

**Vanguards or Backstabbers?**  
**A Comparison of Coups in Brazil and Turkey**

Brendan Duke

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Professor Dosh

Brazil and Turkey, two countries on opposite sides of the world, without historic relationship, without common religion or culture, without particularly anything in common, both experienced military coups during the 1960's. The parallels between the two countries offer a series of lessons about civil-military relations. Both had been liberal democracies with constitutions, the rule of law, and free press. When a member of one party lost to another party, transition occurred peacefully. However, the militaries overthrew the democratically elected civilian governments, ostensibly to save democracy from itself. Despite these similarities, the Turkish military junta yielded to democracy with a year, while the first free Brazilian presidential elections did not occur for over twenty years. If both militaries supposedly intervened for the same reason, to "save" democracy, why such a difference in transition periods? First, I will compare why the transitions occurred. There are five main factors: crises of legitimacy, histories of military rule, military autonomy, military prestige, and military concern for development. The fundamental difference is that Turkish democracy was sure to collapse without intervention, while the Brazilian civilian government did not endanger democracy in any way. This brings up an additional question: why was the Brazilian military so much more eager to intervene than the Turkish military. The answer to both questions is a military obsessed with producing growth and the presence of a hard-line deeply distrustful of the Brazilian Left and people as a whole.

## **I. A Comparison of Interventions**

### **History Crisis, and Autonomy: The Common Building Blocks for Military Intervention**

The Brazilian and Turkish militaries both have long traditions of involvement in politics. In the Ottoman Empire, special military officers known as Janissaries were responsible for the

day-to-day administration of the empire and one of the challenges Ottoman emperors traditionally faced was satisfying the Janissaries' demands. Atatürk, the Thomas Jefferson and George Washington of the Turkish Republic, was a military hero and his successor, an unelected general, led this "republic" until the first elections in 1946. Thus, the military coup of 1960, coming after only fourteen years of democratic civilian rule, did not seem strange. The situation in Brazil was similar. The coup that ended the Brazilian emperor's rule came from the military and a military leader, Deodoro da Fonseca, became the country's first civilian president.<sup>1</sup> From 1889 on, the military consistently intervened in politics, picking and abandoning leaders, although by the 1950's and 1960's Brazil enjoyed a free press and a freely elected civilian government. By Jao Goulart's accession to the presidency in 1961, however, the military managed to exert enough pressure to have Brazil changed from a presidential to a parliamentary system to weaken Goulart, whom the military severely distrusted. These histories of military rule gave the interventions legitimacy, as military rule was nothing strange to either country.

The regimes immediately before military intervention suffered crises of legitimacy, which, as Juan Linz argues, lead to breakdown.<sup>2</sup> In Turkey, the ruling Democratic party, oversaw a failing economy, high inflation, as well as high deficits and sought to fix the legitimacy crisis that usually accompanies a government's inefficacy by stifling dissent, causing it to further lose legitimacy among the country's Kemalist elites.<sup>3</sup> Under Goulart, Brazil also suffered an economic crisis that hurt the president's legitimacy with the Church, business, and elites in general because of his inability to solve the crisis satisfactorily. His government so

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<sup>1</sup> Kesselman et al, *Introduction to Comparative Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Houghton Mifflin, 2004. p. 412

<sup>2</sup> Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978). P.16-18

<sup>3</sup> C.H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*. (North Humberstone, UK: Eothen Press, 1983) p. 9

lacked legitimacy among these groups that they combined with the military to form a “shadow government” that released its own statistics.<sup>4</sup> This illegitimacy created a sort of “pressure” for military action among elites and they enthusiastically greeted the coups: the Brazilian coup “was enthusiastically supported by most of the Brazilian media,” bar, and church<sup>5</sup> and the Turkish military operated with “the support of the overwhelming majority of the urban educated class.”<sup>6</sup> Civilian reliance on the military to carry out the task for them was not unnatural given the militaries’ histories of involvement. These crises of legitimacy enhanced the military juntas’ own legitimacies as both could claim that the system had not been working and the civilians who supported the coups gave them the legitimacy that the civilian governments lacked. Both cases confirm Linz’s theory that inefficacy creates a legitimacy crisis that causes democratic breakdown and the militaries operated with wide civilian elite support.

