
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ANTI-PHILOSOPHY
AS “WISELOVING”

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“*Enchant Newcastle*”

The “*Enchant Newcastle*” Monograph seeks to investigate a “Psycho-chaotic Semiotics” with which to unite creatively the analytical mathematics of chaos and complexity with the fluxional semiotic study of human meaning-making into a overarching theory of human psychological creativity which enables us all to become “*essendi incantatores*” – “*šamánes faciendi*” – “*lingwiz’ds of is*” – “*techneglossists*” – and “*knack-smiths*” of reality. My ongoing personal mission is to find, forge, and extend, as many links between as many fields and ideas as possible. Hence we might dissolve the limiting ligatures of art, language, magic, mathematics, music, myth, philosophy, religion, and science and create an “Altermodern” chimerical “*mascyrelsoth*” fit to enable human evolution into the Twentyfirst Century and beyond.

Central to these discussions is the pivotal rôle played by language in shaping humankind’s psychic development. We begin with an exploration of the origin, nature, function and utilization of language – in both its creative and controlling manifestations – with particular emphasis on the “magic of language.” This is set in the context of systems theory, generative grammar, and modern approaches to semiotics. We next develop the idea of “*linguaging*” as an activity and use examples from literature and philosophy to demonstrate the importance of adopting a combined “*neuro-linguistic*” and “*psycho(a)logical*” approach to human growth, creativity and change. This discussion is then widened to encompass an in-depth (Re)(de)(con)structivist exposition of the link between language and thought. From this we go on to illustrate how (ab)use of *linguaging* can fundamentally influence the human psyche, cognition, and affects, and to provide new Psycho-chaotic-semiotic memes drawn from the realms of magic, science, religion, language and myth, which might act as tools in practical creative interventions.

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Dedicated to Toam Hope Jean Yoeli ("ΔΧΙΤ").

May you find "Suitable Balance"

through an *Anti*-philosophical life of Wiseloving.

Dr Patrick Jemmer & Dr Joel Yoeli

Newcastle upon Tyne

9 November 2010

Part 5: *Anti-philosophy* as “Wiseloving”

5.1: Let us now revisit the Reflection-Correspondence theory of language whereby Truth-value and therefore meaning can be assigned only to linguistic expressions which can be interpreted directly in terms of observables [0]. We would do well to recall at this point that the first speaking children, subcreating their shared fantasy worlds (which incidentally paved the way for later interpersonal collaboration), bequeathed us with a distinction between human-created “internal reality” and pre-existing “external reality” – the former by its nature occult and mysterious, and the latter supposedly transparently obvious [1]. Culbert points out that human faculties and experiences allow only limited perception of, knowledge about, and tolerance for, “reality,” and he claims that these limitations are sufficient to invalidate the very conceptualization of “absolute Truth” [2]. He maintains that there is not any “absolute Truth” to find or to give. This is echoed in Eliot’s opinion that Humanity is constantly under threat of being overwhelmed by the vast spatio-temporal *mélange* that is the “real” ([3], Number 1: “*Burnt Norton*”), perhaps mirroring a Lovecraft-Lacanian “*Unaussprechlich Real*” (German – “Unutterable Real”) [4]. It is in this context that we site Heraclitus of Ephesus’ (who was called “*Αἰνικτῆς*” – “Riddler” in Book IX, chapter 1 of [5]; and “*Σκοτεινός*” – “Occultist,” by Cicero [6]) famous undecidable comment that “The truth loves to hide” [7], [8], [9] – where Truth (Greek – “*ἀλήθεια*”) itself is by definition that which is “not hidden” and “not forgotten” [10], [11]. Democritus expands on this and informs us that at its origin and end, “*ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια*” (Greek – “Truth lies in the Abyss”) and thus “*ἔτεῃ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν*” (“we know nothing”) [7]. The source and guardian of this Hidden Truth is the Unseen *Αἰδης*, both father of the kingdom of the dead, wealthy in souls, and the realm of riches itself – a twilight realm which heroic dreamers co-create, and where in Heidegger’s terms “making itself intelligible is suicide for philosophy” [12]. This is the world of Joyce’s “*Wake*” [13] – the slippery, hallucinatory territory patrolled by the “*baku*” (Japanese – “dream-eating tapir”) [14] where all boundaries are broken down, and all characters dream their lives.

5.2: The Medieval Scholastics like Thomas Aquinas [15], [16], [17] and Anselm of Canterbury (1033 – 1109) [18], [19] went on to utilize Aristotle’s syllogistic logic in attempting to justify their religious convictions regarding the ontology of God as the source of “Ultimate Truth.” In the course of all this ontological searching, discourse (“*epistēmē*”), as agent-pursuer, is imposed on reality (“*ontōn*”). The observer’s informed gaze changes and transforms objectivity, taming rawness and wildness, and harnessing entropy. Reality reciprocates by adapting, adjusting, joining up, and responding to consciousness and *epistēmē*’s very essence. Eventually, this meeting of mind and not-mind causes reality to retreat and makes way for understanding, and indeed philosophical discourse. Subsequent to this transformation of understanding, the ongoing endeavor of philosophy turns to epistemology. For, as consciousness and mind relate to and engage with reality, they gradually and steadily grow, expand, incorporate and devour their object of study. Ontological boundaries become blurred; a never-ending loop of observer-observed interaction is formed; and an acquisition-*cum*-merger takes place. However, at the end of the Middle Ages, Erasmus (1466 – 1536), [20], Bacon (1561 – 1626)

[21], Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) [22], and Galileo (Gregorian 1564 – 1642) [23] inaugurated an empirical and humanistic approach to intellectual investigation. By the 17th Century, philosophy had become the province of axiomatic logic and rational scepticism [24]. Descartes (1596 – 1650) [25], [26], [27], Pascal (1623 – 1662) [28], [29], and Hobbes (1588 – 1679) [30], [31], attempted to combine the already-existing religious ideas into this framework, resulting in a “dual” conception of the spiritual and the material. At this point, “existence,” as the very epitome of ontology, was matched-up with “thought,” as the sheer embodiment of epistemology. Berkeley [32] and Spinoza [33], [34] rebelled against this dualism, with the counter-proposal of “monism” and unity.

5.3: The 18th Century saw the inception of the Enlightenment [35], for which the model can be taken as Newton’s systematically empirical science, which he called “natural philosophy” [36], [37]. At this stage the status of knowledge (“*epistēmē*”) became elevated over that of the knowable-world (“*ontōn*”). This created the breeding-ground for the work of Diderot (1713 – 1784), Voltaire (1694 – 1778), Rousseau (1712 – 1778), and Kant. The American Revolution (1763 – 1789) [38] and the French Revolution (1789 – 1799) [39] opened up the field of political philosophy. Such is the power of this movement that Positivists, beginning with Comte (1798 – 1857) [40] sought to remove all that was “unobservable” from debate. However this attitude in fact does a serious disservice to science where, for example, “mechanical force,” “electromagnetic field” and “quantalmechanical wavefunction” are not “physical objects” but concepts whose properties are deduced secondarily from certain observed effects [0]. Turchin claims that the ultimate goal of Western metaphysics has been the overturning of this reflection-correspondence theory, and that actually the function of language is to model reality holistically, to organize experience, and to allow the prediction of certain events and the outcomes of some actions, for which applicability of the reflection-correspondence theory is not necessary. In Turchin’s sense a proposition in a language is true if it can lead to true predictions, and there is only quantitative difference between “facts” and “theories,” both of which represent extremes of a spectrum of predictive propositional models of reality. A proposition is a “factual statement” if the route from it to verifiable predictions is short and uncontroversial, and generally unique. A proposition is a “theory” if the routes from it to verifiable predictions require chains of reasoning, calculation, subordinate propositions, and may be non-unique and controversial. We should always therefore be prepared to subject facts and theories to critical judgement and re-examination, for “facts” may well turn out to be “untrue” due to deceit, hallucination or misunderstanding; just as well-established but “unproven” theories often pass as “fact” – since yesterday’s bad theory may well become today’s good theory. The outcomes of this are twofold. First, theoretical constructs (like “force,” “field,” “wavefunction”) become as existentially “real” as physical matter; secondly, the existential status of material objects becomes “unstable and hazy.” A corollary of this understanding is that the top of the pyramid of scientific concepts arises abstractly from human creativity rather than directly from empirical observation; and that often, the usefulness of these concepts arises only retrospectively. If we accept Turchin’s idea of language as a hierarchical model of reality, we can then reinterpret the usefulness of metaphysics in “linguaging” possible “logical structures” (or “conceptual frameworks”) which can be systematically refined to improve the model. Thus we might reinterpret Thales’ dictum that “the world

is made of water” (in the “*Metaphysics*” in [41]) as proposing a reasonable model of the world based on an abstract, plastic, infinitely-divisible fluid – and in today’s language this could well be identified with certain descriptions of electromagnetic field. Similarly, Pythagoras [42] advocated a model for the entire Cosmos based on pure number, and this might now be identified with the “Grand Unified Theory” sought today by mathematical physicists [43]. And yet again, Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius [44], [45] theorized about “atoms” moving *in vacuo*, and Turchin claims that similar correspondences might well be found between these ideas and those such as Schopenhauer’s “Representation” and “Will” [46]. Hegel, in the 19th Century, sought to reconcile the ideas of formal systems with those of organic growth in his “dialectic” methodology. His philosophical “Absolute Spirit” [47], [48], [49], [50] could well be mirrored by modern science’s “Zero-point Field” [51].

5.4: The 20th Century saw philosophy and philosophers as having ended up trapping themselves within a circular hermeneutics in seeking an all-in-one and one-in-all theorisation of an absolute, totally integrated whole. In a series of concessions to “commonsense” and to “precedent,” it was felt that they had come to require and to preserve now-naturalized “foundational” concepts for philosophical discourse, such as – a historical frame of reference; an intricate system of culture-bound coordinates; hidebound linguistic conventions; built-in intellectual dogmata, orthodoxies and prejudices; a purposeful script; an indicative legend; and the admission of organizing editor-narrator into the discourse. We might go so far as to claim that the metaphysical pursuit of knowledge had aimed up to the high heavens and reached down to the depths of the earth – whilst things on the ground were left to wallow and be trampled upon in the mud of the everyday. And at the same time, love and life were willingly sacrificed at the altar of theory and intellect. Naur [52] goes so far as to say that logic-based philosophy since Aristotle has “perverted” comprehension of thought-processes by wilfully misapplying reasoning to concepts such as Being, Essence, Logic, Truth, and Reality. He uses as examples passages from the writings of the philosophers Descartes, Heidegger, Russell, Ryle, and Wittgenstein in particular.

