliographical research done by the archivists and the cooperation encouraged by CWIHP.

The most important information in this document comes from the citations to telegrams held in the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. Such citations are of course not as definitive as the telegrams themselves, but in the case of citations that present information that directly contradicts the official Soviet position on the Korean War's outbreak, one may confidently infer that this information is accurate. It would simply have been impossible for the writers of this survey baldly to contradict the often repeated Soviet on this highly sensitive subject unless these statements were true.⁴

Following from the above textual analysis, we can conclude that this document resolves two key questions—whether North Korea did in fact plan and initiate the large-scale fighting that began on 25 June 1950 and whether this action was planned and/or supported by the Soviet Union.⁵ It is clear from the information presented below that the assertion maintained to this day by the DPRK, and by the Soviet government until

its demise, that the military action by North Korea on June 25 was a defensive response to provocation by the South, is simply false. The DPRK planned a full-scale attack on South Korea to begin June 25, with the goal of unifying the country through military force. Stalin approved the North Korean plan, provided sufficient arms and equipment to give the DPRK a significant military superiority by the time of the attack, and sent Soviet military advisers to North Korea to assist in planning the campaign.

This document thus refutes part of the revisionist interpretation. However, it supports the revisionist argument that the impetus for the war came from Pyongyang, not Moscow. This was Kim Il Sung's war; he gained Stalin's reluctant approval only after persistent appeals (48 telegrams!).⁶ The Truman administration's assumption in June 1950, and of many scholars writing since then, that the Korean War was Stalin's initiative, is therefore also false.⁷

The question of whether the North Korean attack was Stalin's initiative was absolutely central to the development of the Cold War. The United States knew that Kim Il Sung was determined to unify Korea under his control, as was Syngman Rhee in the South, but by the spring of 1950 the Truman administration had concluded that South Korea was not of sufficient strategic importance to the United States to justify military intervention to prevent a North Korean takeover of South Korea. However, for the *Soviet Union* to attempt to gain control over South Korea was a different matter entirely.

The issue was not so much that South Korea should be kept out of Moscow's control, but rather that Soviet aggression against an independent state lying outside its sphere of influence, as Washington viewed the events of June 25, was a challenge to American resolve that must be met, especially when that state was closely linked to the United States. The nearly unanimous opinion within the Truman administration was that this was a Soviet probe; if the United States did not resist this act of aggression, the Soviet Union would move next into West Germany, or perhaps Iran.⁸

This document suggests, however, that Stalin supported Kim's plan only because he calculated that it would *not* involve military conflict with the United States. The reference in this survey to Kim's calculation that Washington would not intervene implies that

Stalin based his approval on this argument, but it does not state explicitly that this was Stalin's reasoning. However, other documents I have seen in the Foreign Ministry archive, as well as memoirs published recently in Russia, indicate that Stalin was surprised and alarmed by the U.S. intervention.⁹ He evidently blamed Kim for having badly misjudged the situation, which explains the statement in paragraph two that Kim and other North Korean leaders were "determined to unify the country by military means, without devoting the necessary attention to studying the possibility that existed at that time for peaceful reunification through the broad development of the democratic movement in South Korea." Soviet officials were in fact well aware that by the spring of 1950 the leftist movement in South Korea had been severely weakened by the South Korean police, acting with U.S. aid.¹⁰ Soviet criticism of Kim for failing to pursue peaceful methods of reunification, a line which began soon after the U.S. entry into the war, was therefore a veiled way of holding Kim responsible for the negative consequences the Soviet Union suffered as a result of the U.S. intervention.

If the North Korean attack on South Korea was not Stalin's initiative and was not a test of American resolve, the question remains: Why did Stalin approve Kim's scheme and provide him with the necessary military supplies? The evidence available thus far suggests that the reason was tied to Stalin's relations with Mao. Stalin's fear that Mao's victory in the Chinese civil war potentially challenged the Soviet leader's position as leader of the international communist movement, combined with his distrust of Mao's loyalty to the USSR, seems to have propelled him to support Kim's attempt to reunify Korea.¹¹ However, we are not yet able definitively to answer this question. For this we need access to, among other items, the cables and other communications between Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang in 1950, either from the Foreign Ministry archive or the Presidential Archive (the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, or APRF), neither of which has been fully opened to scholars.

The statement in this document that Kim secured Mao's support for the military reunification of Korea during Kim's visit to Beijing in April 1950 is the first documentary evidence uncovered of Mao's advance

knowledge and approval of the North Korean plan.¹² The brief statement that the Chinese government adopted the decision to send volunteers to Korea “under pressure from Stalin” is also the first documentary evidence we have of Stalin’s pressuring the PRC to intervene in the Korean War. It is far from conclusive, however; since such a claim supports the Soviet criticism of the PRC that is the focus of this survey, it is entirely possible that the writers stretched an ambiguous statement by Stalin into “pressure” to intervene. A recently-published telegram from Mao to Stalin on 2 October 1950 reveals that Mao immediately informed Stalin of the decision of the Chinese Communist Party leadership to send Chinese troops to Korea, but the Chinese sources do not reveal communications from Stalin to Mao.¹³

The implicit criticism of the PRC for intervening in Korea only to protect its own security and the lengthy discussion of the tensions between the PRC and DPRK were no doubt an attempt to disparage the Chinese effort in Korea in order to counter criticism of what was in fact very weak Soviet support for the DPRK. Although Stalin provided North Korea with arms and equipment, once the United States entered the war he took great pains to distance the Soviet Union from the fighting. And despite heavy bombing of North Korea by the Americans in the fall of 1950, the Soviet Union did not intervene to defend its client state. When Stalin did at last covertly send military forces to Korea, in the spring of 1951, he did so only in support of Chinese forces, to whom he was bound by a mutual defense treaty.¹⁴

It is interesting that this document cites the participation of Soviet military advisers and the provision of military equipment, but does not mention the participation of Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft personnel. According to several memoir accounts published recently in Russia, the Soviet military forces eventually sent to Korea were substantial, though still tiny in comparison with the Chinese military commitment.¹⁵ The omission of such information from this otherwise quite forthcoming report reinforces accounts by several participants of the extreme measures taken by the Soviet government to keep the extent of its military involvement in the Korean War a secret,¹⁶ an effort motivated by Stalin’s fear of direct conflict with the United States.

Finally, this document provides sup-

port for the conclusion that it was the death of Stalin rather than U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons that finally brought a breakthrough in the negotiations for an armistice to end the Korean War. While serving as Secretary of State under Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles claimed that it was the new administration’s “unmistakable warning” to Beijing that it would use nuclear weapons against China that finally brought an end to the war, a claim Eisenhower repeated in his memoirs.¹⁷ However, the threats communicated by the Eisenhower administration were made in May 1953, two months after Soviet leaders discussed with Zhou Enlai the need to conclude an armistice rapidly and dispatched a representative to the DPRK to facilitate this result. This report is circumspect in its discussion of this subject, but it indicates that as soon as Stalin was no longer part of the decisionmaking, the Soviets, Chinese and North Koreans were able quickly to reach an agreement to end the conflict. If further evidence proves this conclusion to be true, it will have significant implications for our understanding of the relationship among Stalin, Mao, and Kim, as well as for the study of “atomic diplomacy.”

Prospects are fairly encouraging for finding answers soon to many of the remaining questions about the Soviet role in the Korean War. The Soviet Foreign Ministry archive, through a project funded by the International Archives Support Fund, has begun systematically to declassify its records, proceeding in five year blocks. For the first year of the project, Oct. 1992 - Sept. 1993, the archive planned to declassify records from 1945-50 and 1917-21, and the following year those for 1951-55 and 1922-26. So far, the declassification work is on schedule and the results are encouraging; a large percentage of the files are being declassified. The most important exception is the archive’s continuing reluctance to release deciphered telegrams, a critically important category of documents.

The Defense Ministry archive is currently declassifying its documents on the Korean War, in response to President Yeltsin’s promise to South Korea in November 1992 that Soviet records on the war would be opened. The Presidential Archive is also planning to release a collection of documents on the Korean War. These are scheduled to be published in the November 1993 issue of a new journal, *Istochnik: Documents of Russian History*, which is under the

general editorship of Rudolf G. Pikhov, director of the State Archival Service of the Russian Government.¹⁸

The following text is a translation from a handwritten copy of the original, which I wrote in the archives in January 1993. I was unable to obtain a photocopy of the document because the archive staff said that it did not have the technical means to make a photocopy from microfilm. Since the archive closed its reading room in April 1993, I have been unable to fill in the brief sections I omitted from my hand-written copy, which are marked here with brackets.

* * * * *

mb-04339/gs TOP SECRET
9 August 1966

copies to: Brezhnev (2), Kosygin (2),
Gromyko, Kuznetsov, Kovalev, Kornienko,
Sudarikov, IDU, UVU, OIUVA (2), file (2)

On the Korean War, 1950-53,
and the Armistice Negotiations

I. [Background to and Preparations for First Stage of the War]

After separate elections in 1948 in South Korea and the formation of the puppet government of Rhee Syngman, on the one hand, and the formation of the DPRK, on the other, relations between the North and the South of the country were sharply aggravated. The Seoul regime, as well as the DPRK, declared its claim to be the authority in all of Korea. The situation at the 38th parallel became even more tense in 1948 after the withdrawal of Soviet and American troops from Korea.

During this period, Kim Il Sung and other Korean leaders were firmly determined to unify the country by military means, without devoting the necessary attention to studying the possibility that existed at that time for peaceful reunification through the broad development of the democratic movement in South Korea.

In the DPRK, a people’s army was created which in manpower and equipment significantly surpassed the armed forces of South Korea. By January 1, 1950, the total number of DPRK troops was 110,000; new divisions were hastily being formed.¹⁹

Calculating that the USA would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim Il Sung persistently pressed for agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong to reunify the country by military means. (telegrams #4-51, 233, 1950)

Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve, noting that “such a large affair in relation to South Korea ... needs much preparation,” but he did not object in principle. The final agreement to support the plans of the Koreans was given by Stalin at the time of

Kim Il Sung's visit to Moscow in March-April 1950. Following this, in May, Kim Il Sung visited Beijing and secured the support of Mao.

The Korean government envisioned realizing its goal in three stages:

- 1) concentration of troops near the 38th parallel
- 2) issuing an appeal to the South for peaceful unification
- 3) initiating military activity after the South's rejection of the proposal for peaceful unification.

At Stalin's order, all requests of the North Koreans for delivery of arms and equipment for the formation of additional units of the KPA [Korean People's Army] were quickly met. The Chinese leadership sent to Korea a division formed from Koreans who had been serving in the Chinese army, and promised to send food aid and to transfer one army closer to Korea "in case the Japanese enter on the side of South Korea." (telegram 362, 1950)

By the end of May 1950 the General Staff of the KPA together with Soviet military advisers announced the readiness of the Korean army to begin concentration at the 38th parallel. At the insistence of Kim Il Sung, the beginning of military activity was scheduled for June 25, 1950. (telegram 408, 1950)

By the time of the attack, the North Korean armed forces had significant superiority over the South Koreans. The correlation of forces between South and North Korea was as follows: in number of troops 1:2; number of guns 1:2; machine-guns 1:7; submachine guns, 1:13; tanks 1:6.5; planes 1:6. The operational plan of the KPA envisioned that Korean troops would advance 15-20 kilometers per day and would in the main complete military activity within 22-27 days. (telegram 468, 1950)

[Here follows a brief factual account of the course of the war through October 1950, from the initial successes of the KPA in June, July, and August, through their near defeat following the U.S./U.N. amphibious landing at Inchon in September-K.W.] During this period, which was an ordeal for the Korean people, the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party and the government of the DPRK worked strenuously on the formation of new military units, using the territory of China as well for this purpose. The most steadfast of the KPA units that were surrounded in the South carried on partisan combat in the mountains.

II. Entry of the Chinese into the Korean War

During Kim Il Sung's visit to Beijing in May 1950, Mao Zedong, in conversation with him, underscored his conviction that the Americans would not become engaged in a war "for such a small territory as Korea" and stated that the Chinese government would transfer one of their armies to the region of Mukden in order to render the necessary assistance in case the South Koreans drew Japanese soldiers into military action. The Chinese leadership based their cal-

culatation on the fact that the American troops would not take part in the war, and they did not intend to aid the DPRK by means of the entrance of a large number of their troops.

In August 1950 American planes began bombing Chinese territory near the Yalu. In October 1950, soon after the American landing at Inchon, the front line moved close to the Korean-Chinese border and the enemy's artillery began to fire on Chinese territory. Ships of the American Seventh Fleet entered the Taiwan Straits.

By that time the Korean People's Army had virtually disintegrated as a fighting force. Remnants of military units that escaped encirclement were making their way toward China to regroup.

The Chinese government, under pressure from Stalin, adopted the decision to send volunteers to Korea only after a real threat to the security of China had arisen and the very existence of the DPRK had been called into question. The entry of Chinese volunteers into Korea began in the second half of October 1950. Subsequently, the total number of Chinese troops in Korea was brought to 1 million men; approximately the same number of men were sent to Korea to transport military cargo. (transmission of Soviet Embassy in Beijing #7, January 18, 1952) By the end of 1951, the strength of the Korean People's Army was brought to 337,000 men. On the other side, 700,000 officers and soldiers participated in ground operations, including 380,000 South Koreans and 280,000 American troops, not counting American naval and air forces, which blockaded Korea from the sea.

The entry of the Chinese volunteers into the war and the active participation of Soviet military advisers, who participated in the planning of all major offensive operations, brought about a vital breakthrough in the course of military events. American and South Korean troops were thrown back to the 38th parallel, and in several places even further southward. Chinese troops, operating on the Western front, occupied Seoul at the beginning of January 1951.

However, Chinese troops, following the strategic line of the leadership of the PRC to preserve the front at the 38th parallel (one may suppose that Mao Zedong was afraid of the consequences of a further advance to the south), left Seoul and withdrew to the north. They did not support the efforts of the Korean units on the eastern front to dislodge American troops from the area along the northern side of the 38th parallel.

During this period of the war, sharp disagreements arose between Kim Il Sung and the command of the Chinese people's volunteers, led by Peng Dehuai. The Koreans were against the surrender of Seoul by the Chinese volunteers and reproached them for not supporting the Korean units on the eastern front.

During the time that Chinese volunteers were in Korea there were numerous cases of Chinese interference in the internal affairs of the DPRK. Studying the morale of the Korean population,

they sent reports to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which underscored the poor conditions of the population and criticized the policies of the Korean authorities. The Chinese attempted to draw towards themselves the commanders of the KPA. Illustrative in this regard is the affair of Pak Il-u, chief representative of the KPA in the headquarters of the Chinese volunteers. Kim Il Sung more than once declared that Pak Il-u was behaving as the personal representative of Mao Zedong, trying to disparage the authority of the leadership of the Korean Worker's Party, placing himself above the party. The Chinese inflamed any sort of intrigue, using Pak Il-u against Kim Il Sung.

Peng Dehuai was not ashamed to express his low opinion of the military capabilities of Kim Il Sung. Cases of great power manners were observed, obvious scorn toward Koreans by Chinese commanders. Once Kim Il Sung was stopped by Chinese sentries when he went to Peng Dehuai's headquarters, and was detained by them for a long time. Local Korean authorities complained that the commanders of the Chinese volunteers frequently arbitrarily forced the population into construction work, indiscriminate felling of forests, slaughtering of livestock, etc.

Numerous Koreans lay the blame on China for the retreat of the KPA and its huge losses, declaring that "if the Chinese help had arrived a month earlier, everything would have turned out differently." Korean leaders said at that time that if it had not been for the Chinese position, it would have been possible to expel the Americans from the Korean peninsula and unify the whole country during the successful attack of the Chinese volunteers in the winter of 1950-51.

In all of this the Chinese volunteers, as is known, played an important role in the breakthrough in the military situation and in the retention of the front at the 38th parallel. Their losses for the first year of the Korean war alone were more than 300,000 men.

The Chinese leadership, making use of the volunteers' long stay in Korea, tried to strengthen their long-term influence in the DPRK. After the signing of the armistice in Korea on July 27, 1953, the Chinese volunteers remained in Korea for more than five years. It was the end of October 1958 before they returned to their homeland, under pressure from the Koreans.

The Chinese leaders even now, in every way possible, use the participation of the volunteers in the war in Korea to pressure the DPRK into supporting their adventurist positions.

III. The U.N. and the Intervention of the USA in Korea [a brief straightforward summary-K.W.]

IV. Negotiations for the Armistice

By the middle of 1951, the situation clearly indicated that it was in practice impossible to

resolve the unification of Korea by military means. Both the Chinese and the Korean leaders equally were forced to acknowledge this. After preliminary consultations with the Chinese and Koreans, the Soviet government on June 23, 1951, put forward a proposal for settling the military conflict in Korea. "As a first step," the Soviet representative declared, "it would be necessary to begin negotiations for a cease-fire, for an armistice with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel." This proposal attracted universal attention.

On June 27, 1951, the American Ambassador [to Moscow Alan G.] Kirk visited A.A. Gromyko (at that time deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR) and appealed to him with a number of questions in connection with these proposals. Elucidating to Kirk the position of the Soviet government, Comrade Gromyko indicated that the negotiations on the armistice must be conducted by representatives of the joint American command and the command of the South Korean troops, on one side, and by representatives of the command of the Korean People's Army and the command of the Chinese volunteers, on the other. Comrade Gromyko noted that the negotiations must be limited to military questions and first of all the question of a cease-fire.

On June 29, Ridgway, who was at that time the commander of the "U.N. troops" in Korea, appealed over the radio to the commander of the Korean People's Army Kim Il Sung with a proposal to begin negotiations for an armistice.

July 1, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai broadcast over the radio a joint answer to Ridgway's appeal. The answer expressed their agreement to meet with representatives of the American command "to conduct negotiations for the cessation of military activity and the establishment of peace."

The negotiations of the representatives of the commands of the warring sides began on July 10, 1951, and continued, with breaks, for more than two years, until the end of July 1953.

In the course of the negotiations such basic questions were discussed as: the establishment of a line of demarcation between the two sides for the creation of a demilitarized zone as a condition for the cessation of military activity in Korea; the elaboration of practical measures for implementing the cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the staff, authority and functions of an apparatus for observing the implementation of the conditions of the cease-fire and armistice.

By the beginning of May 1952, an agreement was reached on all questions, with the exception of the question regarding prisoners of war. Later that question was also resolved on a mutually acceptable basis.

Measures undertaken by the Soviet government after the death of Stalin in many ways facilitated the conclusion of the agreement. While in Moscow for Stalin's funeral, Zhou Enlai had conversations with Soviet leaders regarding the

situation in Korea. During these conversations, Zhou Enlai, in the name of the government of the PRC, urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of the negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice. Such a position by the Chinese coincided with our position. For the implementation of practical measures ensuing from the complicated situation, a special representative was sent to Pyongyang from Moscow in March 1953 with a proposal for speeding up the peace negotiations. By that time the Koreans also showed a clear aspiration for the most rapid cessation of military activity.

On July 27 an armistice agreement was signed in Panmunjom.

The armistice agreement fixed the military demarcation line and provided for the withdrawal of troops 2 km from this line to create a demilitarized zone, [and] provided for a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops of both sides from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice agreement takes effect. [Here follows a listing of the terms of the agreement—K.W.]

V. The Korean Question after the Armistice

The conclusion of the armistice in Korea created the preconditions for a peaceful reunification of the country. The first step in this direction must be the convening of the political conference envisioned in the agreement.

Because of the sabotage of the USA, a political conference on Korea was convened only on April 26, 1954, in Geneva. The American delegates applied maximum efforts to prevent the adoption of the proposals of the DPRK, USSR, and PRC that aimed to create on the Korean peninsula a single, genuinely democratic government. The conference did not adopt any constructive decisions on Korea.

The Korean question has remained until now within the framework of the U.N. and is considered unresolved. It is a subject of "discussion" at every regular session of the U.N. General Assembly. The government of the DPRK speaks out against the discussion of the so-called Korean question in the U.N. and in favor of disbanding the "Commission on the Reunification and Restoration of Korea" and the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. This position of the Korean leadership is fully supported by the Soviet government.

FROM MATERIALS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE USSR

(Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, Fond 5, Opis 58, Delo 266, 1, Listy 122-131)

1. I am indebted to a senior Korea specialist in Moscow who served in the Korea section of the Central Committee's International Department in 1966 for a description of the context in which this report was written. It is an indication of the enduring Soviet concern for maintaining secrecy about the Korean War

that although he was a specialist on Korea, he had never seen this internal history, and prior to our conversation did not know most of the information it contains.

2. M. Yu. Prozumenshchikov and I.N. Shevchuk, "Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1953-59," paper presented to the CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, Moscow, 12-15 January 1993.

3. Another conference participant, David Holloway, professor of political science at Stanford University, was the first to follow up on this footnote, asking for and receiving the file cited. He then mentioned the significance of this document to a Russian participant, Vladislav Zubok, who then called me to suggest I look at it. I am grateful for Vlad's and David's collegiality and am happy to report that it is characteristic of the interaction among researchers working on postwar foreign relations in Moscow archives over the past year, a situation which is largely the result of existence of the Cold War International History Project.

4. With regard to the survey as a whole, similar internal histories that I, as well as other scholars working on the postwar period, have seen in recent months have been accurate in their factual details, though limited in their analysis and scope.

5. Though most knowledgeable observers at the time and many historians since have asserted that it was absurd to think that Kim Il Sung could have prepared and initiated such a major military action without Stalin's approval and aid, some scholars have continued to argue that Kim may have acted on his own, and that, indeed, the North Korean attack on June 25 may have been a response to a provocation from the South, as the DPRK and the Soviet Union have maintained. The most important statement of this argument is in Bruce Cumings' monumental study, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1990), 439-65, 568-621. See also Gye-Dong Kim, "Who Initiated the Korean War?" in James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., *The Korean War in History* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1989), 44; and Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 28.

6. This agrees with the account in Khrushchev's memoir, which emphasizes that "the war wasn't Stalin's idea, but Kim Il Sung's." Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 367-8.

7. A recent statement of this interpretation is in Adam Ulam, *The Communists: The Story of Power and Lost Illusions: 1948-1991* (New York and Toronto: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 81-82.

8. For detailed studies of the U.S. intervention, see, e.g., James Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and William Whitney Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Foreign Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

9. See Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives," CWIHP Working Paper No. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November, 1993).

10. The Foreign Ministry archive contains lengthy, detailed reports on political activity in South Korea sent regularly from 1945-1950 by Soviet officials in North Korea to their superiors at the Foreign Ministry.

11. For a discussion of the evidence available to date, see my Working Paper, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the

Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From Russian Archives.”

12. Tworecently published accounts of Kim’s April 1950 visit to Beijing based on Chinese memoirs and interviews give conflicting accounts: Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” *China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990), 100; and Chen Jian, “The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China’s Entry into the Korean War,” *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 1* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1991), 1, 20-21.

13. See Li Xiaobing, Wang Xi, and Chen Jian, “Mao’s Dispatch of Chinese Troops to Korea: Forty-Six Telegrams, July-October 1950,” *Chinese Historians* 5:1 (Spring 1992), 67-68.

14. For details, see Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-50: New Evidence From Russian Archives.”

15. Lieutenant-General Georgi Lobov, who commanded the 64th Corps in Korea, has estimated that from 1952 until the end of the war in 1953, the corps numbered about 26,000 personnel. Interview with G. Lobov, “Blank Spots of History: In the Skies of North Korea,” *Aviatsiya i Kosmonavtika* 10 (Oct. 1990), 30-31, 34, in JPRS-UAC-91-003 (28 June 1991), 27-31. Also see Aleksandr Smorchkov, “Speak Korean in Battle,” *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 9 June 1990; A. Roshchin, “During the Cold War on the East River,” *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, Jan. 1990, 131-39; interview with Aleksandr Smorchkov, Moscow International Broadcast Service in Korean, 11 June 1990, translated in FBIS-SOV-90-121 (22 June 1990), 9-10; and B.S. Abakumov, “Sovetskie letchiki v nebe Korei,” *Voprosy Istorii*, Jan. 1993, 129-39.

16. See, e.g., the interview with Lobov cited above.

17. James Shepley, “How Dulles Averted War,” *Life*, 16 January 1956, 70-72; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 179-80. Furthermore, as Roger Dingman has shown, the United States had been threatening to use nuclear weapons throughout the war. For discussions of this debate see Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War,” *International Security* 13:3 (Winter 1988/89), 50-91, and Rosemary Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” *International Security* 13:3 (Winter 1988/89), 92-112.

18. For a translation of these documents see my forthcoming article, “The Soviet Union and the Korean War: New Evidence from the Soviet Archives,” in the winter 1993-94 issue of *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*.

19. This figure is higher than the estimates of U.S. intelligence, according to which by June 25 the KPA numbered between 87,500 and 99,000 men. See the discussion of these figures in Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II*, 452-53.

Kathryn Weathersby received her Ph.D. in Russian history from Indiana University and is an assistant professor of history at Florida State University (Tallahassee). With support from Social Science Research Council and Florida State University, she spent 1992-93 conducting archival research in Moscow on Soviet policy toward Korea, 1945-53. Last January she presented her findings at the CWIHP conference in Moscow; they are also available in a CWIHP Working Paper. She has also written a commentary on a collection of documents on the Korean War from the Presidential Archive, for the Russian journal Istochnik.

ARCHIVES

continued from page 1

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would have seemed utterly fanciful. Although the most important archives in Moscow are still sealed off and access to the Central Committee and Foreign Ministry collections is still highly problematic, the Russian government has made at least some effort to release materials to researchers from both Russia and abroad. When I first went to the Central Committee archives and the Foreign Ministry archives in 1992 I assumed I would have to fight constant battles to get the documents I wanted. But soon after I began working there, I found that the main problem I was having was just the opposite: namely, how to cope with the thousands of pages of materials they were quite readily bringing me. Even after some three months of work in those archives, the difficulty of absorbing everything remained as acute as ever. For a brief while I even began to suspect that Strachey was justified in regarding ignorance as a scholarly virtue.

That feeling quickly dissipated, however, when the situation at the archive containing the post-1952 holdings of the Central Committee took a sharp turn for the worse in the spring of 1993. The abrupt dismissal of one of the top archival officials, Vladimir Chernous, in February 1993 was the first sign of an impending clampdown. Chernous had been a prominent advocate of greater openness in the CPSU archives. Two months later the director of that same Central Committee repository, Rem Usikov, was also fired after being accused of “laxness in enforcing regulations on access to confidential material.”² Although Usikov had been a long-time CPSU functionary and was never a proponent of opening up the archives, he had gone along — if only grudgingly — with the more relaxed policy that was introduced in the latter half of 1992 and early 1993.³ Thus, his ouster and the initial charges lodged against him were a further indicator that a period of retrenchment was under way. The extent of the retrenchment soon became clearer when Usikov’s successor, Anatolii Prokopenko, did away with all the procedures that had been adopted in 1992 to make the archive more accessible. The new director’s intention of adhering to what he described as a “more restrictive approach” was well summed up in a remark he made during a conversation in May 1993: “Yes,

these documents have been declassified, but that doesn’t mean people should be allowed to look at them.”⁴ In the span of just a few days, all the progress at the Central Committee archives that had been achieved since August 1991 seemed to come undone, perhaps irreparably.

Fortunately, this adverse trend did not greatly affect the Foreign Ministry archives, where the degree of access for scholars continued gradually to expand. Although the main reading room at the Foreign Ministry was closed temporarily in mid-1993 (a smaller, temporary one was then opened following complaints from researchers), this was done mainly so that renovations and a much-needed expansion of the room could be completed. The clampdown at the CPSU archives may have engendered a somewhat more cautious atmosphere at the Foreign Ministry, but the trend at the latter was still toward greater openness.

Furthermore, even at the post-1952 Central Committee archives the situation as of mid-1993 was by no means hopeless. In the past, Prokopenko espoused a distinctly liberal view of the need to curb “senseless, deliberately obstructive, and phony” restrictions on “supposedly classified” materials, arguing that “only a small number of these documents genuinely contain secrets.”⁵ At one point he even quit his job as director of the USSR’s “Special Archive” — the repository in which captured document collections and other highly sensitive items were stored — because he could no longer put up with the “extremely ignorant people” in the Main Archival Directorate (Glavarkhiv) who “insist on keeping everything secret.”⁶ Moreover, in conversations with Cold War International History Project officials in July 1993, both Prokopenko and other archival authorities expressed a willingness to continue cooperation with foreign researchers and projects. Hence, even before Prokopenko was replaced because of health reasons by Natalia Tomilina in September, there were some grounds for optimism that the setback at the former CPSU archives would be only temporary.

Nevertheless, even if the regressive steps that Prokopenko implemented in the spring of 1993 are eventually reversed by his successors, the sudden change of policy was a sobering reminder of how little the Russian authorities understand about the way a government archive is supposed to operate. In

the West, state archives are expected to be independent of day-to-day political considerations, and the archivists are responsible for assisting scholars in historical research. Documents in the archives are considered to be part of the public domain and are thus freely accessible to all who work there. In Russia, by contrast, none of these conditions yet holds true. Archival policy in Russia is still determined by the prevailing political winds, and professional archivists find themselves obliged to respond to the demands and whims of high-level bureaucrats. The notion that archival materials and other official records belong to something called the “public domain” is still alien in Russia. Access to documents often depends instead on political connections or, in some cases, on who offers the highest bid. Although the degree of political manipulation and interference at the Russian archives is not as great now as it was during the Soviet era, most of the official repositories in Moscow still fall woefully short of acceptable standards of professional integrity.⁷

Some Russian and Western observers have expressed hope that the situation will improve, at least somewhat, now that a comprehensive “Law on Archival Collections of the Russian Federation,” to regulate all the far-flung state repositories in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and elsewhere, is finally in place.⁸ This law was under consideration for several years (initially by the Soviet legislature and more recently by the Russian parliament), and the version of it that was approved in July 1993 was somewhat better than expected, especially compared to other measures adopted by the Russian parliament in the wake of the April 1993 referendum. Still, there is little reason to believe that the archival law will improve matters much in the absence of a broader, well-developed legal system in Russia. Indeed, some features of the new law could actually be used to tighten up, rather than loosen, existing restrictions on archival access.⁹ An ominous precedent along these lines was nearly set in July 1993 when the Russian legislature approved a new “Law on State Secrets” in a second reading.¹⁰ If Russian President Boris Yeltsin had signed the secrecy law, as he did with the archival legislation, it could have been used to seal off vast quantities of information indefinitely.

Whatever the ultimate effect of the archival law may be, the broad changes set in

motion by the dissolution of the Russian parliament in September 1993 and the defeat of the hard-line rebellion in Moscow in early October do offer greater reason for hope that access to the Russian archives will improve again. The leeway for reform in the wake of Yeltsin’s victory over his opponents should alleviate the concerns that some Russian officials, including those in the archives, had about exposing themselves to reprisals by hard-line forces. Conditions at the archives also are likely to improve if the Russian Security Ministry (the main successor to the Soviet KGB) is drastically scaled back and restructured, as has been proposed.¹¹ By all accounts, hard-line officials from the Security Ministry were among those most responsible for the clampdown at the archives in the spring of 1993. An overhaul of the Ministry that leaves it a good deal weaker will almost certainly be beneficial for those hoping to work in the archives. Whether such an overhaul will be lasting is a different matter, however. After all, the Soviet/Russian security organs were restructured, pared back, and deprived of some of their key functions right after the August 1991 coup attempt, but they were soon able to reclaim almost all of their lost powers and prerogatives. The officials who helped the ministry regain its strength the last time are still firmly ensconced there.

Thus, even if the ascendancy of reformist elements leads to some immediate or short-term improvements in archival access and a more open climate is soon restored to the Central Committee archives, there is no guarantee that what was taken away once will not be taken away again. Until the archival system in Russia—and the country’s whole political system, for that matter—are placed on a sounder institutional footing, the degree of access to materials in the former CPSU archives and other key repositories in Moscow will continue to depend on capricious judgments and pressures from above.

Scholarly Opportunities

Despite recent setbacks, the Russian government’s willingness to allow even a modicum of access to certain archives is a notable departure from the past. Neither Tsarist Russia nor the Soviet Union had any tradition of releasing archival materials to the public. During the Soviet period, the only historians permitted to use secret post-

war documents were trusted employees of the CPSU Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Committee on State Security (KGB). The main responsibility of Soviet archival officials was to ensure that no items, no matter how inconsequential, fell into the hands of unauthorized researchers.¹²

Fortunately, though, this obsessive secrecy did not prevent the emergence of well-stocked and—to varying degrees—well-organized repositories. The collapse of the Soviet Union came so suddenly that the bulk of the archives (with the important exception of the KGB’s holdings, as noted below) was left largely intact. Soviet officials never expected that their top-secret documents would one day be exposed to public scrutiny, so they tended to preserve almost everything, even the most incriminating materials. On only a few occasions in the past were large quantities of documents destroyed either deliberately or inadvertently. In 1940 Lavrentii Beria, the infamous secret police chief of the Stalin era, ordered certain materials from the 1920s and 1930s to be shredded. Other items were lost or destroyed during the Second World War as a result of the fighting and the confusion accompanying the mass evacuation of official records. In the early post-Stalin years, especially just after the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, senior officials who wanted to cover their tracks ensured that key materials were shredded or transferred to remote locations.¹³ All these episodes in combination may have created substantial gaps in the documentary record of certain events from the Stalin era.

Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the gaps will prove fatal, not least because copies were made of many documents so that they could be sent to one or two other repositories. Even when materials were destroyed or removed from one archive, copies or closely-related items may turn up elsewhere.¹⁴ Furthermore, the scope of what was destroyed may not have been as great as sometimes feared. Crucial documents that have been unearthed in recent years—such as the lists of mass executions and torture that Stalin routinely ordered, the Russian-language version of the secret protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the memorandum ordering the execution of Polish officers in Katyn Forest—are as incriminating as one could possibly imagine.¹⁵ The fact that these and countless other items are still in the

archives suggests that any gaps which may have been created are modest compared to the evidence that was *not* destroyed.

A potentially more vexing problem comes from documents that never existed at all — that is, from decisions which were made without leaving an explicit “paper trail” of written orders, notes, or transcripts of deliberations. The methodological pitfalls associated with this phenomenon can be seen outside the Soviet field in the works of certain historians who have examined Hitler’s decision to order the mass destruction of European Jews. Because Hitler himself refrained from committing the extermination policy to paper (leaving that to subordinates like Himmler, Heydrich, and Eichmann) and resorted to euphemisms when describing the policy in his speeches, a few “revisionist” historians such as David Irving have argued that the Holocaust went on without Hitler’s knowledge or approval.¹⁶ This thesis has been decisively refuted by a large number of historians both inside and outside Germany, but the very fact that Irving can make his claims — no matter how tendentious they may seem — underscores the way the lack of written records on particular matters can be abused and manipulated by historians.¹⁷

To a certain extent at least, this same problem is bound to arise with the former Soviet archives. In a country like the Soviet Union, where “telephone justice” (i.e., telephone calls from top CPSU officials to state functionaries ordering them how to resolve specific issues) and “word-of-mouth-only” decision-making long prevailed, one is apt to find important activities or decisions that were not committed to paper. This may well be the case, for example, with the assassination in 1934 of the head of the Leningrad party, Sergei Kirov. Although most historians agree that Stalin himself ordered the murder, no written order to that effect has yet been located, and it is likely that none exists.¹⁸ Problems of this sort also crop up from time to time in the study of Soviet foreign policy. Deliberations about key foreign policy decisions, both during and after the Stalinist era, did not always get recorded in full. Such may be the case, for example, with the decision in 1962 to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. Although a vast amount of evidence about the Cuban missile crisis has recently come to light, there is little reason to expect that docu-

ments will emerge explaining precisely what the Soviet leadership hoped to gain from the missile deployments.¹⁹

Nevertheless, despite the obstacles caused by gaps in the written record (especially from the Stalin era), these need not hinder efforts to understand Soviet history. For one thing, in a country that was as obsessed with record-keeping of all sorts as the Soviet Union was, the documentation of most events and decisions was far more extensive than one would find virtually anywhere else. Shortly before the archives were opened, a few Western scholars had speculated that access to Soviet repositories would be of only limited value because the records in Moscow “are probably sparse.”²⁰ Even a brief stint at the ex-Soviet archives will show how unfounded this claim was. Far from being “sparse,” the archives in Moscow are overflowing with documents and information that will greatly enrich our historical understanding. What is more, even when genuine gaps in the record exist, one can always try to work around them. The specific order for Kirov’s assassination may not have been put down on paper, but an enormous amount of other evidence points to Stalin’s complicity, as Robert Conquest and others have demonstrated. If freer access is granted to the most important archives in Moscow (i.e., the Presidential Archive, the military archives, and the KGB archives), the amount of documentation that will help fill in gaps will only increase.

Furthermore, even though some gaps are likely to remain once all the archives have been opened, that will not necessarily inhibit scholarly endeavors. No matter how complete or incomplete the written record may be in any particular instance, there will always be room for legitimate differences of interpretation. New documentary evidence can help narrow those differences and cast doubt on certain interpretations — which is precisely why archival research is valuable — but it would be naive to think that the archives alone will generate a grand scholarly consensus on every important matter. With or without greater access to the former Soviet archives, disagreements about how to interpret specific events and documents will persist in the future.

This is not to say, however, that the importance of archival research should be discounted; quite the contrary. The opportunity to examine declassified Soviet docu-

ments and the latest memoirs by ex-Soviet officials may not be a panacea, but it is the only way we are going to obtain a better understanding of Soviet history. Archival evidence and new memoirs can bring to light previously unknown data; and, equally important, they can corroborate or undercut interpretations that had long been taken for granted. Several years ago John Lewis Gaddis noted the value of declassified materials for the study of U.S. foreign policy, and his remarks seem even more apposite now, *mutatis mutandis*, for the study of Soviet foreign policy:

I am familiar with the argument that the [New York] *Times* is usually two steps ahead of the Central Intelligence Agency in any event, and that access to internal government documents would not substantially alter our knowledge of what is going on at any given point. But that is simply not true: anyone who has looked carefully at declassified government documents from the post-1945 era will know how inadequate the public record is as a guide to what was actually happening. . . . And even when the public record does faithfully reflect what goes on behind the scenes, the psychology of many policymakers — at least those who believe that nothing is worth reading unless it is stamped “top secret” — might well cause them to discount generalizations based solely upon what appears in “open” sources, however thorough they may be.²¹

The disjunction that Gaddis noted between the “public record” and “what was actually happening” raises troubling questions about traditional Western analyses of Soviet foreign policy. Of necessity, these analyses were based exclusively on open sources. Yet the very fact that secret documentation was not released by the Soviet government would lead one to expect that the discrepancy between open and closed sources in the Soviet Union was at least as great as — or even greater than — in the United States.

To be sure, most Western scholars did their best to make allowance for the constraints imposed by the lack of primary Soviet documentation. Nevertheless, many were tempted, at least occasionally, to infer too much from the public record.²² Some scholars even led themselves to believe that “the debate and controversies to be discerned among the Soviet press organs constitute a faithful reflection of the actual debates taking place in closed forums.”²³ Such

confident assumptions about what could be gleaned from open sources have not been borne out by the new documentary evidence in Moscow. On the contrary, we can now see from the Russian archives that the divergence between the “public record” and “what was actually happening” in Soviet foreign policy was, if anything, even wider than one might have expected.²⁴

Thus, for scholars who hope to be more knowledgeable and more accurate about the topics they are exploring, access to declassified Soviet documents will be of great benefit. The potential value of the new archival sources is apparent from the way the earlier release of American and West European documents enriched our understanding of Stalin’s foreign policy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when “post-revisionist” scholars began reexamining the Soviet Union’s role in the early Cold War years, they were able to exploit newly declassified Western materials to bridge at least part of the gap between the “public record” and “what was actually happening.”²⁵ The opportunity to take advantage of this evidence helped ensure that the post-revisionist works surpassed all previous studies in the field, both in nuance and in scope. Needless to say, the likelihood of further advances is even greater now that declassified documents will be available not only from Western countries but from Moscow as well.

Already, in fact, new evidence from the ex-Soviet archives has shed a good deal of light on key topics in Soviet domestic affairs and foreign policy. For example, recently declassified materials confirm that Stalin played a direct and expansive role in the mass repressions of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, contrary to what some Western “revisionist” historians had been arguing.²⁶ The new evidence also undercuts the revisionists’ claims that the scale of the Stalinist repressions was much smaller than earlier Western estimates had suggested. It turns out that the earlier estimates, far from being too high, may in some cases have significantly understated the actual number of victims.²⁷ With regard to foreign policy, declassified materials have helped clarify such important issues as the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet role in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and Moscow’s decision to invade Afghanistan. On this last topic, for example, many hundreds of pages of newly released documents indicate that Soviet leaders in Decem-

ber 1979 were well aware of the potential difficulties that Soviet troops might encounter, but were convinced that all those problems could be overcome relatively easily.²⁸

As more documents are declassified in the future, our understanding of many other issues is also bound to improve. Materials from the Presidential Archive, the military archives, and the KGB archives, which are not yet freely available, should be especially valuable in helping to clarify some of the most mysterious and controversial topics. To be sure, scholars will have to be cautious about what they find in the archives, and will have to resist some of the methodological pitfalls discussed below. Also, it is worth stressing again that new evidence, no matter how important, cannot guarantee a scholarly consensus. The room for legitimate disagreement may narrow considerably, but differences over the best way to interpret complex events will inevitably remain. Yet, despite all these caveats, it is clear that the opening of the ex-Soviet archives has provided immense opportunities for scholars.

New Archival Collections

Until late 1991, the central state archives of the Soviet Union were administered by the Main Archival Directorate (Glavarkhiv) of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Glavarkhiv also supervised several thousand regional and local archives in the USSR. The CPSU archives, however, were managed separately by the party itself. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism was responsible for the Central Party Archive, while the Central Committee apparatus supervised its own 140 archives as well as those of the Secretariat. Documents from the Politburo, as noted below, were stored in a special archive in the Kremlin, under the direct control of the CPSU General Secretary.

Following the aborted coup in August 1991 and the dissolution of the USSR four months later, the archives in Moscow were extensively reorganized. Glavarkhiv was abolished, and almost all of its vast staff and bureaucratic apparatus, including its specialized archival research institute, were transferred intact to the newly created Russian State Committee on Archival Affairs (Roskomarkhiv). The 15 central state archives in Russia that had been administered by Glavarkhiv were placed under the direct jurisdiction of Roskomarkhiv. Most of the

nearly 2,200 other state archives in Russia — including 47 republican archives, 170 regional sites, and 1,981 provincial and local repositories — also came under the new agency’s indirect control, though they were accorded much greater autonomy than they ever were permitted when they had to report to Glavarkhiv.²⁹ As of late 1992, the 17 federal archives under Roskomarkhiv’s direct control housed some 65.3 million files, comprising many billions of pages of documents. The other state archives in Russia — at the republic, regional, and provincial levels — accounted for another 138.7 million files, with billions more pages of documents.

In early 1993, Roskomarkhiv was reorganized and renamed the “State Archival Service of Russia” (Rosarkhiv), in accordance with a governmental decree signed in late December 1992.³⁰ The change of name and restructuring of the agency were intended to place Rosarkhiv on a par, both symbolically and substantively, with other federal agencies such as the Russian External Intelligence Service (RSVR). The current director of Rosarkhiv is Rudolf Pikhoya, who was formerly the prorector of the university in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg), where he became acquainted with the then-first secretary of the Sverdlovsk branch of the CPSU, Boris Yeltsin. It was also in Sverdlovsk that Pikhoya got to know a faculty member, Gennadii Burbulis, who later became a top aide to Yeltsin. Thus, it is not surprising that Yeltsin would have chosen Pikhoya to supervise Russia’s archives, a post that is far more politically sensitive than it would be in most countries. Nor is it surprising that as the head of Rosarkhiv, Pikhoya has been unusually attentive to the political interests of Yeltsin, not only by releasing documents that are embarrassing to Yeltsin’s opponents (especially Mikhail Gorbachev), but also by serving as a presidential envoy when materials have been turned over to foreign countries.³¹

Although Pikhoya is the leading archival official in Russia, his agency does not yet have jurisdiction over some of the most important archival collections, including the CPSU Politburo’s records. Rosarkhiv does, however, have control over the rest of the former CPSU archives in Moscow, which are now divided between two major sites: the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI), which includes the former

Central Party Archive and other CPSU holdings through October 1952; and the much larger Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), which includes all CPSU Central Committee holdings from October 1952 through the end of the Soviet regime in December 1991.³² Even though the two repositories are both subordinate to Rosarkhiv and are geographically propinquitous to one another, there seems to be relatively little interaction or collaboration between them.

Together, the former CPSU archives include some 30 million files with more than six billion pages of documents accumulated by the Central Party Archive and the Central Committee apparatus (Fond No. 5), plus a smaller number of documents pertaining to the CPSU Secretariat (Fond No. 4). For the most part these documents, especially those in Fond No. 5, key “inputs” into the decision-making process, rather than how decisions were actually made at the top levels. The materials collected by the Central Committee apparatus include a vast number of items produced by the Foreign Ministry, KGB, Defense Ministry, and other state agencies, copies of which were routinely sent to the relevant CPSU departments. RTsKhIDNI’s holdings also include the voluminous files of the Comintern (Fond No. 495), the Soviet-sponsored organization that coordinated and directed international communist activities until it was formally dissolved in 1943.

In general, the documents from the post-October 1952 period at TsKhSD are better organized than the older documents stored at RTsKhIDNI; but the finding aids at RTsKhIDNI, which have now been listed in a computerized data base, are elaborate enough to compensate for most deficiencies in organization. (The main exception is the Comintern files, for which finding aids are unavailable.) The finding aids at TsKhSD are also of superb quality, even by Western standards. Researchers at the archives can look up whatever files they need under the appropriate Central Committee departments, relevant timeframe, and even specific topics. Whether requests to look at the files will be granted is, of course, a different matter, especially at TsKhSD.

The archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), which were recently renamed the “Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation” (AVPRF), are not under

Rosarkhiv’s jurisdiction and thus have operated along somewhat different lines. In accordance with the liberal and pro-Western orientation of Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, the AVPRF was the first of the former Soviet archives to open its postwar holdings to outside researchers, despite resistance by some archivists within the ministry. (Some noteworthy progress toward opening the MID archives had already begun under the final three Soviet foreign ministers—Eduard Shevardnadze, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and Boris Pankin, especially Pankin and Shevardnadze—whose outlook was similar to Kozyrev’s.) Although the declassification procedures at the AVPRF are still cumbersome and slow, the archive overall has become increasingly accessible since mid-1992 and has remained so even while the CPSU archives have been retrenching. This auspicious trend at MID is at least partly attributable to the existence of a multi-country arrangement that has helped foster an institutionalized framework for the AVPRF, as will be discussed below.

The bulk of the AVPRF’s holdings consists of cables, reports, and other documents generated either at Soviet embassies or within the ministry’s own departments and agencies.³³ Although many of the cables and reports are routine and uninformative, others contain important transcripts of conversations with foreign leaders or cogent assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet policy. A special division of the AVPRF, Fond No. 59, contains all the ciphred (i.e., supersecret) cables transmitted to and from Soviet embassies over the years, but this entire division, unfortunately, is still off limits.³⁴ Even without access to the most sensitive items, however, researchers are bound to come across plenty of valuable documents in the AVPRF.

The main problem with the Foreign Ministry archives, in fact, is not that materials are inaccessible, but that no finding aids of any sort have been disseminated. This deficiency has compelled researchers to depend entirely, or almost entirely, on archival employees to find out what is available on a particular subject. Even the best-intentioned and most capable archivists will not be able to provide the comprehensive coverage one can get by perusing finding aids such as those at the Central Committee archives. Moreover, the lack of finding aids at the AVPRF precludes the serendipitous discovery of ma-

terials closely (or not so closely) related to the researcher’s project, which the archivist may not realize would be of interest. Although officials in charge of the Foreign Ministry archives are aware of the problems caused by the lack of finding aids, they say that severe funding constraints have prevented them from taking remedial steps. Among other things, they would have to pay for the reproduction of dozens of inventories (*opisi*), and would have to hire and pay additional staff (retired senior diplomats) to scrutinize and declassify every page of the *opisi*. Some rudimentary finding aids, including lists of *fonds* and *opisi*, are supposed to be compiled in 1993 and 1994, and more elaborate materials should be available by 1995 or 1996. Those measures will certainly help, but the utility of the AVPRF will be limited until it provides finding aids comparable to those at the CPSU archives.

As illuminating as the former Central Party Archive, the former Central Committee archives, and the Foreign Ministry archives may be, they are not the most important repositories in Moscow. Scholars hoping to understand how decisions were made at the highest levels, as opposed to the “inputs” into the decision-making process, must look elsewhere.³⁵ All transcripts and notes from the CPSU Politburo’s meetings, all materials in the vast personal files of top Soviet officials, and all other items deemed to be of greatest sensitivity are in the Kremlin Archive (Fond No. 3), which during Mikhail Gorbachev’s time was reorganized, expanded, and renamed the “Presidential Archive.”³⁶ During the final years of the Soviet regime, countless documents that had been stored in the CPSU archives were removed from their files and transferred permanently to the Presidential Archive, in keeping with Gorbachev’s broader efforts to shift power from the central party apparatus to the state presidency. The rest of the CPSU holdings have been under the jurisdiction of Roskomarkhiv/Rosarkhiv since late August 1991, but the Presidential Archive has remained independent. In December 1991 the outgoing Soviet president (Gorbachev) relinquished control of the Presidential Archive to the Russian president, and it has been under Yeltsin’s direct supervision ever since.

No change in that status is envisaged any time soon under the new archival law, even though there have been periodic inti-

mations that the Presidential Archive would be subordinated to the archival service. In late 1991 and early 1992, Pikhoya and other senior archival officials maintained that the entire holdings of the Presidential Archive would soon be transferred to repositories controlled by Roskomarkhiv.³⁷ Nothing of the sort actually occurred. In the winter and spring of 1993, Pikhoya again averred that all "historical" items in the Presidential Archive would be turned over by the end of the year to TsKhSD and RTsKhIDNI.³⁸ Whether that will be the case is questionable, however. Although it seems likely that a substantial portion of the documents in the Presidential Archive *will* eventually be reassigned to Rosarkhiv, the new archival law does not mandate any such transfer in a fixed time period.³⁹ Moreover, even if the law did set a time limit, the schedule that Pikhoya proposed is far too compressed and subject to disruption by the recent turmoil at the former CPSU archives and by the expense involved in relocating such large quantities of materials. Most important, the question remains whether a change of formal jurisdiction will truly bring greater access to documents that have been almost totally sealed off until now.⁴⁰

So far, the only materials that have been released from the Presidential Archive have been declassified exclusively for political rather than scholarly reasons: in some cases to improve relations with foreign countries, and in other cases to provide documentary evidence for the trial of the CPSU before the Constitutional Court. Among the documents released to foreign governments are items pertaining to the 1983 Korean airliner incident, the Katyn Forest massacres, the 1956 invasion of Hungary, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the 1980-81 crisis in Poland. The documents provided to the Constitutional Court now come to many thousands of pages, and comprise some of the most sensitive items from the whole Soviet period, including a large number of materials from the Gorbachev era. A special commission was set up in May 1992 under Mikhail Poltoranin (who was later removed) to oversee the declassification and transfer of documents for the Court's proceedings.⁴¹ Until recently, lists of many of the items provided to the Court were available at TsKhSD in Fond No. 89, and copies of the documents could be freely ordered for review or photocopying, no matter what the

topic. That is no longer the case, however, under the stricter rules adopted in April 1993. Any use of materials in Fond No. 89 now requires the archive director's explicit approval, archive director, and only materials germane to the researcher's specified topic may be requested.