The Brazilian and Turkish governments lacked control over the military, which proved to be a definitive factor in intervention. As Diamond points out, “democracy cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated under civilian control.”<sup>7</sup> Without that necessary subordination, the military becomes an independent political actor. However, unlike an independent judiciary, the military has certain advantages over other institutions in becoming the dominant actor. These advantages include organizational and logistic autonomy, excellent managerial skills, and, most importantly, most of the means of violence.<sup>8</sup> It is thus difficult for civilian leaders to rein in an independent military and when crisis comes, the military has advantages over the legislature, the judiciary, and even civil society in taking control of

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<sup>4</sup> Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*. (New York: Oxford, 1988). P. 14

<sup>5</sup> Skidmore, 27.

<sup>6</sup> Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963. p. 154

<sup>7</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999). p.113

<sup>8</sup> Jackie Cilliers, “Security and Transition in South Africa”, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*.” Eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996). p.88

government. When crisis arose in Turkey and Brazil, the militaries became the likely actors to take over, both because of historical precedent and the advantages they had over other actors.

Both cases prove three of Diamond's theoretical assumptions on civil-military relations: that a tradition of military rule, an independent military, and a civilian government considered illegitimate harm a country's chances for democratic consolidation.<sup>9</sup> However, his suggestion that "the risks of military reaction [i.e. intervention] can be reduced if civilians accord the military a position of status, honor, and income"<sup>10</sup> is not correct in the cases of Turkey in 1960 and Brazil in 1964. In fact, both militaries were able to act *because* of the prestige that they enjoyed in their societies; they were traditional rulers and civilian elites in particular saw them as sources of doctrinal purity. The Turkish military was seen as "the vanguard of revolutionary change" and there was a "strong military component" in Turkish political culture.<sup>11</sup> Similarly in Brazil, large numbers of the civilian elite were trained in the *Escola Superior de la Guerra* and in the technocrat-military alliance that was the junta, the military leaders made the decisions. They had such honor and status that when the civilian government began to lose its honor and status, civilian elites in the opposition saw the military as an alternative government and came to support its rule. Although outright disrespect of the military may bring out its fury, too much respect turns it into a potential ruler when respect for the current ruler is gone.

### **Modernity and National Security**

All of this explains what allowed the militaries to intervene, but neither explains why the militaries felt a need to have a role in internal affairs nor what drove them to act in these particular instances. Simple material greed was not a factor, as both militaries were autonomous

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<sup>9</sup> Diamond, p. 13

<sup>10</sup> Diamond, p. 14

<sup>11</sup> Dodd, p. 5

and their leaders received large compensation. Some argue that the Brazilian military intervened because it felt threatened that Goulart would reduce its autonomy, but this only happened after it had made its hostility to him well known. What brought the militaries into internal politics was their status as developing nations. Both militaries were very aware of that developed nations have very real military advantages. High-tech weapons, a powerful economy, and effective communications are all components of a strong military power, and they only come through modernization. Modernization thus came into the realm of national security and both militaries did what they could to promote it, making the military the lead force for modernization. How else can one explain military leaders overthrowing the Ottoman emperor after his empire's humiliating performance in World War I in comparison with the leading industrial states? In order to promote modernization, the militaries had to take strong internal roles.

This need to develop drove the Turkish military to adopt democracy. After World War II, the vast majority of developed nations were democracies a fact that did not escape a military eager to modernize its nation. It is not coincidental that the fall of fascism and the first free elections in Turkey occurred within one year of one another without civil society pressure: fascism had at first presented itself as the only alternative to modernization and had failed in its battle against democracy. Although the Turkish military supported democracy, that democracy was established simply because the military accepted it and not because of political or civil society pressures, together with continued autonomy, meant that the military could just as easily remove democracy as create it.<sup>12</sup>

In Brazil, the military claimed that Soviet-style communism, an ideology that was disloyal to Brazil's democratic regime, was seeping into Goulart's government and therefore threatened Brazil's military regime. Although we should not simply throw out paranoid

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<sup>12</sup> Dodd, p. 83

anticommunism as a made-up justification for overthrowing the regime, the Cuban revolution had occurred only a few years before and Goulart did have communist allies, it came along with a more substantial, and ultimately more influential reason: the Brazilian military's belief that Goulart's economic policy was bad economics and bad economic meant little development. Unlike in Turkey, the military was not convinced of democracy as a means to modernity and democratization was the result of middle-class civil society pressure after World War II. When the Brazilian people elected populist leaders, democracy became an obstacle that threatened development and thus national security. Despite lip service to democratic principles, development as national security was the key reason why both militaries viewed it within their prerogative to play a role in internal politics.