5.5: This internal dissatisfaction with metaphysical aims, methods, and deductions, led to the overturning, abolition, reformation, and reintroduction of many classical notions about philosophy and knowledge. First, the “*anti-philosopher*” Nietzsche [53] began to challenge the foundations of Christianity, traditional morality, and objective truth [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], [60]. Heidegger [61], [62], [63], Lévi-Strauss [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], Popper [69], [70], [71], and Russell [72], [73], [74] questioned the very conceptual basis of epistemology at the same time as Freud [75], [76], [77] and Lacan [78], [79], [80] were reformulating our understanding of the nature of the human psyche. Cutrofello reads Freud and Lacan’s *meta*-psychology as an “inverse Kantianism” (again with its inbuilt antinomies, ethics, ideals, and paralogisms), that reinterrogates the synthetic *a-priori* in terms of the previously foreclosed analytic *a-posteriori* [81], [82]. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein [83], [84], [85] returned to the conception that philosophy is embodied in language and that it must constantly fight is to break the “magic spell” cast by language over thought [85]. He is certainly claimed as an *anti-philosopher* by Adorno [86], [87], Badiou [88], and Perloff [89].

5.6: The postulated *Logos* of philosophical discourse is an innate, universal signal-communication framework, which is omniscient, all pervasive, inherent in consciousness and mind, and immanent in being and reality. Philosophical discourse is sensitive to all elements of linguistic “*mathēsis*,” such as content, meaning, narrative, text, articulation of ideas, formulation of concepts, coherence of story, and precision of words. It also passionately relates to qualities of linguistic “*poiēsis*” such as suspense, musicality, harmony, pace, melody and rhythm, pitch and tone. It makes formidable use of literary devices such as irony, imagery, metaphor, analogy, farce, sarcasm, wit – blending the actual and the implied, the referred and the alleged, the factual and the fictitious, the highbrow and the colloquial. The trajectory of philosophical signification is fully bidirectional and signal and content may merge, split, or collapse entirely. The fundamental human feelings of alienation, confusion, and disorientation in the face of a seemingly absurd and meaningless world were addressed by Existentialism [90], [91] which arose from the work of Camus [92], [93] and Sartre [94], [95], [96], [97], [98], based on the previous ideas of Kierkegaard [99]. Existentialism explicitly focuses on the subjective experience of the living, breathing, acting, feeling, suffering individual, rather than on postulated objective, abstract, codified philosophical structures and doctrines. For Wittgenstein, language is “autonomous” in that it is not a purposeful instrument whose usage can be defined *extra-linguistically*, and in that it is not defined by an “end” [100]. Moreover, syntax is arbitrary in the same sense that mathematical axioms and chess rules are arbitrary, and syntax nothing other than enable the utilization of language [100].

5.7: Following on from this, Postmodernists such as Derrida [101], [102], [103], [104], Foucault [105], [106], [107], [108], and Lyotard [109], [110], [111] sought to identify and theorize ontologically about the immanent features encoded within the very form of the linguistic representation itself. And, most radically, they claimed that signification can be conceptualized as a never-ending, infinite, feedback loop, with nothing to represent but its own ever-evolving self-representations. Moreover, it sometimes seems to let us in on the joke that what we perceive, restrictedly, as “reality” may itself be part of a larger and wider linguistic universe, the *ætiology* and purpose of which we may never be able to grasp. Indeed we might say – “*goaji, goaji, goaji*” [112] – that “language humanates,” rather than that “humans speak”! Thus, philosophical language, which naturally attempts to communicate that which transcends languaged representation, often leaves us, with Wittgenstein, alone, and in abject “silence” [83]. Based in his reading of Saussure’s *Structural Linguistics*, and Heidegger’s *Phenomenology*, Derrida came to realize the falsity of the founding semiotic “*phallogocentric*” binarism of the whole of the Western “*Metaphysics of Presence*” [113], namely the supremacy or transparency of the signified [114]. For example, Husserl grounded all philosophy and science in conscious experience and stressed the importance of complete conscious “self-presence” for appropriate cognition and meaning-making [115], [116], [117]. However, the categories of “past” and “future” events are not actually “present” to the Subject’s experience and yet they are consciously “absent” through the processes of “retention” and “protension” respectively [118]. Hence *Phenomenology* “derails” itself in its very founding precepts and moreover this is a fundamental

problem which even the whole of Husserl's edifice cannot overcome from within. Derrida felt that in general semiosis cannot be tied to an individual's intended conscious meaning, but instead believed that meaning arises from overarching, supra-individual linguistic structures [118]. Derrida's primary insight was that in the "violent hierarchies" of pairs such as fullness / emptiness; identity / difference; life / death; mastery / submission; meaningful / meaningless; presence / absence; speech / writing, the first "dominant" term is taken as authentic, grounding, original, and superior, whereas the second "parasitic" term is seen as inauthentic, figural, secondary, and inferior [119]. He realized that we *cannot* suppress the signifier, and that the signified is *not* the "grounding term" and basis of all meaning-making. His "Post-structuralist" understanding was that meaning is generated *dynamically* from *relationships*, and *differences*, which are neither intrinsic to the signs themselves, nor to their referents [120]. Moreover human observers always already act as communicators in the dynamic interplay of structures on which all meaning-making life is built – and in this way they are themselves implicated in the semiosis they are trying to observe, and this makes vitiate the possibility of absolute scientific detachment in the description of reality. These understandings shake the foundations of centuries of Western theorizations regarding ontology. We must therefore always recognize that metaphysical vocabulary is inherently subject to instability and thus that the meanings of such words always contain an essential slippery (pre)(ab)sense. This "*Slippage*" acts to undermine traditional Western philosophy which is intellectually founded on the concept of "total presence." In reaction to the quandaries in which he felt late Twentieth Century Western philosophy had become ensnared, Derrida sought to turn metaphysics against itself – to negate the basic ontological dictum that "*Being = presence*" [114]. Moreover, there is a fundamental self-referential contradiction at the heart of all such structured synchronic Systems. The structure must have a genesis and yet the genesis already presupposes the complex underlying structure [113]. The unavoidable "genesis – structure" dyad endlessly and equivocally evolves diachronically [121]. This Systemic property of "*Iterability*," "*Inscription*," or "*Textuality*" thus always inadvertently conspires to undermine the totalizing Project itself [101], [102], [103], [104]. And nowhere is this more evident than in Bourdieu's (1930 – 2002) view of the "simplistic, peremptory" judgements that the "totalizing ambition" of "arrogant" philosophy allows [122]. Wittgenstein expressed this by saying that language is not "contiguous" with any other System [123], and in this sense language "traps" everyone in the same way, since there can be no Subject "*outside language*," and that his job was to "signpost the junctions" to help language-users avoid "danger points" and "wrong turnings" [89], [124]. We must proceed by "bumping our heads" against the "limits of language" ([85], part 1, paragraph 119) in a tentative interrogative process which is simultaneously "self-cancelling and "self-correcting" [89]. This minute attention to language and its problems meant that despite his often "poetic" style, Wittgenstein disavowed any attempts to define "the beautiful" or "the essence of art" [89]. These understandings, in turn, question and must eventually come to overturn the foundational concepts which tacitly underlie aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, imperialism, patriarchy, and science, and indeed, all totalitarian Systems and all Projects [125]. Derrida himself has said that he hoped to uncover an open and unboundable, abyssal, unformalizable "strategic device" for interpretation [126]. With this he aimed to overcome the compulsions, constraints, contradictions, denials, dogmas, insistences, and repetitions that are imbued in

philosophy and by implication in all of socio-historical discourse. Perloff sees Wittgenstein as attempting to identify and formalize the conditions of philosophical *aporia* and although there are “homologies” in this regard between Wittgenstein and Derrida, there are also “irreconcilable differences” regarding “*Speech / Writing*” and lifeform-ontology [127], [128], [129].

5.8: Derrida thus began to frame a new approach based on Miller’s Nietzschean “dismantling, disarticulation, decomposition, demolishing, disentangling” [130], [131], on Husserl’s “*Abbau*” (German – “unbuilding”) [118], [132], and on Heidegger’s vision of “*Destruktion*” (German – “destruction”), as applied to modern metaphysics [62], [133]. Derrida’s work is also crucially influenced by his studies of Saussure [134], and also by those of Freud [135], and Leroi-Gourhan (1911 – 1986) [119], [136]. Derrida thought the already-existing words carried too many negative connotations, being highly reminiscent of the existing analytic processes of “demolition” or “elimination” for his new synthetic philosophy. Allison also points out the impossibility of totally eradicating certain “foundational concepts” from philosophy, and that metaphysical analysis is always a constant struggle [118]. Derrida thus coined the new term “*Deconstruction*,” evoking simultaneously both the French word “*déconstruction*” (“disorder, rearrangement”) and the cognate word “*déconstruire*” (to “strip” or disassemble a machine down to its components). However, Deconstruction is more powerful than a mere “negative” or destructive process [125]. Rather, its operations take apart an “ensemble” or “system,” they open the system’s boundaries and create a negative space in which the components are exposed, surprisingly, to their own paradoxical alterity; and then they reconstruct them, or allow them to restructure, according to the ensemble’s own previously occult institutional conditions, thus enabling change and adaptation [125]. Derrida seeks through Deconstruction to reveal and overcome a “circularly symbiotic logic” at the heart of philosophical discourse, whereby what initially appear as opposed terms (“host” and “parasite”), in fact turn out to be repetitions of the same term (the “symbiote”) [125]. In order to do this he opens up a “differential chain” of “non-synonymous substitutions,” namely a series of singularly contingent “*marques*” (French – “marks”) including “*Archée-écriture – Deconstruction – Derrida – Différance – Écriture – Entame – Hymen – Marge – Parergon – Pharmakon – Same – Slippage – Supplement – Text – Trace -- Writing*,” none of which is a “Master” and none of which is “Subordinate,” each of which contains within itself the prototype of its own application, and all of which must therefore only be applied with care [125]. These “*Marks*” are “simulacral unities,” which represent “false” nominal or semantic properties that overturn standard binary oppositions, without allowing escape through dialectic “synthesis,” and which are thus “undecidable” [113]. By seeking analogous “*Marks*” in any particular text one can demonstrate its inherent “symbiotic logic” whereby the “host” concept is used to “feed” various “parasitic” concepts, which in fact are shown to be “symbiotic” with the “host” [125]. As a prime example of this we take Derrida’s “deconstruction” [119] of Lévi-Strauss’s ethnographic study of the Brazilian Nambikwara [64], [65]. Lévi-Strauss reached the apparently contradictory conclusion that “*savage = speech = anterior = authentic = true = free = pacific*,” and conversely but no less paradoxically that “*civilized = writing = posterior = inauthentic = false = enslavers = violent*” [64], [65], [119]. However, Derrida noted that in fact, Lévi-Strauss’s ethnographic data showed that the