In addition to the Presidential Archive, two other crucial repositories that are still closed are the former KGB archives, which include a total of some 10 million files, and the military archives of the Defense Ministry. During the Soviet period, the KGB's main archives in the Lyubanka were hermetically sealed off to all but a few authorized personnel. Even after Gorbachev came to power, no effort was made to prod the KGB into releasing materials for scholarly purposes.⁴² In the wake of the August 1991 coup attempt, reports surfaced that large stocks of documents in the KGB's central archives were being destroyed. Although President Yeltsin and the newly appointed head of the KGB, Vadim Bakatin, quickly took steps to halt the destruction, Bakatin later surmised that many valuable items had been shredded or burned.⁴³ Similar conclusions were reached by a special parliamentary commission that was set up in October 1991 to monitor the fate of the KGB's documents.⁴⁴ This loss of materials compounded the effects of earlier sprees of archival destruction, which had been directed predominantly against the KGB's holdings.

Jurisdiction over the KGB's entire archives was formally transferred to Roskomarkhiv during the last few months of the Soviet regime, in accordance with a decree Yeltsin issued on 24 August 1991.⁴⁵ Under Roskomarkhiv's auspices, the parliamentary commission and its local branches were able to begin assessing the scope and content of the archives and, in certain instances, publicly disclosing what they found. These steps, combined with Bakatin's efforts to make some materials more accessible, brought a modicum of openness to the KGB's central archives for the first time.⁴⁶ Many observers expected that the trend toward greater openness would continue while Roskomarkhiv tried to figure out expedite and pay for the physical transfer of KGB documents to state repositories at all levels.

No sooner had the Soviet Union collapsed, however, than Bakatin lost his job and the newly renamed Russian Ministry of Security (the main successor to the KGB)

reasserted control over the KGB's central archives.⁴⁷ Although Roskomarkhiv retained nominal jurisdiction over the archives, Pikhoya effectively eschewed any further attempts to interfere with the KGB's materials. For his part, the new head of the Security Ministry, Viktor Barannikov, promptly retracted all the steps Bakatin had introduced to make certain documents available. By mid-1992 the commission that was established to oversee the transfer of the KGB's central archives to independent sites largely ceased to function, despite having failed to complete its mission. Moreover, even when the Security Ministry announced plans in May 1993 to open a reading room in the central archives by late 1993 or 1994, this did not adumbrate a genuine shift in archival policy. The only ones for whom the room is intended are individual citizens hoping to be given information about close relatives who died in the Stalinist repressions. Although a few scholars may eventually be permitted to review scattered files, broad access to the KGB archives is not in the offing. Nor is any improvement likely under the new archival law. On the contrary, most of the KGB's documents could end up being even less accessible than before, with files sealed off completely for 50 to 75 years or more.

Even the one seemingly bright spot in this gloomy picture — a deal that an American company, Crown Publishing, struck with the Russian External Intelligence Service (RSVR, the successor to the KGB's First Main Directorate) in mid-1992 to publish as many as ten books compiled from selected KGB documents — may be less positive than it appears at first glance. Indeed, there are some indications that the arrangement will be counterproductive. Although the books will cover important topics such as the Berlin crises, espionage operations in Great Britain, the Cuban missile crisis, and the case of Leon Trotsky, the deal sets a number of highly undesirable precedents. For one thing, officials from the RSVR have exclusive say over what Crown's authors will be permitted to see. Thus, the version of history that these books yield will be the KGB's own.⁴⁸ More important, the documents selected for Crown's volumes will reportedly be denied to all other scholars for at least 10 years following publication (and perhaps indefinitely after that as well), an arrangement that runs directly contrary to the principle of greater openness. By the

same token, the huge sum that Crown is doling out (\$1 million) creates a disincentive for the RSVR to release any of its other materials for public use in the future unless comparable monetary inducements are forthcoming. Finally, the deal pertains only to the holdings of the RSVR, which for obvious reasons are the easiest for the Russian government to withhold on grounds of “national security.” Crown will have no access at all to the much larger central archives controlled by the Security Ministry.⁴⁹

The unavailability of documents from Soviet military archives is an equally serious obstacle to researchers, especially for those studying postwar Soviet foreign policy. Soviet military documents have long been scattered among several archives in or near Moscow and St. Petersburg, including the General Staff Archives (IATsGSVS), the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), the Archive of the Main Intelligence Directorate (AGRU), the Central Naval Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsVMAMO), the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), the Russian State Military-Historical Archive (RGVIA), and the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGAVMF).⁵⁰ The first four of these repositories contain highly classified military items from World War II and the post-1945 period, and all four archives are independent of Rosarkhiv. Although the other three sites — RGVA, RGVIA, and RGAVMF — are now under Rosarkhiv’s supervision, their holdings are less sensitive than those at the first four archives and they do not include any materials from the post-1941 period. Thus, all military documents from the Cold War era are outside Rosarkhiv’s jurisdiction.

By the mid- to late 1980s a few researchers were able to gain partial access to military holdings from the early Soviet period, especially the revolutionary and civil war years. Eventually, some scattered collections from as late as World War II also were released.⁵¹ Moreover, in early 1989 a five-volume annotated list of nearly 34,000 *fonds* in the Central State Archive of the Soviet Army (TsGASA, the former name of RGVA), covering the years from 1917 to 1941, was declassified. Subsequently, the list was authorized for commercial distribution in the West.⁵² All these measures, however, still fell far short of the access that serious scholars would need. A fitting illustration of how closed and secretive the mili-

tary archives remained even at the height of glasnost came in 1990 when one of the most trusted Soviet military historians, General Dmitrii Volkogonov, publicly complained that he and other senior officers at the Soviet Defense Ministry’s own Institute of Military History were being denied access to holdings from World War II and earlier.⁵³

In the post-Soviet era, the kind of problem that Volkogonov cited may have ebbed, but military documents from the post-1945 period have remained as tightly sealed as ever, and the military intelligence (GRU) archives are still totally off-limits even to the Russian Defense Ministry’s own historians. Vast quantities of military documents from the past five decades, numbering billions of pages, are known to be in either TsAMO or one of the other three defense archives mentioned above; but there is little way, short of having an inside contact, of knowing precisely what is there or how well it is stored.⁵⁴ Judging from articles by high-ranking Russian military officers who have been granted selective access to postwar military documentation, the main Defense Ministry repositories and General Staff archives contain reasonably well-organized collections, with detailed sets of operational plans and instructions from the major postwar crises.⁵⁵ Only a minuscule fraction of this material has been released or even cited, however, and there is little indication that access to the military archives will improve in the future. The continued lack of access prevents scholars from exploring key aspects of the foreign policy-making process in the Soviet Union as well as some of the still-mysterious episodes in Soviet internal politics (e.g., the July 1957 Zhukov affair, in which the celebrated World War II hero and Soviet defense minister, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, was abruptly removed from office⁵⁶).

Collaboration With Foreign Partners

In 1992 and the first few months of 1993, Pikhoya’s agency and some of the individual Russian archives established cooperative links with foreign archival experts and scholarly institutes to help make the collections in Moscow more accessible. Universities, research centers, and national archives from some 25 countries, including Finland, Israel, Poland, Hungary, China, South Korea, and Iran as well as all the leading Western countries, have entered into

such arrangements. By far the largest of the deals was one that Roskomarkhiv arranged with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University soon after the aborted August 1991 coup. The status of this particular deal was not impaired by the retrenchment at the CPSU archives in mid-1993, though this may have been because the initial phase of the deal pertained only to the inventories at the archives, rather than the documents themselves.⁵⁷ Other cooperative ventures of special importance are one involving TsKhSD and the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, another that has provided an international supervisory panel for the Foreign Ministry archives, and a third involving joint production of a new journal called *Istoricheskii Arkhiv* (“Historical Archive”). Each of these arrangements will be briefly discussed below to provide a sample of the nearly five dozen cooperative ventures that have been established since 1991, some with greater success than others.⁵⁸

The Hoover Institution’s project with Rosarkhiv, which is closely tied to separate deals that the U.S. Library of Congress and the British firm Chadwyck-Healey set up earlier, is expected to cost between \$3 million and \$5 million over a period of at least five years. The deal, as signed in April 1992, covers the “preservation, exchange, and publication” of archival materials.⁵⁹ It stipulates that Hoover archivists will catalog and microfilm at least 25 million pages of documents from the CPSU Central Committee archives and assorted state archives, ranging from 1917 to 1991. The project began in mid-1992 and will not be completed until 1996 or later. An editorial board of prominent international scholars, chaired by Pikhoya, is responsible for selecting which of the billions of pages of documents will be microfilmed.⁶⁰ (They will designate entire *fonds* for microfilming, rather than specifying individual items.) All such documents are supposed to be fully available to scholars even while the project is under way, a notable contrast to the Crown Publishing deal with the RSVR archives. The first phase of the Hoover project involves the microfilming of the complete *opisi* (inventories) of the former CPSU and state archives, an impressive undertaking in itself. The total number of pages in the *opisi* is close to 3 million.

When the project is completed, one

copy of the 25,000 reels of microfilms will be deposited at Hoover, and another will be given to Rosarkhiv along with the original negatives. In addition, a copy of the most important microfilms will be deposited at the U.S. Library of Congress and at the Russian State Library (formerly known as the Lenin Library). Chadwyck-Healey will have the right to market a smaller set of microfilms around the world except in the former Soviet Union, where Rosarkhiv will retain full control. Profits from the sales are to be shared with Pikhoya's agency and Hoover. In return for the microfilms from the Russian archives, Hoover not only will underwrite all costs of the project and transfer the advanced microfilming equipment to Rosarkhiv, but will also provide the Russian archival agency with a full set of 4,000 reels of microfilmed documents from Hoover's own large collection of materials about Russia. When further portions of the Hoover documents on Russia are microfilmed in coming years (eventually reaching as much as 25,000 reels), Hoover will supply copies of those microfilms to Rosarkhiv as well.

From the outset, the Hoover-Roskomarkhiv deal's size and scope made it the target of attacks in Russia. Nationalist commentators and parliamentarians accused Pikhoya of the national heritage.⁶¹ Members of the quasi-fascist group *Pamyat'* claimed that the project was part of a Judaeo-Masonic conspiracy to turn over Russia's "treasures" and "deepest secrets" to the West. Some criticisms of the deal also appeared in the liberal Russian press, where commentators voiced "bewilderment" that "a project on such a vast scale would be undertaken by a state-run archive."⁶² Even Yurii Afanas'ev, a distinguished historian and rector of the Russian State Center for the Humanities (formerly the Archival-Historical Institute), who had long been noted for his radical democratic views, immediately expressed skepticism about the deal with Chadwyck-Healey and, a few months later, bitterly complained that Roskomarkhiv was "selling out Russia's past" in its deal with Hoover.⁶³

Although many of the objections to the project were inaccurate or grossly exaggerated, the unease felt by some of the critics, particularly Afanas'ev, was understandable in certain respects. Professional historians in Russia were aware that the economic plight of the archives and the lack of a

concept of "public domain" had created temptations for archival officials to secure funding through any means necessary, including unsavory "exchanges" and "transfers" of documents. It is not surprising, therefore, that Russian historians would have questioned the propriety of a deal as large as the one that Hoover and Roskomarkhiv concluded. Moreover, Afanas'ev and his colleagues seemed to feel a special obligation to "protect" the archives because they sensed — with some justification — that most Russian citizens had little or no interest in what happened to the documents. In 1992, the number of researchers who actually worked in the 17 federal archives in Russia was only about 3,000, and of these more than 45 percent were foreigners.⁶⁴ On average, then, each of the archives hosted a total of just 92 Russians during the entire year, or about one person every four days. This low turnout, Afanas'ev feared, meant that archival holdings could be sold off without arousing a hint of public protest.

These two factors — the pervasive economic stringency in Russia, and the public's seeming indifference to the fate of the archives — induced even the best-intentioned critics (not to mention those whose aims were less benevolent) to misconstrue and misrepresent the Hoover-Roskomarkhiv project. Confronted by charges of a "sell-out," Pikhoya vigorously defended the arrangement and was at least partly successful in overcoming the more vitriolic and tendentious attacks.⁶⁵ In a few cases when legitimate concerns about the project were raised, the officials overseeing the effort sought to accommodate and respond to those concerns.⁶⁶ Although criticisms in the Russian press gradually faded in the latter half of 1992, the lingering effects of the controversy were significant enough to impede the consummation of other proposals to microfilm archival collections in Russia.⁶⁷ Moreover, fresh complaints about the Hoover project suddenly appeared in the spring of 1993, in line with the retrenchment at the former CPSU Central Committee archives.⁶⁸ Those attacks, as noted above, did not create any immediate problems for the ongoing work of the Hoover archivists, but it remains to be seen whether the arrangement will hold up if Russia's political climate takes a sharp turn for the worse.

The deal between TsKhSD and the Wilson Center's Cold War International History

Project (CWIHP) involved a third partner as well, the Institute of Universal History (IVI) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. A tripartite agreement signed in July 1992 stipulated that Western and Russian scholars involved with the project must be given equal and unrestricted access to "declassified materials" in the CPSU archives, with all materials made available to the international scholarly community and no restrictions whatsoever placed on the rights of scholars to use declassified documents.⁶⁹ At a preliminary meeting in Moscow in January 1992, participants discussed exactly what is available in the Russian archives and the terms and principles of possible collaboration. A follow-on conference in Moscow, in January 1993, which was organized by the IVI and CWIHP and funded by the latter, allowed researchers to present the initial findings of their work. Among the topics explored at this conference were the breakdown of wartime cooperation, the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan, the division of Germany, the Korean War, the Suez and Berlin crises, the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Sino-Soviet relations, the Vietnam War, and the 1972 U.S.-Soviet summit. Revised versions of selected papers are supposed to be compiled as a book, but the prospects for continued collaboration were thrown into doubt by the clampdown at TsKhSD in the spring of 1993.

One of the distinctive features of the original CWIHP-TsKhSD deal was the requirement that any documents released in connection with the project must subsequently be made available to all scholars, Russians and foreigners alike. Initially, the access that participants were given to the CPSU archives was less than satisfactory, but starting in the early autumn of 1992 the archivists were willing to comply with most requests. That policy continued for several weeks after the January 1993 conference.⁷⁰ Even so, a few of the archival officials were uncomfortable with the arrangement from the very start, and they often seemed to be erecting as many obstacles as they could to prevent materials from being disseminated. Although TsKhSD received \$12,500 from CWIHP in return for preparing reports and accelerating the declassification of its holdings, that sum apparently was not enough to deter certain TsKhSD officials from trying to renege on the agreement. In May 1993 Prokopenko indicated that he did still intend

to abide by the agreement, but it is difficult to square that pledge with some of his actions, especially his decision to deny or limit access to Fond No. 89.⁷¹

For Western scholars not associated with CWIHP, the task of working in the former CPSU archives has been more arduous still. Although all scholars were supposed to have access to materials released in connection with the CWIHP-TsKhSD-IVI project, those materials were deemed to be "classified" until they were formally released.⁷² Consequently, researchers not affiliated with the CWIHP venture (or with one of the other Western deals with Roskomarkhiv/Rosarkhiv) almost invariably found that they were denied access to materials at TsKhSD, despite CWIHP's repeated requests that all scholars receive equal access to released materials. Although this situation should have been rectified once thousands of documents were "declassified" for the CWIHP-TsKhSD-IVI participants, it is not yet clear whether TsKhSD will live up to its obligations. Certainly the archive's rigidity in providing access to some researchers but no access at all to others in 1992 and early 1993 was a telltale sign of the much more vexing problems to come in the spring and summer of 1993. Those problems will be discussed at greater length in the next section.

A collaborative project that has been more durable, at least so far, is an effort to link the Russian Foreign Ministry archives

with a panel known as the International Academic Advisory Group (IAAG). This multinational undertaking is sponsored by the Norwegian Nobel Institute, which has helped raise funds of more than \$100,000 for the archive from Japanese and U.S. donors, and administered by the International Archives Assistance Fund (IASF). The arrangement provides for four senior Western scholars (Odd Arne Westad from Norway, William Taubman from the United States, Jonathan Haslam from Great Britain, and Gerhard Wettig from Germany) to serve on a joint board with archivists and historians from MID. The panel, which is chaired by Westad and has Sven Holtsmark of the IASF as its secretary, has assisted the AVPRF in applying for funds from Western and Japanese sources to help ameliorate specific features of the archive that are most deficient (e.g., finding aids, the size and working conditions of the reading room, and salaries for the staff). The funding allotments themselves give the IAAG considerable leverage over the AVPRF's priorities, and the panel also can make recommendations for other improvements as it sees fit, especially regarding declassification procedures.

Among the concrete results of the IAAG's work was the establishment of a set of guidelines for declassifying and releasing materials, which the group presented to the Foreign Ministry collegium in March 1992. Their proposals were adopted largely intact

the following month, when the Foreign Ministry published new sets of rules for archival declassification and access.⁷³ The new regulations stipulate that the AVPRF must make items older than 30 years available as soon as possible except when doing so would "demonstrably impede" Russia's security or cause "danger or distress" to individuals. Although these clauses are phrased so broadly that they may be susceptible to abuse, the IAAG has been careful to monitor the implementation of the new rules and to recommend improvements when needed. Despite relatively slow progress in spurring the AVPRF to release and produce more finding aids, and to declassify deciphered telegrams, the international advisory panel has generally been successful in fostering a climate of greater openness.

Another collaborative project that has been valuable in helping to open up some of the most important Russian archives is the renewed publication — after a 30-year hiatus — of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, which covers the latest developments in archival affairs. The journal's chief editor is A. A. Chernobaev, and the editorial board, chaired by Pikhoya, consists of distinguished Russian, American, British, and German scholars and archival officials, who are able to ensure that *Istoricheskii arkhiv* meets high professional standards. Two prominent U.S. specialists connected with the Hoover project — the deputy director of the Hoover Institu-

Note on the Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation

by Vladimir V. Sokolov and Sven G. Holtsmark

For students of the history of international relations since 1917, the gradual opening up of the collection of the *Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation* (AVPRF, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii) means exciting new challenges and opportunities. For the first time it is now possible to start detailed and in-depth studies of the Soviet foreign policy making process based on a kind of material which is, after all, not altogether different from what one expects to find in the Foreign Ministry archives of other great powers.

The AVPRF was built up with the single aim of serving the needs of the Soviet for-

eign policy apparatus. This is reflected in the way the archive is organized, and in the absence of a system of finding aids created for the purpose of allowing external users easy access to relevant documentation. Contrary to what is common practice in western countries, external users are assisted by staff members whose primary task is to respond to requests from the Ministry's own users of the archival collections.

In the transformation process now underway in the AVPRF, the following points are worth noting. Declassification is being carried out on a comprehensive and chronological basis, starting from both 1917 and 1945. As of September 1993, materials covering the periods 1917-1922 and 1945-50 will be basically declassified. Declassification of the periods 1922-27 and 1951-55 is scheduled to be completed by September 1994.

The declassification process encompasses all major *fondy* of the archives. One should be aware, however, that the ordinary *fondy* do not contain deciphered telegrams. All such telegrams are located in a special collection, which is subject to declassification and access rules of its own. Nonetheless, declassification of this collection is underway for the period 1917-1941, but external users of the archive should not expect to be able to make substantial use of this part of the archive's holdings for the time being. One should be aware, however, that a significant number of telegrams as well as documents from other collections have been declassified on an *ad hoc* basis in order to provide documentation on some of the so-called *white spots* of Soviet external relations, such as Soviet policy towards Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

continued on page 52

tion, Charles Palm, and the Librarian of Congress, James Billington — are on the journal's editorial board, as are all three of the Russian archival officials (Pikhoya, Volkogonov, and Nikolai Pokrovskii) who are most directly involved in the Hoover project. Initial funding for the revival of the journal came from Rosarkhiv, with supplementary aid from the Cultural Initiative Fund and the Center for Democracy. Eventually, the publishing effort is to become part of the larger scholarly programs associated with the Hoover-Rosarkhiv deal. The previous version of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was published for eight years during the post-Stalin "thaw," but was abruptly closed down in 1962 because of its boldness in featuring controversial documents.⁷⁴ Unlike that earlier version, the new journal is independent in its editorial judgments and enjoys discretion to print whatever documents it can obtain.

The first issue of the new *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, designated as Issue No. 1 for 1992, appeared in early 1993. It contained some 220 densely-printed pages of recently declassified documents, along with thoughtful introductions and annotations for all the items covered. Most of the documentation came from TsKhSD, RTsKhIDNI, or one of the 15 state archives under Rosarkhiv's direct jurisdiction. Nothing was included from the KGB and Defense Ministry archives or even from the AVPRF, but a few

items from the Presidential Archive were published, and the editors promised to obtain more documents from that key repository in the future. Although most of the materials in the first issue were from the pre-1945 period, a surprisingly large number of documents from more recent years were featured as well, including some from the last year under Gorbachev. No doubt, a few of the items were included mainly to embarrass Yeltsin's opponents, but overall the journal hewed to its scholarly mission and avoided being used for partisan political ends. Among the topics covered were the Stalinist purges, the Bolsheviks' early conceptions of foreign policy, Soviet preparations for World War II, the persecution of renowned literary figures (Mikhail Zoshchenko and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn), the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, the crackdown in Lithuania in early 1991, and the attempts by hard-line CPSU officials to stave off the collapse of the Soviet regime. Although the first issue of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* contained no startling revelations, it was a very useful start for a journal of its kind.

More valuable still was the next issue, which was designated as Issue No. 1 for 1993. As before, almost the entire 225 pages of the issue were given over to the publication of documents, which were grouped thematically and supplemented by cogent introductions and annotations. Among the items included were the stenographic report of the

October 1964 Central Committee plenum that ousted Nikita Khrushchev, secret orders issued by the highest Soviet wartime organs (the State Defense Committee and the Stavka) during the battles around Smolensk in the summer of 1941, classified exchanges about the much-delayed repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war in 1956, and top-level KGB reports on the disturbances and massacre in Novocherkassk in 1962. Other documents dealt with such matters as the Stalin-era repressions against Comintern activists, the Soviet regime's anti-religious campaigns and propaganda, and the role of the Cadet Party in the aftermath of the 1917 revolution. Some topics from the pre-Soviet era, such as the activities of the deposed Romanov family between March and July of 1917, were covered as well.

This issue of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was put out in conjunction with the first in a new series entitled *Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten'* ("Archival Information Bulletin"), which is projected to be a regular "supplement to the journal *Istoricheskii Arkhiv*." Like the journal itself, the supplement is put out by the Archival Information Agency of Rosarkhiv; and it is edited by V. P. Kozlov, who is also one of the main editors of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*. The premier edition of *Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten'*, which is designated Issue No. 1-2 for 1993, is subtitled "Arkhivy Kremlya i Staroi ploshchadi" ("Archives of the Kremlin and Staraya

Limited Access to Documents On Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Found in Foreign Ministry Archives

by Martha C. Little

According to Russian law, all archival materials less than 30 years old are supposed to be off-limits to public scrutiny. As with many laws in Russia these days, however, the Russian government appears to be making exceptions to the rule. During a four-month research visit to the archives in late 1992, I found this to be the case. Sponsored by the Russian Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Association of Professional Schools in International Affairs (APSIA), I received documents from the Gorbachev period from the Foreign Ministry Archives. Although I did not receive access to any documents

labelled "top secret," or receive all the documents I requested, I was allowed to see notes prepared by mid- and top-level Soviet Foreign Ministry officials under Gorbachev, which detailed the substance of their discussions with West European countries on Soviet-European security and economic matters, and on nuclear, conventional, and chemical arms control issues.

The archive's willingness to break the 30-year rule in my case may have been facilitated by the fact that I was a guest of the foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy. Officials at the Academy wrote letters and made telephone calls to the archive on my behalf. However, given that a few other scholars, not attached to the Academy, also received such recent documents, the Academy's assistance, although helpful, was probably not decisive. It is more likely that the Archive made this exception in my case

due to the nature of the documents I requested.

After spending some time in the archives and talking to other Western scholars, it seems clear that unless one has unlimited financial resources or impeccable connections, the acquisition of information which deals with top secret Soviet security issues, such as Shevardnadze's personal assessments of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), will be off limits.¹ With this in mind, I requested documents which dealt with the rather general topic of Soviet foreign policy towards Europe, more specifically concerning the Soviet interest in developing the idea of a "common European home" as a guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy. Although some aspects of this "common home" idea were sensitive, such as the Soviet Union's former relationship with the two Germanies,

continued on page 52

ploshchad””) and is described as the opening segment of “Series I — Directories and Informational Materials.” The entire issue consists of a directory of more than 1,000 documents released from the Presidential Archive and TsKhSD for the trial of the CPSU at the Constitutional Court. The 140-page directory provides an annotated list of documents in chronological order from March 1940 through December 1991. The vast bulk of the documents come from the Gorbachev period, especially the years 1989 to 1991, which account for roughly 62 percent of the total. Because the directory includes detailed subject and name indexes, it is an incomparably better finding aid than the scattered, disorganized lists for Fond No. 89 at TsKhSD, which previously were the only means available of keeping track of what had been turned over to the Court. One can only hope that future issues of *Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten’* will, as promised, offer additional compendia of the holdings of Fond No. 89 that are as convenient to use as this directory is.

The journal *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, as well as its new supplement, is obviously not — and does not pretend to be — a substitute for on-site research in the archives, but it certainly is a welcome successor to the now-defunct *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* (“News of the CPSU CC”), which featured a few new documents every month when it was published between 1989 and August 1991.⁷⁵ *Istoricheskii arkhiv* goes far beyond that and thus helps compensate for the clampdown at TsKhSD and the continued lack of free access to other key archives. In particular, the publication of materials from the Presidential Archive enables researchers to peruse valuable documents that would otherwise be unavailable. Although the new journal and supplement may not be able to live up to their projected publication schedules of six and four issues a year, respectively (only one issue of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was put out for 1992, and the first for 1993 was not published until May), they both should be appearing more frequently once the inevitable delays associated with the start-up of an ambitious new project have been overcome.⁷⁶ Provided that the adverse repercussions of the TsKhSD controversy do not interfere with the publication of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, the journal in its latest incarnation will be an indispensable resource for specialists on the Soviet Union, as well as a model of what can

be gained from cooperative archival efforts.

The “Morris Affair”

From the fall of 1992 through the first few months of 1993, access to the postwar holdings of the CPSU Central Committee steadily increased. That trend came to a jarring halt, however, when a document from TsKhSD about U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in Vietnam was suddenly publicized in April 1993. The controversy surrounding this document was the ostensible reason for the clampdown at TsKhSD, but it seems likely that archival officials had been intending to restrict access anyway and that they merely latched onto the Vietnam document as a pretext for their actions. (The evidence to this effect includes, among other things, the firing of Vladimir Chernous, which occurred long before the POW document came to light.) Regardless of what the precise connection was between the uproar stemming from the Vietnam document and the sudden clampdown at TsKhSD, the repercussions from the incident were important enough to warrant at least a few comments here about the so-called “Morris affair.”

In December 1992 and January 1993 an Australian researcher named Stephen J. Morris, who was affiliated with Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, worked at TsKhSD with documents concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese relations in the early 1970s. Morris hoped to write a book about Soviet policy during the Vietnam War, and he asked the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project to help him gain access to materials at TsKhSD. As with all other researchers who sought aid in gaining access, CWIHP agreed to intervene on his behalf. Although Morris was not then formally listed on the conference agenda, CWIHP subscribed to the general principle that all interested scholars deserve equal access to the archives and invited him to attend the conference and present findings based on his research. Morris’s research proceeded smoothly until early January 1993, when he came across a 25-page translation into Russian of a report that was purportedly delivered by the deputy chief of the Vietnamese People’s Army (VPA) General Staff, General Tran Van Quang, to a meeting of the North Vietnamese Politburo on 15 September 1972.⁷⁷ Morris had ordered the document in the same way

he would have requested any other item, and the archival staff delivered it to him in a perfectly routine manner.⁷⁸ Contrary to what was later alleged in the Russian media, nothing that Morris did in ordering and receiving the document was at all unusual. His discovery and subsequent use of the report were in full conformity with TsKhSD’s rules. Contrary to charges made by the Vietnamese government, it is inconceivable that the document could have been planted or forged, or that Morris could have been steered to it in any way. Any doubts about the authenticity of the *Russian* document can thus be safely laid to rest. (Questions about the authenticity and accuracy of the Vietnamese original are of course a different matter.)

The translation was one among many items that Morris requested and received at TsKhSD in early December 1992 and January 1993. Initially he worked with some of the other materials, unaware of what he would find in General Quang’s report. When he finally turned to the translated document, he was surprised to discover an extended discussion of American POWs two-thirds of the way through what was otherwise a routine assessment of the war’s progress. Morris was even more surprised — indeed, quite startled — to read General Quang’s assertion that North Vietnam in 1972 had been deliberately “keeping secret the number of American prisoners” in the hope of “using the issue to resolve the political and military aspects of the Vietnam question.” According to the translation, the real number of American POWs at the time was 1,205, a figure three times higher than the 368 prisoners that the North Vietnamese government had publicly acknowledged it was holding. The report claimed that “the U.S. government itself does not know the exact number of POWs,” and warned that any disclosure of the true figure would simply be a “premature concession to the United States” that would “cost us [i.e., North Vietnam] a great deal” of leverage.

Elsewhere the translated report specified the political goals that the North Vietnamese authorities hoped to achieve by secretly holding the American POWs. The document provided detailed statistical breakdowns of the 1,205 American prisoners by rank, military specialty, place of capture, place of imprisonment, and even “ideological orientation.” The translation left no doubt that the publicly-cited figure of 368


covered only the POWs whose “progressive political leanings” made them willing to “condemn the unjust and aggressive war that the United States is waging in Vietnam.” At least some of these 368 prisoners were due to be “released in the near future to bring pressure to bear on the Nixon administration” and “to demonstrate our [i.e., North Vietnam’s] good intentions in this matter.” The other 837 American POWs, including 372 who were deemed to hold “neutral political views” and 465 who were classified as outright “reactionaries,” were to be held back for future bargaining.⁷⁹

The discrepancy between the statistics in the report and the figures that were made public by the North Vietnamese government was significant in its own right, but it took on even greater importance in light of a three-page memorandum accompanying the translation.⁸⁰ The memorandum was prepared by the head of Soviet military intelligence (GRU), Army-General Pyotr Ivashutin, who had the most sensitive information in the Soviet armed forces at his disposal. The memorandum clearly shows that Ivashutin regarded the figures in the translation to be accurate, that he believed “the U.S. government does not know the exact number of POWs in North Vietnam because the VPA command has kept this matter in strict secrecy,” and that he was pleased by “the VPA command’s success during the interrogations of the prisoners in extracting valuable information about the U.S. armed forces, about military technology, and about specific types of weaponry.” In view of the close links between the Soviet GRU and the North Vietnamese intelligence organs, Ivashutin’s acceptance of the higher totals of American POWs indicates that those numbers must be taken seriously.

The revelations in the document — both the translated report and Ivashutin’s introductory memorandum — were of such obvious importance that Morris was initially inclined to go straight to the Western press. However, he readily agreed, at my urging, that he should first pursue the matter quietly in case the translation was accurate and some of the hundreds of unaccounted-for prisoners might still be alive. After returning to the United States at the end of January 1993, Morris contacted officials in the Clinton administration and traveled to Washington to discuss what he had found. These contacts yielded few immediately

evident results, which is understandable for an issue that has been the object of so many hoaxes and unfounded claims. Skepticism would naturally tend to prevail, and the administration cannot be faulted for being wary of Morris’s initial overtures. Having failed to make headway in Washington, Morris returned to Moscow in early April to pursue further research.

His return visit proved short-lived, however, as an international controversy soon erupted. Although Morris had not given a copy of the document to U.S. officials when he was in Washington in February and March,



The document that caused the furor

his description of the report had prompted a few behind-the-scenes measures by the Clinton administration. Inquiries were made through an official U.S.-Russian commission that had been set up in mid-1992 to investigate the fate of American POWs and MIAs (soldiers Missing In Action) from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The panel, which was co-chaired by Volkogonov and a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, Malcolm Toon, contacted the staff at TsKhSD and asked for a copy of the document. Toon himself paid a special visit to Moscow at the beginning of April to follow up on the matter, and a copy of the translated report was finally turned over to the commission on 8 April. The following day, through circumstances that are still unclear, news of the

document was leaked to Valerii Rudnev, a reporter from the Russian newspaper *Izvestiya* who had been covering the activities of the POW/MIA commission since it was founded. Rudnev published a story about the Vietnamese report on 10 April.⁸¹ Apparently, he did not yet have a copy of the document because he did not quote it directly, but he certainly was aware of the data about POWs, which he cited in his article.

Once this story appeared, the existence of the document effectively became public knowledge. Only then did Morris approach the Moscow bureau of *The New York Times* to discuss what he had found. A front-page story about the document, by Celestine Bohlen, was published in the *Times* on 12 April.⁸² As soon as the story appeared, a lively and at times highly acrimonious debate arose about the implications of the translated report. Over the next few weeks, countless other stories and news broadcasts about the document ensued, temporarily derailing what had seemed to be steady movement toward the normalization of U.S.-Vietnamese relations. To try to clarify matters, the Clinton administration asked General John Vessey, the former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to travel on an investigative mission to Hanoi. Vessey met with General Quang (the purported author of the document) and other senior Vietnamese officials, all of whom insisted that the report was a forgery and that Quang had not been deputy chief of the General Staff in September 1972.⁸³ At the end of his trip, Vessey publicly averred that he believed there were significant inaccuracies in the translation.⁸⁴ He acknowledged that the translated version of the report was an authentic Soviet document, but he said he was unable to ascertain whether the Vietnamese original was authentic, much less accurate.

Those conclusions seemed reasonable for the most part, but even so, the purpose and value of Vessey’s inquiry were unclear. Presumably, if a U.S. envoy had gone to Moscow in, say, 1950 to ask Stalin and Lavrentii Beria about the Katyn Forest massacres, the Soviet response would have been a vehement denial of any part in the murders. Surely no one in Washington could have expected that General Quang or other leaders in Hanoi would acknowledge that they had done something wrong in 1972, if in fact they did. Not until several generations passed and Communism was disintegrating did the

Soviet government begin owning up to some of its earlier misdeeds. No doubt, the same is likely to be true of the Vietnamese regime. This is not to say that attempts to follow up on the POW issue in Hanoi are pointless, but at least for now the chances of obtaining meaningful documentation are far greater in Russia than in Vietnam.

The potential value of materials stored in the Russian archives was demonstrated in September 1993, when a second document was disclosed that suggested the North Vietnamese authorities deliberately under-reported the number of prisoners they were holding in the early 1970s. This document was a translation of a report presented by a senior North Vietnamese official, Hoang Anh, to a plenum of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Central Committee in early 1971.⁸⁵ The official claimed that Hanoi was holding 735 U.S. "pilots," but had published the names of only 368 as a "diplomatic step," adding that these 368 would be released as soon as Washington agreed to withdraw all its forces from Vietnam and started the withdrawal. Once the pullout was completed, the report went on, the remaining 367 captured pilots, whose names had not yet been disclosed, would be freed.

The figure of 368 in the report corresponded precisely to the number of U.S. POWs in a list that was turned over to two U.S. Senators in Paris in December 1970, a list whose accuracy was challenged at the time by the U.S. government.⁸⁶ The figure of 368 also was identical to the number cited later on by General Quang; and the total number of 735 "captured American pilots" (both acknowledged and unacknowledged) in the earlier report was nearly the same as the figure of 767 pilots that Quang provided. Still, the newly discovered document raised far more questions than it answered: For example, why did the earlier report refer only to "pilots" and not mention other types of POWs, as Quang did later in his report? Was the figure of 368 chosen simply because it was half the number of U.S. "pilots" who had been captured? Why had the figure of 368 not increased at all, and why had the other figure, of 735, barely increased (to just 767) when Quang delivered his report some 20 months later, by which time more Americans presumably had been captured? The answer to this last question may be connected with the fact that twenty of the prisoners included in the earlier totals were

already dead and nine had already been released, but there is no way to be sure.

The answers to all these questions, unfortunately, may be a long time in coming. Only two pages (11 and 18) of the earlier translated report were released by the Russian government, to the American members of the joint POW/MIA commission, and it is not clear whether or when the rest of the document will be turned over. Even if the earlier report is eventually released in full, any hope of determining the accuracy of the two translated documents is going to depend on the availability of a good deal more evidence, including the original Vietnamese versions of the two reports (whether on paper or on tape recording), which are likely to be in the GRU archives. Some of these items may not exist in Moscow any longer, but other documents that bear on the matter are bound to turn up. In any event, the only way to know precisely what is available is to have qualified experts sift methodically through as many of the archives as possible.

Whether that will be practical in the near future is questionable, however. So far, employees of the Russian archives are the only ones who have been permitted to search for additional documentation. Their efforts are obviously crucial, but on a matter such as this, it is essential that outside experts, including experts from the United States, also be permitted to look for new evidence. If the matter is left solely to archival officials, there may be little way of ensuring that their search is as thorough as possible, and that they will release whole documents once they come across them, rather than just handing over scattered pages.

Unfortunately, the U.S. government's apparent failure to request broad archival access at the outset for independent experts and scholars may have been a lost opportunity.⁸⁷ At this point, any attempts to gain permission for American scholars to investigate the matter further at either TsKhSD or the Presidential Archive, not to mention the GRU archives, are likely to be complicated by the unexpectedly harsh reaction of the Russian archival authorities to the disclosure of Quang's translated report. Rather than welcoming the publication of such a controversial document and encouraging researchers to look for other items that would either corroborate or impugn the accuracy of the translation, Rosarkhiv officials did just the opposite.⁸⁸ They sealed off all holdings

at TsKhSD and rescinded the access they had earlier extended to scholars involved with the Wilson Center's Cold War International History Project and other collaborative ventures. The reading room at TsKhSD was shut for the entire summer of 1993, and even before that a host of nettlesome restrictions were imposed on foreign researchers, many of whom were accused by name of working for nefarious "special services."⁸⁹ Among other things, foreigners were not permitted to obtain an entry pass ("*propusk*") to the reading room for more than two weeks at a time, they were prohibited from receiving any document files or microfilm reels, and they were forbidden from using laptop computers for any purpose unless they received explicit permission every day from the archive director.

The clampdown on scholarly access was accompanied by a shakeup of personnel at TsKhSD, most notably the replacement of Usikov by Prokopenko a week after the initial *New York Times* article appeared. At first, the dismissal was attributed to Usikov's purported failure to "enforce regulations on access to confidential material,"⁹⁰ but allegations soon followed that he had also been involved in shady financial dealings. Whether or not the latter charges had any merit—and the present author is not in any position to evaluate them—there was no truth at all to the specific allegation that Usikov sold the Vietnam document to Morris. As noted earlier, Morris's request for the document was handled routinely, and Usikov had nothing to do with it. At no point did Morris even meet Usikov, much less buy documents from him.

Furthermore, even if the new authorities at TsKhSD sincerely believed that the Quang document had been sold—and initially they may have—it would still be hard to explain why their reaction to the "Morris affair" was so much harsher than the brief periods of retrenchment that had followed previous scandals at the archives. After all, the controversy surrounding the POW document was hardly unique. Several incidents in 1992 had caused a comparable degree of embarrassment for the Russian government: the publication in Italy of an unauthenticated 1943 letter from the Italian Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti, showing seeming indifference over the fate of Soviet-held Italian POWs; reports in Great Britain about "secret" contacts between Labour Party lead-

ers and Soviet diplomats (which turned out to be perfectly routine and above-board); and the unauthorized and misattributed publication in London of extracts from diaries by Josef Goebbels that had been stored in the Moscow archives.⁹¹ After each of these episodes, Russian archival officials briefly enforced stricter regulations, but they did not abandon the general trend toward greater openness. The reaction to the “Morris affair” was very different insofar as it severely disrupted and reversed almost all the positive steps that had been implemented. Although the clampdown is not likely to be permanent, it was a disheartening step backward that threatened to inhibit the development of a sound archival policy in Russia.

The reimposition of a “strict regime” (*strogii rezhim*) at TsKhSD may also hinder any further clarification of the two translated documents, at least for some time to come. This is unfortunate for both scholarly and practical reasons. Western commentators have focused almost exclusively on the statistics in the translated reports or on the position that General Quang may have occupied in September 1972, but other aspects of the Quang document, particularly Ivashutin’s introductory memorandum, are far more tantalizing. We may never know whether there was an authentic report in Vietnamese by General Quang, but we already know that Ivashutin’s memorandum is authentic and that he regarded the figure of 1,205 U.S. POWs to be accurate. We need to find out why. Similarly, Ivashutin’s memorandum has a handwritten notation on it from Konstantin Katushev, the CPSU Secretary responsible for ties with other ruling Communist parties, to Igor Ognetrov, the head of the sector for North Vietnam.⁹² Katushev instructed Ognetrov to “prepare, on an urgent basis, a short note for the CPSU CC Politburo about the prisoners of war.” The fact that Katushev, as the most senior official in Moscow with day-to-day responsibility for Vietnam, recognized the importance of Quang’s remarks about the POWs should give pause to anyone who is tempted to dismiss the figures out of hand.

Another aspect of the Quang document that needs to be clarified is the brief cover sheet from Ognetrov, which apparently is in response to Katushev’s handwritten note.⁹³ Ivashutin’s memorandum was prepared in late November 1972, and Katushev’s notation was made on or about 1 December.

Ognetrov’s typed message, dated 6 February 1973, merely observes that “the instruction [presumably a reference to Katushev’s handwritten instruction] has been overtaken by events” and that “comrade K. F. Katushev has been informed.”⁹⁴ This simple, two-line message raises a host of intriguing questions: Why did Ognetrov wait more than two months before responding to Katushev’s “urgent” order? Did Ognetrov prepare a “short note” for the Politburo in the interim, as he was instructed? If so, what did it say and what happened to it? What were the “events” that Ognetrov believed had “overtaken” the instruction from Katushev? Among the possible answers to this last question are: (1) the signing of the Paris peace accords on 27 January 1973, which provided for the release of all American POWs; (2) the issuance of lists that same day by the U.S. State Department and the North Vietnamese government of the 591 American prisoners who were eventually set free under Operation Homecoming; and (3) a top-level meeting of the Soviet and North Vietnamese Communist parties in Moscow on 30 January 1973, which involved both Katushev and one of his closest aides, Oleg Rakhmanin, along with all the members of the CPSU Politburo.⁹⁵ Are these the “events” that Ognetrov had in mind, and if so, what bearing did they have on the much higher number of prisoners cited in the translated report? (The list of 591 POWs represented the 368 whose capture had been publicly acknowledged before September 1972, plus the 223 Americans who were taken prisoner after that date, mainly during the Christmas bombings of North Vietnam.) How much credibility did Ognetrov attach to the higher figures?

Until these sorts of questions are answered, it will be impossible to arrive at any firm conclusions about the data cited in the two translations. Even if the figures of 735 and 1,205 turn out to be much too high, a smaller discrepancy would still be worth exploring, on the off chance that some of the POWs are still alive. Nevertheless, it will be extremely difficult to further investigate the matter so long as the clampdown at TsKhSD continues. One would need free access to such things as the “short note” to the CPSU Politburo that Ognetrov was ordered to “prepare on an urgent basis,” the Politburo’s deliberations about the Paris peace accords, and the secret transcripts from the Soviet–North Vietnamese meetings of 30 January

1973. These and other documents must exist at either TsKhSD or the Presidential Archive. But rather than allowing outside experts and scholars to find materials that would shed greater light on the issue, Russian archival officials have taken the counterproductive and irrational step of trying to prevent researchers from doing their work. Unfortunately, the whole episode suggests we may have to wait years before a genuine archival system emerges in Russia. In a country where democracy is still so rudimentary and tenuous, the status of the archives is bound to remain problematic.

Methodological Pitfalls

Having been denied access to archival materials in Moscow for so long, scholars who are now finally being permitted to examine Soviet documents may be tempted to draw sweeping conclusions from what they find. In some cases these conclusions are likely to be justified, but a good deal of caution is in order. Part of the problem, as E. H. Carr noted more than 30 years ago, is the tendency of historians to be overly impressed by what they find on paper:

The nineteenth-century fetishism of facts was completed and justified by a fetishism of documents. The documents were the Ark of the Covenant in the temple of facts. The reverent historian approached them with bowed head and spoke of them in awed tones. If you find it in the documents, it is so. But what, when we get down to it, do these documents — the decrees, the treaties, the rent-rolls, the blue books, the official correspondence, the private letters and diaries — actually tell us? No document can tell us more than what the author of the document thought — what he thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even only what he himself thought he thought.⁹⁶

There is a danger that scholars will become so engrossed by what they come across in documents marked with the “*strogo sekretno*” (strictly secret) or “*sovershenno sekretno*” (top secret) stamp that they will not approach these materials with the same degree of detachment they would exercise when considering most other forms of historical evidence. The novelty of looking through

the Soviet documents does quickly fade, but even the most seasoned of researchers cannot help but be struck, at least momentarily, when a highly classified report or memorandum turns up with a handwritten notation by the CPSU General Secretary or some other leading member of the Soviet Politburo.

Hence, the need for circumspection in dealing with materials from the ex-Soviet archives can hardly be overemphasized. Among other things worth bearing in mind is that, as TsKhSD's former director acknowledged, "far from all the documents that flowed into the Central Committee departments from elsewhere or that were prepared within the CC's own apparatus are accurate, complete, and 100 percent reliable."⁹⁷ As illuminating as the use of archival sources may be, it can be counterproductive if researchers fail to take account of the possibility that certain documents are either deliberately or inadvertently misleading or inaccurate. Ideally, information contained in archival materials should be cross-checked and verified (or refuted) by comparing it with information in other sources (both closed and open), but unfortunately in many instances the process of verification may prove extremely difficult, especially if key materials are missing. Such is the case, for example, with the two documents about American POWs in Vietnam that came to light in 1993. The evidence from other sources suggests that the numbers in both of the translated reports are too high; but, as noted in the previous section, the introductory memorandum from General Ivashutin on the first document, the questions raised by the cover sheet on that document from Igor Ognětov, and the numerical parallels between the first document and the second document are enough to prevent one from simply dismissing either report as fraudulent or inaccurate. Skepticism about the documents' accuracy is in order, but any final judgment will have to await the release of much more evidence from the archives.

In some cases, fortunately, attempts to check the authenticity and accuracy of documentation are more straightforward. Yet even then, the evidence may be incomplete or may somehow have been tampered with. This problem can be seen, for example, in the Czechoslovak transcript of negotiations between top Soviet and Czechoslovak officials at Cierna nad Tisou in late July 1968.⁹⁸ It has long been known that those talks broke

down at a certain point and were resumed only after a tense interregnum of several hours. By all accounts, the disruption occurred mainly because one of the Soviet participants — either the prime minister, Aleksei Kosygin, or another Politburo member, Pyotr Shelest — used anti-Semitic slurs and ad hominem attacks when addressing one of the Czechoslovak officials, Frantisek Kriegel.⁹⁹ The lengthy Czech transcript of the talks is clearly authentic and its accuracy seems beyond doubt when cross-checked against other notes and first-hand accounts; but the transcript, unfortunately, is missing a critical passage that would have shed light on who caused the breakdown of the negotiations. This gap may have come about because the stenographer was somehow remiss, but it seems more likely that a senior official who had access to the safe in which the transcript was stored removed an entire page.¹⁰⁰ Whatever the precise motivation may have been for excising the passage, the main lesson to be drawn from the episode is that even well-verified evidence can yield incomplete or misleading findings. It so happens that in this particular instance, what was omitted from the document was known from other sources; but that is not likely to be true most of the time. Moreover, even in this case, the question remains of whether it was Kosygin or Shelest, or perhaps both, who uttered the slurs.

Further pitfalls can arise from the very process of cross-checking and verifying documents, especially if it involves comparisons predominantly or exclusively with memoirs and oral histories, rather than with other documentation. Memoirs and shorter first-hand accounts can be invaluable when used with caution, and in some cases (e.g., when documents have been destroyed or never existed at all) they are the only sources available about key events. Nevertheless, the drawbacks to using memoirs and oral histories are well known.¹⁰¹ Even though what Mary McCarthy once said about Lillian Hellman — that "every word she writes is a lie, including a, an, and the" — does not apply to most diplomats and ex-officials, the veracity of many who worked for Communist regimes is far from unassailable.¹⁰² Although cases of systematic prevarication may be relatively uncommon, memoirs as a genre almost always enhance and put an undue gloss on the authors' roles in history. Moreover, even when former Soviet and

East European leaders do their best to record events faithfully, some discrepancies are bound to crop up from ordinary failings of memory. These problems can be mitigated if scholars draw on memoirs and oral histories from several participants who have very different viewpoints, and then correlate each account with the archival documents in question. This method, however, is by no means foolproof, and there may not always be a sufficient number of memoirs available.¹⁰³ In a few extreme cases the process of attempting to corroborate archival materials may itself lead to even greater confusion than before.

Other problems from working in the Soviet and East European archives can ensue if scholars fail to take account of the context and impact of the documents they examine. As in almost every country, many officials in the Soviet Union sought to inflate their own role in the historical record. They were inclined, at least occasionally, to write their memoranda and reports with an "eye on the archives," that is, with the aim of making their influence on policy appear greater than it actually was. Among those engaging in this sort of practice was the long-time director of the USA and Canada Institute, Georgii Arbatov, who regularly depicted himself as a key aide to members of the CPSU Politburo. Although it is true that Arbatov was often consulted by top officials about developments in the United States, he was hardly the indispensable adviser that he made himself out to be. No doubt, Arbatov's exaggeration of his own role was intended in part to bolster his credibility among Westerners who came to visit the USA/Canada Institute, but it was also designed to ensure a proper spot for himself in MID's own histories of Soviet foreign policy. Arbatov and many other officials would write (or lend their names to) analyses and reports that, while ostensibly channeled to the Soviet Politburo, usually went unread.¹⁰⁴ Even when these documents were ignored, they ended up in the archives, where they could serve as fecund material for historians. The general point to be made, then, is that when examining "inputs" into the Soviet decision-making process, scholars must be aware that some — perhaps many — of these alleged inputs were of no influence at all at top levels.

The problem of sorting out real inputs from artificial ones is even trickier than it

may seem because of the difficulty of telling who read what and how much impact it had. Even when we can ascertain that a particular document did go up to the CPSU Politburo — perhaps by seeing annotations in the margins, or by finding a routing list with initials appended — there may still be little way of determining what role the item played. This point was well illustrated by a document that was transmitted to the Soviet Politburo in late December 1974 concerning the situation in Vietnam. The document was a draft response from Leonid Brezhnev to the North Vietnamese Communist party first secretary, Le Duan; and it was passed to the head of the CPSU General Department, Konstantin Chernenko, by one of Brezhnev's top aides, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, with the following message attached: "To Comrade Chernenko. Leonid Il'ich asked for a vote on this proposal (*He has not read the text.*)"¹⁰⁵ How common this sort of practice was is unclear, but it is safe to assume that Brezhnev and other members of the CPSU Politburo, especially those who were elderly and infirm, would frequently sign off on documents that they had not read.¹⁰⁶ That raises serious problems for scholars who hope to trace the decision-making process on specific issues and events.