### **Subverting Democracy in Order to Save It?**

Both militaries claimed to be acting to defend democracy: the Turkish military defending democracy from illiberal leaders who were chipping away at democratic institutions and the Brazilian military defending democracy from totalitarian communists. Military juntas around the world have made this claim, so we must examine it critically.

Juan Linz has provided with us with an effective universal model for the breakdown of regimes, with opposition being divided into loyal, semi-loyal, and disloyal.<sup>13</sup> However, the model does not apply to Turkey. At first glance, the military overthrowing a democratically elected government when the government suffers a legitimacy crisis seems like a normal case of the semi-loyal opposition overthrowing the democratic regime. With a closer look, the Turkish case becomes more complex. The government was elected as the loyal opposition to the Kemalist Party, the RPP, focusing on economic reform and loosening strict controls on religion.

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<sup>13</sup> Linz, p. 27

However, when faced with economic crisis, the government undermined the democratic regime by revoking such basic civil liberties as the right to assembly in order to stay in power. In such countries as Belarus and Egypt, the loss of civil liberties has meant the loss of *meaningful* elections and true liberal democracy was not going to last in Turkey either. In Linz's terms, the government was only semi-loyal to the democratic regime, supporting democracy when the government had legitimacy and undermining it when the government's legitimacy collapsed. Importantly, the legitimacy crisis arising out of economic crisis was not reason enough for the military to intervene. The military stayed out of party politics until the government threatened the democratic regime outright, more specifically by actually arresting the opposition, unruly professors, and even beating military officers.<sup>14</sup> If the military had not been an internal political actor since 1946, can it be really classified as the "opposition?" In many ways, it took a role similar to that of a non-partisan judiciary, not taking the side of government or opposition, but defending the rules of the regime. A case in which the government becomes disloyal, attempts to destroy the democratic regime and only then does the military, out of loyalty to the regime, move against the government falls outside of Linz's model. The problem is that his model assumes that it is the government that is loyal and those that overthrow the regime that are disloyal.

Most political scientists, including Diamond, argue, "It is an urgent challenge to reduce the autonomous and democratically unaccountable power of the military."<sup>15</sup> It is common sense that whenever a military overthrows a democratic government, democracy is no more. However, in Turkey, democracy was surely not going to last and the normal actors who defend a democracy were either weak or absent. Opposition political society had become illegal and disloyal bureaucrats could be fired without process, meaning they lacked any sort of powers like

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<sup>14</sup> Weiker, p. 19

<sup>15</sup> Diamond, p. 113

impeachment. Civil society did not exist: even in Istanbul, one of the hot beds of anti-government sentiment, there exists to this day, “little evidence of what the literature would call civil society.”<sup>16</sup> Without these traditional organs against democratic breakdown, the question was unfortunately not between democracy and military rule, but between military rule committed to eventual democratic rule and the end of democracy. The military chose the former as the lesser evil and the truth of this intention is born out by the quick transition to civilian rule.<sup>17</sup>

Brazil on the other hand fits Linz’s model neatly, with the government being loyal to the regime and the military being semi-loyal, acting when the regime lost legitimacy. Unlike the Democratic Party, Goulart represented no threat to Brazilian democracy. He was a social *democrat*. Although he did eventually reach beyond his constitutional authority at the end of his rule, it was a self-defense from a military that had threatened, and did carry out, his removal. If the military had not intervened, Brazil would most likely have remained a democracy for the rest of Goulart’s term. In Turkey, the military became involved in politics only when the regime was threatened, while the Brazilian military had been an opponent of Goulart before he even entered office, its political role preceding the crisis. The Brazilian military acted because it disagreed with the policies of the constitutional government, proving to be only loyal to democracy when it made the “right” decisions.

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 explain both the “how” and the “why” of both coups respectively. The first chart makes clear that the factors that led to each coup were the same. Both militaries had a history of ruling, which made it seem more legitimate for both militaries to intervene, both maintained their autonomy, and thus their abilities to act as heavily armed independent actors, and finally the economic and ensuing legitimacy crises permanently damaged the legitimacy of

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<sup>16</sup> Jenny B. White, *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*, (Seattle: University of Washington, 2002. p. ix.

<sup>17</sup> Frederick W. Fray, *The Turkish Political Elite*. (Cambridge: M.I.T., 1965). p. 162

the governments in the eyes of civilian elites, who came to trust and honor the military more than the discredited civilian governments.