“illiterate” and “uncivilized” Nambikwara in fact used *speech* for domination and subjugation. This observation overturns Lévi-Strauss’s entire claim and allows Derrida to reverse the binary opposition and to assert instead that *writing = anterior = authentic = true = free = pacific* [119]. The crucial point here is that such observations are generally applicable, and are just as true of all the language used in philosophical discourse – with its dichotomies such as Being-Becoming, Cause-Effect, Determinism-Freewill, God-Satan, Immortality-Mortality, Mind-Body, Knowing-Intuiting, Sensible-Intelligible, Space-Time, Space-Void, Time-Eternity, Subject-Object, and Truth-Falsehood [114]. In this sense Derrida’s “Project” might be seen as sharing many similarities with that of Bataille (1897 – 1962), who, through the introduction of the unstable “third term” of “base matter,” sought to shake the foundations of dominant philosophical discourse, and to assert experience over rationalism (see, for example, “*Le Bas Matérialisme et la Gnose*” in [137], and “*The Maze of Taste: Bataille, Derrida, and Kant*” in [138]). For Bataille, like Bacon (1909 – 1992) the true end of all artistic, intellectual, or religious acts was to engender some form of savage intercourse, thereby sublimating *Objectified Selfhood* [139]. In this work I prefer to expand Derrida’s conception and use the term “(re)(de)(con)struction” (with a nod to Phillip’s playful term “*Derriduction*” [125]), and to Derrida’s own “mischievous” use of language and to his “witty strategies” [125]. This emphasizes the tensions between cooperating and competing processes which simultaneously “construct – destroy – restructure – reconstruct – deconstruct – redestroy – redeconstruct” in the neverending chaotic-semiotic dialectic of meaning-making. We might see (re)(de)(con)struction as offering us an “Ariadne’s Thread” with the help of which we can extricate ourselves from the Linguistic Labyrinth and escape from the Metaphysical Maze. It is worth noting here, though, that Rorty’s (1931 – 2007) Pragmatic and *anti-Essentialist* [140], [141] approach in particular, rejects what is seen as the central Deconstructivist assumption that these “traditional” metaphorical oppositions are “already, all the time” at the heart of all cultural discourse [142].

5.9: In terms of these presupposed occult representations of absolute certainty, Derrida claims that “*Écriture*” (which we may construe as “*Text*” in the most general sense of this word), never means precisely what its author intend it to mean [120]. Here “*Text*” can be written “*Marks*” on paper; spoken vibrations “*Marked*” in the atmosphere; or “*Markings*” in the physio-chemical thought- or memory-structure of the brain; all of them incomplete and slippery, and defying transcendental signification or ultimate meaning. In this sense, crucially, we must recognize that “*il n’y a pas de hors-texte*” (French – “there is nothing that is *extra-Textual*”) [119], [143]. As soon as *Textual* markings are set down they become fixed, unchanging, dead, and subject to interpretation. However, they also inscribe all of the *Text*’s (un)conscious preconditions and presuppositions including but not limited to those such as the authorial, biological, cultural, geographical, historical, ideological, physical, psychological, sociological, and religious inputs to the *Text*’s production. To this extent shared communication is possible only approximately, through comparison of similar *Marking*-systems within the *Texts*, and internal to the correspondents. They always contain inherent contradictions and *sub-Textual* underlayers which have been “papered over” to mould the text into its ostensive form. Thus no *Text* is “unitary” but is crucially traced through with “identity – difference,” since what it is, is defined only in

terms of what it is not – in terms of how it “differs,” and in this sense it constantly “defers” its meaning. *Textual* meanings are thus always already by their very nature self-contradictory and self-dismantling; in short, they are “aporetic” [144]. And in this way, on close interrogation, so are all “philosophical conceptualizations” such as The Enlightenment, Human Nature, Logic, Rationality, the Renaissance, even Philosophy itself. The condition for the very existence of “difference – identity – otherness – contrast – change” with respect to discrete entities is described as “alterity,” which potentiates all of these as its effects [125]. The existence of such alterity as the “absent presence” of “the future now” or “radical otherness” forbids the possibility of any “ideal structure” [125]. For language, alterity is the “always-not-yet-determined” sense of a *Text*, which looks backwards to the *Text*’s originary absence; and forwards, to the *Text*’s “randomly undetermined addressees” [125]. Whereas “difference” refers to synchronous, physical, spatial characteristics, “deferral” refers to diachronic, historical, temporal aspects of meaning [145]. In English, the written lack of an “f” and the substitution of “e” for “i” (with no change of pronunciation) which symbolize the spoken change of stress between the two words, represent the retroviral “transgressive excursion” of writing into speech – they show how the modalities “D(≠E)(FF)ER” [145]. Derrida’s memetic mechanism of “*Différance*” (which is neither a word nor a concept, as discussed in “*La Différance*” [133], and in [145]), is an attempt at rescuing Structuralism’s apparent failure, and by simultaneously integrating these slippery processes of difference and deferral, gaining an advantage over language by celebrating its rebellious virtues. *Différance* as “the economical concept” is the very means by which the metaphysical “sign” can be produced as the essential interplay of “signifier” and “signified” [113]. In this sense the term *Différance* is thus itself a performative, self-referential pun – “*différance*” is what *Différance* means [125]. There is also a second pun, too, since “*différance*” and “*Différance*” sound the same in French and are only distinguished in writing. This inbuilt distinction between grapheme and phoneme draws our attention to the similar distinctions between writing and speech; language and ideas; and sensing and intellection; in all of which we read the slippery (pre)(ab)sense of the *Supplement* and the *Trace*. In a similar vein, Borges, too, sees reading and writing as inextricably intertwined, and might claim that all good reading is in some sense a “rewriting” [146]. This is crucial in understanding Derrida’s conception that in “*Thinking-Speaking*,” language “self-effaces,” but that in “*Writing-Thinking*” language requires active “de-sedimentation – reinterpretation – translation” in order to uncover the wealth of potential “meanings” which were not even encoded in the original writer’s thought [119]. *Différance* lacks foundational essence or absolute existence, and denies the possibility of asserting a single ontology or teleology upon or within a text. This is because it unmask the hidden textual dimension in time, and the historical dimension concealed within text, showing us that origins and foundations are never graspable, but are always elusive, postponed as “disencounters” [145]. Thus signification is seen always already to overturn the idea of “origin” since, through *Différance*, any particular element in the semiotic chain always retroactively implies the existence of another, prior, signifying element [145]. However, this element is itself already hidden by its predecessor in an infinitely regressing chain of “absent meaning” [125]. For Derrida, Western philosophy is dominated by the so-called logic of the “*Supplement*,” which is the paradoxical “thing” required to fill the “*Originary Lack*” in “something” that is ostensibly presented as complete, present, pristine, and self-

sufficient, but which is, actually, incomplete, absent, damaged, and needy [125]. The *Supplement* is both the replacement of an absent centre; and an addition to the existing structure [125]. The very possibility of an external *Supplement's* existence actualizes the “*Invagination*” of an internal “hole” within the “something” [125]. The *Supplement* thus represents undecidability between exteriority and interiority as represented metaphorically by the “*Hymen*” (from Greek “*ὑμήν*” – “membrane, thin skin”) [125]. Thus Post-structuralism is itself *Supplementary* in that it does not uncover the occult structure of the world as the “total perceptual field” – but rather, it adds more structure to that which is already present in the world [125].

5.10: In contradiction to Saussure, for Derrida, there is by definition a “gap” or “*Play*” between signifier and signified which necessarily involves both difference or alteration and repeatability or sameness. All “laws” are in fact “laws of repetition” – and, that which is repeated is always subject to a “law” (as put forth in Plato’s “*Crito*” [147]) [148]. The ideal, indivisible “*eidōs*” or “*Same*” (which is always simple, self-identical, invariable, and undecomposable) is only thus due to its repeatability. But, paradoxically, the repetition-law can apply only to a *Same* that is the common element in a dissociation so that repetition implies *Sameness*; repetition is always of the *Same*; but the *Same*-repetition is never identical [125]. We thus see the “*Iterability*” (Latin “*iterum*” – “a second time, again, afresh, anew”) inherent in the pairs “body-soul” and “idea-writing” where the parts are related not by their separateness, nor by their mixing; but rather by a “double-participation” in an idea in which both are a self-referential repetition of one *Same* [125]. This *Iterability* or difference-repeatability is the minimally ideal “singular condition” for signification [125]. The uncanny unity of identity and difference, governed by simultaneous repeatability and differentiability is called by Derrida the “*Same*” [148]. We could say that the relationship between signifier and signified is mediated by the always-absent “*Trace*” so that reference is always “fleeting and transient” [125]. We return to this in great detail below. In these terms, speaking and writing systems are both complex unstable compositions of elements which are deemed to be present only by their relation to other, necessarily absent elements, which nevertheless leave their *Trace* throughout the whole system [114]. The *Trace* thus represents the inherent undecidable (pre)(ab)sense woven into the warp and weft of symbolic (and in particular, language), systems. And when added to signifier–signified pair, it disrupts their static binarism, and provides the always-elusive third term on which dynamic semiotic evolution depends. The *Trace* is thus formally “non-existent” since it is always already “self-effacing” [119]. So the “finite field” of experience, knowledge and theory is finite and groundless exactly because of the existence of the unrepresentable, necessarily-absent *Trace* which constantly subtracts from it; and similarly the “infinite field” of reason is infinite just because of its ability to anchor reasoning only in the infinite difference and repeatability of the *Trace* which constantly expands it [125]. The operations of “*Supplement*,” of “*Trace*,” and of “*Play*” mean that an “excess” or “remainder” of signification always remains “unsignified” as a “lack” – thus “*Différance*” is the means of establishing new significations in new contexts. Agamben [149] identifies this “caesura” or “rupture” or between signification and its excess as the very “presuppositional structure” of philosophical language [150]. We recall here the ironic poetic “third ideas” insinuated echoically into the mind of the reader through rhymes such as

“Pope / grope, room / tomb, mistress / distress, graced / distaste” [151] which act in tandem with Yeats’ (1865 – 1939) subconscious “ghostly voice” of metre [152]. However, we must be sensitive to the fact that Derrida explicitly *denies* the “unsustainable and absurd” concept of “inversion of the sign” such that signifier gains “priority” over signified [119]. He rather brings into question the very possibility of or “interrupting” signification to “interrogate its mechanism.” This of course indicates a radical formal limitation to epistemology, which can never be overcome, but whose implications must be affirmed and accounted for [125].