In some instances this matter can be handled by searching for connections between presumed inputs and the subsequent evolution of Soviet policy. In the case of the Vietnam War, for example, Soviet leaders usually paid relatively little attention except when the conflict directly affected U.S.-Soviet relations. Instead, they tended to rely heavily on middle-ranking officials to lay out policy guidelines and recommend decisions on all but the most important matters.¹⁰⁷ Thus, when we come across proposals from the Central Committee apparatus or the Foreign Ministry that were subsequently incorporated with few or no changes in the Politburo's decisions about Vietnam, we can deduce that these inputs were of key importance at top levels.

Unfortunately, though, the nature of inputs for most issues is not as clear-cut. Moreover, even when documents produced at middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy correspond precisely with the decisions that were made by the Politburo, researchers must beware of inferring too much about those documents. It was a common practice among Soviet bureaucrats — a prac-

tice by no means unique to the Soviet Union, of course — to ingratiate themselves with top officials by writing elaborate policy "recommendations" for decisions that had already been made. The "recommendations," not surprisingly, would coincide with and strongly reinforce the preferences of CPSU leaders. This could often be seen, for example, in dispatches from Soviet ambassadors, who would set out recommendations for policies that they knew or suspected had already been, or were about to be, adopted. These dispatches can be interpreted in one of two ways: either (1) the ambassador was so far "out of the loop" on key decisions that he did not know what policies had already been adopted by the Politburo; or (2) the ambassador was putting himself on record as having "recommended" the decisions that were already made.¹⁰⁸ In either case, the practice is bound to cause problems for scholars who are seeking to weigh the significance of particular inputs. Checking the date of the inputs may occasionally be enough to sift out phony or insignificant "recommendations" from genuine ones (e.g., proposals that come well after decisions have been made are automatically suspect), but in most instances the situation is at best indeterminate.

Yet another pitfall of archival research in Russia and other ex-Communist states — and in Western countries as well — is the difficulty of balancing published documents against unpublished materials. On the one hand, it is true that published collections of documents can cause a myriad of problems when the editors have an agenda of their own. A classic example of this phenomenon, cited by E. H. Carr, occurred in 1935 when an English publisher brought out an abridged edition of documents and papers from the long-time foreign minister of Weimar Germany, Gustav Stresemann.¹⁰⁹ The publisher conveniently omitted all documents that would have detracted from Stresemann's reputation, a pattern of omission that might never have come to light had the full set of documents not fallen by chance into British and American hands at the end of World War II. Similar problems are likely to arise with at least a few of the collections now being put together of documents from the former Soviet archives.¹¹⁰

On the other hand, it would be a serious mistake for scholars to disregard or place less emphasis on documents and other materials in Moscow that have already been published.

Archival access in Russia is still so erratic, and so many of the key archives are still sealed off, that documents chosen for publication by the government can often be far more valuable and revealing than all the unpublished materials that researchers come across on their own in the Central Committee or Foreign Ministry archives. This is the case, for example, with documents about the Polish crisis of 1980-81 that were released from the Presidential Archive in December 1992 and August 1993 and then published in full in the Polish press.¹¹¹ These items, including selected transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings and documents from a commission set up by the Politburo to deal with the crisis, have done more than all the materials at TsKhSD to shed light on Soviet decision-making at the time.

Another event for which published Soviet documents have been much more valuable than the available unpublished holdings, is the Cuban missile crisis. Scholars have not yet been granted free access to any of the relevant holdings in the Presidential Archive, the military archives, or the KGB archives, which will be crucial in helping to resolve some of the lingering mysteries about the Soviet Union's role in the crisis. The only archival materials that have been available up to now, at TsKhSD and the AVPRF, add little or nothing to what is known about the crisis. As a result, the use of newly published documents about the Cuban missile crisis has been the only way to make up for the continued lack of access to the most important Russian archives.¹¹²

One additional area in which the publication of Soviet documents has been of great importance is the question of nuclear weapons development and nuclear arms control policy. Access to the most important archival holdings on this topic is still non-existent, and the unpublished items that *are* available at TsKhSD (and to a lesser extent at MID) are of relatively little interest. Hence, the publication of key materials and the appearance of new first-hand accounts have been the only real sources of fresh evidence about topics such as the early Soviet nuclear bomb program, the problems experienced by Soviet nuclear-missile submarines, and the bargaining positions adopted by Soviet officials in strategic arms negotiations. Of particular interest in recent months has been the serialized publication of the transcripts of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations at the

Reykjavik summit in October 1986, which reveal how close the two sides came to achieving an agreement far more ambitious than either had anticipated or even wanted.¹¹³

Ideally, if free access to the most important archives in Moscow is eventually granted to scholars, the publication of documents will no longer be so essential. Until that time, however, the use of published documents will be a crucial supplement to on-site archival research.

The reliance on published documentation is only one of the methodological problems caused by the continued unavailability of materials in the Presidential Archive, the postwar military archives, and the KGB and GRU archives. Another obvious pitfall is the temptation to “look for one’s keys where the streetlight is,” i.e., to ascribe excessive importance to the documents that *are* available. Not only are the items stored at TsKhSD and the AVPRF merely “inputs” into the decision-making process; they are not necessarily even the most important inputs. Unfortunately, researchers have not been able to examine all the relevant inputs, much less observe how (or whether) those inputs were used when decisions were actually made. Without access to the KGB and GRU archives, for example, scholars rarely get to see documents produced by either of the ex-Soviet intelligence organs, particularly the highly sensitive reports that might have had a crucial bearing on certain decisions. Much the same is true of vital inputs generated by the Soviet High Command and General Staff in the form of contingency plans, threat assessments, and recommendations for military options. Needless to say, this deficiency creates serious gaps in accounts of particular events and decisions.

Equally important, the unavailability of materials produced by certain agencies in Moscow can lead researchers to exaggerate the policy-making role of other agencies whose documents they do get a chance to examine. This already applies, in some cases, to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, whose documents are available not only at the AVPRF but also in abundance at TsKhSD. By emphasizing the Foreign Ministry’s inputs into particular decisions, and by necessarily having much less to say about inputs from the KGB and GRU, scholars may end up offering highly skewed depictions of what went on. It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that in many cases the Foreign

Ministry’s role was actually quite limited. This was especially true on matters concerning relations with other Communist countries (Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, etc.), where party-to-party ties tended to be far more important than state-to-state interactions. On certain other issues, such as U.S.-Soviet relations and policy toward Africa, the Foreign Ministry did play a significant role, but even in these instances it is essential that the ministry’s influence not be overstated.

One final pitfall for scholars working in the Russian archives is the occasional tendency either to reinvent the wheel or to attack straw men. Some of the participants in the CWIHP’s conference in January 1993 seemed to find it remarkable that Soviet allies and clients in Eastern Europe and the Third World often tried to influence Soviet policy. Why this came as such a startling revelation is unclear. Should it really have been surprising to find that the “tail occasionally tried to wag the dog”?¹¹⁴ Surely archival research was not a prerequisite for arriving at such an obvious conclusion. As far back as the early 1960s Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a whole book about the “desatellitization” of Eastern Europe, noting how the increased heterogeneity among the Warsaw Pact states in the post-Stalin era had led to fissures in the bloc.¹¹⁵ Other scholars offered similar analyses of the unexpected challenges that arose from one-time Soviet allies and clients such as Yugoslavia, China, Albania, and Egypt. No archival research was needed to see that the “tail” and the “dog” were frequently at odds.

Furthermore, by focusing so single-mindedly on instances in which the tail tried to wag the dog, researchers may gloss over or underestimate how successful the dog often was in wagging its tail. A distinguished British scholar recently noted that “research involves the shedding, not the confirmation, of our preconceptions. If historians go to the archives expecting certain answers to their questions, careful study of the evidence will almost invariably change their minds. It will alter not merely their answers but their questions.”¹¹⁶ Scholars who go to the archives in Moscow expecting to find evidence of conflict and bargaining between the Soviet Union and its allies will no doubt succeed in their task. It is not difficult to come across evidence of such phenomena. But these scholars must also be

able to explain why unity and conformity so often prevailed, and why it was the Soviet Union that usually ended up “calling the shots.” During the 1968 crisis in Czechoslovakia, for example, Polish and East German leaders wanted to resort to armed intervention as early as March, and they did what they could to bring about a military solution. But all their efforts would have mattered little if the Soviet Politburo had not finally decided, in August, that an invasion was indeed necessary.

Even in cases such as the Korean war, for which it has long been thought that the tail took much of the initiative, the situation may not be as straightforward as it seems. Although a recent study based on extensive archival research has supported the view of an “active tail” (i.e., the view that Kim Il-sung was the driving force behind the plan to invade South Korea in June 1950, even though Stalin had to give final approval to the invasion), other evidence that has recently emerged leaves the picture a good deal murkier.¹¹⁷ Documents unearthed by Gavril Korotkov, a former GRU officer who is now a senior fellow at the Russian Defense Ministry’s Institute for Military History, suggest that Stalin’s role in initiating and encouraging the plans for an invasion was much greater than previously assumed.¹¹⁸ Even if, as some Western scholars suspect, Korotkov is understating the importance of Kim’s own actions, the new evidence confirms how difficult it often can be to tell when the tail was wagging the dog and when the dog was wagging its tail. Certainly researchers must approach the matter with an open mind, not only in this specific instance but in general.

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The lingering ambiguity about the inception of the Korean War is one of countless issues that remain to be explored in greater depth in the Russian archives. Although it may be difficult to avoid all the pitfalls discussed above, careful scholarship and open-mindedness will ensure that as more of the holdings in Moscow become available, they will continue to enrich our historical understanding and clear up at least some of the mysteries left by the pervasive secrecy of the Soviet regime.

1. Lytton Strachey, *Eminent Victorians: Cardinal Manning - Florence Nightingale - Dr. Arnold - General Gordon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1933),

- v.
2. Statement by Natal'ya Krivova, press spokeswoman for the Russian Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation, 22 April 1993, carried by Inter-TASS. For further explanation of the action against Usikov, see page 31 and endnote 70.
 3. See his "Chto takoe TsKhSD?" *Kentavr* (Moscow), 4 (July-August 1992), 132-37, esp. 136.
 4. Conversation with the author, 13 May 1993, in Prokopenko's office in Moscow.
 5. "Poka net zakona, vedomstva budut zashchishchat' svoi 'tainy' do poslednego, — schitaet zamestitel' predsedatelya Roskomarkhiva A. Prokopenko," *Izvestiya*, 5 August 1992, 3. See also Prokopenko's article, "Dom osobogo naznacheniya (Otkrytie arkhivov)," *Rodina* 3 (1992), 50-51.
 6. Interview with Prokopenko in "Proshchanie s Osobym arkhivom," *Novoe vremya* 11 (March 1991), 46-47. The "Special Archive" (Osobyi arkhiv) was renamed the "Center for Storage of Historical-Documentary Collections" (Tsentr khraneniya istoriko-dokumental'nykh kolleksii) in June 1992. Under the new archival law (discussed below), the formation of secret archives is forbidden.
 7. This is not to say that Western archives always attain standards of perfection, either. See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, "Nixon's Last Cover-Up: The Tapes He Wants the Archives to Suppress," *The New Yorker*, 14 December 1992, 76-95. Nevertheless, anyone who has worked in the Russian archives can attest that the situation there is fundamentally different.
 8. The law, "Osnovy zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob Arkhivnom fonde Rossiiskoi Federatsii i arkhivakh," was adopted and signed by Yeltsin on 7 July 1993; its text was published in *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 14 August 1993, 5. The Russian government's Decree No. 838 of 23 August 1993, entitled "O realizatsii gosudarstvennoi politiki v arkhivnom dele," which implemented the new archival law, was signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. It appears, therefore, that the law's status was not affected by Yeltsin's subsequent disbanding of parliament in September.
 9. This applies, for example, to the formal "30-year rule" included in the new law. In principle, such a rule had already been in effect under a "decree" approved by the Supreme Soviet in June 1992, but archival officials had generally been flexible in considering requests for more recent items. The inclusion of such a rule in the new law, and the emphasis placed on it in Point 2 of the Russian government's Decree No. 838, might lead to routine denials of access to documents less than 30 years old.
 10. Elena Afanas'eva, "Parlament odobryaet zasekrechivanie Rossii," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 18 May 1993, 2. On the final passage of the law, see Oleg Glushakov, "Teper' my deistvitel'no tochno znaem, chto takoe taina: Verkhovnyi soviet Rossii vo vtorom chtenii prinyal Zakon 'o gosudarstvennoi taine'," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 23 July 1993, 1.
 11. Vladimir Kartashkov, "Rossiiskie spetssluzhby pytayutsya prevratit' v amerikanskie," *Moskovskii komsomolets*, 14 October 1993, 1. The new Minister for Security, Nikolai Golushko, announced in mid-October that the ministry would be "overhauled" and that the "staff and administrative apparatus of the Security Ministry are being dissolved." See Aleksandr Mukomolov, "Reformiruetsya Ministerstvo bezopasnosti," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 15 October 1993, 1.
 12. These restrictions remained in place even in the last few years of the Gorbachev period; see, for example, E. A. Skripilev, "Arkhivnoe delo v SSSR: Proshloe i nastoyashchee," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* 4 (April 1990), 38-46; Yu. M. Baturin, M. A. Fedotov, and V. L. Entin, "Glasnost' v arkhivy: Variant zakonodatel'nogo resheniya," *Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR* 10 (October 1989), 75-87; and S. Kuleshov, "Ot kogo zhe sekrety u partiinykh i vedomstvennykh arkhivov," *Izvestiya*, 29 July 1991, 3. For excellent surveys of the impact of the Gorbachev era, see three works by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted: "Perestroika in the Archives? Further Efforts at Soviet Archival Reform," *American Archivist* 54:1 (Winter 1991), 70-95; "Glasnost' in the Archives? Recent Developments on the Soviet Archival Scene," *American Archivist* 52:2 (Spring 1989), 214-36; and *A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR* (Washington, D.C.: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1989).
 13. See the interview with General Dmitrii Volkogonov, then director of the Soviet Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History, in "My obyazany napisat' chestnye knigi," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 July 1988, 2. See also Kuleshov, "Ot kogo zhe sekrety u partiinikh i vedomstvennykh arkhivov," 3.
 14. A good example of this occurred when documents were found in late 1991 that exposed the KGB's systematic penetration of the Russian Orthodox Church. The evidence was contained in annual reports compiled by the Fourth Department of the KGB's Fifth Directorate, the branch of the agency that was responsible for matters pertaining to the Church. When the Fourth Department was abolished in 1991, most of its documents in the KGB archives were destroyed. However, investigators from the Russian parliament discovered copies of the Department's annual reports in the CPSU Central Committee archives, and learned from these that many top Church officials had been working for the KGB. On this matter, see the interview with Gleb Yakunin, the priest and former political dissident who sat on the parliamentary commission that uncovered the documents, in "Tserkvi nuzhno pokayat'sya: Iz pervykh ruk," *Nevskoe vremya* (St. Petersburg), 8 February 1992, 3. See also the interview with Yakunin in "Abbat' vykhodit na svyaz'," *Argumenty i fakty* 1 (January 1992), 5, where he first cited the documents at length.
 15. These three examples are listed here mainly because they have gained wide publicity. Many other documents that have been less publicized might also have been adduced, such as the order that Lenin issued in 1917 for campaigns of mass "secret terror" in Latvia and Estonia, with a reward of 100,000 rubles for every "kulak, priest, and landowner who is hanged." He added that "we'll make the hangings look like the work of the 'Greens,' and then afterwards we'll put the blame on them." See the text of the order as cited in an interview with Pikhoya "Ya protivnik politicheskoi arheologii," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* (Moscow), 31 March 1993, 5.
 16. David Irving, *Hitler's War* (New York: Viking, 1977).
 17. Among the best rebuttals to Irving's thesis is Gerald Fleming, *Hitler und die Endlosung: "Es ist des Fuehrers Wunsch . . ."* (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1982). See also Martin Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der 'Endlosung,'" *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 25:4 (October 1977), 739-88.
 18. See Robert Conquest, *Stalin and the Kirov Murder* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Mikhail Roslyakov, *Ubiystvo Kirova: Politicheskie i ugovnyye prestupleniya v 1930-kh godakh* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1991).
 19. No doubt, the decision was motivated by a combination of several factors, and most likely was not the result of a profoundly rational decision-making process. The official Soviet explanation — that deterrence of a U.S. invasion of Cuba was uppermost in Khrushchev's mind — has not yet been revised by the Russian government. This argument, however, is highly questionable on several grounds. For one thing, the missile deployment's size was far in excess of what would have been needed just to deter a U.S. attack; moreover, there was no reason to deploy longer-range SS-5s as well as SS-4s if deterrence was the only (or main) goal; and finally, there were much less risky ways to deter a U.S. invasion, such as extending formal bilateral security commitments to Cuba or admitting Cuba into the Warsaw Pact. For a review of alternative explanations of Khrushchev's decision to install the missiles, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989), 20-24; Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 230-44; and James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 116-20, 293-305.
 20. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 14:3 (Winter 1989/90), 171.
 21. John Lewis Gaddis, "Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies," *International Security* 12:1 (Summer 1987), 7-8.
 22. For an excellent critical review of the implicit and explicit assumptions that Western scholars made when using the Soviet press, see Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR*, R-2869 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, September 1982).
 23. Ilana Dimant-Kass, "The Soviet Military and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1970-73," *Soviet Studies* 26:4 (October 1974), 504.
 24. To cite but one of countless examples, the public statements that Soviet officials made in September 1983 about the downing of a Korean airliner were at striking variance with what they actually knew, as revealed in top-secret KGB reports, Defense Ministry analyses, and transcripts of the CPSU Politburo's deliberations at the time. See the documents collected under the rubric "Dokumenty o tragedii koreiskogo Boinga," *Izvestiya*, 15 October 1992, 1, 3.
 25. See Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); and William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982).
 26. For preliminary but cogent reviews of the new evidence, see Walter Laqueur, *Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1990); and Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Evidence that has emerged since these books were published provides even stronger corroboration of the authors' contentions. See, e.g., the well-documented and generally well-argued study by O. V. Khlevnyuk, *1937-i: Stalin, NKVD i sovetskoe obshchestvo* (Moscow: Respublika, 1992), which draws extensively on the Central Party Archive (now RTsKhIDNI). See also Aleksei Khorev, "Kak sudili Tukhachevskogo," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 17 April 1991, 4; N. F. Bugai, ed., *Iosif Stalin, Lavrentii Beriya: "Ikh*

nado deportirovat” (Moscow: Druzhba narodov, 1992); and the documentary series published under the rubric “O masshtabakh repressii v Krasnoi Armii v predvoennye gody,” *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), 1, 2, 3, and 5 (January, February, March, and May 1993), 56-63, 71-80, 25-32, and 59-65, respectively.

27. See, for example, Valerii Kovalev, “Kto zhe rasstreival v Kuropatak?” *Krasnaya zvezda*, 20 May 1993, 1; Vera Tolz, “Ministry of Security Official Gives New Figures for Stalin’s Victims,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:18 (1 May 1992), 8-10; and E. V. Tsaplin, “Arkhivnye materialy o chisle zaklyuchennykh v kontse 30-kh godov,” *Voprosy istorii* 4-5 (April-May 1991), 157-63.

28. See, for example, “Vypiska iz protokola No. 149 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 12 aprelya 1979 goda: O nashei dal’neishei linii v svyazi s polozheniem v Afganistane,” No. P149/XIV (TOP SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER), 12 April 1979, in TsKhSD, Fond 89, Perechen’ 14, Dokument 27; “Vypiska iz protokola No. 150 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 21 aprelya 1979 goda: O netselesoobraznosti uchastiya sovetskikh ekipazhei boevykh vertoletov v podavlenii kontrevolyutsionnykh vystuplenii v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan,” No. P150/93 (TOP SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER), 21 April 1979, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 28; and “Vypiska iz protokola No. 177 zasedaniya Politbyuro TsK KPSS ot 27 dekabrya 1979 goda: Onashikh shagakh v svyazi s razvitiem obstanovki vokrug Afganistana,” No. P177/151 (WORD OF MOUTH ONLY — TOP SECRET — SPECIAL DOSSIER), 27 December 1979, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 32. For one of many recent first-hand accounts of the decision, see G.M. Kornienko, “Kak prinimalis’ resheniya o vvoде sovetskikh voisk v Afganistan i ikh vyvode,” *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya*, 3 (May-June 1993), 107-18.

29. This paragraph’s figures come from R. G. Pikhoya, “Sovremennoe sostoyanie arkhivov Rossii,” *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* 2 (March-April 1993), 3-10.

30. “Postanovlenie pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Gosudarstvennoi arkhivnoi sluzhbe Rossii,” 22 December 1992. Two earlier decrees that provided for a similar restructuring of Roskomarkhiv — “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii: O sisteme tsentral’nykh organov federal’noi ispolnitel’noi vlasti” and “Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii: O strukture tsentral’nykh organov federal’noi ispolnitel’noi vlasti,” both in *Otechestvennye arkhivy* (Moscow), 70:6 (November-December 1992), 3 — were held up by the Russian parliament because of the broader provisions in the decrees on the reorganization of the government. As a result, until the end of 1992 the archival service’s activities were governed by the basic rules laid out in “Postanovlenie pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya o Komitete po delam arkhivov pri Pravitel’stve Rossiiskoi Federatsii i seti federal’nykh gosudarstvennykh arkhivov i tsentrov khraneniya dokumentatsii,” *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 70:4 (July-August 1992), 3-9, including supplements.

31. Anyone who doubts Pikhoya’s willingness to enter the political fray should see his acerbic comments about Gorbachev in “Ya protivnik politicheskoi arkhologii,” 5. In addition to releasing documents that make Yeltsin’s opponents look bad, Pikhoya has been careful to withhold documents that would be embarrassing to Yeltsin himself. See “Poshel protsess’ po delu KPSS: Kogo na etot raz zhdal’ v Razlive?” *Argumenty i fakty* 20 (May 1992), 1, and Vladimir Orlov, “KPSS: Umerla tak umerla?” *Moskovskie novosti* 21 (24 May 1992), 6.

32. In Russian these are “Tsentr khraneniya i izucheniya

dokumentov noveishei istorii,” which is located at Pushkinskaya No. 15; and “Tsentr khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii,” which is located at Il’inka No. 12 in Staraya Ploshchad’, diagonally across from the Russian Constitutional Court. For information about the way these centers were formed, see V. P. Kozlov, “Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniya i izucheniya dokumentov noveishei istorii i ego perspektivy” and R. A. Usikov, “K sozdaniyu TsKhSD,” both in *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* 2 (March-April 1992), 192-97 and 198-202, respectively.

33. For an overview of the archive’s collections, see V. V. Sokolov, “Arkhiv vneshei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii — istorikam,” *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* 4 (July-August 1992), 156-65.

34. Selected items from Fond No. 59a have been released, however. This includes cables pertaining to the 1956 invasion of Hungary and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, which were turned over to the Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments, respectively, in 1992. Although I have used the term “ciphered telegrams,” some Russians prefer the term “deciphered” since the documents are, of course, no longer encoded.

35. Usikov readily acknowledged this point; see “Chto takoe TsKhSD?” 133.

36. In July 1990 the greatly enlarged archive was renamed “Arkhiv apparata Prezidenta SSSR” (Archive of the USSR President’s Apparatus) under the auspices of Gorbachev’s new presidential chief of staff, Valerii Boldin. It is now known as “Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (“Archive of the President of the Russian Federation”), or APRF. For a brief survey of the archive’s holdings, see Pyotr Akopov, “Khranilishe ‘kremlevskikh tain’,” *Rossiiskie vesti*, 26 September 1992, 2. A recent article in the main Russian military newspaper revealed that since 1982 the Kremlin Archive has had its own motorized regiment of guards in place to evacuate all the archive’s collections in the event of an emergency. See Anatolii Ivanov, “Adskie voditeli pod brezentovymi kryshami,” *Krasnaya zvezda*, 30 July 1993, 2. These guards are currently subordinated to the Russian State Committee on Civil Defense.

37. Interview with Pikhoya in “Demony iz yashchika Pandory,” *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 11 July 1992, 7. See also Marina Mulina, “Dokumenty — istorikam, donosy — v makulaturu,” *Sobesednik* 39 (September 1991), 5.

38. Interview with Pikhoya at Harvard University, 24 March 1993; Pikhoya interview in Moscow with CWIHP representatives, January 1993.

39. See Articles 17 (“Khranenie dokumentov gosudarstvennoi chasti Arkhivnogo fonda Rossiiskoi Federatsii”) and 20 (“Ispol’zovanie arkhivnykh dokumentov”) of “Osnovy zakonodatel’sva Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob Arkhivnom fonde Rossiiskoi Federatsii i arkhivakh,” 5.

40. Even a few well-connected Russian historians who have been granted access to materials from the Presidential Archive since 1992 have been highly circumscribed in what they are allowed to see. For example, a recent article by M. M. Narinskii, the director of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Universal History — “SSSR i plan Marshalla po materialam Arkhiva Prezidenta RF,” *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* 2 (March-April 1993), 11-19 — cites only one file from the Presidential Archive, No. 270 (from Fond No. 3, Opis’ No. 63). This seems rather limited for an article whose main purpose, judging from its title, is to convey new evidence from the Presidential Archive.

41. For an overview of the commission’s work, see “Vvedenie,” *Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten’*,

“Arkhivy Kremlya i Staroi ploshchadi” (Supplement to the journal *Istoricheskii zhurnal*), 1-2 (1993), 3-6.

42. See, for example, the interview with the then-chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, in “Pravo, pravda i glasnost’,” *Pogranichnik* (Moscow), 6 (June 1990), 5-11, esp. 9-10.

43. See Vadim Bakatin, *Izbaвление ot KGB* (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 133-65 for the fullest published account of the KGB archives. An equally valuable assessment, including a breakdown of what the KGB’s different archives contain, is provided in the 30-page manuscript by Arsenii Roginskii and Nikita Okhotin, “Arkhivy KGB: God posle putcha,” September 1992. On the destruction of KGB documents, see also the interview with Lieutenant Aleksandr Kleimenov in “Dokumenty: ‘Ya skryl seif UKGB, chtoby lyudi znali pravdu,’” *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 3 September 1991, 3; and the interview with General V. Zolotarev, “Chto zhdet arkhivy KPSS i KGB,” *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 November 1991, 4.

44. See Roginskii and Okhotin, “Arkhivy KGB,” 11-13. See also the interview with Nikita Petrov, a member of the commission, in “Dos’e KGB stanut dostupnee — poka teoreticheskii,” *Moskovskie novosti* 8 (23 February 1992), 10.

45. “Ukaz Prezidenta RSFSR: Ob arkhivakh Komiteta gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR,” *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 28 August 1991, 3.

46. Bakatin’s handling of the archives prompted strong attacks by hard-line elements; see, e.g., Vladimir Bushin, “Santa Klauz iz KGB,” *Pravda*, 21 January 1992, 3, and the article by a senior Security Ministry official, General V. Kondrashev, “Arkhivy KGB: To v seifakh, to na rasprodazhe,” *Izvestiya*, 4 February 1992, 7.

47. This did not include some 500,000 files belonging to specialized parts of the KGB that were shorn off after August 1991. For example, files pertaining to foreign intelligence-gathering, which had belonged to the KGB’s First Main Directorate (i.e., the foreign intelligence apparatus), were transferred after August 1991 to the Russian External Intelligence Service (RSVR), the newly independent successor to the First Main Directorate. The same was true of the Committee on Government Communications, which was the independent successor to the KGB’s Eighth and Sixteenth Main Directorates, and of a few other highly specialized organs. In all, the files controlled by these newly independent bodies come to about five percent of the KGB’s former holdings. A more significant number of files — perhaps 3 million to 4 million — that were no longer under the Ministry of Security’s direct control after 1991 were those that had belonged to branches of the KGB in the non-Russian republics. Some of these files were stored in duplicate in Moscow, but others that had not been copied became the property of the independent governments in those republics. The Russian Ministry of Security was thus left with roughly 6 million of the KGB’s original 10 million files.

48. This can be seen, for example, even in the first, relatively specialized volume of the series, by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin’s Master Spy* (New York: Crown, 1993), which tells the story of a Soviet spy from the Stalin era, Aleksandr Orlov, who maintained links with the NKVD after he fled to the United States in 1938. The book plays up Orlov’s significance and emphasizes the ease with which the Soviet spy deceived U.S. counterintelligence authorities.

49. On matters pertaining to the Crown deal, see the interview with Nikolai Arzhannikov, a member of the Russian parliamentary committee overseeing the secu-

rity organs, in "Skandal — Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki prodaet sekretnye arkhivy," *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 3 November 1992, 4. I have also drawn on a press release issued by Crown on 24 June 1992, as well as conversations with scholars associated with the project. [Ed. note: Asked for comment, James O'Shea Wade, Vice President and Executive Editor of Crown Publishers, Inc., said: 1) that it was incorrect that documents selected for the Crown series will be denied to other scholars for at least ten years; in fact, he said, documents used for each book will be available to other scholars immediately following the first English-language publication, and may well be made available even earlier to interested scholars who wish to conduct research in KGB archives; 2) that the RSVR was reviewing documents to exclude only materials that would disclose sources and methods including agents witting or unwitting who are still alive or have families who might be hurt by giving of real names [sensitive sources and names of agents], just as the CIA did; and 3) that the \$1 million figure cited above was misleading because a significant portion (which he declined to specify) of that amount was required to pay for authors, staff work, translation and copying expenses and other requirements involved in preparing the series volumes rather than a flat payment for access.]

50. The General Staff archives are now formally known as "Istoriko-arkhivnyi tsentr General'nogo Shtaba Vooruzhenykh sil" ("Historical-Archival Center of the General Staff of the Armed Forces"), and are located, as before, in southern Moscow. The main Defense Ministry archive ("Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony") is in Podol'sk, just outside Moscow. The GRU archive ("Arkhiv Glavnogo razvedyvatel'nogo upravleniya") is in southern Moscow. The postwar naval archive ("Tsentral'nyi voenno-morskoi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony") is located in Gatchina, near St. Petersburg. The RGVA ("Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv"), formerly known as the "Central State Archive of the Soviet Army" (TsGASA), and the RGVIA ("Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv"), formerly known as the "Central State Military-Historical Archive of the USSR" (TsGVIA SSSR), are both in central Moscow. The RGAVMF ("Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Voenno-morskogo flota"), formerly known as the "Central State Archive of the Navy of the USSR" (TsGAVMF SSSR), is located in St. Petersburg.

51. See the interview with Lyudmila Dvoinikh, deputy director of TsGASA, in "Gde khryanyatsya 'voennye tainy,'" *Armiya* (Moscow), 17 September 1991, 54-56.

52. *Annotirovanniy perechen' fondov Tsentral'nogo Gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva Sovetskoi Armii*, 5 vols. (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 1987). This list was compiled by the All-Union Scholarly-Research Institute for Documentation Studies and Archival Affairs, in conjunction with TsGASA and Glavarkhiv. The Minneapolis-based firm East View Publications gained worldwide distribution rights in early 1991. The roughly 34,000 *fonds* contain some 3.34 million files, according to "Gde khryanyatsya 'voennye tainy,'" 54.

53. Interview in "Triumf tirana, tragediya naroda," *Moskovskie novosti* 7 (12 February 1989), 8-9. See also Moscow Domestic Service, 12 February 1990, transcribed in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, FBIS-SOV-90-030, 13 February 1990, 116.

54. Some Russian experts have advocated the consolidation of all the military archives into one main center as a way of helping to open up the collections, but there is no prospect yet that this will happen. See the

comments by General V. Zolotarev in "Chto zhdet arkhivy KPSS i KGB," 4.

55. For a recent example, see Colonel-General Yu. A. Gor'kov, "Gotovili Stalin uprezhdayushchii udar protiv Gitlera v 1941 g.," *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* 3 (May-June 1993), 29-45.

56. For the best existing account of this episode, see Timothy J. Colton, *Commanders, Commissars, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 175-95.

57. Conversation with Charles Palm, deputy director of the Hoover Institution, 18 May 1993. Palm is in charge of the effort on Hoover's end.

58. For scattered comments about some of the other projects, see Pikhoya, "Sovremennoe sostoyanie arkhivov Rossii," 6-7, 9. [Ed. note: One project of special note is the effort of the eminent Russian and Ukrainian archives specialist Patricia Kennedy Grimsted (Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University) to compile a computerized "ArcheoBiblioBase" (ABB), a comprehensive international database network containing information on archives and libraries throughout Russia and the former Soviet Union. Dr. Grimsted currently seeks funds for the project, which is sponsored on the Russian side by Rosarkhiv with the participation of the State Public Historical Library and the St. Petersburg Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences.]

59. For an overview of the project, see Charles G. Palm, "Roskomarkhiv-Hoover Project," *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (November 1992), 9. A very similar article appeared in Russian as "Kak budet realizovuyat'sya soglasenie Roskomarkhiva i Guvera," *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 70:6 (November-December 1992), 108-09. [Ed. note: The first collection stemming from the project, *Leaders of the Russian Revolution*, was advertised in October 1993 as containing microfiche and microfilm materials from the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI, the pre-1952 CPSU Central Committee archives) on nine prominent Bolshevik revolutionaries: P.B. Axelrod, M.I. Kalinin, S.M. Kirov (Kostrikov), L. Martov (I.O. Tserbaum), V.M. Molotov (Skriabin), G.K. Ordzhonikidze, L.D. Trotsky (Bronshstein), V.I. Zauslich, and A.A. Zhdanov. The entire collection (2,460 microfiche, 355 microfilm reels) sells for \$41,695; individual archives are also available. Orders and inquiries to: Chadwyck-Healey Inc., 1101 King Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 USA; tel.: (703) 683-4890; toll-free: 1-800-752-0515; fax: (703) 683-7589.]

60. The members of the editorial board representing Hoover are Robert Conquest, John Dunlop, and Terence Emmons. The representatives from Rosarkhiv other than Pikhoya are Nikolai Pokrovskii and General Dmitrii Volkogonov. A consultant to the project, Jana Howlett of Cambridge University, is an *ex officio* member of the editorial board.

61. "Arkhivy — vse na prodazhu," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, 15 May 1992, 2.

62. Natal'ya Davydova, "'Delo partii' zhivet i produetsya: Shirokaya rasprodazha gosudarstvennykh arkhivov ne mozhet byt' bezrazlichna obshchestvu," *Moskovskie novosti* 19 (10 May 1992), 21. See also Davydova's earlier article, "Bumazhnoe zoloto partii," *Moskovskie novosti* 8 (23 February 1992), 10.

63. Yu. N. Afanas'ev, "Arkhivnaya 'berezka': Okazyvaetsya iz nashei istorii možno kachat' valyutu," *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 23 May 1992, 5. Afanas'ev's initial comments were in "Proizvol v obrashchenii s obshchestvennoi pamyat'yu nedopustim," *Izvestiya*, 10 March 1993, 3. See also Ella Maksimova, "Krupneishaya

arkhivnaya sdelka s amerikantsami, kotoroi protivlyatsya nashi istoriki," *Izvestiya*, 7 March 1992, 2.

64. Pikhoya, "Sovremennoe sostoyanie arkhivov Rossii," 4.

65. See, for example, "Pis'mo v redaktsiyu: Fakty i vymysli o 'Rasprodazhe istoricheskoi pamyati,'" *Izvestiya*, 17 March 1992, 3. See also the interviews with Pikhoya in "Vokrug arkhivov idet bessovestnaya trgovlya," *Rossiiskie vesti*, 19 June 1992, 2; "Demony iz yashchika Pandory," 7; and "Partiinye arkhivy raskryvayut sovsem inuyu istoriyu," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 25 August 1992, 1-2.

66. For example, the agreement initially specified seven main areas of interest: (1) mechanisms of power within the former USSR; (2) the emergence of Stalinism; (3) demography of the USSR; (4) administrative controls (command economy, terror, etc.); (5) public expectations and state responses; (6) foreign policy; and (7) religion. After criticisms were expressed about the vagueness and amorphousness of these categories, the project organizers decided to microfilm entire *fonds*.

67. On this point, see the very useful commentary by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, "Introduction — Russian Archives in a New World Setting," in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, ed., *Archives in Russia, 1992: A Brief Directory*, Part 1: Moscow and St. Petersburg (Princeton, NJ: International Research & Exchanges Board, September 1992), xxxviii-xxxix.

68. S. Turchenko, "I koe-chto ostaetsya . . . : Sekrety iz nashikh arkhivov uplyvayut za okean," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 22 April 1993, 5.

69. The agreement included provisions that obligated TsKhSD to provide equal access to Russian and foreign participants and to acknowledge that "after the conference"—a phrase added at TsKhSD's request—"all declassified documents, reports and other materials will become accessible to the world academic community and all those using SCCD [TsKhSD] materials for research and publication" (point 1.6); and that "no restrictions shall be imposed on the rights of researchers in making use of declassified SCCD [TsKhSD] materials" (point 1.7).

70. [Ed. note: During a meeting with CWIHP representatives in July 1993, senior Rosarkhiv official V.P. Kozlov cleared up some of the mystery concerning the shifts in access to TsKhSD materials. Kozlov said that then-TsKhSD director Usikov issued an internal directive to archive staff dated 14 October 1992 instructing them to give participants in the upcoming conference full access to materials for the period 1952-1980, below the level of special dossiers (*osobaya papka*), and even those could be shown at each archivist's discretion. Kozlov noted that the directive made no mention of any formal declassification procedure to be followed before the materials were to be made available, and that the failure to properly declassify materials was one reason for Usikov's removal.]

71. When Prokopenko and another senior Rosarkhiv official V.P. Kozlov, met with CWIHP representatives in July 1993, they stated that they could no longer abide by the original agreement's provisions for unrestricted access to and use of TsKhSD materials released to conference participants, and that documents already received by researchers should not be published because they were not properly declassified. They said negative consequences could ensue should another document cause a political sensation such as that caused by the document concerning the number of U.S. POWs in Vietnam, and that this should be avoided. CWIHP representatives repeated the position they had taken since the inception of dealings with TsKhSD, that any

archival materials shown to outside scholars must be considered declassified, regardless of their formal status. Moreover, they noted that as a practical matter the released documents had already been widely circulated and in some cases published, and that in any event CWHIP had no ability or right to control the scholars who had seen TsKhSD materials. CWHIP representatives expressed readiness to consider new terms for future cooperation, but said restrictions could not be placed retroactively on materials previously released to scholars who had conducted research in good faith under the terms of the original agreement.

72. This points to one of the many oddities of the current archival situation in Moscow. From mid-1992 until early 1993 scholars associated with the Wilson Center project were permitted to examine documents at the CPSU archives and take as detailed notes as they wished, but the Russian archival authorities still considered the documents to be formally classified until a Declassification Commission approved their declassification. (See previous footnotes.) Other peculiarities of the Russian notion of declassification are evident in A. V. Elpat'evskii, "O rasskrechivanii arkhivnykh fondov," *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 70:5 (September-October 1992), 15-20.

73. See "The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation: Regulations for Declassification" and "The Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation: Regulations for Access," both in *AAASS Newsletter* 32:4 (September 1992), 1-2 and 2, respectively.

74. V. D. Esakov, "O zakrytii zhurnala 'Istoricheskii arkhiv' v 1962 g.," *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 70:4 (July-August 1992), 32-42. For another useful essay, accompanied by fascinating documents that reveal the extent of high-level CPSU interference in the functioning of the original version of *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, see "Sud'ba zhurnala: 'Istoricheskii arkhiv' v 1955-1962 gg.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 1 (1992), 194-211.

75. Among the numerous documents published in *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, perhaps the most intriguing was a lengthy transcript of the Central Committee plenum held immediately after the downfall of Lavrentii Beria, the notorious secret police chief, in June 1953. See "Delo Beria," *Izvestiya TsK KPSS* 1 and 2 (January and February 1991), 140-214 and 147-208, respectively.

76. The projected number of issues per annum of *Istoricheskii arkhiv* was given as 12 in the first issue and reduced to six by the second issue. A figure of three to four seems more realistic.

77. General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Main Intelligence Directorate, "Doklad zamestitelya nachal'nika Genshtaba VNA General-leitananta Chan Van Kuanga na zasedanii Politbyuro TsK PTV, 15 sentyabrya 1972 goda (Perevod s v'etnamskogo)," Copy No. 6 (TOP SECRET), November 1972, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 64, D. 478, Ll. 183-208.

78. The account here is based on my first-hand observations of what went on both before and after Morris discovered the document. I was working in the TsKhSD reading room at the time he found the section on POWs, and he promptly showed it to me. Like him, I immediately recognized the importance of the document, and I helped him do an on-the-spot translation into English of key passages, especially some of the handwriting on the cover memoranda. For Morris' account of these events, see "The Vietnamese Know How to Count," *Washington Post*, 18 April 1993, C7; "Quangmire," *The New Republic* 208:22 (31 May 1993), 18-19; "Ghosts in the Archives," *Washington Post*, 12 September 1993, C3; and "The '1205 Document': A Story of American Prisoners, Vietnamese Agents, Soviet

Archives, Washington Bureaucrats, and the Media," *The National Interest* 33 (Fall 1993), 28-42.

79. The report spelled out three conditions to be met before all U.S. POWs would be returned: (1) the United States had to cease all hostilities and remove Nguyen van Thieu from power; (2) the Nixon administration had to refrain from any disciplinary measures against the "progressive" POWs who were released early; and (3) "Nixon must compensate North Vietnam for the enormous damage caused by the destructive war."

80. Memorandum No. 313/001286 (TOP SECRET), 29 November 1972, from General P. Ivashutin, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, to K. V. Katushev, CPSU CC Secretary, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 64, D. 478, Ll. 180-182.

81. Valerii Rudnev, "Sledy amerikanskikh voennoplennykh iz Rossii vedut vo V'etnam i Koreyu," *Izvestiya*, 10 April 1993, 1, 5. For a sample of Rudnev's earlier coverage, see "Amerikanskije voennoplennye: Pervye sekretnye dokumenty iz spetsial'nykh arkhivov," *Izvestiya*, 15 July 1992, 5.

82. "Files Said to Show Hanoi Lied in '72 On Prisoner Totals," *New York Times*, 12 April 1993, A-1, A-10; for translated excerpts see "Vietnam's 1972 Statement on P.O.W.'s: Triple the Total Hanoi Acknowledged," *New York Times*, 13 April 1993, A-9.

83. Quang's status in September 1972 is unclear, but there is ample circumstantial evidence to suggest that he may still have been deputy chief of the General Staff. See, e.g., George A. Carver, Jr., "Vietnam—the Unfinished Business," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 May 1993, 16.

84. Thomas W. Lippmann, "Vessey Faults Russian Paper on U.S. POWs," *Washington Post*, 22 April 1992, A-1, A-25.

85. General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Main Intelligence Directorate, "Doklad Sekretarya TsK PTV Khoang Anya na XX Plenum TsK PTV, sostoyavshemysya v kontse dekabrya 1970 goda—nachale yanvary 1971 goda (Perevod s v'etnamskogo)," 1971 (TOP SECRET). For unknown reasons, only pages 11 and 18 were provided. For an English translation of the key passages, see Adam Clymer, "Soviet File Feeds Debate on P.O.W.'s," *New York Times*, 9 September 1993.

86. Terence Smith, "Senators Receive Hanoi P.O.W. List," *New York Times*, 23 December 1970, 1, 7. For the administration's criticisms of the list, see Terence Smith, "Rogers Criticizes Hanoi on P.O.W. List," *New York Times*, 24 December 1970, 2. The list of 368 included 20 prisoners who were known to be dead and nine others who had already been released. Of the remaining 339, the names of all but five had already been published six months earlier in "Names of 334 U.S. Captives Hanoi Admits Holding," *New York Times*, 26 June 1970, 8. At the time the June 1970 list was published, the U.S. government publicly expressed serious doubts about its accuracy and completeness. A senior Defense Department official called on "the North Vietnamese government to provide an official list through accepted government channels," and he explained that the United States would not publish its own list because "then they [the North Vietnamese] would know whom we know about and whom we don't know about. This could be dangerous. For example, at the end of the war, Hanoi could just keep the men we don't know about." Quoted in "Hanoi Said to Confirm List Putting Prisoners at 334," *New York Times*, 26 June 1970, 8.

87. On the administration's overtures regarding documentation, see Celestine Bohlen, "Russians Give U.S. More P.O.W. Documents," *New York Times*, 5 September 1993, 6; Fred Hiatt, "U.S. Faults Russia on POW

Data," *Washington Post*, 3 September 1993, A-27; and Bill Gertz, "U.S. Leaning on Russia for Original POW Report," *Washington Times*, 27 April 1993, A-3.

88. Under Russia's new archival law (adopted three months after the disclosure of Quang's report), researchers are entitled to disseminate all information they find. The only restriction is on the use of information for commercial purposes.

89. Turchenko, "I koe-chto ostaetsya...." 5. Prokopenko repeated this accusation during a conversation I had with him in his office on 13 May 1993: "We're willing to help genuine scholars, but we don't want to aid those who are working for 'special services.'" Curiously, one researcher whom the *Sovetskaya Rossiya* article accused of working at TsKhSD on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency had actually never been present in the Moscow archives. He had been *intending* to do research at TsKhSD and his name had been included in a fax from the Wilson Center listing American scholars who would be coming over, but for a variety of reasons this scholar did not end up working at the archives. The fact that his name was cited in the article indicates that the letter was turned over to *Sovetskaya Rossiya* by a TsKhSD official who wanted to "get the foreigners out"—hardly an encouraging sign.

90. See footnote 2.

91. Sil'va Rubashova, "Svyaschennye sekrety: Kakim klyuchom možhno snova zakryt' seify TsK KPSS," *Moskovskie novosti* 8 (23 February 1992), 10; Ella Maksimova, "Arkhivnoe piratstvo ugrozhaet svobode informatsii," *Izvestiya*, 22 February 1992, 7; "Originaly dnevnikov Gebbel'sa khranyatsya v rossiskom MIDE," *Izvestiya*, 9 July 1992, 6; and Sergei Svistunov, "Torgovtsy pamyat'yu," *Pravda*, 29 August 1992, 5.

92. Igor Aleksandrovich Ognetrov's sector on Vietnam was one of the main components of the CPSU Central Committee Department on Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, which was headed by Konstantin Rusakov. Rusakov reported directly to Katushev, and Ognetrov worked for both Rusakov and Katushev as well as for Rusakov's first deputy, Oleg Rakhmanin, who was a specialist on East Asian communism.

93. "Spravka k dokumentu No. 38995 ot 1 dekabrya 1972 g.," (TOP SECRET) from I. Ognetrov, 6 February 1973, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 64, D. 478, L. 179.

94. The Russian text is: "Poruchenie ischerpano razvitiem situatsii. Tov. Katushevu K. F. dolozheno."

95. "Vietnam Peace Pacts Signed; America's Longest War Halts," *New York Times*, 28 January 1973, 1, 24; "Hanoi Lists of P.O.W.'s Are Made Public by U.S.," *New York Times*, 28 January 1973, 1, 26; "Communists List 555 P.O.W.'s but Give No Data on Laos: Omission Is Seen as the First Hitch," *New York Times*, 29 January 1973, 15; "Listing of American Prisoners, Taken from Names Provided by Communists," "Dead P.O.W.'s Are Listed," and "List of Captured Civilians," all in *New York Times*, 29 January 1973, 16; "V ustanovke serdechnoi družby" and "Priезд v Moskvu," *Pravda*, 31 January 1973, 1-2 and 2, respectively; and Pavel Demchenko, "Mezhdunarodnaya nedel'ya," *Pravda*, 29 January 1973, 16.

96. Edward Hallett Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), 15-16.

97. Usikov, "Cho takoe TsKhSD?" 3.

98. "Zaznam jednani predsedniatva UV KSC a UV KSSS v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968," in Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska (Prague), F. 07/15, Vol. AJ 274.

99. See, e.g., the accounts by Alexander Dubeck, Zdenek

Mlynar, and Josef Smrkovsky: *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek*, trans. and ed. by Jiri Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), 168; Zdenek Mlynar, *Nachtfrost: Erfahrungen auf dem Weg vom realen zum menschlichen Sozialismus* (Koln: Eurpaisches Verlagsanstalt, 1978), 151-52; and "Nedokonceny rozhovor: Mluvi Josef Smrkovsky," *Listy: Casopis ceskoslovenske socialisticke opozice* (Rome) 4:2 (March 1975), 13-14. Dubcek's memoir says Kosygin uttered the slurs, whereas Mlynar and Smrkovsky both point to Shelest.

100. The disjuncture of the transcript suggests that this latter scenario is what transpired, but the renumbering of the pages prevents any conclusive determination.

101. See Mark Kramer, "Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?" *International Security* 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-18, with a response by Bruce Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch. See further comments about these shortcomings in Mark Kramer, "New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia" (Part One), *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), 8, 11.

102. McCarthy's remark came during an interview with Dick Cavett in early 1980. See Herbert Mitgang, "Miss Hellman Suing a Critic for 2.25 Million," *New York Times*, 16 February 1980, 12. During the Stalin era, many Soviet leaders attained this level of mendacity, and even more recently a few ex-officials in Moscow — Andrei Gromyko and Valentin Falin, to name two — came reasonably close.

103. Even when numerous accounts are available, there may be contradictions and discrepancies that cannot be resolved. This is the case so far with the question of whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland in December 1981 if the Polish president, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, had been unable or unwilling to impose martial law. For sharply divergent views on this matter from key participants in the crisis, see Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny — dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); Wojciech Jaruzelski, *Les chaines et le refuge* (Paris: Lattes, 1992); Stanislaw Kania, *Zatrzymac konfrontacje* (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991); the interview with Ryszard Kuklinski, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka," *Kultura* (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), 3-57; Mieczyslaw Rakowski, *Jak to sie stalo* (Warsaw: BGW, 1991); A. I. Gribkov, "Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," *Voенно-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow) 9 (September 1992), 46-57; and Vitalii Pavlov, *Wspomnienia rezydenta KGB w Polsce* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). The only way the matter will be resolved — if it ever will be — is through the release of more documents from the Presidential Archive. Some extremely valuable documents have already been declassified (as cited in note 111 *infra*), but these do not conclusively settle the matter. In other cases where first-hand accounts conflict, there may be little or no chance of ever getting documentation that could clarify things. To cite one of countless examples, it has long been thought that at a meeting in December 1967 between the CPSU General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, and top Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) officials, Brezhnev declared "Eto vashe delo" ("This is your own affair") when he was asked to intervene in the KSC's leadership dispute. Brezhnev certainly said things to that effect, but whether he actually uttered this phrase is unclear. Alexander Dubcek, who was present at the meeting, later was unsure whether Brezhnev had used the expression. Other prominent ex-KSC officials, such as Josef Smrkovsky and Jiri Pelikan, did believe Brezhnev had used the three words, but neither

of them was actually present at the meeting. Whatever Brezhnev did or did not say, the phrase has become a part of the standard lore about the Prague Spring.

104. Interview with former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Brown University, 25 May 1991.

105. Emphasis added. This document, dated 24 December 1974, is sealed off in a "Special Dossier" (*Osobaya papka*), but is cited by Il'ya Gaiduk in footnote 34 of his manuscript "V'etnamskaya voina i sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya," presented at the CWIHP-IVI-TsKhSD conference in Moscow, 12-15 January 1993.

106. Shevardnadze supported this general proposition in an interview at Brown University, 25 May 1991.

107. See Gaiduk, "V'etnamskaya voina i sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya." I do not entirely agree, however, with the emphasis Gaiduk places on the Foreign Ministry's role in particular. In relations with a Communist country like North Vietnam, the key factor was party-to-party ties, which were supervised by the CPSU Central Committee department responsible for intra-bloc affairs. Foreign Ministry inputs, in most cases, probably came via the Central Committee department rather than directly to the Politburo.