The second chart explains *why* they decided to intervene. Again, the legitimacy crisis played a crucial role in involving the militaries; there was a belief both inside and outside the military that *somebody* needed to save the country. Both countries saw internal roles for themselves because they wanted to ensure development, which is an important advantage for a modern military. In Brazil, this manifested itself in the overthrow of a civilian government whose economic plan the military thought to threaten development, while in Turkey, the military defended democracy because it believed that democracy was the best road to modernity. The crucial difference is that the Turkish military really *did* overthrow the democracy to save it, while the Brazilian military overthrew democracy out of policy concerns, something that militaries committed to democracy do *not* do. To examine why the Brazilian military had such an extensive role in internal affairs, I will look at military ideologies, an area that also explains the disparity in transition periods.

## **Part II: Military Culture and Disengagement**

### **Peace Abroad, War at Home**

No doctrine has played as strong a role in a military as Kemalism has in the Turkish military. The military during the 1950's and 1960's followed the doctrine to the letter and it explains perfectly how the military saw its role in Turkish society before and after the coup. Atatürk's goal was "to disengage the military from partisan politics, to let officers assume a kind of autonomous position."<sup>18</sup> Disengagement from partisan conflict ensured that the military was not guardian of the government, but guardian of the Kemalist state and its institutions. This

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<sup>18</sup> M. Naim Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks*. (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000). p. xvi

loyalty to regime and not to government meant the civilian government could neither use the military for political purposes nor be safe when violating the principles of the regime. The 1960 coup is a perfect example of this ideology in practice. The military did not become hostile to the government because of its economic mismanagement, like the elites did, but overthrew it because it became hostile to Atatürk's republic.

Loyalty to Atatürk's doctrine has two sources. The first was commitment to democracy as the best means to development, a notion I discussed earlier. Here, the Turkish military's commitment was mostly to maintaining the regime's liberal democratic institutions and not carrying out the development and governance itself. Second, was national defense. Around the time of the 1960 coup, foreign policy was a central issue. Turkey's location can be described as a crossroads of great civilizations or as a stomping ground for great armies, depending on the period. The Soviet Union had already attempted to expand into the region and a repetition was not out of the question, while tensions with Greece over Cyprus were so high that they culminated in war a couple years later. These geopolitical considerations had a profound effect on Turkish civil-military relations: the main threat the nation faced was outside and therefore the military was focused outward, not inward. The military's role was only to defend the regime, whether the threat be inside or outside. Although this may seem unremarkable, when we compare Turkey with Brazil, we will see how important this is.

While the parallels between Brazil and Turkey are striking, external conflict is the area in which the differences between the two countries could not be more pronounced. Brazil has not fought an external conflict since the nineteenth century and has maintained relatively peaceful borders. Nevertheless, Brazil, like the rest of Latin America, has been subject to economic imperialism on the parts of major European powers and the US because of its relatively weak

economic situation in relation to them. Economics has therefore played a more important role in Latin American foreign relations than in Turkey. As a reaction to this externally peaceful, but economically hostile situation, the Argentine military developed an “ideal of defense” after World War I that spread throughout the continent, Brazil included:<sup>19</sup> successful economic policy could ward off imperialism. Examples of this include the steel and petroleum industries coming under military bureaucratic control, the Brazilian general staff drawing up economic plans that the civilian leadership followed, and a series of army officers operating civilian ministries like transportation.<sup>20</sup> Although the development-national security connection existed in Turkey, it only existed in the form of the military ensuring the development-oriented Kemalist institutions’ survival and not the actual administration of the country as happened in Brazil. Even when the military disengaged, it had knowledge and opinions on civilian matters that the Turkish military lacked. Quite simply, when the Turkish military intervened, it did not know what to do with domestic policy and therefore turned the administration of the country over to civilian professors and professionals.<sup>21</sup> The presence of external threats forced the military to focus on the outside, whereas the lack thereof can give the military a more internal focus. In Brazil, the development-national security connection was much stronger and therefore the military had a much larger role to play in internal politics.