5.11: Moreover, Saal reminds us that such an assumed “signifier-supremacy” has the side-effect of asserting that “complete” spoken language has precedence over “subsidiary” written language [145]. This however, ignores the essential “non-phonetic” components of written language such as punctuation and spatial disposition which can be attempts to convey both verbal and non-verbal meaning (such as silences, and emotions) in their own right. Moreover, were this assumption true, then it would hold out the hope that the spoken word can contain the “unadulterated essence” of Truth about Being [145]. It also instrumentalizes writing, asserts that in effect it is “not language,” and forces it into the rôle of a “violent usurper” of speech. Derrida radically reverses these assumptions, positing speech as a hugely modified form of “vulgar writing” (for which he uses the French term “*Écriture*”), called “*Archée-écriture*.” This emphasizes the openness of language-structure (in both speech and writing) to viral (re)(de)(con)structive mutation through the mechanism of “*Différance*” discussed above [119]. In this vein, Lacan noted that in Joyce’s “faunatic” and “linguistically questioning” [153] writing signification is constantly “(re)(de)(con)structed” – signifiers collapse, mix, and recombine – and could be said to “stuff” the signified [154]. Rabaté describes Joyce – that “*aspace of dumbbillsilly*” (from French slang – “*espèce d’imbécile*” – “stupid idiot”) – as being the “first writer to teach psychoanalysts how to read” [155]. This, he achieved with his use of “floating signifiers” which slip between one language and another [156], [157], [158], [159], and between speech and writing, whose meaning is always “elsewhere” in an infinitely-self-similar but never-repeating, topologically strange semiotic surface. In contrast to this “maximalist” approach, Beckett (1906 – 1989) chose to deal in “impoverishment, in lack of knowledge and in taking away, in subtracting rather than in adding” [160]. His spare, fresh, detached language strives ceaselessly to bring about its own undoing, as the pellucid grace of his words wanes into magical mystification [161].

5.12: Saal [145] identifies Deconstruction as providing a reading-strategy which extends beyond conscious authorial intention, and opens up the idea of a text itself as a productive entity, replete with the seeds of unconscious creativity. It therefore represents a shift of focus from obvious meanings, and central themes, and concentrates on what is revealed by close analysis of plural ambiguities, asides, contexts, errors, and margins. Deconstruction is rooted in the theme of the lack of a single “transcendent meaning,” or of an “absolute reference,” through which any text is objectively grounded in reality [145]. However, in his final “ethico-political turn” [162], Derrida did come to assert that *Justice* is the indeterminate, always-deferred, *un-Deconstructible*, *extra-legal*, and *supra-human* condition and call that potentiates determinate, never-deferred, Deconstructible, human, *Law* [163],

[164], [165]. *Deconstruction* realizes the promise of *Justice* in the experiential application of *Law* and hence bridges the boundary between incalculable, impossible, and absent *Justice* and calculable, possible, and present *Law*. As a “kind of theologian *sui generis*” [162], Derrida came to use the “Name of God,” the great “*Je suis*” [166], as a means of framing the un-Conditional, *un-Deconstructible* heart of *Democracy, Friendship, Hospitality, and Justice*. In this light, *Deconstruction* represents a “critique of idols” which results in a “religion (without Religion)” which “circumfesses” in “prayers and tears,” the Messianic “coming of the future” (French – “à venir de l’avenir”) [165], [167], [168]. *Deconstruction* offers a stringent critical commentary on the contingency of human constructions, beliefs, and values, whether these be cultural, historical, linguistic, philosophical, or religious. It thus offers up a “pure and unconditional affirmation” [166] – “*viens, oui, oui*” (French – “come, yes, yes”) – in the Name of a *Desire* beyond desire, of the possibility of a *Life* totally without reserve [165], [166].

5.13: It is the very truth of the absence of the absolute *un-Deconstructible*, which leads Derrida to attest to a feeling of conflicted authorial multivocality, which denies the possibility of an absolute “I” which can utter “*c’est moi*” (French – “it’s me”), and thus guarantee a single, privileged meaning to a *Text* [166]. Like Kierkegaard’s Climacus [169], [170], Derrida asserts the reality of “*Becoming*” over that of “*Being*” in a world of radically unstable categories, where deeper interpretation is always possible [171]. The plurality of meaningful interpretations is accessed by extremely careful *Textual* “deconstruction” followed by equally painstaking “reconstruction” into novel internally-evolving forms [145]. Certain concepts or images are found to be irreconcilable with the rest of the *Text* and give rise to “interpretive sticking points” buried amongst “intricate networks of meaning” and “hidden levels of internal conflict” [162]. There are three general overlapping “moments” in the (re)(de)(con)structive reading of a *Text*. First, one identifies an implied hierarchical asymmetry in a postulated binary opposition; this opposition is shown to be false under certain conditions; this failure leads to the identification of new meanings and structures [119]. We note here that (re)(de)(con)structive methods resemble parts of the hermeneutics of Philo of Alexandria [172], [173], who according to the “Laws of Allegory” (“*Legum Allegoriarum*” [174]; and [175], 1:viii:73 and 1:xvii:102; [176], [177]) specifically sought out textual artefacts such as – ostensibly extraneous phrases; repetitions and omissions; alterations in register; novel combinatorial renderings; utilization of synonyms; word-play; particular usages of syntax; peculiarities. It has even been claimed that he went so far as to “bend” the reading of texts in order to wring out the last possible drop of meaning. Of course Philo believed that these “interpretative methods,” in the hands of the “right” interpreter, would bring forth the “Truth” – which is the position which Derrida antithetically opposed [178].

The positive “formidable question” as to “what is *Deconstruction*?” is one which even Derrida could give no “simple and formalisable response” [101], [102], [103], [104]. For, according to him, “All sentences of the type ‘*Deconstruction* is *X*’ or ‘*Deconstruction* is not *X*’ *a priori* miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false,” in that “*Deconstruction*” expressly (re)(de)(con)structs itself through the ontological denial of the “third person present indicative: *S IS P*” [102]. He expressly denies that *Deconstruction* is a “Method” but he does define *Deconstruction* as an empirical process; although it

is definitely not process of procedural nor of mechanical judgement [102], [179]. Nor is Deconstruction a Kantian-type “Critique” which would become inextricably lost in its own *contra*-dogmatic version of the Metaphysical Maze [102], [118]. Neither is Deconstruction a classical “Analysis” as all *Textual* components are inextricably independent and no set of them can be taken as fundamental and foundational elements in all cases [102]. Interestingly, Appignanesi *et al.* [120] also claim that the application of (re)(de)(con)struction to the Grand Structuralist Project itself is sufficient to explain the disappointing inability of the Project to construct a *meta*-system of appropriate power and descriptiveness. The fundamental failing of Structuralism is to set up a system which claims to escape from metaphysics whilst at the same time constantly lapsing into metaphysics itself when this is least expected [125]. In short, the whole Structuralist enterprise becomes ensnared in its own circular self-referentiality. In this vein Derrida has denied that Deconstruction is “Post-structuralist” but has instead called it an “*Anti-structrralist gesture*” [102]. Frank goes so far as to use the term “*Neo-structuralism*” to describe Deconstruction [180]. The apparently impossible, yet liberating, self-contradiction inherent in the (re)(de)(con)struction approach, is that it seeks to begin building new roads into philosophical discourse, without already knowing their course and destination. In this endeavour, Rorty sees a “*quasi-Transcendental*” fusion of Pragmatism and Transcendentalism [103], and here we should compare Derrida with Deleuze. This begs the question amongst contemporary metaphysicians as to where to place Deconstruction in the pantheon of modern ideas. The essence of Deconstructionist philosophy might be summarized by the contrast, and necessary tension, between two modes of thought proposed by Derrida – the first which sombrely focuses on its search for the origin of unified truth; the second which playfully diversifies its quest for plural truths [101], [102], [103], [104]. Derrida dreams of opening philosophy up and keeping it always fresh and alive by constantly avoiding the ever-present possibility of its fossilization into a set of dead approaches, methodologies, protocols, and regulations [114]. Both of these modes of thought, and the realization of the stultifying possibility of philosophical “sedimentation,” are inherent in the foundational Western intellectual archetypes of literature and metaphysics. Derrida claims that these only appear “natural” due to social consensus built up over millennia, but that in fact, they contain within themselves the seeds of their own overturning, since from the outset they are unable to provide the absolute guarantee of stable categorization which they promise. And he argues further that this overturning is a natural and necessary one – since it is only by determining the uttermost interpretative limits of such naturalized categories that one can transgress them and escape from the Metaphysical Maze. Deconstruction thus enshrines the requirement to abandon the “*alma mater philosophiae*,” the myth of total presence, in a move which simultaneously motivates, and completes, playful historical development.