108. A telling example of this phenomenon arose with a lengthy report transmitted by the Soviet ambassador in Romania, A. V. Basov, in September 1968. The report, entitled "On Certain Problems in Soviet-Romanian Relations in Light of the Positions Adopted by the Leadership of the RCP vis-a-vis the Events in Czechoslovakia," analyzed Romania's stance during the Czechoslovak crisis and offered numerous recommendations at the end for Soviet policy toward Romania. A one-page attachment to the report, from G. Kiselev, the deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Ties with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, tersely remarked that "the majority of issues raised in the report and the concrete proposals of the embassy were already decided on in the CPSU Central Committee" nearly a week before the report was submitted. Kiselev noted that "the position of the embassy does not diverge from the CPSU CC's decisions," and he backed up his point by listing each of the recommendations in the report and correlating it with an earlier decision by the Politburo. For the report and Kiselev's memorandum (described as "Supplement to Document No. 27116"), see "TsK KPSS: O nekotorykh problemakh sovetsko-rumynskikh otnoshenii v svete pozitsii, zanyatoi rukovodstvom RKP v svyazi s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii," Report No. 686 (TOP SECRET) to the CPSU CC Politburo, 23 September 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D.339, Ll. 106-121.

109. See Carr, *What Is History?* 16-19, esp. 18-19.

110. The potential for problems is adumbrated in the Russian government's Decree No. 838 ("O realizatsii gosudarstvennoi politiki v arkhivnom dele"), which indicates that plans are underway to "publish historical sources and scholarly-informational literature during the period from 1994 to 2000, taking account of prospective directions in which the country's historical scholarship might develop, the growth of national and historical consciousness of Russians ["rossiyan"], and the spiritual renewal of Russia. The aim of these publications will be to show Russia's role and place in the history of world civilization and world culture and its influence on world society."

111. "Scisle tajne: KPZR o Polsce 1980-81," *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 12-13 December 1992, 10-11; and "Dokumenty Komisji Suslowa," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 26 August 1993, 19-20. See also the invaluable collection of transcripts of Polish Politburo meet-

ings from 1980-81: Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., *Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPRa "Solidarnosc," 1980-1981* (London: Aneks, 1992).

112. For citations of some of the recently published items, see my article on "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis" in this issue of the CWIHP *Bulletin*.

113. The transcripts were published in four segments under the general rubric "Iz Arkhiva Gorbacheva (Besedy M. S. Gorbacheva s R. Reiganom v Reik'yavike 11-12 oktyabrya 1986 g.)." See "Pervaya beseda (pervonachal'no naedine) — utrom 11 oktyabrya 1986 g.," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (Moscow) 4 (April 1993), 79-90; "Vtoraya beseda (dnem 11 oktyabrya 1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 5 (May 1993), 81-90; "Tret'yaya beseda (utrom 12 oktyabrya 1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 7 (July 1993), 88-104, and "Chetvertaya beseda (dnem 12 oktyabrya 1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* 8 (August 1993), 68-78.

114. I use this metaphor here because it came up repeatedly at the conference. Unfortunately, as several speakers discovered, there is no good translation of the metaphor into Russian or other Slavic languages.

115. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

116. Blair Worden, "Lyrical Historian," *The New York Review of Books* 40:13 (15 July 1993), 12.

117. The new study is Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 8* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 1993). Weathersby's nuanced presentation by no means discounts the importance of the dog's own desire and ability to wag its tail, but she gives greater emphasis to the tail's initiative.

118. See, e.g., the two-part interview with Korotkov in *Yonhap* (Seoul), 22 and 23 June 1993, reproduced in U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Central Eurasia: Daily Report*, FBIS-SOV-93-118 and FBIS-SOV-93-119, 22 and 23 June 1993, 11-12, 14, respectively; and "Secrets of the Korean War: Forty Years Later, Evidence Points to Stalin's Deep Involvement," *U.S. News & World Report*, 9 August 1993, 45-47. Korotkov has prepared a book-length manuscript on the topic entitled "Poslednyaya voina Generalissimo" ("The Generalissimo's Final War").

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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SOVIET COMMAND AUTHORITY, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Mark Kramer

Over the last several years, a group of American scholars have been reexamining the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. This collaborative project, which included five major conferences between 1987 and 1992, was organized initially by James Blight and David Welch and more recently by Blight and Bruce Allyn.¹ Their research has yielded many important findings and has shed new light on events that we thought we already “knew” perfectly well. Blight, Allyn, and Welch have performed a valuable service for both historians and political scientists.

Nevertheless, the fruitfulness of their work has at times been eroded by their desire to portray the Cuban missile crisis in as dangerous a light as possible. On at least a few occasions, they have been tempted to seize upon startling “revelations” that do not correspond with what actually happened. The result has been greater confusion than before about certain aspects of the crisis, especially regarding the Soviet Union’s role.

The potential for increased confusion has been illustrated most recently by the controversy surrounding the issue of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. This issue first emerged at the conference in Havana in January 1992, where the speakers from the former Soviet Union included General Anatolii Gribkov, who headed a directorate within the Soviet General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate in 1962.² (In that capacity Gribkov helped coordinate Operation “Anadyr,” the Soviet code-name for the missile deployments.) Many of those attending the Havana conference, such as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., construed Gribkov’s presentation to mean that Soviet troops in Cuba in October 1962 “were ready to fire tactical nuclear missiles at an invading force without getting clearance from Moscow.”³ Gribkov’s testimony at the conference was in fact more guarded and cryptic than Schlesinger implied, but most of the American participants (especially those who had to depend on English translations) interpreted the general’s remarks in the same way that Schlesinger did. Although a few of the Americans remained decidedly skeptical about the thrust of

Gribkov’s presentation, the large majority were apparently willing to accept the notion that the commander of Soviet troops had full authority during the crisis to launch tactical nuclear strikes against attacking U.S. forces.

The main purpose of this article is to refute that notion, drawing on recently declassified archival materials and new firsthand accounts. The article also will make clear that the recent controversy surrounding the tactical nuclear weapons issue should induce greater circumspection in the future regarding what we “learn” about the Cuban missile crisis. The first part of the article will consider how and why a fundamental misunderstanding arose in this case, and the second part will invoke newly released evidence to demonstrate that Soviet commanders in October 1962, far from having unlimited authority to use tactical nuclear missiles as they saw fit, were in fact categorically forbidden to use such weapons under any circumstances without explicit orders from Moscow. The brief concluding part of the article will touch upon the broader methodological implications of the controversy.

Scholarly Indiscretions

From the outset there was ample reason to be extremely cautious about Gribkov’s testimony (or at least the conclusions that were derived from his testimony). For one thing, Gribkov offered no supporting documentation when he spoke at Havana, nor did he provide any afterwards. By contrast, key documents *were* available at the time of the conference that should have generated profound skepticism about the notion that Soviet commanders were authorized to launch nuclear strikes during the crisis without clearance from Moscow. (I will have more to say about these documents below.) If important documentary evidence is at hand that strongly supports a given position, common sense would tell us to be wary of a conflicting position that is supported by no documentation at all. Furthermore, Gribkov was the only Soviet participant at any of the conferences who had ever implied that Soviet officers could have ordered nuclear strikes on their own during the crisis. That in itself would not be sufficient grounds to reject his purported “disclosures,” but at the very least it should have induced skepticism and caution on the part of the American participants.

Circumspection is in order whenever

scholars make use of oral history, but it was particularly crucial when dealing with Gribkov’s testimony, for this was not a trivial matter. It was an assertion that, if proven credible, could have altered our traditional understanding of the Cuban missile crisis. Surely it would have behooved the American organizers of the Havana conference to await at least some corroborating evidence before they made too much of this important but unproven “finding.”

The organizers, after all, were not unaware of the perils of inferring too much from oral history. One of their earlier conferences had offered a sobering precedent of

Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons An Excerpt

In January 1992, at a conference in Havana involving scholars of the Cuban Missile Crisis, retired Soviet General Anatolii Gribkov addressed a large audience with a surprising assertion. Gribkov, who had been planning the Kremlin’s secret nuclear deployment to Cuba during the crisis, had possessed tactical nuclear weapons as early as 1962. He claimed that he had advised Nikita S. Khrushchev to use them against an American invasion of Cuba, but that the decision in Moscow had been cut. (See Raymond L. Garthoff, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 1 (Spring 1992), 2-4). These statements may have come closer to nuclear war than previously. This article is part of a larger scholarly controversy over the significance and reliability of some of the statements made at and after the Havana conference. The main focus of the article is Gribkov’s claim, which is supported by Mark Kramer, a scholar affiliated with the Center for Strategic Studies at Brown University and the Russian Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin. The article also discusses other organizing academic conferences in Havana and elsewhere. The authors are James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David Welch, who are the co-authors of a new study, *Cuba on the Brink: The Collapse of the Soviet Union*, which was published this fall by Pantheon. Gribkov was given an opportunity to read and respond to the article. He declined. Gribkov’s testimony to Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and the Cuban Missile Crisis is discussed in Mark Kramer, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet General Staff Plans for the Invasion of Cuba* (New York: Edition Q, January 1994).

the way dramatic “revelations” can turn out to be unfounded. At the conference in Moscow in January 1989 the former Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatolii Dobrynin, startled the American participants when he claimed he had met secretly with Robert Kennedy on the 26th of October 1962 as well as the 27th. This disclosure, if it had been accurate, would have required substantial changes in the historical record of the crisis.⁴ But we now know that Dobrynin’s claim was not accurate, as the ex-ambassador himself later acknowledged with considerable embarrassment.⁵ This false alarm should have spawned greater caution on the part of those who may have

continued on page 42

KRAMER VS. KRAMER:*Or, How Can You Have Revisionism in the Absence of Orthodoxy?*

by James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch

"Almost everything in this statement is inaccurate"—Mark Kramer

Gadflies and devil's advocates perform a valuable academic service. They prevent hasty analysis, inadequate circumspection, and premature closure. We would like to take this opportunity to thank our colleague Mark Kramer for shouldering the gadfly's

Change and the Cuban Missile Crisis:

olving American, Cuban, and Russian veterans and General Anatoli I. Gribkov startled many in his no three decades earlier had been responsible for Cuba, stated that Soviet forces on the island during well as predelegated authority from Soviet leader American invasion force, even if communications with the Havana Conference On the Cuban Missile Crisis, ments, with their seeming implication that the crisis y thought, aroused intense public interest as well as ability of Gribkov's assertions. Taking issue with a Conference, and questioning the evidentiary basis ter with the Center for Foreign Policy Development er at Harvard University. Responding to Kramer's David A. Welch, who collectively were involved in ewhere devoted to studying the missile crisis, and e Brink: *Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet n Books*. Via an American intermediary, General d to Mark Kramer's article on his statements relating ssile Crisis. However, Gribkov declined, saying he ng book: *Gens. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. rals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago:

burden for the past five years as our detailed investigation of the Cuban missile crisis has evolved. His skepticism at every step of the way has been a useful reminder to us that deeply-rooted beliefs die hard.

Nevertheless, it is with some sadness that we pen these words, because there would have been no need for us to reply if Kramer had confined himself to presenting the entirely plausible argument that Gen. Issa Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, may not have had the authority during the Cuban missile crisis to decide whether to use nuclear weapons in the event of a U.S. invasion. But Kramer has chosen to attack us personally, and in the course of so doing, he has committed so many errors

of fact, interpretation, and inference that we feel compelled to address his argument in detail. A closer look reveals that his analysis is not merely flawed; it is self-refuting—so obviously so that we find it difficult to understand why this was not apparent to Kramer himself. We can only imagine that his attack has some deeper motivation and meaning that led him astray. Hence the sadness of which we speak.

We preface our remarks by noting that we are not responsible, nor will we apologize, for the sensationalism of the press. Contrary to Kramer's imputation, we have not encouraged this. In fact, throughout our work on the Cuban missile crisis we have constantly struggled against it. That said, Gen. Anatoly Gribkov's claims at the Havana conference were unprecedented and certainly newsworthy, and we would have been remiss in our outreach responsibilities had we not reported them and commented on their possible significance. Neither are we responsible for George Ball's minor misunderstandings of Gribkov's claims and of Soviet command-and-control arrangements, nor for the judgments of colleagues, such as Philip Brenner and Thomas Weiss, who concluded on the basis of their participation in the Havana meeting that the crisis was even more dangerous than they had thought. While we heartily concur with their assessment, we speak here only for ourselves.

Soviet Standing Orders For Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba

Some months after the Havana conference, in interviews with us and in a revised version of his memoir of the crisis,¹ Gribkov claimed that on 22 October 1960, Khrushchev, through Minister of Defense Rodion Ya. Malinovsky, categorically forbade Pliyev to use nuclear weapons of any kind under any circumstances in Cuba. Kramer believes that this "admission" by Gribkov—along with corroborating testimony by two other Soviet officers familiar with command-and-control arrangements during the crisis (Gen. Leonid S. Garbuz, Pliyev's deputy in 1962, and Lt. Gen. [then Col.] Nikolai Beloborodov, allegedly the commander of the "central nuclear base" in Cuba)²—"should set the record straight once and for all." "This new evidence," Kramer claims, "should ... put to rest any further claims that General Pliyev was authorized to order the

use of tactical nuclear weapons during the Cuban missile crisis without approval from Moscow." Kramer asserts that Lt. Col. Anatoly Dokuchaev, author of the article in which Garbuz and Beloborodov give their testimony, "is absolutely right" when he concludes that Moscow jealously guarded its prerogative to decide whether to authorize nuclear action in Cuba. Kramer believes Gribkov's later testimony constitutes a "retraction" which "bring[s] Gribkov's position into line with my own."

This is most curious. Kramer evidently believes the question has been settled definitively. But to date, we have seen no documentation that would justify this conclusion. Russian military officials have provided us with what they claim to be verbatim quotations from, and specific citations to, documents from the General Staff archives that support Gribkov's original story: namely, that Khrushchev pre-delegated to Pliyev the authority to launch tactical nuclear missiles. They have also provided us with what they claim are paraphrases of documents (but no verbatim quotations or specific citations) suggesting that at some point—and certainly within a few hours of President Kennedy's October 22 speech announcing the U.S. discovery of the missiles and his intention to impose a quarantine—Khrushchev instructed Pliyev not to use nuclear weapons of any kind except on Moscow's explicit instruction. But we have not as yet seen originals or facsimiles of any of these documents, and the excerpts and summaries that we have seen leave unresolved such crucial issues as the manner in which Khrushchev conveyed to Pliyev his original standing orders; the date on which he received them; the number and precise content of any changes made to them subsequently; and the timing of the alleged modifications. In short, we have yet to see any "hard" evidence one way or another. The evidence that we have seen (soft though it may be) tends to support Gribkov's original story somewhat more strongly than the revised accounts. Thus, although Kramer decries "the utter lack of evidence" for Gribkov's original claims, he is apparently willing to accept unreservedly a modified set of claims supported by even less.

How might Kramer justify his confidence? Certainly not by any appeal to authority. One of the men providing the crucial testimony upon which Kramer

continued on page 47

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

continued from page 40

once been willing to accept oral history without thorough corroboration.⁶

Unfortunately, though, the utter lack of evidence for the claims made about Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, and the experience in 1989 with Dobrynin's "revelations," did not end up having much of a cautionary influence on discussions following the Havana conference. If only for the sake of prudence, those who attended the conference should have qualified any statements they made about Soviet tactical nuclear weapons when talking with journalists and others afterwards. But what actually happened was just the opposite: Soon after the conference, one of the organizers, James Blight, publicly announced that at the height of the crisis "the Kremlin placed the finger of a soldier in the field on the nuclear button."⁷ This alarming "disclosure" was meant to bolster Blight's contention that "we were far closer to the verge of disaster than most historians, policy makers, and citizens think."⁸

Other American participants were equally indiscreet. No sooner had Gribkov finished his presentation than one of the Americans, Philip Brenner, a professor of international relations at American University, told Western journalists that "there is now *absolutely no question* that we were right at the brink" and "came closer to nuclear war than anyone had ever imagined."⁹ This theme was endorsed—just as uncritically—by the former U.S. defense secretary Robert S. McNamara, who declared that the risk of nuclear war during the crisis was "far greater than any of us imagined at the time" because "we never would have suspected" that "Soviet commanders in Cuba had the authority to use their short-range nuclear weapons."¹⁰

To be sure, one of the American participants, Raymond L. Garthoff of the Brookings Institution, did consistently warn that more evidence was needed before claims about Soviet tactical nuclear weapons could be endorsed; and another participant, John Newhouse, pointedly challenged Gribkov's whole testimony.¹¹ The reservations expressed by these two, however, were drowned out by the far more numerous statements of participants who were ready to accept the alleged "revelations" at face value.

Not surprisingly, the uncritical tone of most of the participants was echoed in Western media coverage of the Havana confer-

ence. In a typical case, an American journalist bluntly informed readers that "Soviet forces in Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis were armed with nuclear warheads and had the authority to use them against a U.S. invasion."¹² Many other reporters outdid one another in their eagerness to highlight the newly discovered dangers of the 1962 crisis, arguing that "under the circumstances, it was something of a miracle that we were spared a nuclear war."¹³ Thanks to Peter Jennings of ABC News, millions of television viewers also were among those who learned the startling "fact" that Soviet "battlefield missiles armed with nuclear warheads . . . were deployed in coastal areas" of Cuba in October 1962, and that Soviet commanders were on the verge of using the weapons against an American invasion force.¹⁴ Where ABC News's investigators got the idea that Soviet troops had armed their Frog missiles with nuclear warheads in preparation for firing is unclear, for even Gribkov had explicitly denied this at Havana (as well as afterwards). But never mind; historical precision was not always the chief consideration for journalists assigned to cover the latest "revelations" about the crisis.

Admittedly, the organizers of the Havana conference cannot be held responsible for the blithe way that many reporters and TV documentary crews sometimes dealt with the tactical nuclear weapons issue; but the organizers can indeed be faulted for not having done more to discourage sensationalism. Scholars in any field who believe they have come up with an important discovery—cold fusion for example, or a cure for AIDS, or new insights into the Cuban missile crisis—are remiss if they do not emphasize to the media how many pitfalls must be surmounted before they can verify their new findings. Not only did the organizers of the Havana conference fail to emphasize these pitfalls; in at least some cases, by breathlessly repeating Gribkov's claims, they may actually have encouraged the sort of coverage they received.

Dispelling the Confusion

It would be hard to overstate the confusion that emerged last year about the role of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis. Even a knowledgeable observer like former State Department official George Ball could somehow write, in

late 1992, that "the general in command [of Soviet forces in Cuba in October 1962] has repeatedly said that, contrary to what we assumed to be established Soviet practice, the Kremlin gave him full authority to use [tactical] nuclear warheads against any United States force that might try to invade Cuba."¹⁵ Almost everything in this statement is inaccurate. The general who commanded Soviet troops in Cuba in 1962, Issa Pliyev, has long been dead, so he has not "repeatedly said" anything in recent years. The only ones who have repeatedly espoused the view that Ball describes are several of the Americans who took part in the Havana conference on the Cuban missile crisis.

More important, Ball implies that if the Soviet theater commander in Cuba (General Pliyev) had authority to use tactical nuclear weapons against invading forces in October 1962, such an arrangement would have been "contrary to what we assumed to be established Soviet practice." This is simply incorrect. By studying Soviet military literature and by observing Soviet and Warsaw Pact exercises and maneuvers, Western specialists on Soviet military policy have long known that in the early 1960s Soviet theater commanders were supposed to be given authority during a war to order the use of tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁶ This was the *standard* Soviet command structure at that time for theater operations; it was not at all "contrary to what we assumed to be established Soviet practice."

Hence, the only relevant question about the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis is whether General Pliyev actually did have full authority to use such weapons against invading American troops without receiving clearance from Moscow. What we know about Soviet wartime command procedures from the 1960s suggests that he *should* have had that kind of authority once the crisis began, assuming that tactical nuclear warheads were present in Cuba.¹⁷ But did he? The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that he did *not*, and it is on this point that I take sharp issue with my colleagues who argue that he did.

Initially, those who contended that Pliyev enjoyed full authority during the crisis to order the use of tactical nuclear weapons without Moscow's consent predicated their assertions entirely on Gribkov's account at Havana. Yet Gribkov, as noted earlier, offered no supporting documenta-

tion at the conference, even though he claimed to be relying on a “General Staff document.” Bruce Allyn and James Blight followed up on the general’s remarks by attempting to track down this purported “document” in Russia. Allyn did eventually obtain a brief excerpt from it, dated June 1962, which contained the draft of an order from the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, to Pliyev. The draft order stipulated that if a U.S. invasion occurred and communications between Moscow and Cuba were severed, Pliyev should decide on his own whether “to use tactical nuclear Luna missiles as a means of local war for the destruction of the enemy on land and on the coast.”¹⁸ In a letter to *The New York Times* printed in November 1992, Allyn and Blight quoted this passage as evidence for their view that Pliyev was authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons during the Cuban missile crisis.

Closer examination shows, however, that the document they cited has no bearing on the matter. The draft order was never signed by Malinovskii and thus was never implemented or sent.¹⁹ The operational directive that was actually approved and transmitted to Pliyev in September 1962 expressly prohibited the use of tactical nuclear weapons (and even the issuance of nuclear warheads for such weapons) without authorization from Moscow. This directive was sent out several weeks before the crisis, but it remained in effect all the way through, as will be shown below.

Even if Allyn and Blight had been correct in arguing that Pliyev was given discretion in September 1962 to order the use of tactical nuclear weapons, that still would not have told us anything about the procedures that were in place once the crisis began on 22 October. There is a fundamental difference between options discussed in peacetime and the actual steps that leaders take during a crisis or war. Soviet officials who might have been willing, in peacetime, to contemplate scenarios involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons tended to be far more cautious when faced with a real or imminent crisis that threatened the nuclear destruction of their country. That is precisely what happened both before and during the Cuban missile crisis.

Some of the strongest evidence against the Allyn-Blight thesis comes, fittingly enough, from Gribkov himself, who has

now openly (if belatedly) disavowed the gloss that was put on his earlier remarks. His disavowal came in two stages, beginning in November 1992 with an interview published by the main Russian military newspaper, *Krasnaya zvezda* (Red Star). In that interview, which was part of a collection of firsthand accounts and archival materials, Gribkov acknowledged that only “during the *planning stage* of Operation ‘Anadyr’” was there “any consideration given to authorizing the commander [Pliyev] to use tactical nuclear weapons independently.”²⁰ Gribkov then conceded that this arrangement was never approved or implemented either before or during the crisis, noting wryly that “life introduced its own correctives.” The following month, Gribkov published a revised version of his memoirs in which he again denied, even more explicitly than in the *Krasnaya zvezda* interview, that Pliyev was authorized to order tactical nuclear strikes during the crisis. Gribkov maintained that, on the contrary, Pliyev “was *categorically forbidden* to use nuclear weapons of any type” throughout the crisis, even if the United States had launched an all-out invasion.²¹ No statement could be more at odds with what McNamara, Blight, Allyn, and Schlesinger have been alleging.

These admissions by Gribkov, which should set the record straight once and for all, are bolstered by other definitive evidence that appeared in the *Krasnaya zvezda* article mentioned above. Along with Gribkov’s comments, the article contained the testimony of two other high-ranking Soviet military officers who were at least as familiar as Gribkov was with the command arrangements in place during the Cuban missile crisis: Gen. Leonid Garbuz, who was Pliyev’s deputy commander in October 1962, and Col. Nikolai Beloborodov, who was commander of the “central nuclear base” in Cuba, which held all warheads slated for use on the Soviet missiles. Garbuz recounts that on 22 October, just hours after President Kennedy’s speech announcing the discovery of the missiles and the blockade against Cuba, Pliyev received an encrypted cable from Moscow instructing him to resist a potential American invasion with “all means available to the Soviet forces *except* for Statsenko’s delivery vehicles and Beloborodov’s force loadings.”²² General Igor Statsenko was the commander of the 43rd Missile Division (which encompassed

the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that were being installed in Cuba); and Beloborodov, as already noted, was in charge of all nuclear warheads, including those for tactical weapons as well as for Statsenko’s missiles.

Thus, it should now be clear, as Gribkov himself acknowledges, that from the very outset of the crisis on 22 October, Pliyev was explicitly *forbidden* to order the use of nuclear-armed Frog missiles (which in Soviet parlance were known as “Luna”). Although Pliyev could have used the Frog missiles with non-nuclear warheads (of which there were twenty-four on the island), the issuance of nuclear warheads for the Frogs, not to mention the launching of nuclear-armed missiles, was strictly prohibited. On 25 October, as tensions increased, Pliyev and Garbuz sent an encrypted message to Moscow explaining that they anticipated an invasion on the 26th or 27th and asking for further instructions. Within hours they received an answer from Soviet defense minister Malinovskii emphasizing that Pliyev had no authority beyond what had been stipulated in the cable of 22 October. In other words, the use of Frog missiles with nuclear warheads was still explicitly forbidden.²³

On the following day, 26 October, Pliyev sent another urgent cable to Malinovskii requesting approval for his decision to “use all available means of air defense” — which would not include any nuclear weapons — if U.S. planes attacked Soviet bases in Cuba.²⁴ This message, which came a day before an American U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down, underscores how limited Pliyev’s authority was during the crisis. Normally the use of non-nuclear weapons to defend against U.S. air strikes would have been handled through standard rules of engagement for air defense, but in this case Pliyev wanted to ensure that Malinovskii would condone such a step. That would be a strange request if, as McNamara, Blight, and Allyn would have us believe, it came from someone who had already been given broad enough authority to order the use of *nuclear* weapons without approval from above. What is even more telling is that Malinovskii himself, despite his authority as defense minister, did not want to have the final say on whether Pliyev should be entitled to resist U.S. bombing raids with non-nuclear air defenses. Malinovskii referred the cable directly to the top Soviet leader, Nikita

Khrushchev, recommending that Pliyev's decision be approved. This episode demonstrates how closely Khrushchev was supervising Soviet combat operations at the time. The notion that he had taken the risk of leaving Pliyev with independent nuclear-release authority during the crisis thus seems more ludicrous than ever.

Even stronger evidence for this point comes from the encrypted cable that Malinovskii sent in response to Pliyev on 27 October. In that cable, as Gribkov now acknowledges, the defense minister again stressed that "the use of nuclear weapons carried by medium-range missiles, tactical cruise missiles, 'Luna' missiles, and aircraft is categorically forbidden without permission from Moscow."²⁵ Even non-nuclear means of defense were to be used "only in the event of a clear and unmistakable attack."²⁶ Both directives reinforced the strict controls that the central authorities had laid out in the cables they dispatched to Pliyev on 22 and 25 October.

The existence of these cables, and other points mentioned by Garbuz, leave no doubt, as *Krasnaya zvezda* reports, that Soviet leaders "informed Pliyev several times that the use of any of Beloborodov's force loadings [i.e., nuclear warheads] could be undertaken only with Moscow's permission."²⁷ Because Soviet nuclear weapons at the time were not yet equipped with sophisticated devices to prevent an unauthorized or accidental launch, any nuclear warheads that may have been present in Cuba would have been stored far away — some 250-300 kilometers, according to Gribkov — from their intended delivery vehicles.²⁸ Although the separation would preclude any use of the weapons until an authenticated order came from Moscow, it also would ensure that, in the event of a U.S. invasion, the delivery vehicles would be destroyed long before Beloborodov's troops could equip them with nuclear warheads (if any were present) and prepare them to be launched. This means that if the choice had actually come down to either "using or losing" tactical nuclear missiles during the crisis, Khrushchev had decided at the outset that the Soviet Union would have to "lose" them.

That finding is corroborated by Beloborodov himself, whose testimony is transcribed next to Garbuz's in the *Krasnaya zvezda* article cited above. Beloborodov emphasizes that during the crisis "nuclear

weapons could have been used only if the missile officers had received orders via their own chain-of-command from the General Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for storing and operating warheads, had received our own special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or the tactical weapons."²⁹ Both Beloborodov and Garbuz confirm that a decision to issue warheads or use nuclear weapons during the crisis "could have come only from the head of state, Nikita Khrushchev, acting either on his own or after consultation with the other members of the Presidium of the Communist Party's Central Committee."³⁰

The fact that nuclear-release authority remained exclusively with Khrushchev throughout the crisis undermines McNamara's recent assertion that the events of October 1962 brought the world "unbearably close to nuclear war."³¹ Indeed, we knew even before the Havana conference, based on the top-secret correspondence between Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in 1962, that the Soviet leader had no intention at all of resorting to nuclear warfare in defense of Cuba, despite Castro's vehement exhortations.³² The invaluable evidence that this declassified correspondence provides should have been enough to make Blight and Allyn far more skeptical than they were about claims that Soviet troops were authorized to use tactical nuclear missiles against an invading force without getting clearance from Moscow. For if, as McNamara, Blight, and Allyn have been insisting, Pliyev enjoyed full discretion during the crisis to use nuclear-armed Frogs as he saw fit, this would imply that Khrushchev was willing to tolerate a much greater risk of nuclear destruction than was previously believed. By all accounts, Khrushchev and his colleagues did expect that a U.S. ground invasion of Cuba, as well as air strikes, would be forthcoming.³³ And they were well aware that the use of Soviet nuclear weapons against American soldiers just 90 miles from the continental United States could provoke swift nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union itself. After all, Khrushchev had long been warning that any use of nuclear weapons by either side, no matter how limited, would lead inevitably to a full-scale nuclear war.³⁴ Blight's and Allyn's contentions about the role of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis are therefore tantamount to saying

that Khrushchev was willing to accept an extraordinarily high risk of nuclear devastation merely to protect Cuba.

Fortunately, we can easily turn to the declassified Khrushchev-Castro correspondence to show how fallacious this argument is. The letters confirm that Khrushchev was profoundly disinclined to tolerate any prospect of a nuclear exchange. Khrushchev's aversion to nuclear war comes through so clearly in this correspondence that it is all the more puzzling why Blight and Allyn would have been willing to attribute near-recklessness to the Soviet leader, especially considering that there are no documents or any other evidence to support such a view. All available documentation bears out the recent comment by Khrushchev's chief foreign policy adviser in 1962, Oleg Troyanovskii, that "despite Khrushchev's propensity to take risks, the possibility of war with the United States was never a realistic consideration for him under any circumstances because he understood better than anyone else that in the modern world a military clash between the two superpowers would have immediately turned into an all-out nuclear conflict that would be catastrophic for all humanity."³⁵

This new evidence should, I hope, put to rest any further claims that General Pliyev was authorized to order the use of tactical nuclear weapons during the Cuban missile crisis without approval from Moscow. The officer who compiled the first-hand testimony and declassified materials for *Krasnaya zvezda*, Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, is absolutely right when he says that "the perusal of documents from classified safes, and conversations with all the living generals who took part in Operation 'Anadyr,' permit us to draw only one conclusion: namely, that *the commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Cuba did not have the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons independently.*"³⁶ I am glad that General Gribkov has finally acknowledged this point, and I hope that my American colleagues will now be willing to admit they were wrong. I also hope that some of the journalists who went astray, especially those who prepared television documentaries, will now retract their earlier reports.

Conclusion

Although no one would deny that the

Cuban missile crisis was a very dangerous event, the controversy stemming from the Havana conference has led many in the West to regard the crisis as more dangerous than it actually was. The possibility of nuclear war in October 1962 was hardly negligible, and Khrushchev certainly took a major risk by covertly introducing missiles into Cuba; but new evidence confirms that once the crisis erupted, Khrushchev went out of his way to forestall untoward developments that could have precipitated a nuclear exchange. He clearly was not about to leave the decision on whether to “go nuclear” with a general based in Cuba. It is unfortunate that the Havana conference caused so many Western observers to misconstrue General Pliyev’s scope of action during the Cuban missile crisis, for it may take years before the remnants of this confusion will fully dissipate. In the meantime, many journalists, students, and scholars are likely to continue citing the “lessons” of the Havana conference, unaware that solid evidence contravenes those purported lessons.

Nevertheless, despite all the confusion, the attention devoted to the tactical nuclear weapons issue since early 1992 has served two useful purposes: first, it has expanded what we genuinely know about the Cuban missile crisis; and second, it has underscored—once again—the need to be extremely cautious when drawing conclusions about Soviet policy from unsubstantiated “evidence.” Until the Havana conference, little thought had been given to the possibility that Soviet nuclear operations in Cuba during the missile crisis were decentralized. Most observers simply assumed—correctly, as it turns out—that responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons would have been strictly controlled by the central government. By challenging that assumption, the recent controversy forced Western analysts to reexamine what they thought they knew about Soviet policy. Newly declassified evidence has amply corroborated previous Western assumptions, but the process of corroboration has itself been valuable by highlighting Khrushchev’s caution during the crisis. For that reason if for no other, what we learned while setting the record straight may have been worth the uproar and confusion that followed Gribkov’s remarks at Havana.

Equally important, the debate may eventually give a needed fillip to those in Mos-

cow who can decide whether to open the CPSU Politburo archives and the Russian/Soviet military archives to outside researchers. The documents that are now available at the Russian Foreign Ministry archive and the former CPSU Central Committee archive are intriguing, but they are of little or no use in clarifying most of the lingering mysteries of the Cuban missile crisis.³⁷ Only if Western and Russian historians can gain greater access to relevant materials in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff archives, the Presidential Archives, and the KGB archives will we truly have a better understanding of the Soviet side of the Cuban missile crisis. Some, perhaps many, ambiguities are bound to remain and there will always be room for divergent interpretations, but documents in those archives may at least help prevent a recurrence of the unnecessary confusion generated by the Havana conference.

For now, we will have to make do with incomplete documentation. The lack of access to certain key materials makes it especially important for scholars to be circumspect when evaluating new revelations about the Cuban missile crisis. It is always better to err on the side of caution, even if that means extra time and work will be needed to verify new information. And whenever it is not immediately possible to corroborate specific findings, scholars are obligated to make clear how tentative—and potentially flimsy—those findings are.

1. The conferences began in Hawk’s Cay, Florida in March 1987, and were then held at Harvard University in October 1987, in Moscow in January 1989, in Antigua in 1991, and in Havana in January 1992. The first three sessions were under the auspices of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, whereas the fourth and fifth were sponsored by Brown University’s Center for Foreign Policy Development. The conference at Hawk’s Cay included only American participants, but all subsequent meetings included Soviet as well as American participants, and the last three conferences also featured Cuban participants. For transcripts and evaluations of the first three conferences, see James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989) and Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., *Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989*, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 9 (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1992). A third book, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse*, (New York: Pantheon, 1993) with transcripts and assessments of the fourth and fifth conferences, was published this fall.

2. Gribkov offered his account orally at the conference, and then produced a lengthier version in a two-part article published in Germany, which differed in some

respects from his oral remarks. See “An der Schwelle zum Atomkrieg,” *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg) 15 (13 April 1992), 144 ff; and “Operation Anadyr,” *Der Spiegel* 16 (20 April 1992), 196 ff. Subsequently, this version was included with a few minor revisions in Gribkov’s memoirs, *Im Dienste der Sowjetunion: Erinnerungen eines Armeegenerals* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1992), which also were published in German before they appeared in Russian. A Russian-language version of Gribkov’s reminiscences about the Cuban missile crisis was published in four parts in late 1992 and early 1993. See “Karibskii krizis” (Part 1), *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow) 10 (October 1992), 41-46; “Karibskii krizis” (Part 2), *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* 11 (November 1992), 33-42 (plus additional documentation); “Karibskii krizis” (Part 3), *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* 12 (December 1992), 38-45; and “Karibskii krizis” (Part 4), *Voenna-istoricheskii zhurnal* 1 (January 1993) 2-10 (plus additional documentation). The Russian version is similar to the earlier German version, but it is lengthier, is structured differently, and contains two crucial retractions, which bring Gribkov’s position into line with my own. I will cite these retractions below.

3. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Four Days with Fidel: A Havana Diary,” *New York Review of Books* 39:6 (26 March 1992), 23. For a rebuttal to Schlesinger’s comments, see Mark Kramer, “Castro’s Cuba: An Exchange,” *New York Review of Books* 39:10 (28 May 1992), 54-56.

4. For details on the way the record would have changed, see Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, “Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *International Security* 14:3 (Winter 1989/90), 158-59.

5. Letter from Ashok Prasad of BBC Television, 15 May 1992. For a corrected version by Dobrynin, see his “Karibskii krizis: Svidetel’stvo uchastnika,” *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’* (Moscow) 7 (July 1992), 54-68, esp. 63.

6. Another illustration of the potential dangers of relying solely on oral history comes from my first meeting (at Brown University in early 1990) with Nikita Khrushchev’s son Sergei, who was one of the leading participants in three of the five conferences on the Cuban missile crisis. I asked him why his father had sent troops into Hungary to crush the 1956 uprising rather than letting the Communist regime collapse, as Mikhail Gorbachev had done in 1989. Sergei explained that his father had been alarmed because the Hungarian revolution had come so soon after the Soviet Union pulled all its troops out of Romania. According to Sergei, Khrushchev believed the only way to ensure that the withdrawal from Romania would not inspire further unrest was by resorting to military action in Hungary. This explanation is innovative and intriguing, but, as I quickly pointed out to Sergei, it is also patently wrong. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania occurred in 1958, two years after the revolution in Hungary. Sergei’s confusion about such a basic point raises troubling questions for those who are willing to accept oral history without supporting documentation. In this case, I was easily able to demonstrate that Sergei’s oral history was inaccurate. Most of the time, however, matters are not so straightforward.

7. Thomas G. Weiss and James G. Blight, “When We Teetered at the Brink,” *Providence Journal*, 2 February 1992, B-6.

8. *Ibid.*

9. “‘We Came Closer to Nuclear War Than Anyone ... Imagined,’” *Providence Journal*, 14 January 1992, A-1, A-10 (emphasis added).

10. John E. Mulligan, "62 Crisis Could Have Been a 'Disaster,'" *Providence Journal*, 22 January 1992, A-4. See also Martin Tolchin, "U.S. Underestimated Soviet Force in Cuba During '62 Missile Crisis," *New York Times*, 15 January 1992, A-11; and Don Oberdorfer, "Cuban Missile Crisis More Volatile Than Thought," *Washington Post*, 14 January 1992, A-1, A-16.
11. For Garthoff's cautious assessment, see his "The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1* (Spring 1992), 2-4. Newhouse's account was published in "A Reporter at Large: Socialism or Death," *The New Yorker*, 27 April 1992, 52 ff., esp. 69-71.
12. Kim A. McDonald, "Cuba Said to Have Nuclear Warheads During 1962 Crisis," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 38:21 (29 January 1992), A-9.
13. Tad Szulc, "Cuba '62: A Brush with Armageddon," *Washington Post Book World* 22:46 (15 November 1992), 10.
14. "The Missiles of October," ABC News Special Report, 16 October 1992, typescript, 38. This program, which gave pride of place to the tactical nuclear weapons issue, was remarkable for how carelessly it discussed Soviet policy. To cite but one example, Jennings asserted early in the broadcast that until 1962 the Soviet Union had "never before moved missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads outside its own borders" (15). In fact, the Soviet Union had shipped nuclear-capable Frog and Scud missiles to the East European members of the Warsaw Pact before 1962.
15. George Ball, "Present After the Creation," *New York Review of Books* 39:24 (17 December 1992), 11.
16. See, e.g., Stephen M. Meyer, *Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications*, Adelphi Paper 188 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/4), 30-31.
17. U.S. intelligence analysts discovered as early as 27 October 1962 that Frog delivery vehicles were present in Cuba, but the presence of nuclear warheads for the missiles was never confirmed. See "Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba," prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 27 October 1962, 2; reproduced in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962* (Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, October 1992), 325. A recent book based on retrospective analyses of U.S. aerial reconnaissance — Dino A. Brugioni, *Eye-ball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1991), esp. 538-48 — indicates that nuclear warheads were present in special vans at Mariel, but the implication is that these warheads were exclusively for the SS-4s. A recent article by a senior Russian military officer claims that 102 tactical nuclear warheads were present in Cuba for nearly two months in 1962, from 4 October until 1 December. These allegedly included 12 warheads slated for use on the "Frog" missiles, 80 warheads for tactical cruise missiles, 6 gravity bombs, and 4 nuclear naval mines. See Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dukuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 6 November 1992, 2. In an interview with the author (12 January 1993), Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who was in charge of the Soviet Union's "central nuclear base" in Cuba during the crisis, also maintained that 12 nuclear warheads had been shipped to the island for the "Frog" missiles. All these claims are eminently plausible, but so far there is no direct evidence to substantiate them.
18. "Anadyr," Soviet General Staff Archives, File 6, Volume 2, p. 144; cited by Blight and Allyn in their letter to the editor, *New York Times*, 2 November 1992, A-20.
19. See the interview with Gribkov and the preceding remarks in Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 6 November 1992, 2.
20. *Ibid.* (emphasis added)
21. "Karibskii krizis" (Part 3), 35. See also "Karibskii krizis" (Part 4), 5.
22. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," p. 2.
23. *Ibid.*
24. The full document was published in Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, "Operatsiya 'Anadyr,'" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 21 October 1992, 3. The original text with handwritten notations is reproduced alongside an interview with General Dmitrii Volkogonov in "Operatsiya 'Anadyr,'" *Trud* (Moscow), 27 October 1992, 3.
25. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2 (emphasis added). The same wording is reported by Gribkov in "Karibskii krizis" (Part 3), 35.
26. Cited in Anatolii Dokuchaev, "Voina ozhidalas' s rassvetom," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 May 1993, 2. This article presents two intriguing accounts of, and new archival materials on, the downing of the U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane on 27 October. The local decision to shoot down the aircraft clearly seems to have exceeded what the rules of engagement at the time (as laid out in Malinovskii's cable) permitted, and this factor undoubtedly contributed to Khrushchev's determination to bring the crisis to an end before events spun out of control. But that in no way implies that the proscription on the use of nuclear weapons could have been evaded in the same manner. It was precisely to ensure that such evasion could not occur that a host of overlapping procedural safeguards were in place for nuclear weapons. No such procedures would have been feasible or desirable for non-nuclear armaments, which explains why an unauthorized use of air defenses was possible (though even in this limited case, as Dokuchaev's article makes clear, the employment of the weapons was extremely difficult to carry out). Thus, although the downing of the U-2 highlighted the potential dangers of the Cuban missile crisis, there is no basis for arguing that the incident revealed anything about the durability of the Soviet nuclear command structure during the crisis. On the contrary, all the evidence cited below suggests that the nuclear command structure proved just as effective in October 1962 as one would have hoped.
27. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2.
28. On the safeguards for Soviet nuclear weapons at the time, see Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles Zraket, eds., *Managing Nuclear Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), 487, 491-92.
29. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2.
30. *Ibid.*
31. "The Missiles of October," ABC News Special Report, 16 October 1992. See also Robert S. McNamara, "One Minute to Doomsday," *New York Times*, 19 October 1992, A-25.
32. "Obmen poslaniami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow) 24 (31 December 1990), 67-80.
33. See, e.g., Oleg Troyanovskii, "Karibskii krizis: Vzglyad s kremlya," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow) 3 (March 1992), 109-110.
34. See, e.g., Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), esp. ch. 10.
35. "Karibskii krizis: Vzglyad s kremlya," 112. Among the recently declassified documents bearing out this view, see "Iz telegrammy iz Gavany o besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro," 20 November 1962, reproduced in "Dialog v Gavane. Karibskii krizis: Dokumenty," *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* 1 (January 1993), 149.
36. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," 2 (emphasis added).
37. For a survey of items released at the Central Committee archive-the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation-and a brief list of far more valuable items that are still unavailable, see the paper by A. M. Petrov and V. V. Poznyakov, "Kubinskii raketnyi krizis v dokumentakh TsKhSD," January 1993, presented at the Cold War International History Project conference in Moscow, 12-15 January 1993. Among the holdings of the Central Committee archive pertaining to the crisis are dozens of files in Fond 5, Opisy 30, 33, 35, 36, 47, 50, and 55; and Fond 4, Opis 14. Files in the Foreign Ministry archive are concentrated in Fond 104, Opisy 12 and 17. These holdings, unfortunately, shed no light at all on the main questions discussed here.

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KRAMER VS. KRAMER

continued from page 41

relies—Gen. Gribkov himself—Kramer considers untrustworthy. He describes Gribkov's current position as an "admission" and a "retraction," strongly implying that Gribkov originally lied. If Gribkov was not a credible witness then, he is not a credible witness now. Moreover, one reason why Kramer did not regard Gribkov as credible at Havana was that Gribkov "offered no supporting documentation at any point." Gribkov has yet to provide any supporting documentation of Khrushchev's rescindment.

Perhaps Kramer is impressed by the testimony of Garbuz and Beloborodov. Yet Kramer does not tell us why these gentlemen would be credible witnesses if Gribkov is not. Neither has provided any documentation for his claims, and one of them—Beloborodov—initially professed to confirm the version of events that Gribkov related at the Havana conference.³ In print, Kramer has disparaged *mere* oral testimony and has cautioned against the Soviets' proclivity to portray their foreign and defense policies in the most favorable light possible.⁴ Why is he not suspicious that Garbuz and Beloborodov are attempting to shelter Soviet policy from a charge of gross recklessness, particularly in view of the fact that the tone of the article in which their claims appear is strongly defensive in this regard?⁵

Perhaps Kramer regards as conclusive the "documentary evidence" upon which he dwells and that he notes was available at the time of the Havana conference itself: to wit, the letters Khrushchev wrote to Castro immediately after the acute phase of the crisis, which "confirm that Khrushchev was profoundly disinclined to tolerate any prospect of nuclear exchange." We agree that Khrushchev's letters evince a strong horror of nuclear war; but nowhere do they mention tactical nuclear weapons or command authority, and therefore they do not constitute "evidence" for or against any particular command-and-control arrangement. Indeed, Khrushchev's horror of nuclear war is well-known and has been thoroughly documented. But this only renders all the more puzzling Khrushchev's decision to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba in the first place.⁶ It renders almost unintelligible his original standing orders to Pliyev (as they currently appear) pre-delegating authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. Khrushchev's letters

to Castro raise questions; they do not provide answers. What fuels one fire cannot extinguish another. Kramer's appeal to Khrushchev's letters, therefore, is an epistemological *faux pas*.

Kramer has argued himself into a curious corner. He professes not to accept uncorroborated oral testimony; he is inclined to suspect Soviets of dissimulation; he has seen no documentation to support his position; his sole supporting circumstantial argument is fallacious (the appeal to Khrushchev's letters to Castro); and yet he insists that the matter is closed. Is his certainty a function of his confidence in some deduction from prior principles? That would be strange, too; for as Kramer himself notes, it would have been *standard practice* for Pliyev to have predelegated authority to use the tactical nuclear weapons under his command.⁷ If Kramer were to reason instead simply from Khrushchev's aversion to nuclear war, he would never get beyond the very deployment of missiles to Cuba that precipitated the crisis in the first place. We must confess that we are baffled at Kramer's confidence, and we are mystified as to its grounds. We are concerned, too, by the possibility that Kramer selectively accepts as "evidence" only testimony that confirms his hunches.

For our part, we remain unsure as to the details of Pliyev's standing orders. While we are sensitive to the drawbacks of oral history,⁸ we are not inclined to dismiss out of hand the testimony of those whose historical roles and responsibilities suggest that they should be in a position to speak to the issues authoritatively, and until we see disconfirming evidence or contradictory testimony from someone better positioned to know, we are willing to accept the accounts of such people provisionally. At the time of the Havana conference, Gen. Gribkov was the first person ever to address the question of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons and command arrangements, and his role as administrative head of the Soviet General Staff's main operations directorate in 1962 (under Gen. Semyon Ivanov) certainly gave him a more authoritative voice than had yet been heard on any aspect of the Soviet deployment.⁹ Accordingly, we tentatively credited his claims (a careful review of the works Kramer cites intending to substantiate his protestations that we accepted Gribkov's claims absolutely and uncritically will re-

veal that we have been careful to refer to Gribkov's claims only as *claims*, not as *facts*). Yet we did not find Gribkov's account completely compelling. We were concerned, for example, by discrepancies between some of Gribkov's claims (specifically, those having to do with the number of nuclear warheads in Cuba for the strategic missiles, and with the details of their shipment) and the claims of others, such as Gen. Dimitry Volkogonov at the 1989 Moscow conference; and by discrepancies between Gribkov's claims and independent intelligence sources.¹⁰ Indeed, the day after the conference we gave a joint seminar at the Centro de Estudios sobre America (CEA) in Havana, the theme of which was that Gribkov's startling story seemed to have a number of troubling holes. We pursued the matter further in Moscow, pressing for release of archival materials on Operation Anadyr, and conducting extensive interviews—with, among others, Gribkov and Beloborodov. In these efforts we were strongly encouraged by Robert McNamara, who also found Gribkov's testimony difficult to accept at face value—thus belying Kramer's claim that McNamara accepted his testimony uncritically.¹¹ We succeeded in obtaining a full documentary citation supporting Gribkov's original account of Khrushchev's standing orders to Pliyev, but later learned of Garbuz's claim that Khrushchev gave Pliyev strict orders at the beginning of the crisis not to use nuclear weapons without Moscow's explicit authorization. Gribkov subsequently accepted Garbuz's revised account, and claimed that he had been unaware of it at the time of the Havana meeting—an entirely plausible claim, given that he would not have been in the chain of communications between Malinovsky and Pliyev during the crisis itself.

Should we accept Garbuz's claim? Perhaps; but we prefer for the moment to reserve judgment. Without doubt, Garbuz's role in the crisis gives his account *prima facie* credibility. It is entirely plausible that when the crisis broke out on October 22, Khrushchev would wish to keep Pliyev on a tight rein. It remains unclear, however—even if Garbuz's recollections of the cable traffic between Pliyev and Malinovsky are accurate—whether Khrushchev *rescinded* on October 22 authority Pliyev had previously been given, or merely reminded Pliyev of prior limitations on his authority.¹² In any

case, we are troubled by the fact that we have not yet seen any satisfactory documentation of Garbuz's claim, and we are concerned by a number of lingering riddles in the story of the Soviet nuclear deployment to Cuba. Dokuchaev's *Krasnaya zvezda* article in which Garbuz's claims appear, for instance, purports to be authoritative, yet includes a number of startling and/or puzzling assertions. Consider four:

- Dokuchaev claims that the Soviet Union shipped at least 162 nuclear weapons to Cuba—60 for the SS-4 and SS-5 strategic missiles, 80 for tactical cruise missiles, 12 for *Luna* (FROG) missiles, 6 gravity bombs for “airplanes” (i.e., Il-28 “Beagle” jet light bombers), and 4 nuclear mines.¹³ These claims are unprecedented, and contradict the testimony of several Soviets—including that of Gribkov at the Havana conference—that the Soviet Union never intended to provide nuclear weapons for the Il-28 bombers.
- Dokuchaev also claims that on October 26, Pliyev ordered the nuclear warheads in Cuba moved out of storage and closer to their delivery vehicles. This claim, too, is unprecedented, and seems to contradict Beloborodov's claim in the same article that he “did not receive any signals to give out the ammunition either for the medium range missiles or for the tactical weapons.”
- Dokuchaev claims that the freighter *Indigirka* conveyed 162 nuclear warheads from Severomorsk (near Murmansk) to Mariel, but refers to it as a “diesel-electric ship”—a description that only makes sense when applied to submarines.¹⁴
- Dokuchaev refers to Beloborodov as a retired “Air Force” Lieutenant General, but also as the commander of the central nuclear base in Cuba. It is curious that a mere colonel would have held such an important position, and particularly curious that he would have been attached to the air force rather than to the Strategic Rocket Forces or the KGB.