### **Hard-liners and Soft-liners and...**

The effects of this difference in ideology on the different motivations for intervention and time before transition to civilian rule are clear. The Brazilian military was going to be more

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<sup>19</sup> Shawn Smallman, *Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889-1954*. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002). p. 64

<sup>20</sup> Smallman, p. 66

<sup>21</sup> Weiker, p. 21

eager to intervene as well as stay much longer than the Turkish military. The case of Brazil, while more common of juntas, was complicated and will require more space to explain its long transition. The Brazilian military junta was made of two groups, both more interventionist than the Turkish military, but one being significantly less so than the other.

During the Brazilian coup, there appeared what O'Donnell and Schmitter call "hard-liners", whom they define as those to whom "the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible *and* desirable" and "soft-liners" distinguished by "their increasing awareness that the regime they helped to implant, and in which they usually occupy important positions, will have to make use, in the foreseeable future, of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation."<sup>22</sup> The Brazilian military junta was formed out of both groups: Castelo Branco, leader of the soft-line, became president while Costa e Silva, leader of the hard-line, became war minister, a position he used for internal policing powers. Although the interplay between the two factions was similar to what O'Donnell and Schmitter describe, both groups do not exactly correspond to their definitions; tension between the two factions was present from the beginning as opposed to arising from an "increasing awareness." Skidmore writes that even before the coup, Branco and his soft-liners were "committed to democracy but believ[ed] that in the short run arbitrary government was necessary."<sup>23</sup> Only a year after the coup, the hard-line threatened to overthrow Branco as part of his commitment to normalcy, he allowed elections to take place. When the UDF, the military's civilian ally, suffered major defeats in the most important municipal and gubernatorial elections, the hard-line threatened to remove Branco from office if he let the two candidates take office. Reaching a compromise, Branco let them take office and issue the Second Institutional Act, which unleashed substantial controls on political society. The conflict

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<sup>22</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell and Phillippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1986). p. 16

<sup>23</sup> Skidmore, p. 21

between soft- and hard-line was not a byproduct of one wing slowly realizing that permanent military rule was intangible, but of one wing dedicated from the beginning to purging Brazil of both “undesirable” political movements and financial difficulties, but eventually returning power to civilians, and another wing bent on permanent role. The dynamic that define the junta was the conflict between the two factions.

As military rule continued, the gap between the two sides widened. The further Institutional Acts and new constitution that placed limits on political society and eventually civil society were results of further conflicts between the hard-line and the soft-line. The Brazilian presidency became a tug-of-war between the two factions, with Costa-e-Silva and Medici being firmly from the hard-line and Castelo Branco and Geisel, instigator of the *abertura*, being soft-liners. In 1968, the worldwide student movement hit Brazil, with the Brazilian incarnation calling for an end to military rule in the streets, further convincing the hard-line that there were too many undesirable elements within the Brazilian electorate for a return to democracy. After possessing the internal security apparatus for a couple years and carrying out unspeakable atrocities, the hard-line knew that a return to democratic rule, liberalization of the press or strengthening of the legal system, could be dangerous as they could be prosecuted.<sup>24</sup> The hard-line became even more hard-line, while the soft-line stayed consistent in its foal of returning democracy to a “fixed” electorate.

Although the soft-line eventually did win out, a quick transition to democratic rule was impossible because of the presence of this hard-line. The Brazilian junta is a classic example of the interplay between O’Donnell and Schmitter’s “hard-liners” and “soft-liners”, while the Turkish military does not fit their terms: it was softer than the soft-line. We will call the Turkish military the “guardian-line”, defined as intervening only to prevent the disloyal or semi-loyal

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<sup>24</sup> Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). p. 26

government from removing the democratic regime and giving power back to democratic civilian as soon as possible. Although the “soft-line” and the “guardian-line” both shared a desire for a return to civilian rule, there are significant difference between the two. First, the soft-line, like the hard-line, intervened because it disagreed with the policy decisions of the government, while the guardian-line only intervened when the regime was in danger. Branco, leader of the soft-line, was also leader of the conspiracy against Goulart. Second, Turkey’s guardian-line military did not attempt to change the make-up of the electorate in any way; in its coup, it executed a total of three, the president and two of his ministers, and incarcerated a couple hundred politicians. In contrast, Brazil’s soft-line supported incarceration and torture of thousands, with the belief that it could create an electorate that would choose the right government when democracy returned.<sup>25</sup> I have spelled out the differences between the three “lines” in Table 2.1