How, then, can we position Deconstruction as a philosophical method, if at all? Allison situated Deconstruction as a “Critical Project” tasked with “taking apart” (but not with “eliminating”), the conceptual axioms and language at the heart of a whole philosophical era [118]. Rorty sees Deconstruction as the means by which a hidden “essential” reading of any text can be gleaned subversively and treacherously from a constellation of “accidental” (that is, “incidental”) features [103]. Caputo feels that Deconstruction allows thinkers to “crack the nutshell” of “paralyzing and impossible”

philosophical *aporia* [181] and thus to escape the Metaphysical Maze [104]. De Man (1919 – 1983) positions Deconstruction as *Textual* “self-undoing” through the “self-questioning” that arises when a Text’s grammar is tested against its rhetoric [182]. Ricoeur (1913 – 2005) reiterates the idea of Deconstruction as a process always of “questioning” the “answers” purportedly provided by a *Text* [183], [184]. The importance of this, in Blanchot’s terms, is that in saying anything at all we automatically say everything and so we must question all of language [185]. Questions are absolutely necessary as “desire’s thoughts,” always freely moving and turning doors silently, seeking the utter alterity of their answers, overcoming the limitations of dialectical thought. And, indeed, the most “*Profound Questions*” regarding the necessarily always-absent Truth are attractive, distracting, frightening, frivolous, and mortal. Comprehension only comes in drawing them over and over from the Void, allowing them to dissolve in their own language, and then returning them to the Void.

5.14: In terms of criticism, Snyder, seeking to “deconstruct Deconstructionism” from a religious viewpoint, dismisses it with reference to what he claims are “not only ontologically absolute but also epistemologically self-evident” Truths – namely that “reality is objectively knowable” – that “absolute Truth exists” – that “there is one way to Truth” – and that “there is one way to God” [186]. For him Deconstruction’s “extreme scepticism” and “fuzzy-minded pluralism” is “inherently self-contradictory” and thus “absolutely false” [186]. Wellek condemns Derrida’s work as reducible to language-games, metaphors, and puns, based in “extreme subjectivity” and “utter caprice” which ultimately destroys Knowledge and Truth themselves [187]. Searle criticizes Derrida for his lack of philosophical rigour, obscured by exaggerated attempts at finding fake depth in foolish non-paradoxes [188]. Habermas sees Deconstruction as irrational, and as over-reliant on linguistic analyses: these factors lead to the “performative contradiction” that Deconstruction “deconstructs itself” [189]. Foucault described Deconstruction as an unconventional “little pedagogy” that neverendingly seeks the “meaning of Being” not in the full *Text* itself but only in the “interstitial lattice” of the “crossings-outs” gleaned merely from “fragments” of the *Text* [190]. Ellis [191], as a vocal opponent of Deconstruction, is not quite so harsh as to claim that Derrida and his followers are totally in error. However, he does go to pains to try and demonstrate that Deconstruction is as truly revolutionary, or as revelatory, as it claims, but rather that it deals with extremely well-known and historically significant philosophical issues (such as correspondence and coherence theories of truth, the problem of knowledge-justification, issues of linguistic essentialism, authorial *versus* textual intentionality, and reference theories of meaning). He feels that the continued presentation of Deconstruction as a “heady brew,” so “new and exciting” [192], is a means of concealing “unthinking attitudes” bolstered by “rhetorical drama” instead of “logic, reason and analysis” [191]. For him, Deconstruction’s fundamental postulation of semiosis as “limitless, infinite, and indefinite” act of “*Play*” is a serious misrepresentation of Saussure’s observations regarding meaning-making through contextualized linguistic contrasts. The problem for Ellis is that on the basis of this, and other, misappropriations, Deconstruction seeks to dismantle all established theories without offering a means of constructing new and better frameworks. Whilst Rorty and other *anti*-Essentialists might not agree entirely with these sentiments, they would caution that the power of Deconstruction lies in its ability to generate a range of diverse

“external” and subjective readings (rather than to unearth any single “internal” or “objective” truth), each of which must then be open to further critical analysis [103], [142]. We should be careful here not to fall into the populist trap regarding the nature of Deconstruction, illustrated by the “tattooed, shaven-headed and gay behemoth of a singer” with the heavymetal / industrial / reggae band “Desalvo” [193]. He claims that the band produces pieces such as “Cock Swastika” – which he claims “is about castration and deconstructing masculinity” in an attempt to be subversive – although this attempt ends up being interpreted as a strange combination of the “meaningful” and the “ridiculous” by music journalists.

5.15: Kierans [194] and Norris [195], [196], advocate a more positive view of Deconstruction as an ongoing Hegelian, dialectical methodology which by its constant massaging and mangling, generates genuinely novel approaches and understandings. And here again we see the self-referential, evolutionary function of (re)(de)(con)struction at play. According to Kristeva’s allegorical “*Samurai*,” in a Deconstructivist reading, words are broken into their “minutest elements” to produce “flexible shoots” capable of being woven into ponderous, and inaccessible, yet profound, dreams [197]. This process forces philosophers and literary critics to face their own “transcendental stupidity,” which they do in a mixture of astonished silence and bitter irritation. Pyle, an early student of Kristeva’s, characterizes Derrida’s work as “rigorous and careful” in unveiling the “unseen,” and thus as “intellectually exciting and politically hopeful” [162]. Caputo summarizes the “genus” of Derrida’s approach as “brushing against the grain,” as exhibiting a “playfully punning style,” which is “calculated to madden everyone” [166]. Derrida’s legacy is that he provoked “*succès de scandale*” in insisting on the “contingency and context” required to comprehend the “historical construction” of Enlightenment “reason,” which induced a “coefficient of uncertainty” into all “favourite texts and institutions” [166]. However, despite the “devil in his eyes,” Derrida was promoting neither “joyous nihilism,” nor “reckless relativism” – like Socrates, Apostle Paul, and Kierkegaard, he was, most simply, upholding the immense importance of scrupulous scholarship, through detailed reading, intense criticism, and unabridged understanding [166]. Taking Deconstruction as a serious contributor to current thought, Beardsworth [179] sees it as innately political; and Critchley [198] feels that it is fundamentally ethical. Nancy accepts Derrida’s challenges and attempts to answer them rigorously in constructing a *post-Deconstructive* and “*un-Deconstructible*” socio-cultural politics [199].

5.16: We might think of Derrida’s semiotic (re)(de)(con)struction as instigating a revolutionary “geometrical” approach to symbolization (and, in consequence, to magic and psychotherapy). We recall that Saussure’s model of meaning-making posited an infinitely thin, two-dimensional “plane sign” with two separate surfaces (representing signifier and signified) which was oriented to place the privileged signified uppermost. Derrida’s revolutionary model twists the strip by 180° and then joins opposite edges together, to produce a new three-dimensional object with only *one* continuous “non-orientable” surface – what we might call a “Möbius-sign” [200]. Eco [201] described the mystery of infinite Möbius-semiosis in terms of a cosmic “onion” of meaning, centered everywhere and bounded nowhere. He states that the blessing of those “initiated” is that they can, and should, ceaselessly

exfoliate this onion, thereby forming endless new interconnected paths of signification from the “peel” [201]. In Lacanian topological terms this exhibits “*extimacy*” or “external intimacy” and it is well able to represent signification as a tortuous, “*ex-centric*” process [202]. It is now possible to “trace” a path down the centre of the strip, from a starting point in the signifier, all the way round the strip, passing through the signified, and returning smoothly to the initial point. In the vicinity of any particular meaning, two possibilities can be distinguished, but, globally, the meanings blend together – and these “local meanings” are only separated by the time taken continuously to traverse the signification. The inescapability of the *Trace* and the interminable twists and turns of semiosis can be further demonstrated geometrically. For on attempting to cut asymmetrically with respect to the path just described, right around the Möbius-sign, and hence resolve the Gordian problem, the twisted loop does *not* fall apart into two separate loops, but rather forms two smaller *interlocked* strips – one a Möbius-sign, and the other a doubly-twisted non-Möbius-sign! On cutting along the symmetric line, the result is a single long non-Möbius-sign. There is also an inherent “handedness” in our new chiral Möbius-signs [203], which depends on whether there is a “jump to the left” or a “jump to the right” [204] – clockwise is distinct from anticlockwise. We can here make a connection with various “bivalent” optical illusions such as the Necker cube, the candlestick-faces, and Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit which contain simultaneously the *One* and the *Other*, and which facet is perceived is dependent on the observer’s perception [205]. And if we allow a Time-warp to transport us backwards into our Collective Unconscious we find resonances with the self-consuming *Ouroboros* (from Greek “*ουροβόρος όφις*” – “tail-devouring snake”). This serpent is the ancient Egyptian symbol for eternal love and immortality [206], and in Jungian (1875 – 1961) terms represents transformation and individuation via resolution of paired oppositions along the *Ego – Self* axis [207]. Lacan saw how this continuous topology leads to the collapse of binary oppositions such as – inside / outside – love / hate – truth / appearance – master / analyst [208]. This insight creates the therapeutic space required to cut through the “*Borromean Knot*” uniting “*Real*,” “*Symbolic*,” and “*Imaginary*,” so allowing us to “*Traverse the Phantasy*” [209], to accept *Subjective* responsibility, and to acquiesce in the innocence of the *Other*, the *Object-Big-A* in the *Loss of the Imaginary Object of Desire*, the *Object-little-a* [210]. All of these issues will be discussed in detail below.

5.17: We recall also that *Ouroboros* is also the alchemical motif which represents the Nietzschean “*ewige Wiederkunft*” (German – “Eternal Return” or “Perpetual Return”) [55], [56], under which either a physically limited and materially finite Cosmos cycles endlessly throughout all Eternity [211]; or, under which, such a postulated cycling can be used as a philosophical tool to aid in psychological development towards the state of “*Übermensch*” (German – “Superior Man”) [55]. Here we might also cite Montaigne (1533 – 1592), a good Catholic who claimed “I rarely repent” and also stated that “If I had to live over again, I would live as I have lived” [212]. He saw his Self as “shapeless and diverse” as a “patchwork” of instantaneous and autonomous “past selves,” each of which “each moment, plays its own game” [212]. He thus embraced, and always attempted to learn from, his frailties, “failings” and uncertainties, an attitude which he saw as contributing in a tiny but necessary way towards the overall improvement of his Self, and thus towards that of all Humanity [213]. Based on his writings,