These mysteries, coupled with lingering inconsistencies in Soviet testimony,¹⁵ make it difficult to know how much confidence to place in any particular set of claims. Our efforts to get to the bottom of issues such as these have not yet borne the desired fruit. Increasingly, we have begun to suspect that Russian military intelligence has placed limits on how much—and what—our interlocutors may say.¹⁶ At this point, we believe it is useful to weigh competing accounts and consider their implications; but until we see

hard evidence that enables us to resolve important issues, prudence requires that we remain circumspect in our judgments of historical fact.

Nuclear Danger During the Crisis

It is impossible to know in any objective sense exactly how “dangerous” the Cuban missile crisis was, because it is impossible to fix a probability to the likelihood that the crisis would have escalated to strategic nuclear war.¹⁷ We agree with Kramer that Kennedy and Khrushchev attempted to minimize this danger during the crisis—up to a point (both could have reduced the danger even further: Kennedy by forswearing compellence altogether and deciding to live with Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba; Khrushchev by agreeing to withdraw them without delay). Most significantly, for present purposes, we believe that some time after October 22, both Kennedy and Khrushchev resolved not to order military action against each other's forces in and around Cuba. Does this mean that there was no danger of nuclear war?

Kramer insists that “no one would deny that the Cuban missile crisis was a very dangerous event.” He maintains that “[t]he possibility of nuclear war in October 1962 was hardly negligible.” Yet the whole thrust of his analysis suggests otherwise. “The fact that nuclear-release authority remained exclusively with Khrushchev throughout the crisis undermines McNamara's recent assertion that the events of October 1962 brought the world ‘unbearably close to nuclear war,’” Kramer writes, adding that Khrushchev “had no intention at all of resorting to nuclear warfare in defense of Cuba.” “Because Soviet nuclear weapons at the time were not yet equipped with sophisticated devices to prevent an unauthorized or accidental launch,” Kramer argues, “any nuclear warheads that may have been present in Cuba would have been stored far away—some 250-300 kilometers, according to Gribkov—from their delivery vehicles. Although the separation would preclude [*sic*] any use of the weapons until an authenticated order came from Moscow, it would also ensure [*sic*] that, in the event of a U.S. invasion, the delivery vehicles would be destroyed long before Beloborodov's troops could equip them with nuclear warheads (if any were present) and prepare them to be launched. This means

that if the choice had actually come down to either ‘using or losing’ tactical nuclear missiles during the crisis, Khrushchev had decided at the outset that the Soviet Union would have to ‘lose’ them.” Where exactly, then, lay the danger of nuclear war?

Kramer's analysis betrays an astounding naivete about civil-military relations, command-and-control, and military operations, as well as an astonishing insensitivity to context. Even if it were true, as we suspect, that Khrushchev closely guarded nuclear release *authority*, he had no means of assuring *control*. Kramer himself notes that, on October 26, Pliyev sought from Malinovsky permission to use non-nuclear air defenses against attacking U.S. aircraft, and that, on the very next day, Soviet air defense forces shot down a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane. Neither Khrushchev, nor Malinovsky, nor Pliyev had authorized that action. The U-2 was not even an attack aircraft. The United States and the Soviet Union were not even engaged in combat. As Khrushchev's correspondence with Castro shows, Khrushchev, knowing full well that *he* had not authorized the action, initially assumed that the *Cubans* had shot down the aircraft.¹⁸ Later, Malinovsky reprimanded the responsible officers. The action was a sobering reminder at the height of the crisis of the difficulties of ensuring control.¹⁹

We do not mean to suggest that the risk of an unauthorized use of tactical nuclear weapons was as great as the risk of an unauthorized air defense action. Among other things, as Kramer notes, the tactical nuclear warheads were reportedly stationed some distance from their delivery vehicles, while operational Soviet SA-2 batteries stood on alert with their ordnance armed and fused. But Kramer is simply in error when he states that “in the event of a U.S. invasion, the delivery vehicles would be destroyed long before Beloborodov's troops could equip them with nuclear warheads ... and prepare them to be launched.” U.S. intelligence never pinpointed the number or locations of Soviet FROG missiles or of nuclear storage sites in Cuba. Indeed, as Kramer himself notes, only late in the crisis did U.S. intelligence confirm the presence of FROG missiles (a photographic mission on October 25 found one launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios).²⁰ Even if the United States had been aware of the numbers and locations of the launchers and warhead storage sites, it is

highly unlikely that air strikes alone would have destroyed them all.²¹ Not even the vastly-more sophisticated U.S. Air Force of 1991 succeeded in destroying all of Saddam Hussein's FROG-era Scud missile launchers in the open desert of Western Iraq; far less likely was it that the U.S. Air Force of 1962 would have destroyed all (or even most) of Pliyev's FROGs in the jungles of Cuba. Moreover, U.S. military plans called for a full week of air operations before a landing would even begin.²² The landing itself would have taken days, and the campaign to subdue Cuban forces weeks or months at least.²³ Beloborodov's troops could have removed their tactical nuclear warheads from storage and transported them 250 or 300 kilometers to their launchers in a matter of hours.

While Kramer may have confidence in the integrity of chains of command and in U.S. military capabilities, neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev evinced such confidence during the crisis itself. We have argued elsewhere that the sober circumspection with which they conducted themselves in the week of 22-28 October 1962 was in large part a function of their *lack* of confidence in the utility and controllability of military force.²⁴ We wonder whether Kramer is as well-placed to judge these matters as Kennedy and Khrushchev, who had to live through the most frightening week of the nuclear age, shouldering the burden of responsibility not only for their nations but for humanity as a whole, bearing witness time and again to the limits of their control over the organizations under their nominal authority. Kennedy and Khrushchev were scared. If they had been confident in their ability to control events, they would have had no reason to be.

It was *because* they were scared that they shied away from more intransigent positions and more aggressive actions. Thus, ironically, Kramer's confidence that the actual risks of nuclear war were far lower than we (and others, such as McNamara) maintain—resting as it does on Khrushchev's aversion to nuclear war and his desire (and ability) to keep Pliyev on a tight rein—is directly a function of considerations to which Kramer is oblivious and whose relevance he implicitly denies. Is he nonetheless correct to chastise us for "regard[ing] the crisis as more dangerous than it actually was"? It is difficult to spot an exaggeration of some-

thing unquantifiable, such as the danger of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. We are confident, however, that the crisis was the single most dangerous event of the nuclear age; that the presence of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba only increased the danger; and that a cavalier attitude toward nuclear risk, grounded in a weak understanding of history, of civil-military relations, of command-and-control, and of military operations, is in itself potentially a very dangerous thing.²⁵

The Duties of Scholars

We wholeheartedly endorse Kramer's view that it is "important for scholars to be circumspect when evaluating new revelations" about important events such as the Cuban missile crisis, and that "[i]t is always better to err on the side of caution." For that reason, we are unwilling to share in Kramer's confidence that the matter of Pliyev's command authority is settled and that the crisis was far less dangerous than we had thought.²⁶ We agree, too, that scholars should not encourage sensationalism. Well do we recall our struggle to rein in the extravagant claims of journalists at various times in the course of our research: for example, when Dean Rusk revealed for the first time that, at the height of the crisis, President Kennedy set in train a contingency for a public trade of U.S. missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba; when we published transcripts of Kennedy's secret October 27 cabinet room audio tapes; and when we began to learn for the first time details of Soviet decision-making in the crisis. We further believe that scholars have a duty to ask questions not only of others, but also of themselves, and to be willing to revise their judgments in the light of changing information. We believe our record speaks for itself in this regard. Readers will find many interesting contrasts, for example, between the first and second editions of *On the Brink*, reflecting the progress of our research. Our latest effort (*Cuba On the Brink*) is equally circumspect, and treats the issue of tactical nuclear weapons and command authority carefully.

We further believe that scholars have a duty to conduct their research with a genuine spirit of inquiry, and when they disagree with one another, to identify and explore the substance of their disagreements in a serious academic fashion. Argument *ad hominem*

has no place in this endeavor. We regret that Kramer ventured beyond substance to question our motives. We will not repeat the error—Kramer's motives escape us—but we categorically reject his claim that "the fruitfulness of their work has at times been eroded by their desire to portray the Cuban missile crisis in as dangerous a light as possible." We have no such desire. We cannot even imagine what ends would be served by deliberately exaggerating the danger of the crisis. In any case, even if we had such a desire, the Cuban missile crisis needs no embellishment from us. We also dismiss as unfounded Kramer's charge that "[o]n at least a few occasions, they have been tempted to seize upon startling 'revelations' that do not correspond with what actually happened." For five years we have been exploring "what actually happened" in the Cuban missile crisis, and at each step our appreciation of the irreducible element of mystery surrounding this seminal historical event has only grown stronger. We find Kramer's charges particularly difficult to explain in view of the fact that he has been aware of our extensive efforts to explore the issues which Gribkov first raised in Havana, and we consider it ironic that those efforts—not Kramer's—resulted in the disclosures and publications subsequent to the Havana conference upon which Kramer now bases his attacks. We even went to some length to accommodate Kramer's skepticism, scheduling two meetings to give him the opportunity to cross-examine Gribkov himself—for both of which Kramer failed to appear.²⁷

In closing, we believe these pages would have been better devoted, for instance, to exploring in greater detail the possible significance of some of the more startling claims in recent Russian testimony on the missile crisis, such as those contained in the *Krasnaya zvezda* article noted above. Nevertheless, Kramer's provocative essay demonstrates once again both the difficulty and the crucial importance of approaching complex historical questions with the appropriate mixture of open-mindedness, circumspection, and rigor. For that, we are all in his debt.

1. Gen. Anatoly Gribkov, "Karibskii krizis" (Part 3), *Voenno-istorichesky zhurnal* 12 (December 1992), 35.
2. Lt. Col. Anatoly Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 6 November 1992, 2.
3. Interviews with the authors, July 1992.
4. Mark Kramer, "Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?" *International Security* 15:1 (Summer 1990), 212-16. *Inter*

alia, Kramer writes: "On the Soviet side, the question of ulterior motives is far more intractable [than on the U.S. side]" (213); "[Certain] weaknesses of oral history—both the lapses of memory and the attempts to slant things or mislead—can be compensated for if adequate documentary evidence is available. On the American side, that is certainly possible ... On the Soviet side, the ability to cross-check and verify the recollections of former officials is impossible" (213-14); "... assuming that the requisite documents are available, we will have to wait until Western scholars are granted full access to them—including the opportunity to test their authenticity—before we can truly accept (or reject) major Soviet 'disclosures' about historical events like the Cuban missile crisis" (215); "Until Western scholars get access to documents that will corroborate the claims of Soviet oral history participants, the best we can do is speculate, as we have in the past, about Soviet motives and actions in events like the Cuban missile crisis" (216).

5. Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiž," 2.

6. The difficulty of reconciling Khrushchev's nuclear risk-aversion with his decision to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba led one knowledgeable scholar of the crisis to speculate that Khrushchev never intended to deploy nuclear warheads of any kind to Cuba—in effect, that the strategic missiles Khrushchev deployed were blanks. See Richard Ned Lebow, "Was Khrushchev Bluffing in Cuba?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 44:3 (April 1988), 38-42.

7. Stephen M. Meyer, *Soviet Theatre Nuclear Forces, Part II: Capabilities and Implications*, Adelphi Paper No. 188 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/84), 30-31.

8. See our reply to Kramer, *International Security* 15:1 (Summer 1990), 217-18.

9. Kramer suggests that the fact that "Gribkov was the only participant at any of the conferences who had ever implied that Soviet officers could have ordered nuclear strikes on their own during the crisis ... should have induced skepticism and caution on the part of the American participants." By his choice of words, Kramer gives the misleading impression that at prior conferences knowledgeable Soviets had *denied* or *contradicted* Gribkov's claims. This was not the case. Gribkov was the first to raise the issue.

10. In hallway discussions, for example, Gribkov seemed to deny that the Soviet merchant ship *Poltava* carried nuclear warheads to Cuba. But the Central Intelligence Agency had independent evidence that the Soviets had loaded nuclear weapons aboard *Poltava* in Odessa. See, e.g., James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Noonday, 1990), 276. At the Havana conference, Gribkov parried questions about Volkogonov's conflicting testimony by calling into question his military professionalism. Yet at the Moscow conference, Volkogonov claimed to have been speaking solely on the basis of material in Soviet archives.

11. McNamara doubted Gribkov's claims because shipping nine nuclear warheads for six *Luna* (FROG) missiles made little sense either for defensive purposes (nine would not have been enough to thwart a U.S. invasion) or for deterrence (the Soviets had kept the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons secret). Gribkov has subsequently told us that the Soviet Union shipped twelve *Luna* warheads, and that he spoke in error on this at the Havana conference; but we do not believe his revision resolves McNamara's perplexity.

12. Nowhere in the 6 November 1992 *Krasnaya zvezda* article does anyone actually claim that Khrushchev

rescinded Pliyev's pre-delegated authority. In a lengthy forthcoming book, however, Gribkov argues that in a meeting that took place some time between 7 and 10 July 1962, attended by Malinovsky and Ivanov, Khrushchev invested Pliyev with the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons at his discretion in the event of a U.S. invasion of Cuba; that Pliyev left for Cuba on July 10; that on September 8 Ivanov drafted, and the head of the Soviet General Staff (Matvei Zakharov) signed, a directive codifying Pliyev's authority; and that Malinovsky declined to sign and transmit the directive on the ground that it was superfluous. Dokuchaev suggests that "an operational directive sent to Cuba in September" declared "that the conduct of military activities could be begun only with the command from Moscow," and that this directive clearly covered issuing tactical nuclear weapons ("100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiž," 2). We have no corroboration of this claim, and have seen no other reference to such a directive. Certainly the tone of Malinovsky's alleged cable to Pliyev of October 22—coupled with Pliyev's request for clarification on October 25 and Malinovsky's reply referring Pliyev not to pre-existing instructions but to the October 22 message—suggests that Khrushchev rescinded Pliyev's pre-delegated authority only after the crisis broke out.

13. Gribkov claims that the *Krasnaya zvezda* article erred when it reported that nuclear mines were shipped to Cuba (personal communication).

14. The article also claims that the *Indigirka* carried warheads for the R-14 (NATO designation SS-5) IRBMs in Cuba. Gribkov claims that these warheads were carried in a separate ship, the *Aleksandrovsk*, which docked in Mariel but never unloaded its cargo (personal communication).

15. See, e.g., n. 12, above.

16. One of our telephone interviews, for example, was mysteriously cut off just as a knowledgeable source began to retract an important published statement.

17. For further discussion, see Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*, 204-214.

18. Khrushchev to Castro, 28 October 1962, in James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), appendix 2.

19. See, e.g., Peter Douglas Feaver, *Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); and David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect," *International Security* 17:2 (Fall 1992), 112-46. [Ed. note: For a newly published analysis of the difficulties of ensuring control over military forces during crises, see Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).]

20. See Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, National Photographic Interpretation Center, "Supplement 7 to Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba," 0200 Hours, 27 October 1962, in Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency History Staff, 1992), 325.

21. Among other things, the troops responsible for the safekeeping of the warheads would have been eager to prevent them from being destroyed, spreading radioactive contamination, and would therefore have dispersed them on first warning of a U.S. attack. And if indeed Pliyev had already dispersed the warheads on October 26, as Dokuchaev claims, the likelihood that the United States would have destroyed them all approaches zero. 22. *CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis—*

1963 (U) (Norfolk, Va.: Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, 1963), 21.

23. See, e.g., *ibid.*, 55-56.

24. See esp. Blight and Welch, *On the Brink*, *passim*; Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms"; and David A. Welch, "Crisis Decision-Making Reconsidered," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33:3 (September 1989), 430-45.

25. Further difficulties with Kramer's argument are apparent in the following two passages: (1) Kennedy and Khrushchev, Kramer writes, were "well aware that the use of Soviet nuclear weapons against American soldiers just 90 miles from the continental United States would provoke swift nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union itself. [Ed. note: Kramer changed "would provoke" to "could provoke" when revising his article.] After all, Khrushchev had long been warning that any use of nuclear weapons by either side, no matter how limited, would lead inevitably to a full-scale nuclear war." Aside from the logical error of predicting Kennedy's behavior on the basis of Khrushchev's declaratory policy, Kramer's point here serves *either* to highlight the potential dangers of unauthorized or inadvertent nuclear action, *or* (if Kramer is correct to discount the dangers of a breakdown in command-and-control) it leads logically to the conclusion that Khrushchev should have been confident in his local nuclear deterrent and was foolish to back down. Neither alternative permits Kramer to draw the conclusions he does about the degree of nuclear risk in the missile crisis. (2) In an attempt to make sense of the apparent difference between Khrushchev's risk-acceptance before the onset of the crisis and his risk-aversion afterwards, Kramer baldly states that "Officials who might have been willing, in peacetime, to contemplate scenarios involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons tend to be far more cautious when faced with a real crisis that threatens the nuclear destruction of their country. That is precisely what happened during the Cuban missile crisis." While we agree with Kramer that this describes Khrushchev's behavior in 1962 (and possibly Kennedy's), no study presently exists which substantiates Kramer's general claim of tendency. It is flatly inconsistent, for example, with Castro's behavior during the crisis, and is a controversial proposition among political psychologists, particularly those who study motivated cognitive biases and the alleged phenomenon of the "risky shift." This leaves Kramer with an apparently circular argument: he explains an individual's pattern of behavior (Khrushchev's in the missile crisis) by appeal to an unsubstantiated generalization fallaciously drawn from one well-established case (Khrushchev in the missile crisis).

26. For the same reason, we greatly appreciate the inadvertent compliment Kramer pays us for our cautious treatment of Dobrynin's mistaken recollections of his meetings with Robert Kennedy. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security* 14:3 (Winter 1989/90), 158-59.

27. [Ed. note: Kramer denied ever having been invited to any meeting with Gribkov.]

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[Ed. note: The previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Fall 1992, pp. 1, 13-19) contained an English translation of a report ("Military Planning of the Warsaw Pact: A Study") issued by the Defense Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany analyzing materials of the East German New People's Army which fell into West German hands after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 1989-90. Below is a response to that report by a prominent (West) German scholar, Dr. Gerhard Wettig of the Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien in Cologne. For a recent detailed analysis of GDR military documents pertaining to Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, readers are also referred to the report of Lt. Col. Harald Nielsen, The East German Armed Forces in Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations (Ebenhausen, Germany: Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Forschungsinstitut fuer Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, July 1993); the report by Nielsen, an SWP consultant, was prepared and translated into English for the Sandia National Laboratories (Livermore, CA 94551-0960 and Albuquerque, NM 87185) through a contract with Orion Research.]

WARSAW PACT PLANNING IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE CURRENT STAGE OF RESEARCH

by Gerhard Wettig

Issue 2 of the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin* contained a translation of the German Defense Ministry report on the above topic. What was missing, however, was a more detailed explanation of what was precisely underlying the report. As an analyst who has been working in the field before the report came out, I feel that the following context is worth noting:

1. The report is official in character only in the sense that the German Defense Ministry has transmitted it to the public. The message it transmits reflects essentially the perceptions of the military officer who wrote the report.
2. The West German Bundeswehr did not get hold of NVA [New People's Army] documents that revealed Warsaw Pact military strategy directly. All such materials had been removed before the Bundeswehr entered the NVA premises. As a result, the West Germans found evidence but only on how the East German military were instructed to perform in military exercises, maneuvers, etc. This kind of material provides merely circumstantial evidence, i.e., it is a basis but for indirect inferences.
3. The German Defense Ministry report, therefore, must be understood as containing inferences drawn by the author. It is conceivable that other analysts who saw and evaluated the underlying source basis might have drawn different inferences on some points.
4. If one compares the German Defense Ministry report with Western, particularly U.S., analyses of Warsaw Pact military strategy published before 1989/90 on the basis of the source material then available (which included, inter alia, confidential documents such as Soviet General Staff Academy lectures¹), a fundamental difference emerges. While the German Defense Ministry report infers that the Warsaw Pact's plans for an immediate and rapid military offensive against the European defenses of NATO had envisaged early first use of nuclear weaponry under any conditions, preceding Western analyses had concluded that, at some date in the late 1960s² or early 1970s³, the Soviet military leadership decided in favor of a non-nuclear blitzkrieg provided that the Western enemy refrained from using nuclear weapons. The reason for this change of mind was seen in the Soviet military's growing awareness that use of nuclear weaponry would slow down rather than speed up Warsaw Pact military advances to the shores of the North Atlantic.
5. The kind of indirect evidence underlying the German Defense Ministry report appears insufficient to make mandatory its author's inference that, in the event of East-West war, the Warsaw Pact had a definite intention to use nuclear weapons first even if the Western side were expected to abstain from their use. The demonstrable fact that military preparations were made to initiate nuclear first use in case that this contingency would impose itself, does not necessarily imply that nuclear first use was the preferred course of military action.

Consequently, research on the role of nuclear

weapons in Warsaw Pact offensive strategy must continue. Both the German Defense Ministry material and documents originating from former Warsaw Pact countries other than the GDR need further analysis on this question.

Notes

1. See *The Voroshilov Lectures. Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy. Issues of Soviet Military Strategy*, edit by Graham Hall Turbiville, Jr., compiled by Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, intro. by Raymond L. Garthoff (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, vol. I: June 1989; vol. II: December 1990). A number of U.S. analysts were able to use these source materials (which represent the version of Soviet military strategy lectured to non-Warsaw Pact attendants of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy) many years prior to publication. In the meantime, the previously confidential Soviet General Staff journal *Voennaya mysl'* has also become available to research and offers valuable insight.
2. See Michael McGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 28-29, 379-405.
3. See Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Military Strategy," *Orbis* 27:3 (Fall 1983), 695-739; John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000" *The Washington Quarterly* 9: 4 (Fall 1986), 117-37; Gerhard Wettig, ed., "Die sowjetische Militaermacht und die Stabilitaet" in *Europa, Osteuropa und der internationale Kommunismus* 10. Baden-Baden: Nomos 1950 [containing papers resulting from an international conference in spring 1989].

CWIHP Working Papers

- #1: Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War."
- #2: P.J. Simmons, "Archival Research on the Cold War Era: A Report from Budapest, Prague and Warsaw."
- #3: James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum."
- #4: Vladislav M. Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The 'Small' Committee of Information, 1952-53."
- #5: Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht And The Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence On The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations And The Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961."
- #6: Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev And The Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)."
- #7: Mark Bradley and Robert K. Brigham, "Vietnamese Archives and Scholarship on the Cold War Period: Two Reports."
- #8: Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence From Russian Archives."

AVPRF

continued from page 26

Finding aids: copies of the original *opisi* will gradually be made available to external users. As a first stage parts of the *opisi* will be copied upon request, with the copies delivered for use in the reading room. However, the AVPRF is already beginning to make copies of the *opisi* on a chronological and comprehensive basis. Users of the archives should be aware that a list of *fondy* is available in the archive's reading room, together with a copy of the archive's *indexation system*. The index is indispensable in order to make sure that one receives all relevant *dela* from a given *fond*. A preliminary *Putevoditel* to the archives is scheduled to be available in the reading room from September 1993.

A new *reading room* with approximately 25 seats will open to external users from September this year. [Ed. note: The opening date was reportedly moved back to mid-October 1993.]

These positive developments notwithstanding, the archives continue to struggle with serious difficulties, often of an organizational and financial nature. For instance, documents are not stored in the same building as the reading room, and the moving of *dela* between the buildings is mostly done on foot, due to the lack of a car. The *fondokhraniteli*, who respond to external users' requests, must give priority to orders from the Ministry's own staff. Last but not least, the organizational framework is set up to serve internal, not external, users. Users should consider such factors in order to establish a positive working relationship with the *fondokhraniteli* and the other staff members.

Even under these somewhat adverse conditions, and pending full availability of the *opisi*, research in the AVPRF can yield rich results (depending on the time available for, and the persistence of, the researcher). The absence of certain kinds of top-level documents (Politburo, etc.) is balanced by the presence of extensive materials throwing light on the decision making process and the formation of Soviet policy within the MID bureaucracy.

One important key to success is the keeping of exact records of *opisi*, *papki*, *dela*, and the *index number*. If this is done properly and the topic of research is geographically defined, one can determine with

a high degree of certainty whether one has been shown all clearly relevant *dela* within a given *fond* for a given year. The reason for this is that, within *fondy* of a general nature (for instance *fond* 06, the secret *fond* of Molotov's secretariat), *dela* covering relations with a given country are basically located in blocks of *dela* with consecutive numbers; the index indicating the beginning and the end of the geographical block. Within both these blocks and the purely geographic *fondy*, i.e. the *fondy* of the *referentury* and other geographically defined units, the *index* provides a rough key to where one might expect to find relevant materials. New users should start with a comprehensive search of the respective geographical units, and then continue with the relevant parts of the Minister's secretariat. The collections of the Deputy Ministers also contain highly valuable materials, and it is important, therefore, to identify the *Zamministry* who dealt with the topic under research. There are, of course, special *fondy* of major international conferences, and also *fondy* covering Soviet participation in international organizations. One should also be aware that the archive has a rich holding of *spravki* and *obzory* which were compiled for internal use. These may contain useful references to *dela*, and provide valuable factual information as well.

For more information about the possibilities of doing research in the AVPRF one should contact the *International Diplomatic Archives Association* in Moscow. Applications for access to the AVPRF should be directed to Dr. Igor V. Lebedev, Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, with a copy to the *International Diplomatic Archives Association*, att. Igor V. Bukharkin, Vice President. The fax number for both is: (095)-244-44-11.

Vladimir V. Sokolov is Deputy Director of the Department of History and Records, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sven G. Holtmark is a Research Associate, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, and Executive Director, International Archives Support Fund, IASF. With generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Mr. Masakazu Shiiki of the Sanyo Shinpan Foundation, Fukuoka, Japan, the IASF has launched a three-year program of cooperation with the Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation. The project's aim is to help the Department transform the AVPRF from a purely vedomstvennyi arkhiv to an institution also serving the academic community. On the Russian side, the newly created International Diplomatic Archives Association plays a key role in this process.

GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY

continued from page 27

the Foreign Ministry managed to work around these areas to provide me with materials relevant to my study.

I received many different types of material from the 1985-89 period, which I have organized into four categories. The first and most interesting category of materials includes typed reports and notes from mid- and high-level meetings held between the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union and Western countries on various aspects of European security. The second category of documents consists of reports from the USSR's embassies in various West European states. In these reports, the USSR, embassy official discussed the political, economic, and cultural affairs of his or her host country. The third category consists of reports regarding scholarly meetings and exchanges between Western and Soviet experts on issues such as arms control, and the fourth and least interesting type (to me) are a collection of press analyses, inter-office memoranda and European-Soviet communist party reports. Below I will provide a sampling of each.

In the first category of documents, I found that two general subject areas were discussed: the process of European integration and cooperation, and European arms control issues. For example these two documents, "Notes on consultations between the Political Administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Center of Analysis and Prognosis of the Political Department of the French Foreign Ministry," and "About the Soviet-British Seminar on the theme of 'Perspectives on the Construction of a common European Home,'" recount Soviet-European discussions on the process of European integration.

When taken together, these two documents reveal the gradual softening of Soviet attitudes towards European security issues. In the first set of notes, which details a December 1985 exchange between high-level French and Soviet foreign ministry officials, A.A. Slusar, Soviet first deputy chief of the political department, accuses the Western side of "lagging behind the spirit of events" resulting from the process of European integration and harmony begun by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.² The French Foreign Ministry representative responds that the CSCE (the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe which was a product of the Final Act), is a place not only where the two sides can "express opinions" on these matters, but it "stands first" as a place to protect the Act's 10 principles. By contrast, in their meeting with the British in May 1989, the Soviets expressed an interest in working with the British to build the "foundations" of the "common home," calling these steps a "strategic element" of Soviet foreign policy thinking which has "long-term character."³

Also in the first category are reports from a series of parliamentary exchanges between France and the Soviet Union in which the USSR's role in the social, economic and military development of Europe are discussed. One such report by Vadim Zagladin, former Secretary of the Commission on Foreign Affairs in the USSR Supreme Soviet, details the Supreme Soviet's meeting with members of France's National Assembly on 25-30 January 1988. He writes that, in this meeting, attention "was directed at the development of democracy and glasnost in the Soviet Union as an important element of perestroika. The participants emphasized the profound internal relations between the decision to accelerate socio-economic development and the improvement of the international situation." The text of the document is written in the third person in the form of a summary rather than as a first-person verbatim account.⁴

Documents outlining Soviet and European positions on nuclear, conventional, and chemical arms control are represented by the sort of report prepared by Lev Mendlevitch, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's former Chief of Administration, Assessment and Planning. In his report, Mendlevitch describes a June 1986 working group meeting between Soviet and French officials on the issues of nuclear weapons and SDI. On the back of the last page of the document, indicating that this document was especially important, the circulation list instructed that this document was to be routed to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other top Soviet Foreign Ministry brass.⁵ Another document dealing with arms control contains notes from Victor Karpov, former chief of the disarmament department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, assessing his meeting with the French Foreign Ministry's Director of the European Department, M. Blo, regarding negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on

European conventional weapons.⁶

The second, third, and fourth category of documents I outlined above are not as interesting as the first because they contain mostly summaries of events or reports which do not deal particularly with decisionmaking or policy formation at the mid- or top levels of government. For example, in the second category of documents, I include reports sent to Moscow from the USSR's embassies in various West European states analyzing the state of affairs in the host country. In an analysis by the Soviet Ambassador to France on 19 February 1985, for example, the ambassador evaluated the crisis of power in France with an eye to strengthening the French Communist Party.⁷ No embassy recommendations for action, or cables sent from Moscow issuing instructions for action, were included in these reports.

The third category of documents consists of reports regarding scholarly meetings and exchanges between Western and Soviet experts on issues such as arms control. One such report was from a scientific conference on British and Central European TVD in London in which Lawrence Freedman participated. It is interesting because on the pages of the report were hand-marked notes and underlines indicating that the report had been carefully read.⁸ But it could not be determined who had read it, because no circulation list was provided.

In a fourth category of documents—press analyses, inter-office memoranda and European-Soviet communist party reports—I and many of my Western colleagues were bombarded by folder upon folder of what essentially were Russian translations of photocopied newspaper articles from all over Europe and the United States, or Russian reports analyzing a group of Western newspaper articles. Any scholar working in these archives should expect to receive this sort of information. I also received inter-office memoranda and correspondence. These letters were of little interest as they included mostly memoranda from a Foreign Ministry chief to a subordinate, ordering the organization of a seminar or meeting. Finally, from the earlier 1985 documents I also received texts detailing French-Soviet communist party meetings, replete with well-known socialist dogma and rhetoric.⁹

Clearly the Foreign Ministry did not give me all the documents it had regarding the formation of foreign policy towards Eu-

rope during the Gorbachev years. Two critical aspects of this policy were noticeably omitted from the files I received, namely any documents from the year 1987—the year many Soviet decisions on Europe were made—and documents covering Soviet exchanges and discussions with Germany. Even so, the documents I did get will serve as useful supplementary information to my project, and are probably more than I could hope to see from the French or British archives on this period.

Notes

1. One Western scholar told me that, according to archive officials, many of the Gorbachev documents will be off-limits because the Yeltsin government is still using them.
2. See "Referentura on France," Fond 136, Opus 69, Delo 15, Papka 179 (December 4-5, 1985), 67-81.
3. "Referentura on Great Britain," Fond 69, Opus 81, Delo 10, Papka 304 (May 19, 1989), 55-60.
4. "Referentura on France," Fond 136, Opus 72, Delo 8, Papka 192 (February 9, 1988), 110-115.
5. "Referentura on France," Fond 136, Opus 70, Delo 18, Papka 185 (June 9-10, 1986), 37-43.
6. "Referentura on France," Fond 136, Opus 72, Delo 8, Papka 192 (July 11, 1988), 71-75.
7. "Referentura on France," Fond 136, Opus 69, Delo 14, Papka 179 (February 19, 1985), 11-16.
8. "Referentura on Britain," Fond 69, Opus 81, Delo 10, Papka 304 (September 29, 1989), 120-149.
9. See for example, "Referentura on France," Fond 136, Delo 14, Opus 69, Papka 179 (December 27, 1984), 6-10.

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RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performed in Russian archives may contract with students at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to:

Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov
Historical Archives Institute (HAI)
Russian State University for the Humanities
FAX: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964-3534
Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or
(7-095) 925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to the:

Institute of Universal History
Leninsky prospect 32-a
117334, Moscow, Russia
FAX: (7-095) 938-2288
Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009

PRAGUE SPRING

continued from page 13

in "Avantyrysticheskie plany Pentagona i TsRU," *Pravda*, 19 July 1968, 4.

51. Historicky ustav CSAV, *Sedm prazskych dnu*, 53-54. See also Andrew and Gordievskii, *KGB*, 487.

52. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Special Operations Command, *Special Operations: Military Lessons from Six Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Fall 1982), 205-12.

53. Memorandum No. 2613-Ts (TOP SECRET) from S. Tsvigun, deputy chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 19 November 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, Ll. 137-140.

54. *Ibid.*, L. 137.

55. Mlynar, *Nachtfrost*, 112-14. See also Pavel Tigrid, *La chute irresistible d'Alexander Dubcek* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1969), 62-64.

56. August and Rees, *Red Star Over Prague*, 127-28.

57. Dawisha, *The Kremlin and the Prague Spring*, 196.

58. Karel Kaplan, "Zamysleni nad politickymi procesy," *Nova mysl* (Prague) 22:6 (June 1968), 765-94; *idem*, "Zamysleni nad politickymi procesy (Cast druha)," *Nova mysl* 22:7 (July 1968), 906-40; and *idem*, "Zamysleni nad politickymi procesy (Cast treti)," *Nova mysl* 22:8 (August 1968), 1054-78.

59. "Zapis' besedy s zaveduyushchim otdelom molodezhi TsK KPCh t. Ya. Svobodoi i glavnyim redaktorom zhurnala 'Zhivot strany' ('Partiinaya zhizn') t. I. Valentoi, 4 marta 1968 goda," Cable No. 241 (SECRET), 10 March 1968, from M. N. Kuznetsov, first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Czechoslovakia, to M. A. Suslov and K. V. Ruskov, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 299, Ll. 132-136.

60. On this point, see the remarks of Antonin Liehm, the editor of *Literarni listy* in 1968, in Vladimir V. Kusun, ed., *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968: Proceedings of the Seminar Held at the University of Reading on 12-17 July 1971* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio Press, 1973), 61. Liehm's remarks were based on a meeting he and other editors had with the Czechoslovak deputy interior minister in July 1968.

61. See, e.g., the comments by Brezhnev in "Zapis' peregovorov s delegatsiei ChSSR, 4 maya 1968 goda," 4-5 May 1968, in Archiv Kom., Z/S 2, p. 135.

62. Andrei Sakharov, *Vospominaniya* (New York: Izdatel'stvo imeni Chekhova, 1990), 371-89.

63. "Lubyanka: Deistvuyushchie litsa i pokroviteli,"

6. See also Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia*, 10-11, 58-63.

64. Interview with Oleg Gordievskii, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 4 March 1992. This point is also raised in Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union* (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 295-96. Knight argues that this hesitancy may have stemmed both from concerns about the damage that military force would cause to the USSR's relations with other countries, and from a bureaucratic desire to avoid giving the Soviet military a larger role in Soviet foreign policy. The former consideration seems more plausible than the latter.

65. Andrew and Gordievskii, *KGB*, 487-88.

66. See, e.g., John Erickson, "International and Strategic Implications of the Czechoslovak Reform Movement," in Kusun, ed., *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement 1968*, 31-49, and the follow-up discussion on 50-62.

67. See "Vystoupeni generala Prchlika, vedouciho statne administrativniho oddeleni UV KSC, na tiskove konferenci," *Obrana lidu* (Prague), 16 July 1968, 1-2.

68. See, e.g., Lawrence L. Whetten, "Military Aspects

of the Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia," *The World Today* 25:2 (February 1969), 60-68; Condoleezza Rice, *Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: Uncertain Allegiance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 139-41, 146-48; and Erickson, "International and Strategic Implications of the Czechoslovak Reform Movement," 33-34.

69. Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 150-51, 487-89.

70. A copy of the Soviet-Polish agreement, "O przedswiezeciu majacym na celu podwyzszenie gotowosci bojowej wojska," 25 February 1967, is located in the Central Army Archive in Warsaw, but has not yet been formally declassified. For further details, see "Ta bron nie byla nasza" and "Zabieramy swoje czolgi," *Gazeta wyborcza* (Warsaw), 19 April 1991, 1 and 9, respectively; and Maria Wagronska, "Bron atomowa byla w naszym kraju," *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 9 April 1991, 1, 7. The agreement with Hungary was signed by Brezhnev and Kadar, presumably around 1965. See the reports on "Hungary: USSR Nuclear Weapons Formerly Stored in Country," translated in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, *Nuclear Proliferation*, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 May 1991, 14-16. Soviet-East German nuclear weapons agreements, which covered some 16 storage sites, may be found in the German military archives at the Office for Information Sources of the Bundeswehr (*Amt Fur Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr*) and the Documents Division of the Seventh Regional Administration of the Armed Forces (*Der Dokumentation der Wehrbereichsverwaltung VII*). The significance of these agreements is discussed in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper on "Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations from the East German Military Archives."

71. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie*, February 1992, 5.

72. Whetten, "Military Aspects of the Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia," 61.

73. "Dogovor mezhdu pravitel'stvami SSSR i ChSSR o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti raketnykh voisk," 15 December 1965. For interesting discussions, see Jan Brabec, "Jaderne hlavice pod Bezdezem," *Respekt* (Prague) 13 (25-31 March 1991), 6; and Milan Krurnt, "Utajena smrt," *Mlady svet* (Prague) 33:12 (March 1991), 14.

74. Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, "Jaderna municie: Asi tady byla," *Ceske a moravskoslezske zemedelske noviny* (Prague), 4 July 1991, 1.

75. Brabec, "Jaderne hlavice pod Bezdezem," 6.

76. Erickson, "International and Strategic Implications of the Czechoslovak Reform Movement," 31-35; A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1982), 60-65; and Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, esp. 85-110.

77. Johnson, Dean, and Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments*, 67-70; Rice, *The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army*, 114-16; and Erickson, "International and Strategic Implications of the Czechoslovak Reform Movement," 33-37.

78. Memorandum No. 2351-14 (TOP SECRET) from N. Malygin, deputy chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 10 October 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, pp. 92-94. Handwritten notations at the bottom of the memorandum indicate that most of the CPSU Secretaries saw it. Malygin noted, among other things,

that many of the new Czechoslovak officers were "reserved in their judgment about the merit of Warsaw Pact exercises."

79. The full text of the "memorandum" was first published in *Lidova armada* (Prague), 2 July 1968, 2-4.

80. The document was entitled "Problems with the Policy of Safeguarding the Internal and External Security of the State, Their Status at Present, and the Basic Ways of Resolving Them," and a copy of it may be found in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 310, Ll. 121-153, along with Chervonenko's cover memorandum (marked TOP SECRET) to Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and the two most senior CPSU officials who were handling the crisis on a day-to-day basis, Konstantin Katushev and Konstantin Ruskov. Chervonenko notes that the author of the draft was the "infamous General Prchlik."

81. "Vystoupeni generala Prchlika, vedouciho statne administrativniho oddeleni UV KSC, na tiskove konferenci," 1-2.

82. "Interview with Jiri Pelikan," 27.

83. "Komu ugozhaet general V. Prchlik," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 23 July 1968, 1.

84. *Ibid.*

85. "Pervomu sekretaryu KPCh, t. Aleksandru Dubcheku" (TOP SECRET) from Marshal I. Yakubovskii, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, to Dubcek, 18 July 1968, in Archiv UV KSC, F. 07/15.

86. "Nota vlady SSSR vlade CSSR, 20.7.1968" (TOP SECRET), 20 July 1968, in Archiv Kom., K — Archiv MZV, file Gs "T."

87. See the KGB memorandum cited in note 78 *supra*.

88. Michel Tatu, "Les militaires enlevent des barbes a la frontiere germano-teheque," *Le Monde* (Paris), 5 April 1968, 5.

89. "Nota vlady SSSR vlade CSSR, 20.7.1968," 4.

90. *Ibid.*, 3-4.

91. On this point, see the comments of General Svetozar Nad'ovic, of the Czechoslovak defense ministry, in E. Chernykh, "Tainy yazovskogo bunkera: S familiei ministra oboronny SSSR sverkhsekretnyi ob'ekt na territorii Chexhoslovakii ne svyazan," *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), 9 April 1991, 5.

92. "Obeti srpna zaluzi: Z duverne zpravy pro pet nejvyssich predstavitelu Ceskoslovenskeho podzimu 1968," *Obcansky denik* (Prague), 24 July 1990, 3 (Part 1), 26 July 1990, 3 (Part 2), 31 July 1990, 3 (Part 3), 2 August 1990, 3 (Part 4), 4 August 1990, 3 (Part 5), and 7 August 1990, 3 (Part 6).

93. *Ibid.*, Part 1.

94. *Ibid.*, Part 3.

95. On these scattered morale problems, see Memorandum No. 2613-Ts (TOP SECRET) from S. Tsvigun, deputy chairman of the KGB, to the CPSU Secretariat, 19 November 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, Ll. 137-140.

96. "O voprosakh svyazannye s prebyvaniem voisk Varshavskogo Dogovora na territorii Chexhoslovakii," Cable No. 620 (SECRET), 4 October 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 311, Ll. 78-86. This document was prepared by the KSC Central Committee Department of Information, Planning, and Administration. The cover memorandum, from Chervonenko to Katushev and Grechko, says that the Soviet embassy acquired the document from "reliable sources."

97. To cite but one example of apparent tampering, the lengthy Czech transcript of the Cierna nad Tisou conference is marred by the apparent excision of one or two critical pages. See "Zaznam jednani predsednictva UV KSC a UV KSSS v Cierna n. T., 29.7.-1.8.1968," in Archiv UV KSC, F. 07/15, Vol. AJ 274.

98. See references in note 7, *supra*.

99. "Stenograficky zaznam schuzky varsavske petky v Moskve dne 18.8.1968 k rozhodnuti o intervenci a projednani planu," p. 398.

100. Pyotr Rodionov, "Kak nachinalysya zastoi? Iz zametok istorika partii," *Znamya* (Moscow) 8 (August 1989), 182-210. During the 1968 crisis, Rodionov was the second highest-ranking CPSU official in Georgia.

101. Interview with Voronov in Yu. V. Aksyutin, ed., *L. I. Brezhnev: Materialy k biografii* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991), 189-90.

102. *Ibid.*, 190. This speech was one of the pieces of evidence that Rodionov adduced in support of his claims about Voronov.

103. For ample evidence, see Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis*, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Canberra: Australian National University's Research School of Social Sciences, 1970).

104. R. Jeffrey Smith and Patrick Tyler, "To the Brink of War in the Prague Spring," *Washington Post*, 29 August 1989, A-23.

105. Bruce G. Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), 25, 179-80.

106. Interview with author, Moscow, 24 January 1993.

107. This is, for example, a central argument in Christopher Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

108. Memorandum for Walt Rostow from William L. Lemnitzer (TOP SECRET), 6 September 1968, declassified 15 August 1990 under Mandatory Review Case No. 89-41, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library (hereinafter LBJPL), Austin, Texas. Among other Western documents pertaining to this issue, see U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report 1500 Hours EDT" (SECRET), 6 September 1968, pp. 1-2, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report, 1200 hours EDT" (SECRET), 24 August 1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report 1200 Hours EDT" (SECRET), 26 August 1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report, 0600 hours EDT" (SECRET), 24 August 1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report 1200 Hours EDT" (SECRET), 29 August 1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report 0600 Hours EDT" (SECRET), 29 August 1968, p. 2, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL; U.S. Department of State, Czech Task Force, "Situation Report, 0800 Hours EDT" (SECRET), 11 September 1968, p. 1, in Country File, Czechoslovakia, Czech Crisis 8/68, State Situation Reports, Box 182, LBJPL. For recent Soviet documentation bearing on the matter, see "Zapis' besedy s General'nym sekretarem TsK RKP Nikolae Chaushesku, 23 avgusta 1968 goda," Cable No. 847 (SECRET) from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to the CPSU Secretariat, 25 August 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 6, D. 339, Ll. 47-53; "Zapis' besedy s poslom SFYRu v Bukhareste Ya. Petrichem, 2 sentyabrya 1968 goda," Cable No. 917

(SECRET) from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador to Romania, to the CPSU Secretariat, 5 September 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 69-72; "Zapis' besedy s general'nym sekretarem TsK RKP N. Chaushesku, 3 sentyabrya 1968 goda," Cable No. 915 (SECRET) from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, 5 September 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5., Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 73-80; "O nekotorykh problemakh sovetskorumynskikh otnoshenii v svete pozitsii, zanyatoi rukovodstvom RKP v svyazi s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii," Report No. 686 (TOP SECRET) from A. V. Basov, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to the CPSU Politburo, 23 September 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 106-121; and "O pozitsii Rumynii v svyazi s sobytiyami v Chekhoslovakii," Report No. MB-4809/GS (TOP SECRET) from B. Makashev, deputy secretary-general of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, to the CPSU Secretariat, 16 October 1968, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, D. 339, Ll. 188-194.

109. A notable proponent of this view is Jiri Valenta; see *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia* (rev. ed.), 187-90.

110. Among those holding this view was Dubcek himself; see, for example, the four-part interview with him in "Alexander Dubcek vzpomina: Puvodni rozhovor pro *Obcansky denik* o pozadi srpnovych udalosti roku 1968," *Obcansky denik* (Prague), 3, 10, 17, and 24 August 1990, 3. Dubcek offered a similar, though slightly more qualified, defense in his posthumously published memoir, *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek*, trans. and ed. by Jiri Hochman (New York: Kodansha International, 1993), 155-56, 178-79.

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DOCUMENTS

continued from page 1

tions" would be placed on the right of scholars to use the materials they had been permitted to see. As Mark Kramer's article in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin makes clear, many obstacles to unhindered research in the Soviet archives remain, and the revelation of one particularly controversial document discovered at SCCD prompted at least a temporary pause in the trend toward increased openness. Nevertheless, after decades of exclusive dependency on Western archives, the conference marked at least a substantial beginning in the process of exploring the Cold War's history from the "other side." Although participants noted continuing difficulties in gaining access to some Russian archives—and issued a joint appeal to the Russian Government to open historical materials from the Kremlin Presidential Archive—they were, for the first time, able to make extensive use of documents concerning the post-World War II period in previously closed archives of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Presented here is an illustrative sampling of translations from Soviet-era documents that have become available in recent months; more translations will appear in future issues of the Bulletin.

Document One:

A Conversation with Mao, 1959

The following document records an October 1959 conversation between Mao Zedong and the Soviet diplomat and sinologist S.F. Antonov, in which Mao attempted to reassure the Soviets that China would not provoke war with the United States or with its Asian neighbors.

The conversation took place in the aftermath of Khrushchev's visits to Beijing and Washington. During the Beijing visit, Khrushchev criticized the Chinese Communist Party's heavy-handed tactics on the Taiwan issue and tried to win Mao's approval for a lessening of tensions with the Americans. Mao's response was non-committal on both issues. Khrushchev's subsequent visit to Washington raised Beijing's suspicions of a Soviet-American rapprochement over the heads of the Chinese leaders. Within the CCP, Mao and his comrades voiced their opposition to improved relations between the Blocs, and the Chinese press launched a series of attacks on U.S. foreign policy in the wake of Khrushchev's visit.

In his conversation with Antonov, Mao attempts to lessen the impact of China's displeasure with Soviet policies. He tries hard to show his agreement with Moscow on every issue—the United States, Taiwan, India, Tibet, disarmament. It is unlikely, however, that his reassurances carried much weight in Moscow because of what the Soviets knew about the CCP's internal positions. On the contrary, Mao may have stimu-

lated Khrushchev's suspicions of China's trustworthiness as an ally.

Other points worth noting in the conversation are Mao's views on conflicts within the capitalist camp, his forthright description of the strength of Tibetan nationalism, and his amazing ability to imagine a global picture of alliances and conflicts which few other contemporary leaders would recognize. Introduction by Odd Arne Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

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From the journal of
ANTONOV, S.F.
"21 October 1959"

Top Secret, Copy 3

Summary of a conversation
with the Chairman of the CC CPC
[Central Committee Communist Party of
China] Mao-Tse Tung
on 14 October 1959

In accordance with instructions I visited Mao Tse-Tung and gave him confidential information about Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the USA. Handing Mao Tse-Tung the text of the information, I told him that according to the Chinese press and to comments of Chinese comrades, the conviction had developed at the Embassy that our Chinese friends approve of the results of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the USA. Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, in reply, said that they fully approve of this foreign policy step of the CPSU, and that they have no differences in evaluation of the significance of this trip. In a half-joking tone, I asked Mao Tse-Tung whether one could consider that on this question we are united on all ten fingers. Mao Tse-Tung said, that it is so, and added, that in general, whenever we have some sort of disagreements, they consist of just one finger out of ten, or more precisely, just half a finger. Regarding that, he continued, if there are some disagreements between us, then they are not of permanent character, but are partial and temporary. On most questions we are united on all ten fingers. Sometimes, it may appear that our disagreements are on many fingers, rather than just one, but that is incorrect. In fact, on all important and fundamental matters there is always unity between us.

In response to the interest which Mao Tse-Tung expressed, I briefly imparted to him the main points of the information conveyed to him. Mao Tse-Tung listened to this report with great interest, and in a number of places added his own commentaries on certain questions. He agreed with the CC CPSU's conclusion, as contained in the information, that as a result of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's visit to the USA there had been carried out a real relaxation of tensions in the

international situation. Mao Tse-Tung expressed extreme approval of the Soviet government proposal for general and complete disarmament which N.S. Khrushchev made during his voyage to the USA, and which was submitted for review to the United Nations. The proposal of the Soviet government for full disarmament, said Mao Tse-Tung, really is the best means of resolving the entire problem of disarmament. Precisely general and complete disarmament is necessary, he underlined. At the present time, he said further, the Peoples Liberation Army of China counts in its ranks approximately 2 million people. The internal needs of the Chinese People's Republic [CPR] do not require an army of such size. Control over the internal situation in the country can be entirely realized by the people's militia, which consists not of military personnel but of people working in industry. In the event that the matter leads to the real achievement of general disarmament, the size of the army could definitely be reduced. If the Americans set out to reduce the size of their own army, continued Mao Tse-Tung, then we definitely could take corresponding steps to reduce our own armed forces.

Mao Tse-Tung said further that a session of the Permanent Committee of the All-China Council of People's Representatives was set for October 14, at which would be accepted a resolution of approval and support for the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament. In this way, he added, the Soviet proposal will be supported by our Chinese parliament.

I told Mao Tse-Tung that the debate and approval of the Soviet proposals on disarmament by the Permanent Committee of the ACCP is a very important and useful measure by our Chinese friends. Further, I briefly pointed out to Mao Tse-Tung the place in the report on N.S. Khrushchev's trip where Chinese-American relations are discussed.

Regarding this, Mao Tse-Tung noted that Comrade N.S. Khrushchev in his conversations with Eisenhower had spoken very firmly and correctly about the Taiwan question. Taiwan, continued Mao Tse-Tung, is an inalienable part of China. Contrary to a number of countries, which after World War II had been divided in accordance with international agreements (Germany, Korea, Vietnam), on the Taiwan question there had not been and were not any sort of international acts in which the separation of Taiwan from China had been mentioned. To the contrary, even during the war, in the Cairo Declaration, it had been decided that after the completion of military operations Taiwan would be freed from its Japanese occupiers and returned to China.