### **Part III: Conclusions**

Time and time again, external threats have been used to justify crackdowns on civil liberties and democracy.<sup>26</sup> In his book on civil liberties in war time in the US, Geoffrey Stone writes “the United States has attempted to punish individuals for criticizing government officials or policies only during six times in our history”, each of those six times being wars.<sup>27</sup> Brazil and Turkey during the 1960’s serve as counterpoints. Both interventions were remarkably similar, enjoying almost identical contexts. Yet, the Brazilian military intervened out of policy concerns while the Turkish military intervened to halt impending democratic breakdown. This is a major difference. This difference, as well as the disparity between returns to civilian rule, is explained

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<sup>25</sup> Skidmore, p. 64-65

<sup>26</sup> Interestingly enough, Lexus Nexus and the Minnesota libraries unearthed no resources on comparisons on how democracy fares during war, which would be an interesting area for future research.

<sup>27</sup> Geoffrey Stone, *Perilous Times*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004). p. 12

by slightly, but crucially differing military ideologies, which, in turn, are explained by differing international security situations. Interestingly enough, it was the country with little prospect of war that experienced the most extensive military rule. That both cases are so dissimilar in everything other than their military interventions implies that the lessons discussed here have applications for other cases.

The first lesson is that a history of military rule, military autonomy, military prestige, and crises of legitimacy, and a connection between development and security are the building blocks for military intervention. Of these, the first may not be necessary, but it supports the other three: there is most likely a correlation between strong and independent militaries, the civilian government's legitimacy is hurt when the military is seen as an alternative, as can happen when the military has ruled before, and previous glories create honor. The second lesson is that when strong militaries of developing nations see it in their interest for their countries to modernize, they may come to support democracy if convinced that it is the best way to modernity, as happened in Turkey. However, such a basis for democracy is inevitably weaker than civil or political society demanding democracy because a significant portion of the population may not be ready for democracy.

Third, and finally, there are three possible ways a military can intervene: the military can be "guardian", only overthrowing the civilian government when it threatens the democratic regime and promptly giving back power. Such is a rare case and though most juntas claim to be operating in this capacity, the Turkish military was truly abnormal in doing this. Furthermore, the coup of 1960 was the last time the military truly returned to the barracks: from the 1970 intervention on, a National Security Council was established to review all major decisions. There may indeed be a tendency for the guardian-line to become the soft-line through repeated

intervention. The soft-line believes in democracy, but intervenes against a civilian government, even one that is completely committed to democracy, because it believes that the civilian government's policies are the wrong path for the country. It also believes in purging the electorate so that it will elect the "right" sort of government. However, in order to carry out the coup, the soft-line must often form an alliance with the hard-line, a group that has no intention of returning democracy. While the hard-line may have the upper hand in the beginning, the soft-line can eventually restore democracy by gradually lifting strict controls on civil-society, increasing pressure on the hard-line to make steps toward re-democratization, as happened in Brazil. The Brazilian case is an excellent example of a combination of two of these three factions in the same junta. The combination and interplay of these different groups play a major role in the character and lifetime of a junta. It is absolutely necessary for scholars, when observing a regime, to correctly identify the separate factions and their relative strengths to make a correct analysis. If Turkey had had a soft-line instead of a guardian-line, or if there had been no hard-line in Brazil, the histories of both countries would have been drastically different.

Table 1.1	History of Military Rule?	Military Autonomy?	Military Prestige?	Legitimacy Crisis?
Brazil	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 1.1 Cont.	Development-Security Connection?
Brazil	Yes
Turkey	Yes

Table 1.2	Legitimacy Crisis?	Democracy Threatened?	Military Has Policy Opinions?
Brazil	Yes	No	Yes
Turkey	Yes	Yes	No

Table 2.1	Tries to Rule Permanently?	Intervenes because of Policy?	Purges Population?
Hard-Line	Yes	Yes	Yes
Soft-Line	No	Yes	Yes
Guardian-Line	No	No	No

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Military coups which compare in the thesis are Argentina 1976, Brazil 1964, Chile 1973 and Turkey 1980 military coups. The main theme of the comparison is the military coup. For this reason, in the first part of this thesis, a framework for understanding military coup in theory and practice is presented. In the second and third sections of the thesis, political history narration is used, which is based on countries and military coups on the background. Since discussing only these military coups will be far from showing the whole table, military coup history of the countries are also being added. Country comparison, you can compare any two countries and see the data side by side. Here you have the comparison between Brazil vs Turkey 2019. Afghanistan Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burma - Myanmar Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Costa Rica Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo Denmark Djibouti Dominica.