Bakewell urges us to “go with the flow” [214]. We do note, however, that Page [215] estimates the Poincaré Recurrence Time (in Planck Units [216]) [217] for an isolated Solar Black Hole in a rigid nonpermeable box with stationary boundary conditions to be a number with a base-10 “triple-logarithm” of about 77 (compared with base-10 “triple-logarithm” of about 0.3 for the age of the Cosmos). It is thus an inconceivably large “*hyper*-astronomical” length of time [218]. Nevertheless, at the “Gateway to the Moment” of recurrent symbolization we can say “Everything straight lieth ... All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle” (“*Of the Vision and the Riddle*,” Part III, chapter XLVI, section 2 [55]) – “The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust” ([56], aphorism 341). Or, as Hyatt puts it in terms of self-(re)(de)(con)struction – “where liveth the straight line lurketh the curve” [219]. Moreover, this sentiment is echoes in Ecclesiastes 1:9 – “*mah-shehâyâh hu' sheyyihyehumah-shenna'asâh hu' sheyyê'âseh ve'êyn kol-châdhâsh tachath hashâmesh*” [220] – “What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun” [221]. This is very much in accord with the conception of the “*Hermetica*” which sees cyclical natural laws governing a fundamentally changeless Cosmos in which both past and future are illusory [222]. Even the “now” is so fleeting as to be almost imperceptible, apart from the Timeless or Eternal perspective of the One. Moreover, as Pike [223] points out, Nietzsche certainly rejects the Aristotelian conception of an “unmoved mover” which identifies a beginning of the “time-loop” and sets it playing recurrently. It may be, however, that the Recurrence is a dreamlike mental phenomenon which is subjectively experienced by each individual [223]. In order to accommodate many perceiving beings in this scheme, we must abandon the notion of time as a “linear, four-dimensional matrix” and reformulate it as a complex, evolving, multiply-recurrent network, as postulated by Einstein (1879 – 1955) and Hawking [223], [224], [225]. And, here we can read [226] the Heraclitean “ever-changing river” ([227], DK B12, DK B91; [8], [9], and [228]) of time as meaning that every instant is a Cosmos in and of itself [223] wherein “*πάντα ῥεῖ*” (Greek – “everything is in flux”) [229] so that, paradoxically, “*εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν*” (Greek – “we are and we are not”) [8], [9]. This corresponds with Hölderlin’s theoretical appraisal regarding “*Das Werden im Vergehen*” (German – “Becoming in Dissolution”) in which he imagines the continuous creation of a new instantaneous “time and world” in the annihilation of the previous instant [230]. Along these lines, Barbour [231] conjectures that time consists in eternally-existing moment-Universes which are independently experienced by consciousnesses in a linear fashion. Thus, with a nod to Marvell (1621 – 1678), the “green shade” of the mind’s perception is generated through the continual organic death and rebirth of meditative “green thought” [232].

5.18: Moving on from cosmology, Weiss [233] takes a “linguistic turn” in reading the Semiotic Perpetual Return in terms of Jakobson’s categorizations of linguistic aphasia [234]. As eternal, unvarying recursion, enforcing dialectical continuity of past and present, it is akin to the “similarity disorders” [233]. These disrupt the selection and substitution of lexemes, and render meaning entirely context- and syntax-dependent, being governed by the external metonymic relations of presence and contiguity. Similarity disorders make *meta*-language, metaphor, tautology and translation impossible. Self-identity is thus clearly and permanently fixed, but incommunicable, since it is expressed in a

uniquely solipsistic idiolect. As a form of selection, driven by chance and seeking discontinuity, it is akin to the “contiguity disorders” [233]. These disrupt the syntactic organization of sentences, and render meaning entirely semantically-dependent, being governed by the internal metaphorical relations of absence and substitution. Contiguity disorders, in the worst cases, lead to “*aphasia universalis*” – the total breakdown of language. Self-identity thus disintegrates into a multiplicity of chaotic symbolizations which leave the sufferer speechless. Syed comments that all attempts to comprehend the Self introspectively and so to dispel the Cartesian “machine-ghost” are doomed to result in bizarre Self-referential experiments which naturally change the very Self under inspection [235]. For him we are thus doomed never to find understanding regarding consciousness, desires, or impulses simply by introspection.

5.19: However, there are two faults in this “linguistic-turn” analysis of semiotic meaning-making. This first is that it discusses the outcomes of more-or-less severe linguistic pathologies – and these are the uttermost limiting cases of normal semiotic function, only to be found in severely impaired individuals. The second, is that it assumes a purely deterministic order in semiosis, which defines absolutely and unvaryingly “*wie man wird, was man ist*” (German – “how one becomes what one is”) [236]. This implies that all human meaning-making must ultimately give itself up to the “*amor fati*” (Latin – “love of fate” [236], [237]) which this onesided Möbius-circularity might seem to entail. However, we will come to see that human language (and human thought) is not infinitely repeatable, without intrinsic, unpredictable, “psycho(a)logical” mutation. The recognition of this “Psycho-chaotic Semiotics” at work at the heart of both inner and outer communication, offers a liberation from the Nietzschean “*schwerste Gewicht*” (German – “heaviest weight”) [56] which is the curse of the unending, cyclic, repetition of meaning and behaviour [211]. Thus whilst it is true that the Psycho-chaotic Semiotics that emerges from the brain’s neural nets [238], [239] is both repetitive and selective – tragic and joyful – it is always already “psycho(a)logical” and heterogeneous, and thus unrepeatably and unsymbolizable in its entirety [240], [241]. Pike points out that under these chaotic conditions (which were not known in Nietzsche’s time), any infinitesimal change applied at any time, to the complex system which is a “human becoming,” can magnify exponentially as time progresses – although a close reading of Nietzsche does not support this specific modern scientific interpretation [223]. In the “*Hermetica*” earthly and impermanent human life is merely an illusory manifestation of the true permanent underlying reality. The endless inbuilt cycles of death and rebirth are necessary for the constant recreation of the Cosmos – the human Soul merely travels from form to form – and “The end of becoming / is the beginning of destruction. / The end of destruction / is the beginning of becoming” ([222], Chapter XV, lines 1 – 4). In living a life of striving after Godknowledge, the Soul becomes all Mind, and on death becomes Godlike, assuming a body of pure Light. Thus the irony (Greek “*εἰρωνεία*” – “deception, false ignorance, hypocrisy”) of true *Self*-knowledge is that by its very nature it is incommunicable, and yet one is nevertheless driven remorselessly in the attempt to express one’s *Self* to *Others* throughout life. In doing this, and finding shelter in the “House of Knowledge,” we become Minds, “like God” – *omni*-present, unborn-alive-dead – embracing all opposites – directly experiencing Truth. Thus, the “*Hermetica*” explains that we free ourselves from the “cloak of shadows”

– the “conscious corpse” – the “hateful enemy” – the “household robber” – the “living death” – the “portable tomb” – the “shackles of decay” – the “smothering garment” – the “web of ignorance” ([222], Chapter XVI, lines 46 – 55). Of course, the “*Hermetica*” is urging an escape from all these aspects of embodied existence, whereas the Psycho-chaotic Semiotic approach affirms that we can achieve transcendence in and through mundane bodily life. Nietzsche’s Recurrence can in this vein be read purely psychologically, as a call to be “worthy of this greatest of all deeds” – to “become gods ourselves” ([56], aphorism 125). Thus by flinging ourselves fearlessly into the “new sea of possibility” created by “God’s death” we exponentially increase our awareness, our power, and our active creation of life [223]. Unlike Christians and Platonists we are thus empowered to go “*Beyond Good and Evil*” – to embrace all aspects of life equally as beautiful in their own right, without objective condemnation of any experience [58]. The shackles upon living fall away and one becomes intoxicated in an artistic, Dionysian semiotic existence of “*vita gratia vitæ*” [242]. For the truly creative are the law-breakers, the belief-batterers, and the value-smashers [55]

5.20: Incidentally, as a result of the Psycho-chaotic nature of semiosis, the “playful” [223] path traced on the Möbius-sign is described as “*fractal*” (from Latin – “*frang-ō, -ere, frēgī, frāctus*” – “break”) [243]. It shows different degrees of self-similarity, when examined on different scales, and whilst each step in its construction obeys a simple rule, the overall pattern is too irregular to be described simply in “everyday” language [244], [245]. Hyatt expresses joyful understanding that this implies that human beings are “open-ended systems” [219]. Thus we are never fixed in Being, but rather we are always subject to the ebb and flow of Becoming. In terms of Gaarder’s [246] Semiotic Tarot [247], destiny is like a ravenous self-devouring serpent; an *equi*-inflating cauliflower head [248]; a set of mutually-unpacking nested boxes. And, this “family curse” requires a virally-immortal earth-walking Joker as Seer, who can live through, and interpret the Psycho-chaotic order according to its own ever-changing rules. The Sun pours forth inspiration on (Her)m(it), Tarot Card 0, the “blissfully ignorant embryonic child,” as (S)h(it) frisks on a crystal cliff’s edge, accompanied by a faithful dog [249]. Huets explains that this androgynous Joker, as unified “spirit on the edge of manifestation,” represents balance between positive and negative; the cusp between the exhalation of creation and the inhalation of destruction; embracing within circularity, all potentiality [249]. Pike [223], here points out that “Recurrence” provides a powerful tool for analysis of our personal narratives. If, on reflection, our self-searching is positive, then we can assign positive “artistic” value to our experiences. However, if, in contrast, it is negative, then we must learn to adjust our perceptions. We can also use Recurrence as a “helpful decision-making apparatus” [223] by asking the “... question in each and every thing, ‘Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’” ([56], aphorism 341) – which Tittle explains “will either crush you or lead you to transform your life” [250], dependent on the decision as to how “one were to live life as if it were to recur eternally” [250]. The Joker, symbol of imagination, enchanting and perilous, reminds us that imagination and ecstasy are siblings; that ecstasy itself treads a tightrope between sanity and madness; and that imagination only brings forth fruits when realized by action [249]. This means that if we so choose, we can create and ride our own tidal waves of experimental self-making. First, we experience enthusiasm and inspiration; then frustration and

disappointment (here depression, despair, fear, and laziness can drive us into regressive fantasy); from this, with perseverance, comes new enthusiasm and effort; and finally we achieve excitingly unpredictable results and satisfaction. And, having completed the cycle, we dissolve ourselves and begin the journey once more. And in accepting this terrifyingly creative challenge, Nietzsche tells us that, rather than despairing, you will become “well disposed to yourself and to life,” that you will “crave nothing more fervently than this eternal confirmation and seal” ([56], aphorism 341). And, in true (re)(de)(con)structionist style, Nietzsche’s doctrine of “Perpetual Return” must be read as warning us of the necessity of defeating the insidious human “*Will to Truth*,” which is in any case always just a sublimation of the fundamental *Drive* of the “*Will to Power*,” either positive or negative ([58], section 1). The frustrated discharge of the “*Will to Power*” was what initially generated the spark of human consciousness, and it rules all human faculties and behaviours – conscious and unconscious, logical and alogical, constructive and nihilistic, good and evil. For Nietzsche “truth” is merely a pragmatic “mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms” composed artistically by the human mind and then consented to in order to ensure communal consistency, docility, and security [251]. It is only by accepting that there is no single “absolute Truth,” but rather a spectrum of equally-viable “interpretations,” accessible to actively-seeking individuals, that we become psychologically free and able to live “well” in our allotted lifespans without recourse to external agents, props, rewards, or threats [252], [223]. Thus, the Joker supports nonconformity, and creative decadence, and opposes the overbearing rationality and purposiveness of Totalitarianism in all its forms [249]. Even falsehood can be acceptable when it is sincerely life-affirming ([58], aphorism 4). Fromm (1900 – 1980) supported this viewpoint in rejecting the dichotomous identifications “*absolute = perfect*” / “*relative = imperfect*” [253]. He held that there is no “absolute Truth” to be uncovered, but rather that science reveals functionally objective yet culturally-mediated “optimal Truths” which are subject to continuous revision.