At the same time, Mao Tse-Tung announced further, the Chinese People's Republic does not intend to start a war with the United States of America over Taiwan. We can wait 10-20 and even 30 or 40 years, continued Mao Tse-Tung. In this case we are taking into account the experience

of the Soviet Union, which over 22 years [1918-1940--ed.] did not take military measures to return the Baltic states to the ranks of the USSR. However, while not starting a war over Taiwan, we will always say and pronounce, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Republic.

In 1958, continued Mao Tse-Tung, the Chinese People's Republic, as is well known, shelled the coastal islands in the Straits of Taiwan. This was after the Americans fell into a difficult situation in the Middle East. In last year's situation, added Mao Tse-Tung, this step proved useful by adding to the American difficulties. Mao Tse-Tung said further, that the Chiangkaishisti [Nationalist Chinese] themselves wanted and had requested that such a shelling be conducted. It is true, that during the first days after the shelling had begun Chiang-Kai Shek experienced some doubts regarding the fact that the CPR might intend to occupy the islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a result of the shelling, however, Chiang-Kai Shek soon, in the words of Mao Tse-Tung, became convinced that the government of the CPR had no such intentions. The same was true regarding the Americans, continued Mao Tse-Tung; for two weeks they thought that the PLAC (People's Liberation Army of China) intended to conquer the islands, but then they understood that this was not included in the plans of the government of the CPR.

Mao Tse-Tung further emphasized, that the Chinese friends began from the fact the USA would not begin a war over the coastal islands. Besides that, he added, last year's shelling of the islands was undertaken when certain concrete conditions prevailed. At the present time, noted Mao Tse-Tung, the situation was already different.

Having further on his own initiative broached the question of the border conflict between India and the Chinese People's Republic, Mao Tse-Tung underlined: "We never, under any circumstances, will move beyond the Himalayas. That is completely ruled out. This is an argument over inconsequential pieces of territory."

Nehru is now trying to use the armed incident which took place on the border, Mao Tse-Tung said further. He is pursuing a three-part goal: First, he is trying to deliver a blow to the Communist Party of India; second, to ease for India the conditions for the receipt of economic aid from the Western powers, in particular from the USA; and third, to obstruct the spread of influence of the CPR and the socialist camp on the Indian people.

Further, Mao Tse-Tung touched on the situation in Tibet, pointing out that at the present time Tibet had set out toward democratic reformation, and precisely that more than anything frightens Nehru. It is necessary to note, continued Mao Tse-Tung, that the popular masses of Tibet had met these reforms with great enthusiasm. During

the Tibetan events approximately 12 thousand people had left for India, of whom reactionary elements, large landowners-serfholders, reactionary lamas, stewards of landed estates and so on made up around 6-7 thousand. Around 5 thousand people ran off to India under compulsion, deception, or threat. These refugees at the present time are manifesting a desire to return to China. Of all the serfholders-landowners of Tibet, around 80 percent took part in the revolt, and many of them ran off to India. However, some of the landowners remained in Tibet. Regarding those landowners who remained, remarked Mao Tse-Tung, certain measures had been taken aimed at giving them, after reforms, the possibility of maintaining their long-term existence.

Characterizing the situation in Tibet, Mao Tse-Tung tried hard to emphasize that it is to a great degree unique. "The Dalai Lama is a god, not a man," said Mao Tse-Tung — "in any case he is seen that way by the majority of the Tibetan population." Mao Tse-Tung said further that it is even better that the Dalai Lama left for India, insofar as if he had remained in Tibet the masses of Tibetan peasants could not raise themselves to the realization of democratic reform. If, continued Mao Tse-Tung, we had arrested the Dalai Lama, that would have called the population of Tibet forth into rebellion. This is difficult even for Chinese from other parts of our country to understand, added Mao Tse-Tung; only in Tibet do we have a situation like this. Not in inner Mongolia, nor in Sinkiang, nor in other regions of the CPR where national minorities live, do similar situations exist. Nonetheless, hate and ill-feeling toward serfowners had been building up for a long time among the Tibetan peasantry, and now, when the majority of landowners had left, and land is being given to the peasants, they raised themselves up and heatedly approve of the democratic reforms which are now under way.

Mao Tse-Tung said that really, the situation in Tibet, evidently, is complicated, there are present various social and economic structures. Mao Tse-Tung said that overall in China up until the present time there are even colonies of foreign states, like Macao. A small country, like Portugal, 400 years ago grabbed from China this chunk of land. How should we proceed in this case? The CC CPC considered this question, and worked out a course, which for now consists of not touching Macao.

"And so, when they say that the Chinese are war-like," noted Mao Tse-Tung, "one cannot accept this as true, but sometimes in a certain case it is expedient to show an opponent one's own firmness. Last year, for example, during the Middle Eastern crisis the U.S. State Department published a memorandum in which it made against the CPR various accusations of aggression in Korea, in Vietnam, and so on. However, the USA ended up in isolation. After our shelling

of the coastal islands the Americans did not assume the obligation of defending Quemoy and Matsu, they took a passive position." It might seem, continued Mao Tse-Tung, that here there is a sort of very tricky and unclear matter, but in fact everything is clear enough. Of course, he added, all this is said relevant to the situation which obtained in the autumn of last year. Now, already, there is no sense in continuing these measures. Overall, it is possible to consider the measures we took last year, continued Mao Tse-Tung, as one of the links in a chain of those troubles, which were created for the Americans. Another link in this chain was the advancement of the Berlin question by the Soviet Union.

In the Middle-Eastern crisis, and the shelling of the islands, and the broaching of the Berlin question—these are all events which have caused trouble for the Americans. These events made possible the achievement of several goals which you posit in Europe, noted Mao Tse-Tung. "And in fact," he continued, "the CPR will not begin a war with the USA, nor with Chiang Kai-shek over the Taiwan question."

As far as Chinese-American relations are concerned, said Mao Tse-Tung, we, the Chinese, have so far done what we can. The Americans do not want to recognize us and every day conduct anti-Chinese propaganda, cursing us in all sorts of ways in the newspapers and in official pronouncements. Meanwhile, there is a single serious question in Chinese-American relations — the Taiwan question. We, continued Mao Tse-Tung, showed on this issue a certain readiness to compromise, on the question of the terms of cessation of the American occupation of Taiwan. We proposed that the Americans stay for a time on Taiwan, on the condition, however, that they would accept the obligation to leave the island over a certain period of time, say over 5-10 or 15 years. We, said Mao Tse-Tung, sort of traded with them: Which do you, Americans, prefer — permanent tension in the region of Taiwan or a calm situation in exchange for the obligation to quit Taiwan over a period of time? This method of solving the question, observed Mao Tse-Tung, was proposed by the Chinese side during negotiations with the Americans in Warsaw. And if the USA would agree with this, then the question of tension in the region of Taiwan could be settled. However, the Americans had turned out to be too thick-skulled; they placed their hopes on the use of force and on the creation of high pressure. The CPR, continued Mao Tse-Tung, does not send its airplanes to Taiwan, even reconnaissance flights of the CPR air defense forces do not fly there. At the same time, American-made planes all the time fly from Taiwan to the mainland, in fact not so long ago one airplane was shot down in the region of Peking with the help of arms which were received from the USSR. I said to Mao Tse-Tung that this weapon at the present time had already been transferred to the CPR and our Chinese comrades

had already used it, and mastered it well, as the results of this operation showed. Therefore, the credit for the shooting down of the plane belongs to the Chinese anti-aircraft gunners. It is also pleasant for us to hear, I added, your evaluation of our weapons, and that you associate this victory with our aid.

"Yes, we associate them," said Mao Tse-Tung. After the presentation of the conclusions of the CC CPSU, as contained in the concluding part of the report regarding the journey of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to the USA, Mao Tse-Tung again announced: "Your evaluation (i.e. the evaluation of the CC CPSU-S.A.) is correct. We agree with it. We have no disagreements on those questions." Further Mao Tse-Tung said that the Cold War had already begun to be an unfavorable factor for the American imperialists themselves. And the imperialists will bring an end to the Cold War only when it turns into an unfavorable factor for them. Mao Tse-Tung emphasized that he had already spoken about this with Comrade N.S. Khrushchev during their meeting in July-August 1958. If the Americans want to end the Cold War now, it means that it has become disadvantageous for them. "And for us," continued Mao Tse-Tung, "what do we need it for? It is another matter if the Americans, as before, are inclined to take a hard line, in that case we can be more than tough enough."

Mao Tse-Tung right after that said that during his meetings with Comrade N.S. Khrushchev in Moscow in November 1957 and in Peking in July-August 1958 he had exchanged views on the questions of turning the Cold War into a factor which would be unfavorable for the Americans, about which side fears war more, and about the character of aggressive blocs (NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact). These blocs cannot be characterized only as offensive. They act aggressively when we in the Socialist camp undergo something disadvantageous, when something happens like the events in Hungary. If we are strong internally, then the members of these blocs will be required to sit on the defensive. They build bases like dams against a flood. One can liken the above-mentioned blocs precisely to these sorts of dams. The imperialists fear the infiltration of communist bacillae into the capitalist world.

Our most dangerous enemies, said Mao Tse-Tung further, are West Germany and Japan. At the present time these countries do not have colonies, while the USA, England and France have multiple spheres of influence. Take, for instance, the USA, said Mao Tse-Tung; everything, beginning with Taiwan and ending with Turkey, this in its essence is the "American world." The Americans grabbed a lot, they try everywhere to hold on to everything, not wishing to let anything escape their grasp, not even our Chinese island Quemoy. We take, for example, continued Mao Tse-Tung, West Berlin; its terri-

tory is not big, its population also not large, however, the Americans fear losing it very much, clutching it in all sorts of ways, evidently fearing that their exit from West Berlin will lead to a decrease in their international authority, and that as a result of losing West Berlin they can lose everything else.

Regarding an evaluation of the perspectives for settling the problem of West Berlin, said Mao Tse-Tung further, he, Mao Tse-Tung, thinks that Western powers will begin, evidently, to decrease their occupation forces in Western Berlin. It is possible, that in the longterm, in about 10 years, or over a slightly longer term, the Westerners will be obligated to relinquish West Berlin entirely.

Mao Tse-Tung repeated that the Americans fear very much giving anything up. Therefore, he continued, also in the Far East we for now will not touch them, even in places where they are weak, like Macao or Quemoy. Generally, the Americans don't want us to touch them anywhere, even to the slightest degree, don't want us to touch any territory which is under the influence of capitalism. And why should we harass them, continued Mao Tse-Tung. We ourselves have a large territory, and we can take 20 or 30 years, or even more, to live and develop, and ultimately achieve a full victory over capitalism.

Overall, the international situation is favorable for the socialist camp, underlined Mao Tse-Tung. He said: "Comrade Khrushchev and the CC CPSU undertook good measures in relation to the United States of America." The imperialists, Mao Tse-Tung added, have many weaknesses. They have serious internal contradictions. A rapid swell in the anti-imperialist liberation movement is occurring in Africa and Latin America. As far as Asia is concerned, continued Mao Tse-Tung, here on the surface there is a certain decline [in the movement], explainable by the fact that in many countries of Asia the national bourgeoisie has already taken power. This has not taken place in Africa and Latin America. These two continents present for the USA, England, and France a source of trouble and tasks which are difficult to solve.

Right then, Mao Tse-Tung again said that during the meetings with Comrade Khrushchev in Peking he had already articulated the thought (on the way from the airport to the residence), that at the present time West Germany and Japan represent the main danger to us and to the matter of peace. America, England, and France, it can be said, support the maintenance of the status quo. Therefore, a relaxation of relations with the USA, England, and France is possible. And in certain cases the possibility even of joint efforts with these capitalist powers against West Germany and Japan is not excluded. West Germany, said Mao Tse-Tung, represents a danger not only for us, but also for the capitalist countries of the West.

The Americans at the present time are the richest country, and therefore they support to some extent the maintenance of the status quo. However, the Americans at the same time create tension even in those regions where they occupy an advantageous or even dominant position. For instance, the USA systematically hurts Cambodia, and incites neighboring states to act against it. The Americans even wanted to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, and to replace him with more obedient people.

Regarding this, Mao Tse-Tung recounted how, on 24 May 1957, when the American embassy building on Taiwan was destroyed (and this deed was organized by people close to Chiang Kai-shek's son, Tsian Tszin-go), in the hands of the Kuomintang turned up secret American documents, in which were discussed American plans to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Tse-Tung said that these documents were taken from the safes in the Embassy, which during the destruction of the Embassy building were taken by participants in the demonstration with the help of heavy iron hammers. And so, the USA as an imperialist power in fact has not the slightest sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek, or for [Indonesian leader] Sukarno, or for [Iraqi prime minister 'Abd al-Karim] Qassem, or for [Egyptian president Gamal Abdel] Nasser. So sharp, said Mao Tse-Tung, are the conflicts inside the capitalist world.

Comrade Mao Tse-Tung expressed thanks for the confidential report given to him. He requested that we convey a big greeting to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and to all members of the Soviet party-government delegation, who had taken part in the celebration of the 10-year anniversary of the founding of the CPR.

For my own part I thanked Comrade Mao Tse-Tung for the conversation and in conclusion briefly told him about the progress toward fulfillment of the economic plan of the USSR for 1959, and also about the preparations which had begun in our country for the Plenum of the CC CPSU. Mao Tse-Tung listened to this with interest.

Comrade B.N. Vereshagin, Counselor of the Embassy, and Yan Min-Fu, translator of the Secretariat of the CC CPC, were present at the conversation.

(Signed) S. Antonov, Temporary Charge d'Affair of the USSR in the CPR

(Source: SCCD, Fond [collection] 5, Opis [inventory] 49, Delo [file] 235, Listy [pages] 89-96.)

Document Two: Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961

On 3-5 August 1961 an extraordinary meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders took place in Moscow. The main issue on the agenda was the fate of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Almost three years earlier, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev had provoked an international crisis by giving Western powers an ultimatum: negotiate a final settlement of the German Question with the Soviets, or else Moscow would sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR, threatening Western occupation rights in (and access to) Berlin. By the time he unleashed the crisis, Khrushchev knew that Soviet possession of nuclear weapons meant that West Germany was not such a big military threat, but he feared that the FRG's economic and political prowess might eventually overwhelm the weak, unstable GDR. There would then be the danger of a peaceful Anschluss and the Soviets, with all their tanks and missiles, would face a fait accompli and the undermining of their whole European security system. Thus stabilizing East Germany became a top priority for the Kremlin—and for Khrushchev personally, for he had committed himself to the preservation of a "socialist GDR" during the post-Stalin succession struggle. (See James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum," CWIHP Working Paper No. 3.)

East German communists, led by Walter Ulbricht, masterfully exploited Moscow's fears of an East German collapse, edging the Soviets toward a decisive confrontation with the West. For them the ultimate solution was the "liberation" of West Berlin, removing its subversive influence as a powerful magnet for East Germans and East Europeans in general. Recently declassified Soviet documents reveal how serious and effective was the GDR leadership's pressure on Khrushchev. It seems that the idea of a German peace treaty, announced by Khrushchev in November 1958, was conceived by the GDR's Socialist Unity Party (SED). [Ed. note: For further analyses of newly available Russian and East German materials on the Berlin Crisis, see CWIHP Working Papers No. 5 (Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961") and No. 6 (Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)"].

Soviet leaders obviously realized that Ulbricht's solution would pose an unacceptable risk of war, and hoped similar calculations in Washington and Bonn would produce a compromise—such as recognition of two German states with a special settlement for Berlin. But FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's tenacity, coupled

with the disastrous turn in U.S.-Soviet ties after the May 1960 U-2 affair, left Khrushchev with little room for maneuver. He tried to gain time by postponing further action in Berlin until after the U.S. presidential elections in November, but any hope that John F. Kennedy would help him out of his predicament proved wishful thinking.

By Spring 1961, Khrushchev's time was running out. The deepening Sino-Soviet rift rendered his authority as a communist leader more precarious than ever. Beijing and other militant communists blamed the Soviets for putting agreements with the West ahead of their internationalist revolutionary duty—and among the East German communists there was less sympathy for Moscow's foreign policy than for the Chinese, who had only recently tried to "liberate" their own "imperialist-occupied" territory, the offshore islands in the Taiwan straits. In March, at a regular Warsaw Pact summit, Khrushchev promised to conclude a separate peace treaty with the GDR should a general settlement with the West prove impossible, and by early June it certainly looked this way from Moscow: Kennedy had attempted to "roll back" communism in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and came to the Vienna summit with Khrushchev with nothing new to say on the German Question. In accord with his commitments Khrushchev pressed the Soviet position on a separate peace treaty and thereby catapulted the Berlin crisis into its most dangerous stage. Kennedy responded on July 25 with a speech that made it clear that unilateral Soviet or GDR actions to block Western access to West Berlin would mean war. Both leaders seemed to be heading toward an inevitable clash that neither desired.

The decision to cut off West Berlin from the GDR by a Wall thus came as a blessing in disguise both for Khrushchev and Kennedy. It stabilized the GDR regime for several decades and froze the status quo that both the Soviets and Americans came to prefer to the uncertainties and dangers of German reunification. From the Soviet viewpoint a divided Berlin was a lesser evil, but still an evil. All through the crisis the official Soviet line was to promote trade contacts with West Berlin and prepare the ground for drawing it, and ultimately West Germany, toward the East. The Wall meant that, in a 15 year tug-of-war for "the German soul" victory was with the West.

The August meeting in Moscow coincided with the moment when Khrushchev grudgingly agreed to bite this bullet. At the same time he warned Ulbricht, "not a millimeter further," thus dashing his hopes for strangling and ultimately capturing West Berlin. Transcripts of this meeting were found by archivist Zoia Vodopianova and this author in the SCCD files during research for the CWIHP conference. I have translated selected excerpts from Khrushchev's concluding speech at the conference, as they convey most

vividly the mood and dilemma of the Soviet leader at the peak of the crisis. His address graphically reveals the contortions he had to go through when taking the decision to build the Wall. But one thing that stands out in this text is Khrushchev's political realism even at the moment of his boldest gambling. He did not want to drive Kennedy into a corner, cognizant of domestic pressures on him and confident he could get away with dividing Berlin. Introduction, commentary, and translation by Vladislav M. Zubok, formerly of the USA/Canada Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, currently a visiting scholar at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo.

* * * * *

The Conference of first secretaries of Central Committees of Communist and workers parties of socialist countries for the exchange of views on the questions related to preparation and conclusion of German peace treaty, 3-5 August 1961.

Second session. 4 August. Morning. Present on the Soviet side: Nikita S. Khrushchev, Frol Kozlov, Anastas Mikoyan, Andrei Gromyko. Foreign guests: Walter Ulbricht (GDR), Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria), Janos Kadar (Hungary), Wladyslaw Gomulka (Poland), Antonin Novotny (Czechoslovakia), Georgi Georgu-Dej (Rumania).

[Excerpts from Khrushchev's comments:]

"Our delegation agrees completely with what Comrade Ulbricht has reported...We must wring this peace treaty...They [the Western powers] had hauled Germany into the Western bloc, and Germany became split into two parts. The peace treaty will give legitimacy to this split...it will weaken the West and, of course, the West will not agree with it. Their eviction from West Berlin will mean closing of the channels for their subversive activities against us." (p. 139)

"...I believe there are people in our countries who might argue: was it worth a cost to push this issue and let the heat and international tension rise... We have to explain to them that we have to wring this peace treaty, there is no other way... Every action produces counteraction, hence they resist fiercely..." (p. 140)

[There was always an understanding, Khrushchev continued, that the West] "would intimidate us, call out all spirits against us to test our courage, our acumen and our will." (p. 140) "As for me and my colleagues in the state and party leadership, we think that the adversary proved to be less staunch [*zhestokii*] that we had estimated...We expected there would be more blustering and...so far the worst spurt of intimidation was in the Kennedy speech [on 25 July

1961]...Kennedy spoke [to frighten us] and then got scared himself." (p. 141)

"Immediately after Kennedy delivered his speech I spoke with [U.S. envoy John J. McCloy]. We had a long conversation, talking about disarmament instead of talking, as we needed to, about Germany and conclusion of a peace treaty on West Berlin. So I suggested: come to my place [Black Sea resort in Pitsunda] tomorrow and we will continue our conversation." (p. 141)

"On the first day [in Pitsunda] before talking we followed a Roman rite by taking a swim in a pool. We got our picture taken, embraced together...I have no idea whom he is going to show this picture to, but I don't care to appear on one picture with a Wall Street representative in the Soviet pool."

"I said [to McCloy]: 'I don't understand what sort of disarmament we can talk about, when Kennedy in his speech declared war on us and set down his conditions. What can I say? Please tell your president that we accept his ultimatum and his terms and will respond in kind.'" (p. 142)

"He then said...[that] Kennedy did not mean it, he meant to negotiate. I responded: 'Mr. McCloy, but you said you did not read Kennedy's speech?' He faltered [*zamialsia*], for clearly he knew about the content of the speech." (p. 143)

"'You want to frighten us,' I went on [to McCloy]. 'You convinced yourself, that Khrushchev will never go to war... so you scare us [expecting] us to retreat. True, we will not declare war, but we will not withdraw either, if you push it on us. We will respond to your war in kind.'" (p. 143)

"I told him to let Kennedy know...that if he starts a war then he would probably become the last president of the United States of America. I know he reported it accurately. In America they are showing off vehemently, but yet people close to Kennedy are beginning to pour cold water like a fire-brigade." (p. 144)

[Khrushchev said he had met Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, who came to Moscow ostensibly at his own initiative, but in fact at Kennedy's prodding.] "How we could possibly have invited him in such a tense moment... We would have exposed our weakness immediately [and revealed] that we are seeking a way out, a surrender. How [could it be] you would ask, [that] Kennedy advised Fanfani to go to Moscow, and Rusk did not know about it...Why? Kennedy must be in a difficult situation, for Kennedy represents one party and Rusk another." (pp. 145-46) [Khrushchev reports that he told Fanfani:]

"We have means [to retaliate]. Kennedy himself acknowledged, that there is equality of forces, i.e. the Soviet Union has as many hydrogen and atomic weapons as they have. I agree with that, [although] we did not crunch numbers. [But, if you recognize that] let us speak about equal opportunities. Instead they [Western leaders] behave as if they were a father dealing with a toddler: if it doesn't come their way, they threaten to pull our ears [*natrepat' ushi*]. (p. 148) We already passed that age, we wear long trousers, not short ones." (p. 149)

"I told Fanfani yesterday: '...I don't believe, though, there will be war. What am I counting on? I believe in your [Western leaders'] common sense. Do you know who will argue most against war? Adenauer. [Because, if the war starts] there will not be a single stone left in place in Germany...'" (p. 150)

[*War between the USSR and the United States, Khrushchev allegedly told Fanfani, is*] "hardly possible, because it would be a duel of ballistic intercontinental missiles. We are strong on that... American would be at a disadvantage to start a war with this weapon... They know it and admit it... America can unleash a war from its military bases they have on [Italian] territory. Consequently we consider you as our hostages." (p. 151)

[*British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Moscow in 1959 and told Khrushchev that war was impossible. Khrushchev presumes that Western leaders continue to act on that conviction.*] "Macmillan could not have lost his mind since then. He considered war impossible then and, suddenly, now he changes his mind? No, no. The outcome of modern war will be decided by atomic weapons. Does it make sense if there is one more division or less? If the entire French army cannot cope with the Algerians, armed with knives, then how do they expect to scare us with a division? It is ludicrous, not frightening. [*De Gaulle admitted to our Ambassador a couple of weeks ago, Khrushchev says, that he did not want the reunification of Germany.*] He pays lip service to it [reunification] because it is in Adenauer's interests. Nobody wants reunification of Germany—neither France, nor England, nor Italy, nor America." (pp. 151-52)

[*Khrushchev said he told McCloy:*] "Listen, why is it that you cannot shake hands with Ulbricht? I shook hands with Adenauer and I am ready to do it again. Do you believe that your Adenauer is better than our Ulbricht? We praise our commodity." (p. 153)

[*If Western powers refuse to sign a treaty with the GDR, then, as Khrushchev said to McCloy:*] "You will have no access [to West

Berlin]. If you fly and violate [the aerial space over the GDR], we will down your planes, you must know it." (p. 155)

"Why we were so blunt? Comrades, we have to demonstrate to them our will and decisiveness...." (p. 156)

[*What is the difference between the two parties of "monopoly capital," the Democrats and the Republicans? Khrushchev admitted that real difference is small*] "but some distinctive features exist, one cannot deny it, since otherwise we wouldn't have been politicians, but agitators, who say, that there is capitalism and working class, so one has to blame damned bourgeoisie and that's it. Only Albanians understand it this way...." (p. 156)

"Can we clash? Possibly...I told Fanfani, that [the American state] is a barely governed state... Kennedy himself hardly influences the direction and development of policies [*politiki*] in the American state...The American Senate and other [state] organizations are very similar to our Veche of Novgorod... One party there defeated the other when it tore off half of the beards of another party... They shouted, yelled, pulled each other beards, and in such a way resolved the question who was right." (pp. 156-57)

"Hence anything is possible in the United States. War is also possible. They can unleash it. There are more stable situations in England, France, Italy, Germany. I would even say that, when our 'friend' [John Foster] Dulles was alive, they had more stability [in the United States]. I told McCloy about it." (p. 157)

[Dulles was the enemy who] "resolved to bring us down to submission [*sognut v baranii rog*], but he was afraid of war. He would reach the brink, as he put it himself, but he would never leap over the brink, and [nevertheless] retained his credibility." (p. 158)

"If Kennedy says it, he will be called a coward. But Dulles had never been called this way, [and people believed when he said] it had not to be done in American interests. Who could suspect Dulles? The man was anything but a coward. As for Kennedy, he is rather an unknown quantity in politics. So I feel empathy with him in his situation, because he is too much of a lightweight both for the Republicans as well as for the Democrats. And the state is too big, the state is powerful, and it poses certain dangers."

"I think you will not suspect I am sympathetic to Dulles, only for the fact that he is no longer with us, so my sympathy cannot seek any goals." (p. 159)

"I understand, comrades, and share this state of mind, that our enthusiasm for peaceful construction acts as poison, weaken our muscles and our will." (p. 160)

"We got ourselves carried away with peaceful construction and, I believe, we are going too far. I will not name countries. This is the internal matter of each of the socialist states." [*But the Soviet Union had had to bail out some of them in the past by*] "taking gold out of its coffers." Khrushchev called all participants to live on principle, "Pay as you go." [*Po odezhe protigivai nozhki*], [*and said a change of plans is necessary, a mobilization*]. (pp. 160, 165-66)

"So I would consider us bad [statesmen] if we do not now make conclusions [to]...build up our defense...our military forces." (p. 160) "If we do not have these measures worked out, then Americans, British, French, who have their agencies among us, will say, that we, as they put it, are bluffing, and, consequently, will increase their pressure against us." (p. 161)

"On our side, we have already mapped out some measures. And we are considering more in the future, but short of provocations."

"I told McCloy, that if they deploy one division in Germany, we will respond with two divisions, if they declare mobilization, we will do the same. If they mobilize such and such numbers, we will put out 150-200 divisions, as many as necessary. We are considering now... to deploy tanks defensively along the entire border [between the GDR and the FRG]. In short, we have to seal every weak spot they might look for." (p. 162).

[*Khrushchev doubted that Western powers would risk to force their way to West Berlin, because it would surely mean war.* (pp. 163-65) *But he said that chances of economic blockade of the GDR and, perhaps, of the entire Eastern bloc were "fifty-fifty."* *That led him to comment ruefully on the dependence of socialist economies on Western trade and loans:*]

"We have to help the GDR out...Everybody is guilty, and the GDR too. We let down our guards somewhat. Sixteen years passed and we did not alleviate pressures on the GDR...." (p. 167)

[*Khrushchev praised Ulbricht for "heroic work since 1945" and approved his collectivization campaign. "You cannot build socialism without it."*] (p. 168) [*He conceded that the GDR, if not helped, will collapse.*] "What will it mean, if the GDR is liquidated? It will mean that the Bundeswehr will move to the Polish border,...to the borders with Czechoslovakia,closer to our

Soviet border.”

[He then addressed another point of criticism, why it was necessary to help the GDR to raise its living standard, already the highest among the countries in the Eastern bloc:] “If we level it [the GDR’s living standard] down to our own, consequently, the government and the party of the GDR will fall down tumbling, consequently Adenauer will step in...Even if the GDR remains closed, one cannot rely on that and [let living standards decline].” (p. 170)

[Khrushchev admitted the GDR cost the Soviets much more than they needed for their own defense.] “Each division there costs us many times more, than if it had been located [on the Soviet territory].” “Some might say, why do we need the GDR, we are strong, we have armaments and all, and we will stand on our borders. This would have really been a narrow nationalist vision....” (p. 171)

“I wish we could lick the imperialism! You can imagine what satisfaction we’ll get when we sign the peace treaty. Of course we’re running a risk. But it is indispensable. Lenin took such a risk, when he said in 1917 that there was such a party that could seize power. Everybody just smirked and snorted then...World public opinion now is on our side not only in the neutral countries, but in America and in England.” (p. 178)

[He returns again to Kennedy’s dilemma.] “Presidential aide on mass media [Pierre] Salinger invited one day our journalists [to pay a visit to Kennedy]. He picked [Alexei] Adzhubei and [Mikhail] Kharlamov. [In presence of Adzhubei and the Soviet interpreter only, Kennedy admitted.] ‘If I do what Khrushchev suggests, my senators will arrest [impeach?] me.’ He is seeking my sympathy, isn’t he? So that I will spare him that? He said it so that I understood and let you know that he is in a bind, because his good will and decision was not enough. The situation is very grave there. It looks as if I am a propagandist for Kennedy, to make you less stern about him....You might turn on me for that, but I will survive....” (p. 183)

“Summing up, our Central Committee and government believe, that now preparations are proceeding better, but there will be a thaw, and, more importantly, a cooling down...We have to work out our tactics now and perhaps it is already the right time.” (p. 184)

(Source: SCCD, miscellaneous documents of the CC CPSU International Department.)

Documents Three and Four: Moscow and the Vietnam Peace Talks

The following documents confirm Western analyses of the Soviet Union’s role in negotiations to end the Vietnam War. From June to December 1966, Janusz Lewandowski, the Polish representative to the International Control Commission, launched a diplomatic initiative called “Marigold.” Lewandowski served as an intermediary between North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV) and U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge in an attempt to discover terms that might provide a basis for negotiations. Although the initiative broke down in December when the United States resumed its bombings of the North, the Poles claimed to have extracted a commitment from the DRV to bilateral negotiations with the United States. According to George C. Herring, the Soviet Union supported, and perhaps even directed, the Polish initiative. [Herring, ed., *The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1983), 227.] Colonel Fitzgerald’s reported claim therefore that the USSR “is to blame for the fact that the war drags on” is overstated and inaccurate.

The Soviets had refused to serve as an active mediator of negotiations on several occasions. But, as the Zorin document indicates, the Soviets played a key role in secret deliberations. Zorin, the USSR ambassador to France, summarizes a meeting he had in Paris in February 1969 with representatives of the DRV and National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV). His conversation confirms the Viets’ commitment to their respective Four and Five Point plans for peace. What is new and exciting about Zorin’s memorandum, however, is the Viet position that “the time for discussion of military questions,” with the United States, “hadn’t come yet.” Shortly after the Tet Offensive of 1968, the negotiations in Paris opened with the DRV and NLFSV adopting the strategy of *vua danh, vua dam* [fighting while negotiating]. Zorin’s note tells us much about the Communist side’s military strength in early 1969.

Through these investigations in the Soviet archives, a complicated and ill-balanced history may be made clearer and fuller. If only to confirm the previous work of Western scholars, the Soviet documents are important. Perhaps, further research will reveal some new insights into the Second Indochina War. Introduction by Robert K. Brigham, History Dept., University of Kentucky; translations by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.

* * * * *

Secret
Copy No. 1

CC CPSU

(For the [General] department CC CPSU)

Colonel Ch.G. Fitzgerald, the military attache at the USA Embassy in the USSR, has lately, in his talks with the officers of the Foreign Affairs department of the Ministry of Defense, been methodically and insistently maintaining the idea of the important role the USSR could play in settling the Vietnam conflict, as the initiator and an active mediator of negotiations.

In this respect he considers that the USSR “is to blame” for the fact that the war drags on and on: “When two forces meet head on—in this case the U.S. and the Vietnamese communists—a third force is needed, which could help them come to an agreement. Only the Soviet Union could be this third power.”

In his speculations about the ways the Vietnamese conflict could be settled, Colonel Ch. Fitzgerald made the following points:

— Peace in Vietnam can be achieved through negotiations, between the USA, North Vietnam, the Vietcong, and the government of South Vietnam. The main obstacle to organizing the negotiations is the government of North Vietnam, though in the present situation negotiations would be most beneficial to North Vietnam. At the same time we understand that the war in Vietnam is profitable for the USSR, because it attracts the attention of the Chinese, otherwise you would have had a lot of trouble and unpleasanties with them on frontier questions and other issues.

— The main goal of the USA in the situation as it has developed is to maintain its prestige — to leave Vietnam “beautifully” [*krasivo*]. That’s why the American government is persistently looking for ways to organize the negotiations. This was the mission of the senator Mike Mansfield when he came to the USSR, but unfortunately he failed to find understanding from the Soviet representatives. Not long ago the President appointed A. Harriman as his special assistant, with his task being to find paths to negotiations. He has been appointed to use every tiniest possibility to achieve this goal.

— The President’s declaration during his press conference in Texas after his meeting with the Commander [of] American troops [Gen. William] Westmoreland, that the American people must know that there will be no quick victory, is just an assertion of his former position. This is not new for us, we are used to it.

Colonel Ch. Fitzgerald expresses his personal attitude to the American aggression in Vietnam evasively: “I’m a soldier and am therefore obliged to maintain the policy of my government and follow the directions of my command, but as a man I may sometimes be ashamed for the undermined prestige of the USA.”

(signed) P. Ivashutin
 "23" August 1966
 No. 46722

(Source: SCCD, F. 5, Op. 58, D. 262, LI. 237-38.)

* * * * *

FROM THE DAYBOOK Secret, Copy # 2
 OF ZORIN, V.A. "28" February 1969

Initial #203

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

with the head of the DRV delegation Comrade Xuan Thuy and the head of the NLFSV delegation Comrade Tran Buu Kiem at the Paris negotiations

21 February 1969

Today I visited the residence of the DRV delegation, where a talk with Comrades Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem took place.

1. I briefly informed the Vietnamese comrades about the latest statements of the American representative, C. Vance, during the conversation with the Advisor-Envoy of the Embassy Comrade Oberemko, V.I. on February 15 of this year and about French perceptions, expressed by the acting head of the Asia department of the French Foreign Ministry, Delayer (sic) (without direct reference to him) during a talk with Comrade Utkin, the counselor at the Embassy, on February 18 of this year, about questions related to a settlement in Vietnam. The Vietnamese comrades thanked me for this information, which they received with great interest.

2. Referring to the fact that within the next few days I plan to pay a return visit to C. Lodge, the head of the USA delegation at the Paris negotiations, I tried to find out if my interlocutors thought we should, before President Nixon's arrival to Paris, ask C. Lodge some questions which would be interesting to the Vietnamese comrades, in order to push the U.S. toward a political settlement. I also asked if the Vietnamese comrades had any questions for the French, taking into consideration that De Gaulle is likely to discuss the Vietnamese question with R. Nixon.

In response to this, my interlocutor made the following observations:

a) Having remarked that the U.S. does not now want to consider serious issues at the negotiations, Comrade Tran Buu Kiem said that Richard Nixon is trying to strengthen the Saigon regime and its army and only then to work toward the resolution of essential questions. But the situation in South Vietnam will change and the U.S. will not realize its goals. Now the USA is taking measures to provide security in the cities.

The Americans have to face new difficulties now, caused by the growth of the movement of various strata of the urban population. This movement has not only a nationalist character, but appears to be broader, with its main aim being the restoration of peace in the country, the dismissal of Nguyen van Thieu, Nguyen Cao Ky, and Tran van Huong from power, and the creation of a "Cabinet of Peace."

The delegations of the NLFSV and the DRV, he went on, have already put forward the proposals which are necessary to discuss in order to come to a political resolution of the problems, and had clearly expressed their positions on political and military issues, but the USA is trying first of all to solve military questions, to improve its position in South Vietnam in order to conduct the negotiations from a position of strength.

b) Comrade Xuan Thuy, having agreed with the ideas expressed by Comrade Tran Buu Kiem, stressed that R. Nixon, like Johnson, wants to solve the Vietnamese problem from a position of strength, and that the U.S. is continuing to strengthen the puppet regime, intending to stay in Vietnam even after its troops are withdrawn in order to carry out its neo-colonial policy, using the puppets.

The Americans don't yet have a concrete plan for settling the Vietnamese problem. The concrete suggestions which they put forward during the first meetings (I mean C. Lodge's proposal to start discussing problems connected with the demilitarized zone, withdrawal of foreign troops and exchange of prisoners of war) are aimed at talking, not at actually solving the problem, at putting off its decision. The Americans understand that if the questions which they have put forward are not resolved, they will have a chance to strengthen the Saigon regime. The USA is forcing consideration of military questions in order to put pressure on the DRV and NLFSV.

As for the position of France on the Vietnam question; the French, according to Comrade Xuan Thuy, want the USA to leave South Vietnam and France to return there, but not in the same role which it played before. Obviously the French, during their negotiations with R. Nixon, will somehow push him in this direction.

Then Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the following could be said in the talk with C. Lodge:

— The DRV and NLFSV want to solve the Vietnam problem on the basis of the achievement of true independence, not on the basis on which the U.S. wants to solve it.

— Should the U.S. continue to act from a position of strength, the Vietnamese people will not agree with this, and will go on struggling against U.S. aggression.

— If the U.S. wants to solve the Vietnam problem, it has to start talking with the NLFSV. If it doesn't happen the Vietnam

problem will not be solved. So far the USA and Saigon speak only with the DRV at the negotiations, and don't want to talk with NLFSV.

— If the USA doesn't agree to a complete and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from South Vietnam and continues the war, it will suffer even greater military losses.

As for concrete questions and approaches to their decision, in the opinion of Comrades Xuan Thuy and Tran Buu Kiem the proper time to discuss them with the Americans still hasn't arrived.

3. During an exchange of opinions on certain aspects of the Vietnam problem, some questions were raised on our initiative (to find out the position of the Vietnamese comrades). These included "the Peace Cabinet," the gradual withdrawal of American troops, the elimination of American bases and the cessation of military operations.

In this respect the Vietnamese comrades expressed the following ideas:

a) Comrade Tran Buu Kiem explained that participants in the opposition movement to the Saigon regime treat the Thieu-Ky-Huong government as a war government, capable only of serving the war. This movement and its demands confirm the NLFSV idea about the creation of the "Cabinet of Peace;" therefore the NLFSV supports this movement. The NLFSV also supports people whom this movement puts forward as candidates to be included in the "Cabinet of Peace." These candidates are worthy people and among them there are some who formerly were connected with the Americans, but who now maintain progressive positions.

b) Comrade Xuan Thuy added that the present-day Saigon government doesn't want peace and continues the policy of support for the aggressive American war. That's why the population of Saigon and other cities, and districts occupied by the Americans, demand the overthrow of Thieu, Ky, and Huong. This is not the demand of the DRV and NLFSV but a demand of the people, a demand coming from below, and the DRV and the NLFSV support it.

The DRV and NLFSV do not have concrete proposals regarding the creation of the "Cabinet of Peace," he went on, but we will welcome all people who will join a new government and who express the desire to conduct negotiations with the NLFSV. It would be very good if the population of South Vietnam demands that the government include NLFSV members. But if the readiness to conduct negotiations with the NLFSV is expressed, rather than a wish for the NLFSV to be represented in the "Cabinet of Peace," the DRV and NLFSV will accept it. The main task is for a national union of different strata of the population to be created in this "Cabinet of Peace,"

for it to include representatives of the "Union of National, Democratic and Peace-loving forces." Later, when a "Cabinet of Peace" like that has already been created, a temporary government may be created on the basis of the NLFSV political program.

c) In connection with my remark, that in order to solve military questions it might be reasonable for the DRV and NLFSV to put forward some concrete proposals—for example, on the limitation of the scale of military operations in some districts, or on the gradual withdrawal of American troops and liquidation of American bases within definite periods of time, Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the time for discussion of military questions hadn't come yet. The Americans want to conduct negotiations from a position of strength and want to use this strength. The DRV and NLFSV demand a quick, and complete—not gradual—and unconditional withdrawal of American troops. The Americans think that the power of the NLFSV and DRV has trickled away, and that they are incapable of effective actions. That's why, if the DRV and NLFSV would put forward some concrete proposals now—for example on the limitation of military actions—the Americans will interpret it as a revelation of DRV and NLFSV weakness.

In this connection Comrade Tran Buu Kiem added that "we'll fight the Americans eagerly and we believe in our strength."

Having said that this question shouldn't be mentioned in talks with Americans, Comrade Xuan Thuy said that the DRV and NLFSV delegations will discuss it and then have an exchange of opinions with the Embassy.

d) In the course of the discussion I suggested to the Vietnamese comrades that, to make the Americans talk with the NLFSV, the NLFSV delegation to the Paris negotiations could propose a concrete program—which could be supported by the DRV—based on the four and five points.

The Vietnamese comrades treated this idea with interest, and Comrade Xuan Thuy said that this suggestion will be considered by the delegations.

DRV delegation members Comrades Ha van Lau, Mai Van Bo; a member of NLFSV delegation Nguyen van Tien; Comrade Nguyen Ngoc Thuong, a colleague of the NLFSV delegation; Embassy Counselor Comrade Zelentsov, V.A.; the Second Secretary of the Embassy Goritskii, V.A. were present at the talk.

The talk was translated by Counselor Comrade Zelentsov, V.A.; the talk was recorded by the second secretary Goritskii, V.A.

The USSR Ambassador in France (signed)
V. Zorin

6 copies sent to:

1—Comrade Kozyrev, S.P.

2—General department of CC CPSU

3—I EO

4—OUVA

5—UOMP

6—To the file

No. 256, February 24, 1969

(Source: SCCD, F.5, Op. 61, D.460, LI. 56-60.)

Document Five: Dobrynin and Kissinger, 1969—Opening the Back Channel

In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon's first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House "backchannel" established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.

Several strands stand out in Kissinger's tour d'horizon, which he describes as a faithful rendition of Nixon's views. He expresses a desire not merely to avoid direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation but to advance superpower relations beyond the Cold War to a more "constructive" phase, and probes Dobrynin on the idea of a series of U.S.-Soviet summit conferences. As further testimonial to Washington's desire for better relations, Kissinger assures Dobrynin of Nixon's readiness to ratify the status quo of a divided Berlin and Germany rather than insist on a reunification—a foreshadowing of agreements reached in 1970-1971 on Berlin and the normalization of relations between East and West Germany—and of his acceptance of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe, notwithstanding "isolated critical public comments" made for domestic political reasons. Kissinger also dangles the possibility of future U.S.-Soviet cooperation on such issues as a nuclear test ban treaty, trade, and the Middle East conflict, and in a delicate discussion of the tensions between Moscow and Beijing—whose forces were engaging in sporadic border clashes—he ingratiatingly notes Nixon's wish that U.S. and Soviet leaders collaborate in safeguarding the world from major military conflicts until China "grows up." (Whatever notions the Americans already had for an opening to the PRC remained camouflaged behind vague declarations of neutrality in the battle between communist rivals.)

Yet, looming over all of Kissinger's bonhomie and hopes for a superpower rapprochement is the Vietnam War. Reflecting his and Nixon's grand strategy, to lean on Moscow to help extricate the United States from the quagmire,

Kissinger admonishes Dobrynin that as chiefly and arms supplier the Soviets are in a position to pressure Hanoi to make the concessions necessary for peace. Should diplomacy fail, Kissinger threatens ominously, Nixon will be forced to consider unspecified "alternatives" to convince Hanoi to be more forthcoming. Dobrynin describes this declaration of Nixon's resolve to prevail in Vietnam as "blackmail," but acknowledges that the possibility of a drastic U.S. military escalation cannot be dismissed. (This clear attempt to "signal" Moscow accorded with Nixon's so-called "madman theory" according to which he, like Eisenhower before him, would successfully terminate U.S. military involvement in an Asian land war by threatening to raise the stakes.)

*Dobrynin concludes with a shrewd thumbnail character portrait of Kissinger, and the qualities that later brought fame to the German-born Harvard professor and diplomat—then largely still unknown to the general public—are readily apparent. The Soviet envoy terms him "smart and erudite" but at the same time "extremely vain." Kissinger later reciprocated this mixed appraisal, describing Dobrynin as "Suave not just by Soviet standards—which leave ample room for clumsiness—but by any criteria," and able to glide through Washington's upper echelons "with consummate skill," yet ready to be "as ruthless and duplicitous as any other Communist leader." (See Kissinger, *White House Years*, 138-41) Interestingly, Kissinger seemed to have regarded the White House back channel as firmly established by February 1969, yet here Dobrynin is only five months later able to tell the Politburo "with sufficient confidence" that in the Nixon foreign policy set-up it is Kissinger, not Secretary of State Rogers, who has "dominant" and "commanding" influence. Introduction by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP coordinator; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, Harriman Institute, Columbia University.*

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Send to members of the Politburo, CC CPSU and to candidate members of the Politburo, CC CPSU

July 12, 1969

A. Gromyko

Secret, Copy No. 1

Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR to the USA A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger, Aide to President Nixon

On the eve of my July 12 departure to Moscow, Kissinger, aide to the President, called me and expressed his wish to meet with me before I left. I agreed and the meeting took place in Kissinger's White House office (like all previous meetings with him, this meeting was unannounced). Kissinger began the conversation with

a comment to the effect that President Nixon knows about my departure to the USSR and that this meeting was organized with the President's knowledge, so that, while in Moscow, the Soviet Ambassador in his report to his government could, if necessary, provide "first hand" knowledge of the President's point of view on various international questions and especially on Soviet-American relations. Kissinger said that he can with full responsibility declare, that in foreign policy—besides the settlement of the Vietnam question (on which he intended to dwell a little later)—President Nixon feels that the other basic area which demands his attention is Soviet-American relations. He poses his main goal in this area as the necessity of avoiding situations which could lead to direct confrontation between the USA and USSR. He, the President, feels that such a task is entirely feasible. In any case, he, Kissinger, according to instructions from the President, can assure me, that Nixon will not allow any third countries or any situation to develop in this or any other region of the world, which could pull him along a path fraught with the threat of direct confrontation between our countries. The President hopes and believes that the Soviet government has the same point of view on this question.

Nevertheless, went on Kissinger, this is only one side of the question. Nixon would like very much that during his Presidency—until 1972, or maybe even until 1976 in case he's re-elected—Soviet-American relations would enter a constructive phase, different from those relations which existed during the "cold war" and unfortunately continue to make themselves apparent even now. Although ideological disagreements, undoubtedly, will remain, and since they are very deep will make themselves known, the President nonetheless thinks that the above-mentioned turn in relations between our countries is entirely possible and desirable, although time and mutually tolerant work, taking into account the interests of both sides, is required.

President Nixon assigns the question of a meeting with the Soviet leaders an extremely important place in all this, continued Kissinger. He, however, approaches this question with a certain degree of caution, mainly because of the domestic political considerations and the corresponding reaction around the world. The thing is that such meetings are accompanied by an unavoidable ruckus and various sensations and ill-considered prognoses, leading to initial "great expectations" and then disappointments of the same magnitude, although, properly speaking, it is difficult to expect great results from a two- or three- day summit meeting, especially since the most complicated international problems can hardly be decided quickly, since it is necessary to clear the corresponding obstacles and long-term blockages step by step. Unfortunately, mass public opinion expects "miracles" from such

meetings, and insofar as these are difficult to achieve, various speculations of "misfortune" and "failure" begin, and these cannot help the process of searching for a resolution, since they put negative psychological pressure on the summit participants, who from the very beginning begin to think about the fact that at the end of the summit they will have to present the results to the press.

And that is why, said Kissinger further, President Nixon is convinced that the organization of only one such meeting with the Soviet leaders during his entire Presidency (as was the case with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson) is not the correct path to follow. It would be preferable to conduct a series of meetings, at predetermined intervals, say, once a year. Then the meetings will be less of a sensation, and will have a more business-like character. In the course of such meetings it would not be strictly necessary to search for an externally stream-lined formula, which would in a way satisfy society but in reality do little to move the process forward. Instead of this it will be possible to make an efficient periodic survey of the most important problems, and to search out a mutually acceptable approach, not fearing consequent labels imposed by the press, to the effect that the leaders of the USSR and USA "did not agree" or that a misfortune befell them, since everyone will know that in a while there will be another meeting, at which the consideration of the issues will continue, and that during the interval between the meetings corresponding efforts will be undertaken via diplomatic channels.

At such meetings, continued Kissinger, it will be important not only to strive toward settlement of the most difficult issues (which it will not be possible to always do immediately), but also to conduct mutual consultations, an exchange of opinions on potentially explosive situations which could draw both sides into conflict; even if their points of view on such situations will not coincide, the sides will better understand each other's motives and not overstep dangerous borders in their actions. It goes without saying that it will be necessary to prepare carefully and in good time for every summit, keeping in mind the necessity to get from them the maximum beneficial payoff in these or any other concrete conditions.

Kissinger was interested in my opinion on the idea of periodically holding such meetings. I answered that in my personal opinion, the idea deserves consideration.

Moving on further to concrete problems and regions, Kissinger said that in Europe Nixon agreed that it is not appropriate to undertake any sort of attempts to change the situation which developed there as a result of the Second World War. The USA, as is well known, in principle favors the unification of Germany, but this is still a question, taking everything into account, realistically speaking, of the very very distant future. The current administration does not intend to push or force events in this direction. On the contrary, it is

interested in achieving a certain degree of stability around West Berlin, so that events there do not from time to time inflame Soviet-American relations. We are waiting, Kissinger added, for any possible more concrete proposals on this issue from the Soviet side, taking into account that this was mentioned in the first note of the Soviet government to President Nixon in February of this year.

To my counter-question about what the American side could suggest on this question, Kissinger answered in such a way so as to assert that they would like first to receive more concrete Soviet thoughts. From his rejoinder it would be possible to understand that in exchange for "calm" on the access routes to West Berlin, they would consider measures to "neutralize" those actions of the FRG in that city which are a cause of "frictions" between the DDR [East Germany] and its allies, particularly the USSR, and the FRG and its allies, including the USA. It was at the same time possible to understand that Washington however is not now ready to accept for West Berlin the status of a "free city."

In the course of the conversation on European affairs Kissinger repeated that President Nixon takes into account the special interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, and does not intend to do anything there which could be evaluated in Moscow as a "challenge" to her position in that region. This is Nixon's basic approach to this question, and it is not necessary, asserted Kissinger, to pay much attention "to isolated critical public comments about some East European country, because that is only a tribute to the mood of certain sub-strata of the American population which play a role in American elections."

Kissinger, like Secretary of State [William P.] Rogers earlier, brought up the issue of joint ratification of the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as President Nixon proposed to us several months ago. Kissinger underlined that Nixon as before has two reasons for ascribing great importance to the simultaneous ratification by the Soviet Union and the United States. First, this would be the first important joint Soviet-American act since the beginning of his Presidency, giving it, in his opinion, a significance beyond the limits of the act itself. Second, joint Soviet-American ratification, Nixon is convinced, would strengthen the pressure on those countries which so far have not signed that agreement.

I expressed our position on this question. I reminded him that, as the American side had already been informed, this agreement is now under review by the international commissions of the Supreme Soviet, which is a constituent step in the ratification process according to Soviet law. I also expressed my personal opinion, that the USA is not now putting the necessary influence and pressure on the government of the FRG, which is openly inclined against signing the agreement, which could make the agreement basically

purposeless. I further expressed the hope that the Nixon government would act much more actively towards Bonn in order to achieve their early signing of the agreement.

Kissinger in fact did not deny that at the present time they are not putting in this sense any sort of serious pressure on Bonn. He tried to justify it as a response to the "dragging out of our answer" to Nixon's proposal as to the simultaneous ratification of the agreement by the USSR and the USA. In Kissinger's words, the leaders in Bonn, besides referring to the election campaign in the FRG, assert to the Americans that they, the West Germans, feel no need to hurry so long as the USSR itself has not ratified the agreement.

Overall from the conversation on this question arises the impression that Nixon, apparently, detects in our leaning against his proposal for simultaneous ratification more our disinclination in the present situation (the CPSU plenum, the sharpening of Soviet-Chinese disagreements) to demonstrate by taking such an act unity of actions with him, Nixon, than the conviction on our part that the absence of our ratification puts any sort of pressure on the FRG. (Kissinger in various ways asserted that the failure of the USSR and the USA to ratify the agreement actually helps those powers in the FRG who are against the agreement.)

Overall, judging by our observations, it is evidently possible with a sufficient degree of confidence to say, that the USA itself will not in the near future conclusively ratify the agreement or put strong pressure on the FRG, as long as we have not agreed with Nixon's above-mentioned proposal or have not reacted to it in a more concrete manner than we have up until now. (In the opinion of the Embassy, it is not advisable to drag out the review of this agreement by the commissions of the Supreme Soviet. In an extreme case, the agreement could be ratified with a special proviso regarding the necessity that the FRG adhere to it.)

Speaking about other areas where, in Nixon's opinion, Soviet-American contacts and bilateral exchange of opinions should develop, Kissinger cited the problem of a Near Eastern settlement, questions of strategic nuclear arms control, and, in the long-term, the gradual development of our trade relations.

Touching on the Near East, Kissinger said that Nixon thinks that if in general it is possible to do anything now, in order to bring this tangled and extremely complex problem closer to a decision, then this can be accomplished only through an unpublicized exchange of opinions between the USSR and USA, who know what their "clients" want and to some extent share their views, but need not be under the thumb of their clients.

In Kissinger's words, in the near future (he has recently finished working out his "plan of action" on the Vietnam question and hopes soon to review and approve directives to the prospective Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations)

Nixon intends personally to make a more detailed study of the concrete possibilities for a Near Eastern settlement. Besides the recent meeting with the King of Jordan, a meeting with the Israeli premier Golda Meir is planned for this month. With her, the American government intends, in particular, to consider the developing situation, especially in light of the on-going bilateral Soviet-American exchange of opinions and taking into account the Soviet answer, which is eagerly awaited in Washington and which soon should be received, after Soviet minister A.A. Gromyko returns to Moscow from his visit to Cairo (the conversation with Kissinger took place during this visit).

During the ensuing discussion of Near Eastern affairs, Kissinger shied away from consideration of concrete questions which I raised, saying that he himself had not yet studied these questions deeply because he had been occupied with Vietnam, but that he will be ready, if necessary, in about a month or a month and a half, to become "personally involved" in the Soviet-American relations on these questions, but that he will not substitute for [Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph] Sisco on the details. He, Kissinger, can secretly meet with me for the all-sided consideration of "key questions" which we might raise, and then present his personal report and recommendations to the President. This report, in Kissinger's words, might serve, depending on the development of the situation and other circumstances, as the basis for supplemental Presidential instructions to the State Department for the long-term exchange of opinions with the Soviet side, without any reference to the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador. He added that in his opinion, for success it would be necessary for both sides (the Arabs and Israel) to "swallow the bitter pill of certain compromises." But Kissinger did not broach the details.

He also said that the President expects that all these questions relating to a Near Eastern settlement will be the subject of detailed consideration by A.A. Gromyko and Secretary of State Rogers during the U.N. General Assembly session.

After all these statements Kissinger moved on to the Vietnam question, which as was evident from everything, occupies the main place in the minds of the President and his most important advisors.

In the course of a detailed exposition of their positions on the Vietnam question, Kissinger in essence repeated all the basic thoughts and arguments which Nixon expressed to me during my last meeting with him, at the White House in May, as well as that which Kissinger set forth earlier on the President's instructions for transmission to the Soviet government.

A more direct call to us to cooperate in overcoming the existing dead end in Paris sounded

somewhat new, however.

Noting that the U.S. government as before highly values the positive things that the Soviet Union has already done in support of the Paris negotiations, Kissinger said further that, speaking frankly, the impression was growing, however, that Moscow in recent months had less actively been involved in the negotiations, leaving them, evidently, almost entirely to the discretion of the leaders from Hanoi, and that Soviet influence at the negotiations had in any case become noticeably less than the influence over Hanoi and the NLF [National Liberation Front] of South Vietnam which the Soviet Union should have at its disposal, since it is the main supplier of military and economic aid to them. We, of course, know well Moscow's basic position, that it does not conduct negotiations for the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] and NLF. But all the same, he noted in passing, what he had said raises among several aides to Nixon a question which is asked more and more often at meetings in the White House: "Doesn't Moscow think that in the final analysis the continuation of war in Vietnam benefits them in a variety of ways, and that therefore it is not worth it to them to hurry to settle the conflict?"

According to Kissinger neither he nor President Nixon shares this point of view. They think that Moscow is interested in finishing the war, for it costs a lot and also because the Vietnam conflict is a serious stumbling block, which, if not removed, will make it impossible to think about a really serious improvement in Soviet-American relations.

Obviously in the same context Kissinger touched here on the question of China. Recalling Nixon's idea, which had been told to us before, that they were not going to interfere in the present-day Soviet-Chinese conflict in any way, and once more confirming the stability of this principle, Kissinger said that they of course don't mind improving relations with China and are ready to take "reasonable steps" forward in this direction, but this process must have a bilateral character. Nevertheless a thorough analysis of the last CPC [Communist Party of China] decisions and of the ensuing events, according to Kissinger, didn't in any way prove to Americans that Beijing leaders were ready to carry out a more peaceful policy towards the USA.

Though, he added in a more ironical manner, the USSR now occupies our place as the main object of Chinese attacks, and we have come to take as if second place, in every other respect the Beijing attitude toward us remains the same. The Chinese still insist on the return of Taiwan to them. The USA can't accept this, though they have no objections to Beijing and Taiwan discussing this problem, but the latter doesn't express such a desire and the Nixon administration will not urge it to do this. Taiwan still occupies an important place in the chain of bases for

restraint of Beijing's expansionist aspirations.

But all this is not really important, asserted Kissinger. We are realists. The main force of the countries of the socialist camp in both military and industrial respects is not China but the Soviet Union. This will be true not only now but also during the whole period of Nixon's Presidency. From this point of view, frankly speaking, our main rival is the Soviet Union, if we speak in global terms and about possible consequences for the US in case of a nuclear war. That's why Nixon considers it important first of all to maintain good or at least more or less normal correct relations with the USSR, not to bring them to a dangerous precipice.

We understand, he went on, that in Moscow, evidently, there are people who think that the USA and China can somehow come to an understanding in opposition to the USSR. In its world historical aspect and taking into consideration different countries' past experience, this concept can sound convincing enough. Nevertheless in this concrete situation, if we speak on behalf of the US government, putting the question this way, asserted Kissinger, would not satisfy the interests of the US itself.

Of course it would be hypocritical, went on Kissinger, to assert—and you wouldn't believe us all the same—that your growing disagreements with the Chinese upset us. But there is here one significant circumstance, which Nixon considers very important. The president is sure that his best course is to not openly take the side of either the USSR or the PRC, and to be very careful not to give the Soviet government any grounds to think that the US somehow supports China's anti-Soviet course or seeks agreement with Beijing on the basis of such a course. Nixon's logic as a realist is very simple: the Soviet Union is much more capable than present-day China to confront the USA in different parts of the world, and that can create dangerous situations, possibly leading to conflicts in which the very existence of the US as a nation may be at stake if the big war breaks out. As for its military-economic potential, China for several more years won't be able to present such a threat to the USA, but the USSR can.

Besides, added Kissinger, Mao Tse-Tung's actions can't be evaluated using rational logic. Anything can be expected from him, though until now he obviously avoided anything that could cause a direct military collision between China and the USA (this doesn't refer to confrontations in third-world countries). Another thing is that the Soviet Union is governed by realistically thinking politicians who are interested in their people's and their country's well-being. It is possible to conclude concrete agreements with them, which satisfy the interests of both countries and not only these countries. That's why President Nixon once expressed to the Soviet leader his idea that if our countries manage

within the next 10-15 years to unite their efforts or at least follow appropriate parallel courses in the most important and dangerous questions, then it will be possible to prevent dragging the world into major military conflicts, until China "grows up" and more responsible leaders come to power in Beijing.

But for this, according to Kissinger, it's necessary to stop the Vietnam conflict as soon as possible, and the Soviet Union must play a more active part in reaching a settlement, "without trusting everything to Hanoi, which evaluates the international situation only from its own, specific and narrow point of view, which often satisfies first of all the interests of China."

All Kissinger's subsequent and repeated speculations were centered on this basic thesis. One could feel that he had instructions from Nixon to give us precisely this kind of argument, though Kissinger expressed it as if in his own words.

The basic Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict was expounded to Kissinger again. It was stressed that we are really striving to put an end to the Vietnam war, but only provided that all lawful rights, interests and expectations of the Vietnamese people are taken into consideration. It was also stated that the unrealistic course of American policy in Vietnam only benefits Mao Tse-Tung and his group and interferes with the creation of a really independent and neutral South Vietnam, as suggested in the NLF of South Vietnam's well-known 10 points. The sooner they understand it in Washington, the better it will be both for Vietnam and for the US itself, and for relations between our countries.

Kissinger, however, still defended Nixon's program to settle the Vietnam conflict, constantly stressing, that they are ready to discuss "any suggestions and to look for compromises," if Hanoi and the NLF finally begin serious negotiations and "don't just repeat their ultimatums." Having mentioned "compromises," Kissinger noted that there can be "different variants, which can be discussed secretly," but added, that they "can't, nevertheless, reject [South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van] Thieu, because that would represent for Vietnam a political capitulation."

In the course of these discussions, Kissinger again (as Nixon had earlier) threw out a comment to the effect that if Hanoi will endlessly "obstruct" the negotiations, then after a few months it will be necessary for the government to think about "other alternatives in order to convince Hanoi."

I said firmly that there are not and there cannot be any other alternatives to peaceful negotiations and a peaceful settlement, if the current administration does not want to repeat the mistakes of the preceding administration, and the consequences to which they led, [which were made] sufficiently clear by the example of the previous owner of the White House.

Kissinger, obviously not wanting to sharpen

the conversation, changed the topic. However, this sufficiently firm sounding theme of "other alternatives" in talks with both Nixon and Kissinger cannot but be noted. Although at the current stage these comments carry, evidently, more the character of attempts to blackmail the Vietnamese and in part the USSR with hints that upon expiration of a certain period of time Nixon might renew the bombing of the DRV or take other military measures, it is not possible to entirely exclude the possibility of such actions by the current administration if the situation, in Nixon's opinion, will justify it.

All the same, it is necessary to be ready for such a development of events, especially if Beijing's provocative course against the USSR will gather strength, and, if in Washington they start to believe that the situation in this sense may be unfavorable for Hanoi. In one place Kissinger, apparently not by chance, threw out a comment to the effect that if it nonetheless becomes necessary for them to turn to "other alternatives" then they hope that Soviet-American relations do not fall any further than a "dangerous minimum," for they from their own side will not do anything which could inflict any sort of a loss to the Soviet Union itself or its authority. Kissinger was told that any attempt of the USA to solve the Vietnam question by forceful means unavoidably is destined to fail and that such a course of action undoubtedly will bring in its train a general increase in international tension, which could not but touch on our relations with the USA.

Overall from the conversation a certain impression was formed that for Nixon foreign policy problem No. 1 remains the question of how to find an exit from the Vietnam War under acceptable conditions, which would guarantee him reelection as President of the USA. Judging from everything, his attempts to "convince" the USSR to help settle the conflict will continue and this will to some extent make itself known in the course of our negotiations with this Administration on other international questions, if not directly, then at last as a definite slowing of the tempo of these negotiations or settlement of other problems.

Kissinger expressed a wish to talk again, after my return, about a broad set of questions in our relations and the general international situation. I agreed to this.

Several words about Kissinger himself. Observing the activities of Nixon and his main foreign policy advisors (and now I am acquainted with practically all of them), it is possible to state with sufficient confidence that at the present time Kissinger has basic, in fact dominant influence on the President in the area of foreign policy. In his hands is concentrated the collection and presentation to the President of all material on foreign policy (including intelligence data) which comes to the White House. He, along with a personally selected staff of 25 experts on various

questions, prepares the agenda and materials for consideration by the National Security Council under the chairmanship of the President (this organ under Nixon began to work regularly, meeting no more rarely than once or twice a week). As recognized by Nixon himself, at my last meeting with him, Kissinger every week “pesters” him (that is, meets with him) significantly more often than any other aide.

Judging by my personal observations and compared with, for example, the relation of President Johnson with his aide [Walt] Rostow, I can say that Kissinger conducts himself much more freely than his predecessors in the presence of the President: one feels the certain confidence of a man who has won for himself a solid position at the White House (at the State Department they say directly that if “Henry”—Kissinger’s first name—speaks against that or some other proposal, then Nixon will most probably reject it).

Kissinger himself, though he is a smart and erudite person, is at the same time extremely vain and in conversations with me, especially during a private lunch (we have established a pretty good personal relationship), not averse to boasting about his influence. During our last conversation he, for example, without any excessive humility, announced that in all of Washington “only two people can answer precisely at any given moment about the position of the USA on this or that question: these are President Nixon and he, Kissinger.” Regarding this he suggested to me that if it is necessary to precisely define something really important “for the correct understanding in Moscow of Nixon’s policy on a concrete question,” I should quietly appeal directly to him.

I should say that he himself readily welcomes the Soviet Ambassador or visits us in the Embassy for a private conversation immediately following a request from our side. He himself often takes the initiative to arrange such meetings. Evidently, he also cites all this as a confidential channel of communication with the Soviet side in order to strengthen his own personal position with Nixon. In this connection I should mention that Kissinger holds under his own personal control all communication of members of his staff with our Embassy personnel, and sternly requires that all such conversations are reported directly to him, and if he considers it necessary, that he himself report to the President. Most recently, his tendency to limit the number of such communications and subsume them all into the flow of his personal contacts with the Soviet Ambassador has been noticeable.

Evidently, it would be expedient over time to more and more actively develop and use the channel with Kissinger in order to influence and through him drive home directly to President Nixon our points of view on various important questions, especially in situations where a certain delicacy is called for or where any sort of public-

ity is undesirable, which is often not possible to achieve when acting through the State Department. It goes without saying that we will as always have to handle routine and official matters, especially those where it is necessary to fix our position, through ordinary diplomatic channels. Secretary of State Rogers has noticeably begun to gather strength and operate more actively in the area of American foreign policy, leaning on the wide apparatus of the State Department and Foreign Service. And all the same, it is necessary to take into account that Kissinger’s influence on the formulation of Nixon’s foreign policy course, judging by all our observations and information in our possession, for now remains commanding.

A. DOBRYNIN

(Source: SCCD, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 558, LI. 92-105.)

**Document Six:
Soviet Policy in Afghanistan, 1979:
A Grim Assessment**

The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mistakes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 “revolution.” The PDPA’s draconian social measures and “unjustified repression” are cited as key factors responsible for the alienation of the army (“which still remains the main basis for the regime”) and the general populace. The document reveals that the Soviet leadership has earlier rebuffed a PDPA request for direct military support in response to fighting in the provincial city of Herat and correctly predicts “the serious political consequences which would have followed if the Soviet side had granted their request....”

Nevertheless, despite these cautionary words, seven months later the Soviet Government did approve direct military intervention in Afghanistan to enforce the continuation of communist rule in Kabul. (For a detailed analysis of Soviet policy in Afghanistan in 1978-79, using newly available CPSU CC materials, see the forthcoming article by Odd Arne Westad of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in the February 1994 issue of International History Review.) Introduction by Robert S. Litwak, Woodrow Wilson Inter-

national Center for Scholars; translation by Loren Utkin; document provided by Mark Kramer.

* * * * *

[The report was found attached to the following cover memorandum:]

Return within 3 days *Proletariat of the world*
to the CC CPSS *unite!*
(General department, First sector)

**Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL PAPERS

No P149/XIU

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov,
Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,
Pusakov, Baibakov, Skachkov, Zamiatin.

Memorandum on protocol no. 149 of the
meeting of the Politburo (CC CPSU) on April
12, 1979

Our future policy in connection with the situation
in Afghanistan.

Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov,
Ponomarev are in agreement with the consider-
ations on the given question, which are laid out in
the memorandum (enclosed).

SECRETARY OF THE CC [Central Committee]

[The report is appended:]

In reference to point XIU of protocol no. 149

Top secret
SPECIAL PAPERS

CC CPSU

In accordance with the 3/18/79 request we are reporting an analysis of the reasons for the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which have recently worsened and our thoughts about our possible further steps in helping the leadership of DRA strengthen its position and stabilize the situation in the country.

Last April’s revolution in Afghanistan occurred in an economically weak, backward feudal country with primitive economic forms and limited domestic resources. The old regime left a great variety of social, economic, and political problems.

In the conditions of a severe class struggle, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan appeared on one pole, representing the interests

of the working class, facing the forces expressing the interests of the gentry-feudal class, the bourgeoisie, and the most reactionary part of the clergy on the other.

The Afghan reactionary forces are very skillfully taking advantage of the almost complete illiteracy of the population, complex international and intertribal conflicts, religious fanaticism and nationalism.

Subversive actions, sabotage and the resistance of the overthrown class of exploiters are deepening the economic problems, lowering industrial and agricultural output, as well as hampering business activity, raising prices and reducing the influx of revenue into the state budget. The actions of reactionary forces, which are at present headed by Muslim leaders, who rely on the "Muslim Brothers" organization, have banded together on the basis of their common negative relation to the new order in separatist and nationalist groupings and in the pro-Maoist organization "Shoalee Javid."

The reactionary forces have consolidated somewhat recently after overcoming the confusion following the rapid and rather unexpected victory of the April revolution. They have started to change the forms of struggle, shifting from covert subversive actions to open armed forms of activity. They were able not only to regroup within the country but also to build wide connections with imperialist and clerical groups abroad, which supply them with active propaganda support as well as money and weapons. The tactic of the enemies of the revolution is to widen the front of the struggle, to force the government to disperse its forces across different regions of the country.

Reactionary forces use slogans of extreme anticommunism and antisovietism. Their main political goal is the overthrow of the revolutionary democratic order and the creation of a "free Islamic republic" in Afghanistan.

The program of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan anticipates the implementation of wide political and social-economic reforms in the interests of the working people. But this program is just beginning to be realized and therefore only a small portion of the population has felt the advantages of the new order and its progressive character. The new authorities must overcome centuries of backwardness of the country, remove difficulties, and solve problems. This requires time as well as a thoroughly planned and well calculated approach. The leaders of democratic Afghanistan have to create a new state apparatus, reorganize and strengthen the army, and gather practical experience in building a state and party.

The weak side of the people's authority is the fact that it has not yet established a firm basis of support in the provincial and urban administrative political organs through which the working people would be involved in the management

of the state from the center and particularly from distant areas.

The new authority is experiencing serious problems because of its relationship with the clergy and opposition tribal leaders which are the most influential forces in Afghanistan. The resolution of this problem, which requires circumspection and a careful approach, has not yet been found and both forces continue to be dangerous opponents of the present regime. They play a major role in the counterrevolutionary struggle. The situation in Iran and the spark of religious fanaticism all around the Muslim East was the underlying cause of the activation of the struggle against the government of Afghanistan.

The difficulties which the leadership of DRA faces are growing more complex because the PDPA has not yet become a mass political organization. The best workers and poorest peasants are becoming involved very slowly. The party is still unable to attract the layers of society which could accept the revolutionary aspects of the revolution: the intelligentsia, white-collar employees, the small bourgeoisie, and lowest layers of the clergy.

The party itself split following the April revolution and weakened its position, influence, and prestige. PDPA continues to be not only small in number but also has been weakened seriously by the internal struggle between the "Khalq" and "Parcham" groups. The most popular leaders of the "Parcham" group were either physically destroyed or purged from the party, army, and state apparatus. Some of them found themselves abroad as political refugees. This situation has hurt the party's remaining "Parcham" members. The people have demonstrated fear, suspicion, and distrust of the PDPA leadership. Rapid changes in the leaders of important administrative units in the center as well as the periphery and constant changes in the army have made the situation even worse.

The enemies of the revolution are acting not only from within the country but from abroad, especially from Pakistan and Iran where many of the opponents of the new order have emigrated. According to our sources, Western special services, particularly American and Chinese agencies, are involved in the organization of the struggle against the government inside the country. They have taken advantage of the fact that Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and Iran are practically open. Not only subversive and terrorist groups, but also large armed bands are sent across those borders.

The internal and external counterrevolutionary forces are trying to use not only the objective difficulties of the new order, but also the miscalculations and mistakes of the Afghan leadership. It is known that following the victory in the April revolution, extreme measures and unjustified repression were often allowed in solving both internal party and government problems. There were

cases of financial corruption, as well as violence towards arrested persons during investigations.

The dissatisfaction with unjustified repression affected the army, which still remains the main basis for the regime. This makes the counterrevolutionary task of dictating the system not only from within the country but also from abroad significantly easier. Many commanders feel uncertain and fear arrest after witnessing their colleagues' arrest and disappearance. These fears were confirmed by events in Herat, where not only a large portion of the population but also some army units, on their commanders' orders, sided with the counterrevolution.

The Herat events also revealed the weakness of the political, agitational, and propagandistic work of the PDPA among the people. The destabilizing activities of the enemies of the new system, including the reactionary clergy, are much more active and widespread than the work of the party.

The Soviet leadership has many times given recommendations and advice to the leaders of the DRA, and on a very high level. They have pointed to their mistakes and excesses. But the Afghan leaders, displaying their political inflexibility and inexperience, rarely heeded such advice.

The insufficient political experience of the DRA leaders was apparent during the conflict in Herat, where they displayed a lack of understanding of the serious political consequences which would have followed if the Soviet side had granted their request to call in Soviet troops.

It is clear that due to the internal nature of the antigovernmental opposition, the use of Soviet troops in repressing the Afghan counterrevolution would seriously damage the international authority of the USSR and would set back the process of disarmament. In addition, the use of Soviet troops would reveal the weakness of the Taraki government and would widen the scope of the counterrevolution both domestically and abroad, bringing the attack of antigovernmental forces to a much higher level. The fact that the government was able to suppress the rebellion in Herat with its own forces should hold back the counterrevolution and demonstrate the relative strength of the new system.

Therefore, our decision to refrain from satisfying the request of the leadership of DRA to send Soviet military units to Afghanistan was correct and this policy should be continued further because the possibility of new rebellions against the government cannot be excluded.

Of course, we should continue to do anything we can to assist the leadership of Afghanistan with their struggle against counterrevolution and in their stabilization of the situation of the country. We have to help the government strengthen its influence and to lead the people along the path of socialist reform.

The Soviet Union has been providing active

political support to the new government, as well as widespread economic and military assistance and has been participating in the training of skilled personnel from the first days following the victory of the April revolution. Large numbers of advisers and specialists were sent to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government to assist in solving the problems faced by the DRA leadership.

Taking into account the recent additional decisions, in order to continue this work it is necessary:

1. To continue to support the leadership of the DRA in improving the combat efficiency and political awareness of the Afghan army, ensuring its loyalty and dedication to the revolutionary leadership, and in strengthening and improving the efficiency of the security organs, including the border patrol.

It should be noted that in connection with the latest events, large amounts of arms and military technology have been sent and an additional amount will be sent into Afghanistan. In addition, the training of military specialists for the armed forces of the DRA has been expanded in military academies in Afghanistan itself as well as in the Soviet Union. It should be emphasized that modern and effective mastering of the supplied weapons and technology is essential. The same applies to aid provided to the security organs.

2. As much as is possible, to examine and solve problems connected with provided economic assistance to Afghanistan, especially that which would accelerate and strengthen the political position of the revolutionary-democratic regime in the country. To advise the Afghan leadership on developing the principal sectors of the economy which would strengthen the productive capacity of the country, resolve social problems, and provide employment to the population.

3. In contacts with the leadership of the DRA at all levels to always emphasize the importance of widening the political base which supports the party and the government. The importance of the consecutive implementation of the planned reforms, such as land reform, should be instilled in the leaders of the DRA. This has to be done carefully, devoting essential attention to the political and ideological side of reform. For example, the peasants should be convinced that they are getting the land only because of the revolution and will lose it if they will not protect the revolutionary authority. Similar explanations should be made in cases of other socio-economic reforms.

To widen the political base of the PDPA, the Afghan leadership should be made to understand that it is essential to gradually create electoral organs, yet, of course, the leading role of the party should be maintained and strengthened in the state and political structure of the country.

They should also understand that it is advisable to develop and enact a constitution which will secure the democratic rights of the people and regulate the activity of the state organs.

4. It should be emphasized to the Afghan leadership that as the party ranks grow numerically, it is crucial to maintain the unity of the party leadership and membership. They should also be reminded about the advisability of collective decision-making on the most important issues along party and state lines. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the leadership of DRA should be given practical assistance in establishing the party organization, spreading mass information, and preparing party and state cadres.

5. To continue to draw the attention of the Afghan leadership to the necessity of carrying out appropriate work among the Muslim clergy of the country in order to fractionalize it and reduce the influence of reactionary Muslim leaders on the people. This influence could be diminished by encouraging religious freedom and demonstrating that the new power does not persecute the clergy as a class, but only punishes those who act against the revolutionary system.

6. The DRA leaders should be convinced of the necessity of the introduction and strict observance of law and order, based on revolutionary legality, as well as the necessity of a more reasonable approach to the use of repressive measures. This does not mean, however, that repressive measures should not be used against true infidels or those who engage in active counterrevolutionary activity. A person's fate should not be decided on the basis of circumstantial and unverifiable evidence, or verdict by two- and three-man commissions, without a true investigation and trial. This applies both to party and military cadres.

7. Considering the importance of personal contacts in communicating our views and thoughts on the above questions to the DRA leadership, visits on various levels should be practiced on a more regular basis in order to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

8. To continue, along official diplomatic and special channels, to work against the interference of other countries, particular neighboring ones, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

9. To help Afghan friends conduct political work among the people, including radio propaganda, which due to the high percentage of illiteracy plays a special role in Afghanistan.

In our propaganda concerning Afghanistan, the traditional friendship and wide base of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries should be emphasized. This relationship not only exists today, but will continue to develop in the future. The achievements in socio-economic development of the Central Asian republics during the Soviet period should be described in a wide and clearly understandable manner; these republics should be used as an example to demon-

strate the falsity of assertions concerning repression of religious expression, the Muslim faith included.

10. To periodically inform brother socialist countries about our steps in aiding the leadership of DRA in stabilizing the situation in the country, thereby orienting them to render similar political and material support of Afghanistan.

Concrete proposals on the above positions, as well as any other measures, will be included as needed.

Please review these materials.

A. Gromyko. Y. Andropov. D. Ustinov. B. Ponomarev.

April 1, 1979
No 279/gS
No 25-S-576

(Source: SCCD, Fond 89, perechen [list] 14, dokument 28.)

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The Update section summarizes items in the popular and scholarly press containing new information on Cold War history emanating from the former Communist bloc. Readers are invited to alert CUIHP of relevant citations.

Abbreviations:

AAASS = American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies

CDSP = Current Digest of the Soviet Press

DA = *Deutschland Archiv*

FBIS = Foreign Broadcast Information Service

MN = *Moscow News*

NYT = *New York Times*

RFE/RL = Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

SHAFR = Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

VfZ = *Vierteljahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte*

WP = *Washington Post*

ZfG = *Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft*

Russia/Former Soviet Union

Russian military publisher, Voenizdat, discloses USSR combat losses in 1918-1989 in statistical survey entitled, *Unclassified*. (Interfax, 12/28/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 248 (12/29/92), 3, and FBIS-SOV-92-252, 12/31/92.)

Comintern files in Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents of Recent History disclose further details of Soviet Government financial support to the U.S. Communist Party. (Letter from John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Labor History* 33:4 (Fall 1992), 576-78.)

Russian Ministry of Security official gives new, far higher figures on number of people persecuted under Stalin in 1935-45. (Vera Tolz, "Ministry of Security Official Gives New Figures for Stalin's Victims," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:18 (5/1/92), 8-10.)

Four-part series by gulag survivor who reviewed KGB files on camps. (Lev Razgon, "Captive in one's own country," *New Times International* 31-34 (1991).)

Red Army archives yield new details of Holocaust. (Gerald Fleming, "Engineers of Death," *NYT*, 7/18/93, 19.)

Recently-released Soviet documents supports contention Raoul Wallenberg died in Soviet detention in 1947 and that USSR Foreign Ministry lied about the case until 1957. (Helene Carlback-Isotalo, "Glasnost and the Opening up of Soviet Archives: Time to Conclude the Raoul Wallenberg Case?" *Scandinavian Journal of History* 17:3 (1992), 175-207; see also "Report on Wallenberg," *WP*, May 31, 1993, A22.)

Reports on Soviet development of nuclear weap-

ons during and after World War II, including account by senior scientist Yuli B. Khariton. (*The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49:4 (May 1993): David Holloway, "Soviet scientists speak out," 18-19; Khariton & Yuri Smirnov, "The Khariton version," 20-31; Roald Sagdeev, "Dividing the glory of the fathers," 37-39.) Khariton says Soviets relied on espionage data from the Manhattan Project to develop their first fission bomb, but not the H-bomb. (Y. Khariton, "The USSR Nuclear Weapon: Did it come from America or was it created independently?" *Izvestia*, 12/8/92, 3; Serge Schmemann, "1st Soviet A-Bomb Built from U.S. Data, Russian Says," *NYT*, 1/14/93.)

Two-part series on Soviet espionage penetration of the Manhattan Project. (Vladimir Chikov, "How the Soviet intelligence service 'split' the American atom," *New Times International* 16 (23-29 April 1991), 37-40, and *New Times International* 17 (30 April-6 May 1991), 36-39.)

Russian minister of atomic energy says Soviet nuclear stockpile was far higher than U.S. thought, peaking at 45,000 warheads in 1986. ("Russian Says Soviet Atom Arsenal Was Larger Than West Estimated," *NYT*, 9/26/93.)

Profile of life in Arzemas-16, one of two "secret cities" (with Chelyabinsk-70) devoted to nuclear research and production, and site of development of first Soviet atom bomb. (Brenda Horrigan, "The Changing Fate of a Russian 'Secret City,'" *RFE/RL Research Report* 47 (11/27/92), 50-54.)

Declassified USSR archives disclose Soviet submarines sunk three Japanese ships carrying refugees on 21-22 August 1945, a week after Japan surrendered, killing 1,700 people, Japanese press reports said. (Vasily Golovin, "Death After Capitulation," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 10/8/92, FBIS-USR-92-137, 10/24/92, 44-45.)

Continuation of article on Stalin-Mao relations. (N. Fedorenko, "Stalin and Mao Zedong," *New and Newest History* 6 (1992), 83-85.) Former CPSU CC interpreter recounts evolution and deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. (Vasily Sidikhmenov, "Stalin and Mao hearkened to us," *New Times International* 5 (Feb. 1993), 30-32.)

Recounting of covert U.S.-Soviet air conflict along periphery of Soviet air space in 1950s-60s. (G. Mikhailov, A. Orlov, "Secrets of the 'Closed Sky,'" *New and Newest History* 6 (1992), 96-110.)

Retired general recalls Stalin's 1952 order, never implemented, to set up 100 divisions of retaliatory bombers. (N.N. Ostroumov, "The Armada that Never Took Off," *Military-Historical Journal* 10 (1992), 39-40.)

Russian and Swedish officials investigate 13 June 1952 Soviet downing of Swedish DC-3 military aircraft. (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6/12/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-116, 6/16/92.)

Incident disclosed in which man entered top-secret underground complex through Moscow metro and interrupted high-level meeting. (*Argumenti i Fakty* 30 (7/93), 6, in FBIS-USR-93-102 (8/9/93), 9.)

Analysis of 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, including first publication of Soviet casualties: 669 killed, 1450 wounded, 51 missing. (Valery Musatov, "Operation Whirlwind," *New Times International* 49 (1991), 28-31.)

Nikita Khrushchev remembered by his grandson. ("Khrushchev Had a Thick Glass and a Perceptive Ear," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 1/12/93.) Extensive review of recent evidence and assessments of Khrushchev. (David Nordlander, "Khrushchev's Image in the Light of Glasnost and Perestroika," *The Russian Review* 52 (April 1993), 248-64.)

Ex-diplomat Viktor Beletskiy examines Soviet policy toward East Germany in 1950s-1970s. (S. Suk, "We Cannot Compete with Capitalism with Open Borders," *Izvestia*, 9/29/92, 6.)

CPSU archives yield records of extensive payments to Communist Party of Japan. (*New Times International* (English) 21 (May 1993), 30-32, in FBIS-USR-93-075 (6/18/93), 3-5.)

Examination of charges that former Finnish leader received financial aid from the KGB; authenticity of evidence questioned. (A. Gorbunkov, "Was Urkho Kekkonen a KGB Agent?" *MN* 47 (11/22/92), 12.)

Military newspaper discloses 18 June 1961 nuclear reactor accident aboard Soviet K-19 submarine; an undetermined number of repair workers were reported to have died of radiation sickness. (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12/26/92, cited in Steven Erlanger, "Russians Tell of '61 Atom Accident on Submarine," *NYT*, 12/27/92, 9.)

Two-part series on emerging evidence on suppression of 1962 Novochoerkassk workers' uprising. (Ol'ga Nikitina, "Novochoerkassk: Khronika tragedii," *Don* 8-9 (1990), 119-26, 137-46, English trans., "Novochoerkassk: The Chronicle of a Tragedy," *Russian Social Science Review* 33:5 (Sept./Oct. 1992.) Review of other suppressed revolts in 1960-62. (Vadim Belotserkovsky, "The upheavals the country did not notice," *New Times International* 15 (1991), 8-9; reprinted from *Suchastnost* (USA), 1978.)

Analysis of Soviet policy toward 1967 Middle

East war cites Kremlin role in fostering Israeli-Arab tensions. (Alexander Shumilin, "Backstage events of the 'six-day war,'" *New Times International* 40 (Oct. 1992), 24-26.)

Soviet military blocked 1973 initiative to offer transfer of two Kurile islands (Shikotan and Habomai) to Japan in order to sign peace treaty, according to Russian diplomatic sources in Tokyo. (Itar-Tass, 7/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-146, 7/29/92, 6-7.)

CIA director Robert Gates gives Yeltsin data on CIA recovery of Soviet submarine wreckage. (N. Buryga, "In the Summer of 1974 the CIA was Burying Soviet Naval Officers," *Izvestia*, 10/22/92, 3.)

Details on abortive 1975 mutiny by Navy Capt. Valery Sablin, who tried to commandeer anti-submarine ship from Riga to Leningrad to denounce Soviet government. (Fred Hiatt, "Soviet Navy's Rebel With a Cause," *WP*, 11/18/92.)

Recounting of KGB investigation into January 1977 bombings in Moscow; Armenian nationalists blamed. (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 7/28/93, 4, in FBIS-USR-93-110 (8/23/93), 2-4.)

Documents from Soviet archives provide new details on decisions to invade Afghanistan in 1979 and to withdraw seven years later. (Michael Dobbs, "Soviet Memos Trace Kremlin's March to War," *WP*, 11/15/92, and "Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War," *WP*, 11/16/92.) Norwegian scholar Odd Arne Westad analyzes Soviet policy in Afghanistan in 1978-79, using newly available CPSU documents. (Forthcoming article in *International History Review* 16:1 (February 1994) and spring 1994 issue of *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*.)

Profile of former Defense Minister Grechko, including his assertion at one juncture that war with China was "inevitable." (V. Vladimirov, "Marshal Grechko's Invocations," *Arguments and Facts* 6 (1993).)

Germ warfare accident blamed for hushed-up 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk that is said to have killed at least 42 people. (Study in Proceedings of the *National Academy of Sciences*, cited in Associated Press dispatch, *WP*, 3/15/93, and "U.S. and Russian Researchers Tie Anthrax Deaths to Soviets," *NYT*, 3/15/93.)

Investigation of Soviet chemical weapons development program. (Oleg Vishnyakov, "I helped

make the binary bomb," *New Times International* 1 (Jan. 1993), 25-27; Vishnyakov, "An interview with a noose around the neck," *New Times International* 10 (March 1993), 22-23.)

Politburo minutes illuminate Soviet policy during 1980-81 Polish crisis. (N. Yermolovich, "'Moscow's Hand' in the Car Near Brest," *Izvestia*, 1/21/93.)

Russian government seeking evidence in KGB and CPSU Central Committee files of Soviet involvement in 1986 death of Mozambiquan leader Samora Machel in plane crash. (Jack Anderson

4-7.) Former party official says CPSU gave financial aid to "about 100 Marxist-Leninist parties abroad." (Interfax, 7/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-148-S, 7/31/92, 15; also Moscow Ostankino television report, 6/11/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-116, 6/16/92, 6.)

Russian, Italian prosecutors investigating secret financial ties between Soviet and Italian Communist Parties disclosed in CPSU archives. (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 6/9/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-116, 5-6; Alexei Bukalov, "Searching for the 'lost money,'" *New Times International* 28 (July 1992), 26-27.) CPSU funding to Iranian Communists disclosed. (M. Krutikhin, "Once Again About the Disinterested Aid to Fraternal Parties," *MN* 44 (11/1/92), 12.)

Charges of CPSU money-laundering in Finland investigated. ("CPSU Funds: Finnish Police Are Getting Involved," *Izvestia*, 11/13/92, 3.) More on CPSU financing of foreign Communist Parties. ("From the CPSU Archives: 'The Party Expenses on the World Revolution,'" *Arguments and Facts* 6 (1993).) CPSU documents show KGB financed Muslim protest at US Embassy in New Delhi. (*Kuranty*, 6/3/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-108, 6/4/92, 8.)

Communist Party archives document Soviet aid to the Palestine Liberation Organizations. (Brian Duffy, "The company they keep: The Palestinians' Communist pals," *U.S. News & World Report*, 4/26/93, 52.)

Secret minutes of CPSU Central Committee document official cover-up of 1986 Chernobyl disaster's extent. (Alla Yaroshinskaya, "40 Secret Protocols of the Kremlin Elders," *Izvestia*, 4/24/92, 3, in *CDSF* 44:17 (5/27/92), 5-8.)

Transcripts of Oct. 1986 U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik published. ("From Gorbachev's Archives (Talks Between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik, 11-12 October 1986); Second Session (Afternoon, 11 October 1986), *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* 5 (1993), 81-90 [English translation: FBIS-USR-93-087 (7/12/93), 1-6], continuation from *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* 4 (1993); Part 3: "Pages of History: From the Gorbachev Archive (M.S. Gorbachev's Talks with R. Reagan in Reykjavik on 11-12 October 1986): The Third Conversation (Morning of 12 October 1986)," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* 7 (July 1993), 88-104; [English translation: FBIS-USR-93-113 (8/30/93), 1-11]; and "Chetvertaya beseda (dnem 12 oktyabrya

Documents from the CPSU Archives: Leaders of the Russian Revolution

Now available for order is the first collection stemming from a collaboration between the State Archival Service of Russia, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, and Chadwyck-Healey, to make available previously secret documentation from the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The collection, *Leaders of the Russian Revolution*, was advertised in October 1993 as containing microfiche and microfilm materials from the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI, the former Central Party archives, which holds the pre-1952 CPSU CC records) on nine prominent Bolshevik revolutionaries: P.B. Axelrod, M.I. Kalinin, S.M. Kirov (Kostrikov), L. Martov (I.O. Tserdbaum), V.M. Molotov (Skriabin), G.K. ORdzhonikidze, L.D. Trotsky (Bronstein), V.I. Zauslich, and A.A. Zhdanov. The entire collection (2,460 microfiche, 355 microfilm reels) sells for \$41,695; individual archives are also available. Orders and inquiries to: Chadwyck-Healey Inc., 1101 King St., Alexandria, VA 22314 USA; tel.: (703) 683-4890; toll-free: 1-800-752-0515; fax: (703) 683-7589.

and Michael Binstein, "Yeltsin's Hunt for Soviet Misdeeds," *WP*, 10/14/93, DS14.)

Soviets developed "Doomsday machine," providing for automatic "dead hand" nuclear retaliation against U.S. if Kremlin leadership were incapacitated by attack, Brookings analyst reports. (Bruce G. Blair, "Russia's Doomsday Machine," *NYT*, 10/8/93, A35, and William J. Broad, "Russia Has Computerized Nuclear 'Doomsday' Machine, U.S. Expert Says," *NYT*, 10/8/93, A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Soviet Nuclear Retaliation System Said to Be Still in Place," *WP*, 10/9/93, A23.)

Documents expose CPSU financing of foreign parties, contradicting denials of ex-officials V. Falin and V. Zagladin. ("The secret file of the Politburo," *New Times International* 44 (1991),

1986 g.)," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnaya otnosheniya* 8 (August 1993), 68-78.)

Previously unpublished Aug. 1988 letter from Andrei Sakharov to Mikhail Gorbachev regarding Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. (Yelena G. Bonner, intro., "There Couldn't Be a More Severe Blow Dealt to Perestroika": Andrei Sakharov's Unposted Letter," *Nevisamaya Gazeta/Independent Newspaper* (English ed.) 2:14-15 (Nov.-Dec. 1992), 7.)

Soviet nuclear submarine sunk in North Atlantic in 1989 unlikely to pose contamination hazard, scientists say. (William J. Broad, "Hazard is Doubtful from Sunken Sub," *NYT*, 9/5/93, see also "Two Soviet 'Nuclear Wrecks' in Baltic Sea," *FBIS-WEU-93-029*, 16 February 1993, 13.)

Former Soviet and American advisers recount Cold War's end at Princeton conference. ("SDI, Chernobyl Helped End Cold War, Conference Told," *WP*, 2/27/93.)

Publications: The Soviet Ministry of Interior's final, secretly published crime statistics: *USSR Crime Statistics and Summaries: 1989 and 1990*, trans. Joseph Serio, for Timothy Heleniak (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1993); *Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev*, ed. and intro. Albert Resis (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1993); European Workshop of International Historical Research on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism, *The International Newsletter of Historical Studies on Comintern, Communism and Stalinism*, Vol. 1, 1993, No. 1/2 (Akademie Verlag GmbH, Leipziger Str. 3-4, P.O. Box 12 33, D-1086 Berlin, tel.: (030) 2 23 60; fax: (030) 223 6387), contains data on archives, libraries, sources, scholarly cooperation.

KAL-007 Investigations:

Russian government releases secret documents and transcripts relating to 1983 downing of Korean airliner. (*Izvestia*, 10/15/92, 1, 3.) Analysis of new materials indicates Korean pilots were unaware that plane was off course or being tailed, and fails to disclose who gave Soviet interceptor the order to fire; Yeltsin's motives in releasing materials also assessed. (John W.R. Lepingwell, "Opening the KAL-007 Black Box: New Documents and Old Questions," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:44 (11/6/92), 20-26.)

Yeltsin gives South Korea additional materials, also promises materials on outbreak of Korean War. (*Korea Times* (Seoul), 11/15/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-221, 11/16/92, 10-11; Itar-Tass, 11/19/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-224, 11/19/92, 9; see also

Literaturnaya Gazeta 46 (11/11/92), 9, in FBIS-USR-92-150, 11/23/92, 3-4.) South Korea urges Moscow to release more materials, calls for international conference; Moscow promises originals. (A. Illesh, "Silence of the Black Boxes—It Has Caused an Uproar," *Izvestia*, 12/1/92, in CDSP 44:49, 1/6/93; Itar-Tass, 12/2/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-233, 12/3/92, 3-4; S. Agafonov, N. Burbyga, A. Illesh, A. Shalnev, "Tumult Over the 'Black boxes,'" *Izvestia*, 12/4/92, 1, 7; *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 12/10/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-240, 12/14/92, 6; "The 'black box' of the President's policy," *MN* 50, 12/13/92; N. Burbyga, A. Illesh, and A. Shalnev, "After Nine Years of Secrecy—Fate of Black Boxes Finally Decided," *Izvestia*, 12/22/92, translation in CDSP 44:51, 1/20/93, 16.) Moscow hands over original "black box" recordings to international investigators. (Itar-Tass, 1/8/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-007, 1/12/93.) French pilot expresses skepticism over *Izvestia's* account. (K. Privalov, "Maybe, We Should Look for Other 'Black Boxes,'" *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 1/27/93.) Further report on investigation, as well as recollections of U.S. and Soviet officials at conference at Princeton University. ("The KAL-007 Tragedy: Experts Prepare Conclusion, While Former Key USSR and U.S. Figures Speak Frankly," *Izvestiya*, 3/5/93, in FBIS-USR-93-036, 3/24/93, 61-64.)

Long shielded from Western accounts, residents of Sakhalin Island doubt people were aboard KAL 007 airliner shot down in 1983. ("Isolated Sakhalin Island Residents Still Doubt KAL Crash Evidence," *WP*, 6/2/93.)

Secret burial site of debris from crash, in silo in Nevelsk District, to be opened. (Itar-Tass, 6/9/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-110 (6/10/93), 18.)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concludes inquiry, states that Soviets "failed to make exhaustive efforts to identify the intruding aircraft" and mistook KAL-007 for U.S. spy plane; some questions still open. (*Izvestia*, 6/16/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-116 (6/18/93), 17-18.) Russian Federation State Commission finishes inquest, reaches conclusions identical to those of ICAO inquest. (*Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 8/28/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-1647 (8/31/93), 9; *Izvestia*, 8/28/93, in FBIS-USR-93-117 (9/8/93), 50.) More on findings; commission head Sergey Filatov blames errors of KAL-007 crew, defends downing as "act of self-defense" and "an unavoidable and lawful act." (Itar-Tass, 8/30/93, and *Yonhap* (Seoul), 8/30/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-166 (8/30/93), 17-19.)

No bodies recovered from crash, diver recalls, claiming that KAL-007 must have been unmanned; ex-air defense security chief responds. (*Trud*, 7/3/93, in FBIS-USR-93-089 (7/16/93), 85-87.) Former member of Soviet investigatory

commission asks why pilots did not detect flight error. (*Trud*, 8/14/93, in FBIS-USR-93-114 (9/1/93), 74-75.) Theory raised that KAL-007 landed in USSR, dropped off passengers, then was sunk. (*Trud*, 7/17/93, in FBIS-USR-93-100 (8/4/93), 73-74.) Pathologist explains failure to recover bodies from crash. (*Trud*, 8/21/93, in FBIS-USR-93-117 (9/8/93), 50-51.)

Intelligence/Espionage Issues

Newly released documents reveal murders by Soviet secret police services at home and abroad dating back to Stalin's time. (Natalya Gevorkyan and Nikita Petrov, "KGB's secret weapon," *MN* (English edition) 32 (8/9-16/92), 9, also in FBIS-USR-92-126, 10/2/92, 1-2, and Gevorkyan and Petrov, "Acts of terrorism to be recognized as expedient," *MN* (English edition) 36 (9/6-13/92), 10, also in FBIS-USR-92-132, 10/17/92, 1-4.)

Ex-KGB officer Vitaliy Chernyavskiy describes Beria, Soviet intelligence relations and operations in Romania, East Germany. ("At the Last Minute the Ambassador Got Scared," *Novoye Vremya* 42 (Oct. 1992), 24, 41, in FBIS-USR-92-155, 12/4/92, 2-4.)

Profile of ex-NKVD agent Nikolai Khokhlov, who defected to West after refusing to carry out assassination plot in 1954 against West German labor leader. (Lev Yetlin, "Two death sentences," *New Times International* 24 (June 1992), 31-34.)

Ex-intelligent agent reviews case of Richard Sorge, Soviet spy executed by Japan during World War II. (Vitaly Chernyavsky, "The secret agent who was never exchanged," *New Times International* 6 (1991), 31-33.)

First installment of series on Col. Rudolf Abel, Soviet spy who oversaw atomic espionage in U.S. and was exchanged in 1962 for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 7/10/93, 1, 3, in FBIS-USR-93-113 (8/30/93), 11-14.)

Excerpt from memoir of British double agent and defector George Blake describing 1966 escape from a British prison. (Blake, "The Escape," *New Times International* 45 (1990), 37-30.)

Excerpts from forthcoming book by defected KGB officer Oleg Kalugin. ("Intelligence Leaders," *MN* 2 (Russian) (1/10/93), 9V; "Leningrad Notes," *MN* 6 (Russian) (2/4/93), 8V; translation in FBIS-USR-93-038 (3/26/93), 1-6.)

Vitaly Yurchenko, a KGB officer who defected to the United States but redefected to the Soviet Union 93 days later, was probably a genuine asylum seeker, ex-CIA head Gates says. ("Gates Calls '85 Defector Bona Fide," *WP*, 1/16/93.)

Former *Washington Post* reporter Dusko Doder denies charge reported in *Time* magazine that he accepted \$1,000 from KGB while working in Moscow. ("Ex-Post Correspondent Disputes Report of KGB Ties," *WP*, 12/20/92.)

Russia's Foreign Intelligence service denies a Soviet defector's claim that former *WP* Moscow Bureau Chief Dusko Doder had accepted payment from the KGB. ("Ex-Post Reporter's File Fails to Back Defector," *WP*, 2/26/93)

Review of recently released data on Soviet intelligence operations, including translations of selected documents. ("Research Note: Recently Released Material on Soviet Intelligence Operations," *Intelligence and National Security* 8:2 (April 1993), 238-49.)

KGB documents during August 1991 coup attempt published. ("KGB in action," *New Times International* 36 (1991), 18-19.)

In excerpt from memoir (Novosti Publishers), Vadim Bakatin, briefly head of the KGB in late 1991, defends decision to give information to American ambassador detailing Soviet bugging of US embassy building in Moscow; notes 1969 USSR leadership decision to approve spying. (Vadim Bakatin, "'Getting rid of the KGB,'" *MN* (English edition) 34 (22-29 Aug. 1992), 16, also in FBIS-USR-92-126, 10/2/92, 2-5.)

Debate on Hiss case continues. (Letters, *NYT*, 11/13/92; Anthony Hiss, "Personal History," *The New Yorker* 68:39 (11/16/92), 100ff.; Russian historian Volkogonov qualifies earlier categorical assertion that Soviet archives proved Hiss was not a spy, acknowledging he had not had access to all relevant archives; Hiss, declaring innocence, urges further search. (Serge Schmemmann, "Russian General Retreats on Hiss," and Marvine Howe, "Then Search Further, Hiss Says," *NYT*, 12/17/92.) Skeptical view of Volkogonov's assertions; letter from Volkogonov acknowledging that he had "not once" visited the archives of external intelligence but relied on the assertion of its head, Yevgeny Primakov, that Hiss was not registered as a spy. (Vladimir Abarinov, "Hiss's Case: Miscarriage of Justice?" *Nevisimaya Gazeta/Independent Newspaper* (English) 2:16-17 (Jan. 1993), 5.)