5.21: Here, Clark claims that in the Postmodern world a painful bifurcation has occurred, since we today choose to seek “objective Truth” through the scientific exploration of “outer space,” and we have abandoned the quest for “personal Truth” through the cultivation of the hidden human worlds of “inner space” [254]. As a result of this externalized searching we find ourselves lost in infinite singularities, by becoming simultaneously all and nothing [254]. In this sense, Clark’s puzzlement arises from his religiously-motivated view that as human beings we always already have access to Truth compounded of Presences axiomatic and iconic of Oneness, Goodness, and God, as refracted through the scientific lens; and yet that in the Postmodern Age we now choose to ignore these obvious human insights. Now, Clark is at pains to point out that he is not rejecting “objective Truth” outright, but instead making a strong case for a return to “personal Truth.” In so-doing he strives to distinguish himself from the Postmodernists whom he interprets as saying that “there is no Truth” – although as discussed above, this is not in fact what Derrida claims at all. It is the case, though, that Postmodernism’s radical skepticism lacks sufficient grounding for the justification of value-judgements. Furthermore, as a negative critique, it is well able to expose assumptions, inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and omissions in opposing modes of thought; but, it does not necessarily provide a

framework for correcting these deficiencies, or for proposing new solutions [255]. Lyotard [109] supports what he calls “Paganism” in value-judgement. This involves casewise, open-minded pragmatism in making judgements based on detailed interrogation of evidence with respect to flexible metrics [255]. In this context [256] Khashaba [257] points out that the problem with “militant atheism” is that it tends to prescribe a “*Weltwissen*” (German “World-knowledge” [258], [259]) based on “purely objective” thought, derived solely through the restrictive empiricism of “purely objective” science. Zubiri urges us to go beyond such “classical” and “objective” notions of Truth as agreement between thought and thing, which, whilst applicable in certain very definite milieux, such as the practice of Law, fail dramatically in others, such as the realm of Art [260]. For him, Truth is primarily a property of reality itself, rather than of thought [261]. This “real Truth” allows reality to be actualized in intellection [261]. We recall here that Heidegger appropriated the Greek concept of “*ἀλήθεια*” and saw “*Truth = dis-closing*” or “*Truth = un-veiling*” to call for *Dasein*’s authentic ontological openness as the locus for the manifestation of embodied Truth.

5.22: From a Derridean-Lacanian viewpoint, Saal [145] summarizes this genealogy of “Truth as unveiling” by comparing Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. Heidegger could be said to have discovered the limits of ontology through the analysis of *Dasein* [61], but also to have remained trapped within them. Nietzsche, in contrast, succeeded in escaping ontology by the parallel utilization of a pragmatic theory of Truth derived from an underlying pragmatic theory of Belief, and a correspondence theory of Truth based on an understanding of reality as a “forcefield,” such that most “commonsense” Beliefs concerning existence are vitiated [211], [262]. Derrida would carefully query and tease apart the nature and means of interpretation of these “axiomatic presences” and “real Truths” in order both to gain knowledge, and to comprehend this knowledge wisely and without prejudice. With this proper treatment of the human search for enlightenment we can understand how metaphysics develops into classical physics, and this in turn metamorphoses into quantalphysics, and how, in the fullness of time, a revolutionary new magic will appear to bear Humanity forward. Derrida, finally, synthesized these viewpoints with his conclusion that one should not even to attempt to venture “beyond ontology” in order to find answers to the “Big Questions.” Thus we can agree with Turchin [0] that, for example, the concept of Hegelian “Absolute Spirit” [47], [48], [49], [50] lacks personal Truth for him, since he cannot extract pragmatic life-approaches from it; but this does not exclude the possibility that it might hold personal Truth for others, who can; nor the fact that it might at some point come to form the basis of some as yet unknown kind of objective Truth. The power of metaphysics thus lies in its potential for helping to shape realities as yet uncovered. And so, we must come to realize along with Wittgenstein that “The meaning of the world must lie outside the world” ([83], proposition 6.41), as was well understood by Jesus, who, when fasting in the Wilderness, rebukes his Questioner, saying “Man shall not live by {the} bread {of rationality} alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God” (Matthew 4:4 [221]). By this we understand the necessity for Humanity to begin to assert the magical “God-word” through artistic semiotic endeavours such as painting, performance, philosophy, and poetry, which empower us to wrestle with intractable cosmic enigmas, and in so-doing, to self-create fertile human logomyths [263].

5.23: Meister here warns of the perils inherent in the human drive to construct totally consistent, finite hermeneutic systems which are then applied to occult symbols in order to save and empower through the equation “*meaning = revelation*” [264]. For, on the cusp of exegesis, as Eco demonstrates, the vacant, slippery secret merely evaporates [201]. We note here that Gandhi (1869 – 1948), who was known in Sanskrit as “*Mahātmā*” or “Great Soul,” sought for “*satya*” (Sanskrit – “truth”) through lifelong self-experimentation. Whereas he first claimed that “God is Truth,” he came later to reverse this in his proclamation that “Truth is God” [265]. Moreover, Whitehead denied the existence of “full Truth” with the implication that the discoverable “partial Truths” can in fact lead one astray [266]. Thus Wittgenstein’s “*Tractatus*” [83], which claimed to solve all of philosophy’s major problems, simultaneously showed that such “intellectualizing,” and the resultant “solutions,” can be essentially meaningless [267]. Indeed, Eyres claims that music and poetry were possibly more meaningful to Wittgenstein than philosophy, and that his philosophical works themselves are rather “poetic,” having form that mirrors content, and creating “time and space to think” [267]. It is as if his posting on the Eastern Front in World War I, and the constant *memento mori* this entailed, changed the whole course of his thought. This moved from initial abstract and dusty considerations of method and system, to the later considerations of transcendental mysteries. In particular, his later ideas relate to the enigmas of “non-linguaged” reality and experience which utterly evade symbolization. Wittgenstein finally concluded that regarding the æsthetic, the ethical, the moral, and the religious, nothing can be “said,” but what is important can only be “shown” [83]. Farber [268] goes on to point out that mementities engage with and create “realities” through the application of epistemologies that encode presuppositions which, to humans, seem apparently alogical. Dunn [269] takes these ideas to their “psycho(a)logical” conclusions, in his development of a “Postmodern magic” (which I would call “Pragmagic”) in which, quoting Le Guin, Truth is “a matter for the imagination” [270]. Dunn, though, is quite clear, that this Truth is absolute, and yet multifaceted, nondogmatic, and personal – in the same ways as is Love. Horwich [10], meanwhile, adopts a controversial and apparently trivially mundane “minimalist” approach, wherein each proposition is taken simply as defining its own truth condition, thereby vitiating all of the above metaphysical entanglements. However, as Raatikainen points out, this “minimalism” invokes an infinitely-recursive symbolic “*w-rule*” [271] which would allow conclusions regarding truth to be reached only by an “idealized infinite mathematical super-being” [272]. Sutcliffe [273] here makes the point that in the arena of æsthetics, minimalism no longer represents “non-feeling,” but is rather the expected medium for modern public artworks. In this sense, white space is considered more truly “open” to receive any interpretation which an onlooker wishes to inscribe. And once more we cross the flimsy border between “fantasy” and “reality,” and through this “*anti-metaphysical revolt*,” we open the shadowy door to the “proud mysticism” of *neo-Gnosticism* as [274] – a topic we shall investigate in detail in work to come.

5.24: Grice (1913 – 1988) took the pragmatic point of view that communication must presuppose that an utterance is “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” on the basis of the maxims of relevance, quality and quantity – that is, that dialogic intercourse relies on the speakers’ appropriate

intent; on their truth-telling, and on their cooperation. Heidema and Labuschagne [275] do go on to point out that Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems can be overcome in an "absolute" sense by sequential composition of new provable sentences in a series of type-ramified *meta*-languages, together with a Reducibility Axiom [276], in an in-principally infinite regress devoid of any physical-ionic object representation. In terms of natural languages, in contrast, Li and Gleitman [277] discuss the relatively straightforward formal mapping from biologically pre-programmed conceptual spaces and mental representations onto the expressive linguistic systems used to describe them, in terms of ionic representations. In this context, Heidema and Labuschagne [275] further explain that the linguistic-semantic conception of "truth" can therefore only ever be approximate, since it by definition requires finite ionic representations. Lucas [278] asks whether human thought is a species of abstract symbolic algorithm-mapping which can therefore be described by a terminating Universal Church-Turing Machine [279], [280], [281]. Were this conjecture true, and the Machine also consistent, then it would be susceptible to the Incompleteness Theorems. Putnam [282] believes that the Theorems cannot be applied directly to inconsistent and error-prone human thought. However, he holds that they are in general applicable to abstract human rational computations (via science or mathematics for example) which are therefore either not provably consistent, or alternatively, non-representable in the Church-Turing sense. Hawking [283] came to the realization that Gödel's Theorems [284], [285], [286], [287], [288], [289] invalidate the physicist's dream of a "Theory of Everything" (that is the project to know "God's mind") from his consideration of Black Holes on whose non-existent boundary no information is available. Jaki explains that it is perfectly possible to construct a "Theory of Everything We Have Discovered up to Now" – but that this cannot be known to be necessarily complete [290]. He further holds that this leaves open the question of a "God-object's" free creation of the Cosmos [290], [291]. Bartley [292] contradicts this by positing that an omniscient God-object must know everything, and by then pointing out that this eventuality seems to be excluded by Gödel's Theorems. He does suggest though that in "some weird infinite way" a God-object might come to have self-referential, recursive knowledge of everything, including knowledge about its Self. In fact, Gödel himself went on to use modal logic [293] in formalizing Leibniz's elaboration of St Anselm's ontological proof of God's existence [294], [295]. This starts by defining a "*property*" as that which assigns a truth value to every existent object in every possible world; and by further defining a *positive* property as being one which is "morally-æsthetically" positive, or positive through *pure attribution*, with the exclusion of any privation. The "object" *G* called "God" in some world possesses the "God-property" such that all positive properties are true for *G* in that world. He goes on to argue for the necessary existence of a unique *G* in every possible world. This proof relies on the assumption that the conjunction of positive properties is itself positive; and more fundamentally, on the axiom that necessary existence is a positive property. Sobel [296] and Anderson [297] later revised Gödel's proof to avoid such problems, with the consequent redefinition of the postulated God-object. Hawking and Mlodinow [298] go on to explain that the scientific development of "M-Theory" [299] at the start of the 21st Century, requires eleven spacetime-dimensions, and that the "compactification" of the "extra" seven space-dimensions results in the necessary existence of a "Multiverse" which is a set of Universes the number of which has a base-10 logarithm of 500. Under these circumstances no God-