Documents in Hungarian Interior Ministry archives' file on American defector Noel Field cited by historian as evidence showing Hiss's guilt; another researcher who reviewed same file questions findings. (Maria Schmidt, "The Hiss Dossier," *The New Republic* 209:19 (11/8/93), 17-20; Sam Tanenhaus, "Hiss: Guilty as Charged," *Commentary* 95:4 (April 1993), 32-37; Tanenhaus, "Hiss Case 'Smoking Gun'?" *NYT*, 10/15/93, A15; Ethan Klingsberg, "The

Noel Field Dossier: Case Closed on Alger Hiss?" *The Nation* 257:15 (11/8/93), 528-32; Jeffrey A. Frank, "The Unending Trial of Alger Hiss," *WP*, 10/29/93, B1, B4; Tony Hiss letter, *NYT*, 11/2/93, A22.)

Author states KGB and CPSU documents show link between KGB and ex-*Novoye Vremya* correspondent in U.S., later Russian parliamentarian Iona Andronov. (*Izvestia*, 5/29/93, in FBIS-USR-93-078 (6/23/93), 1-3; also *Express Chronicle*, 1/19/93, and *Freedom Review*, June 1993, 9-11.)

Excerpt from book on KGB Alpha unit: Mikhail Boltunov, *Alpha'—Top Secret KGB Detachment* (Moskva Publishing House, Kedr; Pressa Printing House; for information contact Association of Veterans of Special Forces, 435-21-17 or 439-53-74). Article describes overthrow of Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin on eve of Soviet invasion in December 1979. ("Alpha'—Top Secret KGB Detachment," *Moskovskaya Pravda*, 2/13/93, in FBIS-USR-93-038, 3/26/93, 6-10.)

Report on Russian intelligence service agreement with Crown Publishers to publish books on KGB activities. (Moscow Ostankino television, 6/26/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-126, 6/30/92, 16-17.)

Russian Intelligence Service declassifies KGB dossier on Alexander Orlov, who spied for Stalin and later defected to the West; new details disclosed. (John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, "In From the (Russian) Archives: The Orlov Story," *International Herald Tribune*, 7/1/93.)

Ex-KGB official alleges that hundreds of U.S. military and civilian officials spied for USSR during the cold war, triggering investigation, according to Ronald Kessler's *The FBI: Inside the World's Most Powerful Law Enforcement Agency*, published by Pocket Books. ("FBI Probing Soviet Spy Effort, Book Says," *WP*, 8/18/93; "New Book Says the F.B.I. Waged Espionage War With the K.G.B.," *NYT*, 8/18/93.)

Russian Security Ministry denies *Der Stern* and *Focus* reports it gave the FRG government archival documents on GDR espionage activities. (Itar-Tass, 7/14/93, and *Izvestiya*, 7/15/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-134 (7/15/93), 7-8; also Itar-Tass, 7/16/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-135 (7/16/93), 6.)

Publications: Col. Oleg Maximovich Nechiporenka, trans. by Todd Bludeau, *Passport to Assassination: The Never-Before-Told Story of Lee Harvey Oswald by the KGB Colonel Who Knew Him* (New York: Birch Lane Press, 1993); Victor Sheymov, *Tower of Secrets: A Real Life Spy Thriller* (Naval Institute Press, 1993); John Costello and Oleg Tsarev, *Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin's Master Spy* (New York: Crown, 1993).

Archives Developments

Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, ed., Vladimir Petrovich Kozlov, forward, *Archives in Russia 1993: A Brief Directory*; price US \$35 individuals, \$75 institutions plus postage (\$5 domestic, \$10), IREX, 1616 H St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20006, tel: (202) 628-8188/fax: (202) 628-8189; e-mail. Order payable to IREX, attn. Ann E. Robertson.

Report on opening of Russian-American exhibition, "Making Things Work: Russian-American Economic Relations, 1900-1930," co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution and Russian State Archives Service (Rosarkhiv). ("Russian archives exhibit, 'Making Things Work,' opens at Hoover," *Hoover Newsletter* (Spring 1993), 5, 9.)

Agreement reached in Minsk by envoys of Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine on devolution of state archives to former USSR republics. (Itar-Tass, 6/5/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-111, 6/9/92, 10.)

Military historian Dmitri Volkogonov gives impressions of CPSU and KGB archives. (*Krasnaya Zvezda*, 6/12/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-116, 6/16/92, 37-39.)

Leading U.S. expert on Russian archives reviews recent developments. (Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *Russian Archives in Transition: Caught between Political Crossfire and Economic Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: International Research & Exchanges Board, Feb. 1993); available for \$3.00 from IREX, attn. Ann Robertson, 1616 H St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006; see also Grimsted, "New Laws on Russian Archives," *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (Nov. 1992), 5-6.)

For another report on the archives situation in Moscow, containing material through August 1992, see William Karasik, *The post-Soviet archives: organization, access, declassification* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993).

Historian assesses obstacles to archival openness in Russia, calls for "a revolution in archivists' mentality." (Arkady Shershnyia, "Who will break the seventh seal?" *New Times International* 29 (July 1992), 30-31.)

Text of Russian government mandating equal access to archives for Russian and foreign citizens and organizations; a 30-year rule for most documents; and a 75-year restriction (except for person concerned or next of kin) on documents containing "information on the private lives of citizens." List of Russian archives (with new names) appended. (R.I. Khasbulatov, Decree No. 161, 7/14/92, citing Russian Federation Su-

preme Soviet directive, "On the Provisional Order for Access to Archival Documents and their Use," 6/19/92, *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (Nov. 1992), 6-7.)

Text of Yeltsin decree number 658 dated 23 June 1992 to declassify government records documenting repressions and infringements of human rights. (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 6/27/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-131, 7/8/92.)

Russian presidential representatives present "special files" to Constitutional Court to support ban on Communist Party. (Itar-Tass, 7/3/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-133-S, 7/10/92.) Special files said to reveal party's "criminal nature." (*Izvestia*, 7/14/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-138-S, 7/17/92, 21.) Prosecutor discloses CPSU document on party archives storage procedure, signed by party central committee deputy general secretary V. Ivashko on 29 March 1991, indicating that "25 million cases from the CPSU archives have been done away with to save the party's face." (Interfax, 7/13/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-138-S, 7/17/92, 12.) Russian presidential representative S. Shakray alleges destruction took place immediate after failure of August 1991 coup. (Moscow Russian Television Network report, 7/21/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-148-S, 7/31/92, 4.)

Critical analysis of Russian government's politically-motivated selective declassification of historical archives to discredit Communist Party, Gorbachev. (Vera Tolz and Julia Wishnevsky, "The Russian Government Declassifies CPSU Documents," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:26 (6/26/92), 8-11.) Use of presidential archives in trial of CPSU discussed; contents of March 1985 Politburo meeting at which Gorbachev elected cited. (David Remnick, "Report from Moscow: The Trial of the Old Regime," *The New Yorker*, 11/30/92, 104-21.)

Selective use of KGB archives against political enemies assailed. (Leonid Mlechin, "Archive dust," *New Times International* 24 (1991), 10-11.)

Neizvestnaya Rossiya-20 Vek [The Unknown Russia—The 20th Century], containing documents from CPSU, KGB, and Kremlin archives, published by Moscow Archives Association in association with Historic Heritage publishers. (Moscow Mayak Radio, 8/25/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-167, 8/27/92.)

Developments concerning effort by Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace to microfilm Soviet archives and finding aids. ("Roskomarkhiv-Hoover Project," *AAASS Newsletter* 32:5 (Nov. 1992), 8; "Roskomarkhiv, Hoover Continue Work on Joint Microfilm Project," *Hoover Institution Newsletter*, Fall 1992, 12.)

Report on developments concerning KGB and Presidential archives. (Ella Maksimov, "The Rights of Victims and Rights of History Are Clashing as KGB Archives Are Being Opened," *Izvestia*, 11/27/92, in FBIS-USR-92-157, 12/9/92, 1-2.)

Interview with senior Russian archives official V. Kozlov on agreement with Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace to microfilm CPSU archives, beginning with inventory of Central Committee information service. ("Secrets for General Consumption," *Pravda*, 10/22/92, in FBIS-USR-92-150, 11/23/92, 50.)

Russian state military archives reportedly declassify documents from years 1918-1960, including materials from the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD secret police, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. (Moscow Mayak Radio Network, 11/8/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-217, 11/9/92, 33.)

Russian Defense Ministry announces that it declassified more than 500 documents in 1992 on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fate of U.S. personnel shot down over the Soviet Union, and other Cold War issues. (Interfax, 1/10/93, and "Defense Ministry Declassifies Its Shadowy Operations," *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 1/10/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-006, 1/11/93, 19; "Secrecy Seal Lifted," *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 1/27/93, in FBIS-USR-93-014, 2/5/93, 5.) Defense Ministry also vows to declassify files on Soviet role in the Korean War. (Itar-Tass, 1/10/93, cited in AP dispatch, "Moscow to Reveal Korea War Role," *International Herald-Tribune*, 1/12/93.)

Documents beginning to emerge from Presidential or Kremlin archives, including originals of secret protocols to 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. (Lev Bezmensky, "Greatest secret of the Party Secretaries," *New Times International* 46 (Nov. 1992), 25-27; also *Novosti*, 10/29/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 211 (11/2/92), 1; O. Latsis, "Original Protocols to Shameful Pact," *Izvestia*, 10/30/92, in CDSP 44:44, (12/2/92), 22, cites reports on Ostankino television and ABC network and complains that foreign media received access before Russians.)

Analysis of newly released documents from Russian archives on Soviet massacre of Polish officers in 1940; release seen in context of trial of CPSU and Yeltsin-Gorbachev rivalry. (Vera Tolz, "The Katyn Documents and the CPSU Hearings," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:44 (11/6/92), 27-33; also *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:43 (10/30/92), 71.) More on Katyn documents, including translation of March 1940 Beria memorandum requesting Stalin's approval for shooting of 25,700 Polish captives. (Louisa Vinton, "The Katyn Documents: Politics and History," *RFE/*

RL Research Report 2:4 (1/22/93), 19-31; see also "The Decision to Execute was Taken in the CC [Central Committee]," *MN* 43 (10/25/92), and "The Special File Discloses the Mysteries of the Politburo," *Izvestia*, 11/19/92.) Account of intrigues concerning discovery and release of Katyn documents. (Lev Yelin, "Three men in the Kremlin and a package," *New Times International* 44 (Oct. 1992), 30-32; also interview with Lech Walesa, "The Katyn cross on communism's tomb," *New Times International* 45 (Nov. 1992), 26-27.)

Russian and French diplomats sign agreement "On Cooperation in the Field of State Archives." ("New Agreements Signed in Paris," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 11/13/92, in CDSP 44:46 (12/16/92), 19.)

Senior Russian archives official views current situation. (V. Kozlov, "On the Use of the Documents from Russian Archives," *New and Newest History* 6 (1993).)

Reports on the Russian archival situation: Juergen Zarusky, "Bemerkungen zur Russischen Archivsituation" (Observations on the Russian Archival Situation), *VfZ* 1 (Jan. 1993), 139-47; Goetz Aly and Susanne Heim, "Die deutschen Bestaende des Sonderarchivs der Russischen Archivverwaltung" from the Hans-Boeckler-Stiftung, Bertha-von-Suttner Platz 3, 4000 Duesseldorf 1, Germany; and Kai von Jena and Wilhelm Lenz, "Die deutschen Bestaende im Sonderarchiv in Moskau," *Der Archivar* 45 (1992), 458-68.

First issue of *Istorichesky arkhiv* (Archive History), published by Russian Government's Committee on Archival Affairs and the LIT publishing house, contains documents from former CPSU on Latvian succession and the August 1991 putsch. (See *Izvestia*, 1/26/93, 6, in CDSP 45:4, (2/24/93), 35.) Second issue includes Soviet documents on October 1964 CPSU CC plenum meeting at which Khrushchev was deposed; crushing of 1962 workers' revolt in Novocherkassk; repatriation of Japanese POWs after World War II; and church-state relations in 1984. (*Istoricheskii Arkhiv*, Issue I, 1993.) Supplement lists and describes more than 1,000 declassified documents released for trial of CPSU. (*Arkhivno-informatsionnyi byulleten'*, Issue 1-2, 1993.)

New findings from Russian archives presented at Moscow Conference on New Evidence on Cold War History, sponsored by Cold War International History Project. ("Soviets Sought Vietnam Peace," AP dispatch in *Moscow Times*, 1/14/93; "Stalin Tied To Korean Invasion," AP dispatch in *Moscow Times*, 1/15/93; Daniel Sneider, "Archives Revise Cold-War History," *Christian Science Monitor*, 1/20/93; John-Thor Dahlburg,

"Sifting for Soviet Clues to Cold War," *Los Angeles Times*, 1/24/93; Serge Schmemmann, "Soviet Archives Provide Missing Pieces of History's Puzzles," *NYT*, 2/8/93, A8; Gerhard Wettig, "Beitraege zur Geschichte des Kalten Krieges auf der Basis sowjetischer Geheimdokumente" (Contributions to the History of the Cold War Based on Secret Soviet Documents), *DA* 3 (March 1993), 350-52.)

International conference in Moscow on the "KGB: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" adopts resolution demanding parliamentary control over Ministry of Security and declassification of archives. (*Nevskoye Vremya*, 2/25/93, 3, and 2/26/93, 4, in FBIS-USR-93-049, 4/21/93, 1-4.)

Current status of KGB archives discussed in interview with Anatoliy Krayushkin, chief of archives administration of Russian Ministry of Security. ("What Is in the KGB Archives?" *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 3/6/93, in FBIS-USR-93-035, 3/20/93, 1-2.)

New organization founded to support diplomatic archives. (Igor V. Bukharkin, "International Association: 'Diplomatic Archives,'" *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, March 1993, 67-68.)

In wake of controversy over disclosure of disputed 1972 Soviet intelligence report alleging that North Vietnam held hundreds more U.S. POWs than it then admitted, Russian authorities remove Rem A. Ussikov from post as head of the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation, repository of CPSU Central Committee records for 1952-1991, and replace him with Anatoly Prokopenko, formerly head of "Special Archives" containing captured from Germany in World War II. (Celestine Bohlen, "A Russian Assessment," *NYT*, 4/22/93, A3; Alexander Merkushev, "Russian archivist sacked over leaked POW report," AP dispatch in *Washington Times*, 4/23/93; also see POW-MIA section of Update.) Interviews with Prokopenko. ("The end of the special archive," *New Times International* 49 (1990), 21; "Good-bye to the 'special' archives," *New Times International* 11 (1991), 46-47.)

Nationalist press criticizes presence of foreign researchers in Russian archives, Roskomarkhiv agreement with Hoover Institution. ("When They Occupy the Country, They Export Its Archives. In Secret from the People, the Yeltsinites Are Selling the Archive of the USSR," *Den* 14 (11-17 April 1993), 1, in FBIS-USR-93-053, 4/28/93, 67; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 4/22/93, 5, in FBIS-SOV-93-077, 4/23/

93, 13-14.) Group advertises services to locate and copy "any" Russian archival documents: Arkhivarius Agency, 18 Herzen St., Vladimir, 600000, Russia; fax: 09222/30899 (abonent 171). Another

sian Press Service Agency.

Discussion of "Research, Ethics, and the Marketplace: The Case of the Russian Archives," including contributions by Ellen Mickiewicz ("The Commercialization of Scholarship"), Mark von Hagen ("The Archival Gold Rush"), and J. Arch Getty ("Commercialization of Scholarship: Do We Need a Code of Behavior?"): *Slavic Review* 52:1 (Spring 1993), 87-106.

Handover of KGB files to state archives going extremely slowly, scholar Arseniy Roginskiy tells conference. (Itar-Tass, 5/29/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-104 (6/2/93), 39.) Documents disclosing identities of KGB informants likely to remain closed. (*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 6/18/93, 1, in FBIS-USR-93-082 (7/1/93), 2-3.)

Russian press archive established. (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 6/30/93, in FBIS-USR-93-088 (7/14/93), 43.)

Kiril Anderson, head of former Central Party archives, hails new archives law passed by parliament. (Anya Vakhrusheva, "Archive Law Opens Doors on the Past," *Moscow Times*, 7/16/93, 3.)

State secrecy law passed, criticized. (*Novaya Tezhednevnyaya Gazeta*, 7/23/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-141 (7/26/93), 26-27; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 7/23/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-142 (7/27/93), 42-43.)

Russian parliament extends restrictions on access to external intelligence archives, to 50 years from 30. (Itar-Tass, 7/23/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-140 (7/23/93), 36.)

Summary of holdings and research conditions at major Soviet military archive. (E. Kogan, "The Russian Military Records from Podol'sk," scheduled to appear in *Journal of Soviet Military Studies* 6:4 (December 1993).)

Armenia

Dashnaksutyun party newspaper cites KGB documents to assail president Levon Petrosian, who denied working for the security agency. (*New Times International* 30 (July 1992), 10-11.)

Parliament debates opening state KGB archives; opposition proposal to create commission to study files rejected. (Itar-Tass, 7/24/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-144, 7/27/92, 64.)

CWIHP BULLETIN

Back issues of the CWIHP Bulletin are available upon request. Contents of the first two issues included:

Issue #1 (Spring 1992) — 32 pages

- * **James G. Hershberg**, "Soviet Archives: The Opening Door"
- * **P.J. Simmons**, "report From Eastern Europe"
- * **Raymond L. Garthoff**, "The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis"
- * **Steven M. Goldstein and He Di**, "New Chinese Sources on the History of the Cold War"
- * **Scott Parrish**, "A Diplomat Reports [review of N.V. Novikov's memoirs]"

* **Woodford McClellan**, "Molotov Remembers"

* **Rachel A. Connell**, "New Evidence on Beria's Downfall"

* **Update**

* **Documentation:** CIA Openness Task Force Report

Issue #2 (Fall 1992) — 40 pages

* **Csaba Bekes**, "New Findings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution"

* **Mark Kramer**, "New Sources on the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia" (first of two parts)

* Federal Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany, "Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations From the East German Archives" (trans. and annotation by **Mark Kramer**)

* **Hope M. Harrison**, "Inside the SED Archives: A Researcher's Diary"

* **William Burr**, "New Sources on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962"

* **Axel Frohn**, "Archives from the New German Lander" (reprinted from German History Institute *Bulletin*; annotation by Stephen Connors)

* **Documentation**

— "In Re: Alger Hiss"

— FRUS [Foreign Relations of the United States] Publication Schedule

— "A Letter to Brezhnev: The Czech Hardliners' 'Request' for Soviet Intervention, August 1968" (trans. and commentary by Mark Kramer)

* **Update**

service solicits requests for its "archives service" to gather information on Russian and Soviet history, organizations, events, and people: 103782, Moscow, Maly Putinkovsky Pereulok 1/2, Rus-

Belarus

Belarus KGB opens special archives to staff archivists from republican Council of Ministers; 40,000 volumes expected to be transferred. (Itar-Tass, 7/13/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-136, 7/15/92, 55.)

Belarus KGB chief Eduard Shirkovskiy opposes release of six-volume file on Lee Harvey Oswald unless declassified by parliament; says reports show that Oswald, who joined hunting and fishing club while briefly residing in Minsk after defecting to USSR, was "not a particularly good marksman" and denies any KGB role in assassination of Kennedy. (Interfax and Itar-Tass reports, 8/4/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-151 (8/5/92), 68.)

Baltic States

KGB document allegedly shows KGB influence over Stockholm-based Baltic Institute, which denies report. (Stockholm Radio, 5/24/93, in *Baltic Independent* (Tallinn), 5/28/93, in FBIS-USR-93-090 (7/19/93), 86-87.)

Estonia

Report on status of Estonian KGB and Interior Ministry archives, transfer to state archives. (*Paevaleht* (Tallinn), 6/3/93, in FBIS-USR-93-078 (6/23/93), 102-03.)

Estonian archives used in new account of resistance movement following Soviet occupation. (Mart Laar, trans. Tiina Ets, *War in the Woods: Estonia's struggle for survival, 1944-1956* (Washington, D.C.: Compass).

Latvia

Analysis of why files of Latvian KGB have not yet led to investigations; notes journal *Pilsonis* has begun publishing KGB staff employee lists. (Dainis Lemsonoks, "KGB Employees: In *Pilsonis* or In 'Bags,'" *Saime* (Riga), 7/12/92, in FBIS-USR-92-133, 10/19/92, 107-108.)

Latvian State Archives obtain 40,000 case files from former USSR KGB archives. (Riga Radio, 8/24/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-166, 8/26/92, 57.)

Contents of Latvia KGB archives to be disclosed after review by Center for Documenting the Consequences of Totalitarianism. (*Diyena* (Riga), 5/20/93, in FBIS-USR-93-074 (6/16/93), 94-95.)

Lithuania

Documents shed light on January 1991 crackdown in Vilnius, disclosing links to subsequent Moscow putsch. (Leonid Mlechin, "Vilnius de-

cides Gorbachev's lot," *New Times International* 5 (1992), 9-11.)

Interview with head of commission investigating KGB archives in Lithuania, Balys Gajauskas. (Alexander Chudodeyev, "A Pandora's box from KGB," *New Times International* 49 (1991), 14-17.) First 2,400 boxes of Soviet KGB archives reach Vilnius under Russian agreement to hand over relevant records. (*Lithuanian Weekly* (Vilnius), 26 June-2 July 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-152-A, 8/6/92, 14.) Western agencies report initial transfer of 50,000 KGB files on Lithuanians exiled to Siberia. (*RFE/RL Research Report* 1:28 (7/10/92), 78.) Negotiations with Russia to obtain return of KGB files concerning Lithuania continuing. (Baltfax (Moscow), 9/17/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-182, 9/18/92; *RFE/RL Daily Report* 180, 9/18/92, 5; *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:40 (10/9/92), 67.) Newly elected premier Algirdas Brazauskas says he was speaking figuratively when he proposed burning KGB archives, decries hunt for former agents. (Radio Vilnius, 10/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-210, 10/29/92, 72-74.) Lithuanian archives director Gediminas Ilgunas interviewed, discussed status of KGB archives. (*Tiesa* (Vilnius), 4/8/93, in FBIS-USR-93-074 (6/16/93), 99-100.)

Kazakhstan

Law on state secrets, implementing decree published. (*Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 2/26/93, in FBIS-USR-93-107 (8/18/93), 91-95.)

Ukraine

Political upheavals, opening of archives leading to reinterpretation of Ukraine's past, including Stalinist repressions; articles cited from *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, the journal of the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. (David R. Marples, "New Interpretations of Ukrainian History," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2:11 (3/12/93), 57-61.)

Uzbekistan

Law on state secrets, implementing decree published. (*Tashkentskaya Pravda*, 5/18/93, in FBIS-USR-93-092 (7/21/93), 92-94.)

Bulgaria

Ministry of Internal Affairs announces documents found in its archives show past Bulgarian support for international terrorism. (BTA report, 6/10/92, quoted in *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:26 (6/26/92), 77.)

Government vows archives of Bulgarian Communist Party for period 1891-1975 will be made available to the public beginning in early 1993.

(*RFE/RL Daily Report* 161 (8/24/92), 5; *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:35 (9/4/92), 70.)

Czech Republic

Secret police (StB) files once listed Vaclav Havel as a potential collaborator but switched him to category of "persons hostile to regime," president discloses in 24 May 1992 radio address. (*RFE/RL Research Report* 1:23 (6/5/92), 70-71.)

Josef Smrkovsky, one of Prague Spring's leaders, recalls Soviet invasion, summit with Soviet leaders. ("Prague August," *New Times International* 34 (1991), 22-27.)

English Translation of Polish minutes of 24-26 August 1968 meeting in Moscow of Soviet, Bulgarian, GDR, Polish, and Hungarian leaders concerning Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, as published in *Lidove noviny*. ("Murder will out," *New Times International* 8 (1991), 22-26, and 9 (1991), 28-31.)

Russian government gives Czech government Communist Party documents pertaining to August 1968 Soviet invasion to crush the Prague Spring. (Itar-Tass, 7/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-147, 7/30/92, 11; Jan Obrman, "Moscow Reveals Documents on 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:37 (9/18/92), 16-19.)

Czech Army chief of general staff Brig. Gen. Jiri Nekvasil apologizes for Czechoslovak People's Army's suppression of August 1969 protests on first anniversary of the Soviet invasion, discloses details of casualties inflicted and forces used, and announces declassification of secret Army documents on events. (Prague CTK, 8/19/93, in FBIS-EEU-93-160 (8/20/93), 13-14.)

Survey of post-communist Czech historiography. (Jan Kren, "Czech History at a Turning Point," *East European Politics and Societies* 6:2 (Spring 1992), 152-69.)

Hungarian prosecutors agree to comply with Czech request to identify and question state and party leaders on Hungary's role in 1968 suppression of Prague Spring. (*Nepzabadsaq*, 8/21/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 161 (8/24/92), 6, and *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:35 (9/4/92), 69.)

Publication: *Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek* (New York: Kodansha, 1993).

Germany

Swedish document indicates Stalin discussed post-World War II division of Germany as early as December 1941. (Marat Zubko, "Stalin's plan for

a divided Germany," *New Times International* 44 (1990), 35.)

Socialist Unity Party (SED) archives disclose new data on Stalin's policies and plans for post-war Germany. (R.C. Raack, "Stalin Plans his Post-War Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28 (1993), 53-73.)

Hans-Uwe Feige describes the problems faced by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany in "Aspekte der Hochschulpolitik der Sowjetischen Militaeradministration in Deutschland (1945-1948)" (Aspects of the SMAD's German High School Policy from 1945-48), *DA* 11 (Nov. 1992), 1169-80.

Using Soviet archives, Jan Foitzik analyzes the speech of Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zdanov at the September 1947 founding conference of the Cominform; text appended. (*ZfG*, 4 (1993), 329ff.) Foitzik traces the development of the Cominform in "Die Bildung des Kominform-Bueros 1947 im Lichte neuer Quellen" (The Formation of the Kominform Office in 1947 in the Light of New Sources), *ZfG* 12 (Dec. 1992), 1109ff. For a comparison of Stalin's purges of the Eastern European Communist Parties, see Foitzik's "Die stalinistischen 'Saeuberungen' in den ostmitteleuropaeischen kommunistischen Parteien. Ein vergleichender Ueberblick," *ZfG* 8 (Aug. 1992), 737ff.

Developments within the GDR during June 1953 revolt analyzed in Udo Wengst, "Der Aufstand am 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR. Aus den Stimmungsberichten der Kreis- und Bezirksverbaende der Ost-CDU im Juni und Juli 1953," [The Uprising of June 17, 1953 in the GDR. From Internal Reports by the East German Christian Democratic Party (Ost-CDU) in June and July 1953], *VfZ* 2 (April 1993), 277-322.)

Discussion of materials found in the Gesellschaft fuer Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft (DSF) (Society for German-Soviet Friendship) archive. (Lothar Dralle, "Das DSF-Archiv als Quelle zur Geschichte der DDR—Der Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953" [The DSF Archive as a Source for the History of East Germany—The People's Rebellion of June 17, 1953], *DA* 8 (Aug. 1992), 837-45.)

Gerhard Wettig raises new questions about Soviet intentions regarding Germany immediately after Stalin's death in "Sowjetische Wiedervereinigungsbemuehungen im ausgehenden Fruehjahr 1953? Neue Aufschluesse ueber ein altes Problem" (Soviet Reunification Efforts in the Spring of 1953. New Disclosures on an Old Problem), *DA* 9 (Sept. 1992), 943-58; see also Berlin historian Elke Scherstjanoi's rebuttal of Wettig's "The Stalin

Note of March 10, 1952 as an Historical Problem" (*DA* 2, Feb. 1992), in *DA* 8 (Aug. 1992), 858-65.

Two analyses of recent evidence on Soviet policy toward Germany shortly before and after Stalin's death. (Gerhard Wettig, "Zum Stand der Forschung ueber Berijas Duetschland-Politik im Fruehjahr 1953," *DA* 26:6 (June 1993), 674-82; Wettig, "Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. Maerz 1952 auf der Basis diplomatischer Akten des russischen Aussenministeriums," *DA* 26:7 (July 1993), 786-805.)

SED ideological propaganda efforts to stigmatize the FRG from 1960-63 as a "Nazi state" revealed. (Michael Lemke, "Kampagnen gegen Bonn. Die Systemkrise der DDR und die West-Propaganda der SED 1960-63" [Propaganda Campaign Against Bonn. Political Crisis and Inner German Propaganda in the GDR 1960-1963], *VfZ* 2 (April 1993), 153-74.)

Peace plan proposal printed in the *Abendpost und Milwaukee Deutsche Zeitung* (*Evening News and Milwaukee German Magazine*) from 12 February 1959 recently found in the Central Party Archive of the Institute for the History of the Workers' Movement in Berlin. (Ernst Laboor, "Ein vergessener Friedensvertragsentwurf fuer Deutschland 1959" (A Forgotten Peace Plan Proposal for Germany in 1959), *ZfG* 3 (March 1993), 233-38.)

Stasi secret police records reveal East German role in conducting anti-Semitic campaign in West Germany in early '60s to discredit Bonn; files also document East German aid to Arab states against Israel. (Marc Fischer, "E. Germany Ran Antisemite Campaign in West in '60s," *WP*, 2/28/93, A25.)

Report on Stasi efforts to recruit Catholic priests and infiltrate lay organizations in former GDR ("Pornos fuer Kolping" (a German Catholic lay organization), *Der Spiegel*, 4/5/93, 76ff.)

Recently released SED, Stasi, and church archival documents show that evangelical priest Oskar Bruesewitz immolated himself in 1976 because of doubts about the SED regime and his own Church, not because he was an outcast and disturbed, as the government and church leaders claimed. ("Ich opfere mich" (I offer myself), *Der Spiegel*, 3/22/93, 94ff. See also *Das Fanal: Das Opfer des Pfarrers Bruesewitz und die evangelische Kirche* (*The Signal Light: The Sacrifice of Pastor Bruesewitz and the Evangelical Church*) (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1993).)

East German military records indicate greater preparations than expected for Warsaw Pact attack, seizure of West Germany, West Berlin,

from 1960s-1980s. (Marc Fisher, "Soviet Bloc Had Detailed Plan to Invade W. Germany," *WP*, 3/16/93, A11-12.)

East German Gen. Harry Schutt recounts activities as senior official of Stasi for more than three decades. (John Marks, "The Spymaster Unmasked," *U.S. News & World Report* 114:14 (4/12/93), 38-46.)

Reports on opening of Stasi files. (Nikita Zholkver, "Big ear of a big friend," *New Times International* 9 (1991), 38-39; Dmitry Pogorzelsky, "Six million mines," *New Times International* 49 (1991), 17.)

Investigative group (13th of August Society), using East German police files, disclose more than 200 additional cases of persons killed trying to flee the GDR. ("Searching for Truth by the Wall," *WP*, 8/13/93, A29.)

Interview with Moscow's ex-envoy to GDR, Wjatschelw Kotschemassow, in "Schmeichelei und Unterwuerfigkeit," (Cajolery and Subservience), *Der Spiegel*, 11/16/92, 148ff.

Background on joint SED-SPD paper "Der Streit der Ideologien und die gemeinsame Sicherheit" (Ideological Struggle and Common Security), published in 1987 ("Riskanter Dialog. Das gemeinsame Ideologie-Papier von SPD und SED," [Risky Dialogue. The Common Ideological Paper of the SPD and the SED], *DA* 10 (Oct. 1992), 1031-39.)

Daniel Kuechenmeister uses SED archival material, including notes of meetings and telephone calls, to examine Honecker-Gorbachev relationship; book to be published by Berlin's Dietz Verlag in 1993. ("Wann begann das Zerwuerfnis zwischen Honecker und Gorbatschow?" (When Did the Differences of Opinion between Honecker and Gorbachev Begin?), *DA* 1 (Jan. 1993), 30-40.)

How ex-Stasi officers swindled 200 million Marks out of GDR coffers while the Berlin Wall was tumbling ["Die Stasi laesst keinen verkommen," (The Stasi Leaves no one in Ruins), *Der Spiegel*, 3/1/93, 106.]

SED Central Committee files provide insight into GDR communist leadership on the eve of 1989 revolution. (Gerd-Ruediger Stephan, "Die letzten Tagungen des Zentralkomitees der SED 1988/89" (The Last Meetings of the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee 1988/89), *DA* #3 (March 1993), 296-325.)

Transcript of a conversation between two ex-East German Politburo members concerning economic and political situation in GDR's final

months. ("Das reale Bild war eben katastrophal!" (The Real Picture was Catastrophic!), *DA* 10 (Oct. 1992), 1031-39.)

Report on the 18 September 1992 conference sponsored by the Berlin Historical Commission: "DDR Akten und Quellenkritik" (The GDR Files and the Critique of Sources), *DA* 11 (Nov. 1992), 1202-03.

Previously secret East German dissertations available. (Wilhelm Bleek and Lothar Mertens, "Verborgene Quellen in der Humboldt-Universitaet" (Concealed Sources at Humboldt University), *DA* 11 Nov. 1992, 1181-90.)

Publications: Gerhard Lange, *Katholische Kirche—Sozialistischer Staat DDR, Dokumente, und oeffentliche Aeusserungen 1945-1990*. (The Catholic Church: The East German Socialist State, Documents, and Public Statements from 1945-1990), (Leipzig: St. Benno, 1992). Craig R. Whitney, *Spy Trader: Germany's Devil's Advocate and the Darkest Secrets of the Cold War* (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1993); Gerd Meyer, *Die DDR—Machtelite in der Aera Honecker*. (*East Germany—Power Elites in the Era of Honecker*) (Tuebingen: A. Francke Verlag, 1991). Wolfgang Rueddenklau, *Stoerenfried. DDR-Opposition 1986-89 (Mischief-makers. GDR Opposition 1986-89)* (Berlin: BasisDruck Verlag, 1992). Jochen Cerny, *Wer War Wer—DDR. Ein biographisches Lexikon*. (Who Was Who in the GDR. A Biographical Lexicon), (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1992.) Books on the Stasi Foundation Law: Klaus-Dietmar Henke, ed., *Wann bricht schon mal ein Staat zusammen! dtv dokumente: Die Debatte uber die Stasi-Akten auf dem 39. Jistorikertag 1992* (Munich: DTV, 1993). Klaus Stoltenberg *Stasi-Unterlagen-Gesetz. Kommentar*. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992) and Johannes Weberling *Stasi-Unterlagen Gesetz. Kommentar* (Koeln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1993.)

Hungary

Yugoslavia gives Hungary documents related to the 1956 events in Hungary, in particular the fate of officials who took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest after the Soviet invasion. (MTI report, 10/29/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Report* 210 (10/30/92), 6.)

Several documents of the former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party were to be made available to the public beginning on 1 September 1992 when law passed by parliament the previous December goes into effect; those seeking to use archival materials less than 30 years old must apply to the Ministry of Education and Culture. (Radio Budapest, 8/28/92, in *RFE/RL Daily Re-*

port 167 (9/1/92), 5; *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:36 (9/11/92), 77.)

Yeltsin turns over Soviet documents on 1956 invasion, declaring that "citizens of Hungary and Russia, too, must know the whole truth about that tragic time." ("Yeltsin Gives Hungary Soviet Files on Revolt," *NYT*, 11/12/92.) Documents still leave significant gaps in understanding Soviet decision to invade, Hungarian scholars say. ("Russian Papers Shed Little Light on Hungary," *NYT*, 3/25/93, A15.)

Dilemmas of dealing with Hungary's communist past reviewed; destruction of files of intelligence unit which monitored dissidents (3/3 department) cited as objection to screening past members from government posts. (Edith Oltay, "Hungary Attempts to Deal With Its Past," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2:18 (4/30/93), 6-10.)

Poland

Poland hands over documents to Russia on Soviet-Polish 1919-20 war as part of archival exchange. (Viktor Zamyatin, "Polish Archivists Take Reciprocal Step: Poland Hands Over Archives to Russia," *Kommersant-Daily*, 11/6/92, in FBIS-USR-92-155, 12/4/92, 101; N. Yermolovich, "Archival Documents Delivered by the Polish Disappoint," *Izvestia*, 12/28/92, 7.)

Profile of Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, who defected with intelligence data to U.S. in 1981 and is now subject of controversy in his homeland. (Benjamin Weiser, "A Question of Loyalty," *WPM Magazine*, 12/13/92, 8-13, 24-30.)

Manfred Wilke and Michael Kubina discuss the SED-Politburo's reaction to the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980-81; Honecker to Brezhnev letter of November 1980 appealing for intervention included. ("Die Lage in Polen ist schlimmer als 1968 in der CSSR" (The Situation in Poland is worse than 1968 in Czechoslovakia), *DA* 3 (March 1993), 335-40.) See also Manfred Wilke, Peter Erler, Martin Goerner, Michael Kubina, Horst Laude, and Han-Peter Mueller *SED-Politbuero und polnische Krise 1980-82. Aus den Protokollen des Politbueros des ZK der SED zu Polen, den innerdeutschen Beziehungen und der Wirtschaftskrise der DDR*. (*The SED Politburo and the Polish Crisis of 1980-82. From the Protocols of the Central Committee of the SED Politburo on Poland, inner-German Relations, and the Economic Crises of the GDR*), Band 1: 1980. (Berlin, 1993). (Arbeitspapiere des Forschungsverbundes SED Staat Nr. 3, 1993.)

Contradicting assertions he declared martial law on 13 December 1981 to save the country from a Soviet invasion, Soviet documents given to Poland indicate that Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski asked

Moscow for military support should he be unable to quell opposition to the measure; V.K. Rusakov is quoted as telling a 10 December 1981 Soviet Politburo meeting that Jaruzelski had said "that if the Polish forces do not manage to contain the Solidarity resistance, then the Polish comrades hope for the help of other countries in introducing their armed forces into Polish territory." KGB head Yuri Andropov reportedly responded that "there can be no introduction of armies into Poland," and other Politburo members agreed. (*Rzeczpospolita*, 8/26/93, in Warsaw PAP, 8/26/93, in FBIS-EEU-93-165 (8/27/93), 25; see also "Yeltsin Seems to Accept Polish Bid for Role in NATO," *NYT*, 8/26/93.) Ex-KGB general Vitaliy Pavlov, former head of Soviet intelligence in Warsaw, defends Jaruzelski from charges that he sought Soviet military aid in 1981 to enforce martial law. (Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network, 9/9/93, in FBIS-EEU-93-174 (9/10/93), 15.)

Romania

Battle raging over fate of secret police (Securitate) files; suspicion of cover-up by current government cited. (Dan Ionescu, "Romania's Public War over Secret Police Files," *RFE/RL Research Report* 1:29 (7/17/92), 9-15.)

Western agencies report discovery of mass grave containing 150 skeletons on grounds of former secret police force; remains reputedly those of peasant opponents of collectivization in 1950s. (*RFE/RL Daily Report* 174 (9/10/92), 5.)

North Korea

Participant recalls Soviet role in installation of Kim Il Sung. (Georgy Tumanov [pseudonym], "How the Great Leader was made," *New Times International* 17 (April 1993), 24-26.)

Responding to Kim Il sung's appeal, Stalin committed a Soviet military task force to aid North Korea in October 1950 following U.N. landing at Inchon, says Russian military historian Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov. (*Yonhap* (Seoul), 6/22/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-118 (6/22/93), 11-12.) Gavril Korotkov, senior fellow at Russian Defense Ministry's Institute for Military History, says Stalin provided at least US \$1.1 billion in weapons to Pyongyang between October 1950 and July 1953. (*Yonhap* (Seoul), 6/23/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-119 (6/23/93), 14; see also "Kim Il-sung, Stalin, Mao Agreed to Start Korean War," *Korea Newsreview*, 7/3/93, 6.)

Moscow's role in origins and conduct of Korean War explored; citing Defense Ministry archives, Korotkov says Stalin approved Kim Il-sung's invasion plans in March 1949. (Douglas Staglin and Peter Cary, "Secrets of the Korean War," *U.S. News & World Report*, 8/9/93, 45-47.)

People's Republic of China

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Account of PRC ties to Vietnamese communists during war against French, based on newly available Chinese sources. (Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-54," *China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993), 85-110.)

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Review of early U.S.-Communist Chinese contacts. (Chen Jian, "The Ward Case and the Emergence of Sino-American Confrontation, 1948-1950," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30 (July 1993), 149-70.)

Advance notices circulating for biography of Deng Xiaoping written by his daughter, Deng Rong. (Nicholas D. Kristof, "Life of Deng, By Daughter, Diverts China," *NYT*, 8/18/93.)

A new group, the Society for Scholars of Sino-U.S. Relations has been founded in Beijing; the group, associated with the Chinese Association for American Studies, announces plans to hold a symposium on the study of Sino-U.S. relations in China; for further information contact:

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China Exchange News: A Review of Education, Science, and Academic Relations with the PRC
Committee on Scholarly Communication with China
1055 Thomas Jefferson St., NW. Suite 2013
Washington, DC 20007

Publications: HUA Qingzhao, *From Yalta to Panmunjom: Truman's Diplomacy and the Four Powers, 1945-1953* (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993). William W. Moss, "Archives in the People's Republic of China: A Brief Introduction for American Scholars and Archivists" (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, June 1993).

Vietnam

See references in POW-MIA Inquiry section.

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POW-MIA Issues

Report on Soviet archives findings on Americans missing after April 1950 shoot-down of U.S. B-29. (Valery Rudnev, "50 Years After Tragedy Over Baltic," *Izvestia*, 8/29/92, in FBIS-SOV-92-173, 16-18.)

Several Americans held on Soviet soil after World War II were "summarily executed" on Stalin's orders, but none remain in Soviet custody, Yeltsin informs U.S. Senate panel. ("Yeltsin Aide Tells of G.I.'s Held in Wartime Camps," *NYT* 11/12/92; Thomas W. Lippman, "Stalin Executed Some Americans After WWII, Yeltsin Writes," *WP*, 11/12/92; A. Shalnev, "The Stalinist Regime Executed the Americans Without Due Process," *Izvestia*, 11/12/92, 4; text of Yeltsin's statement and other articles: Itar-Tass, 11/12/92, and *Izvestia*, 11/13/92, 4, in FBIS-SOV-92-220, 11/13/92, 18-19; also interviews with commission co-chair

Gen. Dmitri Volkogonov, *Izvestia*, 12/22/92, 3, in FBIS-SOV-92-246, 12/22/92, 16-17, and Moscow Ostankino television, 6/28/92, FBIS-SOV-92-125, 6/29/92, 14-16.) Russia provides additional archival documents on U.S. Air Force planes downed during Korean War. (Itar-Tass, 4/9/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-069, 4/13/93.)

Soviet downing of U.S. B-29 bomber in 1950 over Baltic Sea is recounted. (V. Rudnev, "In 50 Years After the Tragedy Over the Baltics," *Izvestia*, 8/28/92, 7.)

Citing declassified U.S. documents and interviews with ex-Soviet and U.S. officials, news organizations report that 138 U.S. military personnel were lost in spy missions over or near the Soviet Union during the Cold War. ("Special Report: Secrets of the Cold War," *US News & World Report* 114:10 (3/15/93), 30-56, and ABC "Prime Time Live," 3/4/93; "138 Reported Missing in U.S. Spy Flights," *WP*, 3/5/93.)

U.S.-Russian commission uncovers fresh details of Soviet downing of U.S. military aircraft on 2 September 1958; data on 11 missing personnel sought. (*Novaya Yezhednevnyaya Gazeta*, 7/23/93, in FBIS-USR-93-101 (8/6/93), 2-3.)

Russian-U.S. commission meets in Moscow, to continue work. (*Segodnya* (Moscow), 9/3/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-171 (9/7/93), 23.) Citing interviews and newly available Russian documents, U.S. tells Moscow it has evidence the USSR transferred "several hundred" U.S. POWs from the Korean War to Soviet territory. (AP dispatches in *NYT*, 9/27/93, 9/28/93, and *WP*, 9/27/93, citing State Department report, "The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union.")

North Vietnam held 1,205 U.S. prisoners of war in 1972, rather than the 368 publicly acknowledged, according to Russian translation of top secret Sept. 1972 report by Gen. Tran Van Quang to the North Vietnamese Politburo discovered in CPSU Central Committee archives in Moscow by Harvard-based researcher Stephen J. Morris. Critics, including Quang, dispute report, citing alleged errors in document. (*Izvestia*, 4/10/93; Celestine Bohlen, "Files Said to Show Hanoi Lied in '72 On Prisoner Totals," *NYT*, 4/12/93; "North Vietnam kept 700 POWs after war," *Washington Times*, 4/12/93; "U.S. to Press Hanoi to Explain '72 P.O.W." and, reprinting document, "Vietnam's 1972 Statement on P.O.W.'s: Triple the Total Hanoi Acknowledged," *NYT*, 4/13/93; Thomas W. Lippman, "Soviet Document Indicates POW Deception by Hanoi," *WP*, 4/13/93; Jim Mann, "U.S. Checks Out Report Hanoi Lied About POWs," *Los Angeles Times*, 4/13/93; Philip Shenon, "A '72 Report on P.O.W.'s Is a Fake, Vietnam Asserts," and Steven A. Holmes, "Pentagon Is Wary on P.O.W. Text; Families See

Proof of Lies," *NYT*, 4/14/93; Steven A. Holmes, "Debate Rises on Hanoi P.O.W. Report," *NYT*, 4/16/93; Anthony Flint, "Harvard researcher defends accuracy of POW report," *Boston Globe*, 4/16/93; Stephen Engelberg, "Old M.I.A. Theory Is Given a New Life," *NYT*, 20; "Who Was Left Behind?" *Time*, 4/26/93, 39; Philip Shenon, "Hanoi Offers Documents on P.O.W.'s," *NYT*, 4/19/93, A13; Philip Shenon, "Vietnam Report on Prisoners A Fake, Reputed Author Says," *NYT*, 4/20/93, 1; William Branigan, "U.S. General Questions Alleged POW Document," *WP*, 4/20/93, A15; text of communique from Vessey visit to Hanoi, press coverage, in FBIS-EAS-93-074, 4/20/93, 55-57; Steven A. Holmes, "Envoy Says P.O.W. Evidence Undermines Old Russian Report," and Celestine Bohlen, "A Russian Assessment," *NYT*, 4/22/93, A3; Thomas W. Lippman, "Vessey Faults Russian Paper On U.S. POWs," *WP*, 4/22/93; Alexander Merkushev, "Russian archivist sacked over leaked POW report," AP dispatch in *Washington Times*, 4/23/93; Thomas W. Lippman, "A Researcher's Dream Find on U.S. POWs Turns Into a Nightmare," *WP*, 4/25/93, A4; William Branigan, "Vietnam Offers File on POWs," *WP*, 4/26/93, A13; Beth Brophy, "The Search for Truth about POWs Goes On," *U.S. News & World Report*, 4/26/93, 16; Nayan Chanda, "Research and Destroy," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 156:18 (5/6/93), 20-21; George A. Carver Jr., "Vietnam—the Unfinished Business" and "Needed: Authentication Commission," *Wall Street Journal*, 5/20/93, 16; Neil Sheehan, "Letter from Vietnam: Prisoners of the Past," *The New Yorker*, 5/24/93, 44 ff. Thomas W. Lippman, "Vietnamese Defector Cited 500 Additional POWs," *WP*, 5/27/93, A43.)

Russian archives officials hand over additional Soviet documents on disputed 1972 report indicating that North Vietnam held more U.S. POWs than acknowledged. (Celestine Bohlen, "Russians Give U.S. More P.O.W. Documents," *NYT*, 9/5/93, 6. A document from Russian military intelligence (GRU) archives, given to U.S. members of Russian-American commission, says North Vietnam held 735 U.S. "aviator" POWs, in late 1970 rather than the 368 figure publicly acknowledged. (Adam Clymer, "Soviet File Feeds Debate on P.O.W.'s," *NYT*, 9/9/93; Thomas W. Lippman, "Document Indicates Hanoi Held Additional U.S. POWs," *WP*, 9/9/93.)

For Morris's account, see Stephen J. Morris, "The Vietnamese Know How to Count," *WP*, 4/18/93, C7; "Quangmire," *The New Republic* 208:22 (5/31/93), 18-19; "Ghosts in the Archives," *WP*, 9/12/93, C3; and "The '1205 Document': A Story of American Prisoners, Vietnamese Agents, Soviet Archives, Washington Bureaucrats, and the Media," *The National Interest* 33 (Fall 1993), 28-42.

Vietnam agrees to show 229 archive films of POWs to U.S. investigators. ("U.S. Given MIA

Materials," *WP*, 6/1/93; "Hanoi Provides MIA Documents," *WP*, 6/2/93.)

Cuba

Three-part interview with Army Minister Raul Castro in *El Sol de Mexico* includes assertion that Moscow warned Havana in early 1980s that it could not save Cuba from a U.S. invasion. ("Moscow Said No to Cuba," *WP*, 4/23/93, A19; *Izvestiya*, 4/27/93, in FBIS-SOV-93-080 (4/28/93), 17-18.)

Cuban Missile Crisis

Ex-Soviet diplomats recall events. (Oleg Troyanovski, "The Caribbean Crisis: A Viewpoint From the Kremlin," *International Affairs* 4-5 (Apr.-May 1992); Anatoly Dobrynin, "The Caribbean Crisis: An Eyewitness Account," *International Affairs* 8 (Aug. 1992), 47-60.)

Soviet military officials recall Cuban Missile Crisis. (G. Vassiliev, "The Hedgehog in the Pants of Americans," *MN* 42 (10/18/92), 13.) Excerpts from memoirs of Soviet general involved in deploying missiles to Cuba in 1962. (A.I. Gribkov, "The Caribbean Crisis" (part one), *Military-Historical Journal* 10 (1992), 41-46; Gribkov, "The Caribbean Crisis" (part two), *Military-Historical Journal* 12 (1992), 31-37.) More analysis and documents from Soviet side of Cuban crisis. (Y.G. Murin, V.A. Levedev, "The Caribbean Crisis," *Military-Historical Journal* 11 (1992), 33-52.)

Excerpts of meetings between Soviet envoy A. Mikoyan and Castro in Havana, 3-5 November 1962. "Dialogue in Havana: The Caribbean Crisis," *International Affairs* 10 (Oct. 1992), 108 ff.

Latest accounts by Soviet and Cuban officials suggest that the danger of nuclear war was much greater than imagined at the time. Bernd Greiner, "Russisches Roulette" (Russian Roulette), *Die Zeit* 45, (10/30/92), 104.

Publications: James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993); Gens. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994).

United States

Clinton issues directive ordering review of classification system. (Tim Weiner, "President Moves to Release Classified U.S. Documents," *NYT*, 5/5/93, A18; (Tom Blanton, "Canceling the Classifieds," *WP*, 6/6/93, C2.) Gary M. Stern, "President Clinton Calls for New Executive Order on Classification," *First Principles* 18:2 (July

1993). Excessive secrecy assailed. (Tim Weiner, "The Cold War Freezer Keeps Historians Out," *NYT Week-in-Review*, 5, 5/23/93.)

Draft presidential executive order calls for automatic declassification of virtually all U.S. records over 40 years old; critics seek shorter wait. (George Lardner, "Draft of Secrets Disclosure Order Draws Mixed Reviews," *WP*, 9/30/93; Neil A. Lewis, "New Proposal Would Automatically Limit Secrecy," and Steven Aftergood and Tom Blanton, "Secrets and More Secrets," *NYT*, 9/30/93.)

CIA director Woolsey vows to open agency historical records on key Cold War events. (CIA to Open Up Secrets, 'Warts and All,' Director Says," *WP*, 9/29/93, A6.)

Publications: Scott A. Koch, ed., *CIA Cold War Records: Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959* (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency).

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