object is necessary to explain Creation since the “spontaneous generation” of the Multiverse is a necessary consequence of the “Godlike” M-Theory. Thus for Hawking, “philosophy is dead,” and metaphysical-æsthetic yet testable physical theories must come to take its place [224].

5.25: In considering such complex and paradoxical issues Wittgenstein (in “*Propositions under 6*” of [83], and as abridged in [300]) was led to conclude that we must accept that transcendental logic is a straightforward mirror-reflection of reality rather than a doctrinal corpus; and that mathematics is a logical method, and as such that its propositions do not represent thoughts. In fact, the World’s very existence is the true mystery, and the true “meaning” of Creation lies outside of itself, to the extent that Wittgenstein claimed that his own *Propositions* must be recognized as senseless to one who had used them to reach that very alogical conclusion. Doxiadis *et al.* [301] use these observations as the basis of their comments that pure, undiluted, logical reasoning can never reveal answers to the “basic questions” of “frail human life” – questions regarding emotions such as love, desire, and disappointment. Ironically, we find that any quest for “ultimate reason” is itself, ultimately, unreasonable. True “human” knowledge strongly requires the integration of extreme complementary binarisms such as – head and heart – sanity and madness -- reason and passion – logic and emotion [292]. Penrose [302] further suggests (with no formal proof, however), on the basis of the Church-Turing Thesis [303] of recursive computability [304], that the “insightful” human mind might operate on the basis of “non-algorithmic” [305] (and perhaps quantalmechanical [306]) computation. These ideas are to some extent supported by Rapp’s [307] experiments, which show that the brain becomes more electrically chaotic when problem-solving, compared with its resting state [308]. Lord Rees of Ludlow believes that the human mind-brain is reaching the “limits of comprehension” due to its evolved biophysical structure, a view supported by Stannard [309]. They think that Humanity might never, in its current form, understand such “mysteries” as – “Parallel Universes” – the “Big Bang” – the “Nature of Consciousness” – the sought-after “Grand Unified Theory” of Quantum Gravity – “String Theory” – the “Graininess of Space” – “Embedded Dimensions” – or the “Eleventh Dimension” [310].

5.26: Here, DeLillo reminds us that deterministic chaos is constantly with us as a nonlinear, intangible “basic, closely-woven, deep, fine-grained” feature of reality [311], [312]. Here we must be careful to define “chaos” technically, not as a synonym of “random” or of “irrational,” but rather as a term which implies “underlying, highly complex, hidden, deterministic order” [312]. It is suggested that most, but not all, randomness is underpinned by chaotic complexity [313]; we may well ask whether “pure unadulterated randomness actually exists” in circumstances other than the decimal expansion of the number “ π ” [312], [313]. In other words, *pseudo*-randomness begets chaos, and we ask whether there is beyond this a “theoretical horizonless horizon” of “pure randomness” [313]. Chaos produces patterns which are “determined albeit unpredictable” and are this “not pure randomness at all” [313]. Between randomness and chaos lies the “grey no man’s land” of “Falk’s Pale,” the terrain of apparent, although not actual, randomness, which might be called “fool’s randomness” or the “footprint of chaos” [313]. Even sequences of purely random events or numbers exhibit patterns of “random repetition” inside themselves [313]. Hence “*Das Unheimliche*” (German – “the {chaotically} uncanny)

[314] is not hallucinatory but rather represents information that exhibits a complex occult structure whose context and meaning await discovery [312]. Chaos is so basic to human life that its effects extend from control of mundane “supermarket dynamics” on the one hand [313]; to the complex psycho-behavioural nexuses which can cause people on occasion to writhe on the ground, speaking in tongues, on the other [311]. Moreover, the characterization of complex order or of catastrophic disorder depends critically on one’s point of view. It is left to the spectators [315] to discern their own “*Rules of the Game*” [316] and so to determine the outcome of their observations. If they do not, then a magical play of apparently lucid ideals and fabricated cultural conventions can conspire to provide unwavering reasons with which to oblige them to act against their own deepest beliefs [317]. The point here is that reductionism can lead to the “interpretative trap” whereby one always expects an “unbearably beautiful” ordered “answer” to come forth from the chaotic labyrinth as a result of sufficiently critical reflection. We thus seek “protection” from “psychological anxiety” in unending riddling whose cyclical “symbolic exchanges” we believe will vitiate our death-paranoia [318]. However, the gift of Postmodernism is one of “sublime incomprehensibility,” namely the understanding that “Being exceeds Knowledge” [319]. The world of absurdity, accident, ambiguity, and death is not at all fully factual and lawful, but rather it is catastrophic and viral [318]. Indeed we come to learn that it can only be properly described “fractally” through satirical irony which takes in contradictions, fissures, oppositions, revisions, and disorganization [320]. The predicted perpetual perfection of comedy and romance, and the tragic ideal of submission to overarching cosmic laws, both give way to the understanding that existence is doomed to eventual entropic heat-death and frozen-in chaos [319]. Lyotard reads this “sublimity” as meaning that reason is circumscribed, that knowledge is partial, that control is limited, and that ungovernable *Différance* and *Otherness* are fundamental to human life [255], [321]. Here we must accept the importance of art in addressing the “Human Condition” [322]. Plato was the first to hold that art is a form of cognition of the Universal [323]; Schiller, that it is a playful expression of excess energy [324]; Coleridge (1772 – 1834), that artistic imagination transforms raw sense-data into new forms [325]; Croce (1866 – 1952), that art provides a specialized immediate intuition of particular and individual details [326]; and Lyotard, that art attempts to address the chaos and uncertainty of life by “presenting the unrepresentable” [327]. The only appropriate theatrical register for this tale of human imperfection and of cosmic dissolution is farce, which embraces the relativity of reference-frames; the historiological openness of chaology; and the interactional indeterminacy of quantum mechanics [328]. It can here be argued onto-teleologically that the unpredictable *YaHWeH* (unvocalized Hebrew – “הוה”) of the “*TORaH*” (vocalized Hebrew – “תורה” – “teaching”) is “randomness incarnate” – “pure, unadulterated randomness” – who “punishes randomly” in order to terrify his free-willed creations into obedience [313]. Kant, in contrast, argued for the existence of “God” exactly because he saw the ordered evolution of Nature from Chaos [329]. Postmodern chaos-spirituality “re-enchants” nature by reintroducing the magic and mystery previously banished by mechanistic and reductionist science [330], [331]. In fact, the “emergent behaviour” and “self-organization” seen in complex open systems is described creatively in mystical, animistic terms by various authors [332], [333], [334]. This “mysticism,” together with what is seen as the over-liberal, inaccurate, and “corrupted” use of

restricted scientific vocabulary, has sparked “science wars” [335], [336] between the “superstitious” [337] and “nonsensical” [338] romantics on the one hand, and the rationalist “scientists” on the other [339]. “*Essendi Incantatores*” seek to bridge the gulf between experiential “*joie de vivre*” and languaged exegesis by finding the hidden narrative code or subtext in apparent randomness. In framing such speculation, they assert their creative, artistic independence from the dominant controlling scientific discourse, although not necessarily with the intent of bringing about its violent downfall [312].

5.27: We might well claim then that we are in dire need of an “*anti-philosophy*” which represents the “wisdom of love” or “wise loving,” and which wrestles with “philosophy” as the mere study of impersonal data, facts, and information as “means to an end,” becoming an “end” in its own right. Thus “*anti-philosophy*” is the necessary and complementary dialectical *anti-eidos* to “philosophy” as *eidos*. This inquisitive attitude of “wise loving” is described passionately in “*Introduction to Philosophy*” of the *neo-Platonist* David, a pseudonym for a philosopher of c 6th Century CE [340]. In this, we follow Serrès’ [341] derivational reversal and to distinguish carefully “*philosophy*” from the putative “*sophophilia*” (the “love of wisdom”); neither is it “*sophology*” (the “study of wisdom”); nor is it “*philognosis*” (the “facts of love”); nor even “*gnosophilia*” (the “love of knowledge”). We thus come to understand a radical “*anti-philosophical*” stance [342] as defined in negative terms in the Philosophical Manifesto of Badiou [343], and in positive terms in the *anti-Philosophical Manifesto* of Palomo-Lamarca [344]. Bosteels [345] identifies this attitude and approach to *anti-philosophy* in thinkers as diverse as Althusser, Borges, Heidegger, Heraclitus, Hume, Kacem, Kierkegaard, Lacan, Nietzsche, Pascal, Apostle Paul, Rorty, Rousseau, Vattimo, Wittgenstein, and Žižek. At its “invariant core,” *anti-philosophical* intellection partakes of some or all of the following features. 1. It treats epistemology and ontology as fundamentally linguistic; 2. It postulates a domain of meaning, knowledge, and sense that is bounded by language and irreducible to “metaphysical” truth; 3. It denies that this domain is accessible through the systematic development of new concepts or theories, but affirms instead that it can be reached by “radical acts;” 4. It teaches that truth is a historico-cultural phenomenon subject to language-based analysis (the results of which can appear mocking) [345]. *Anti-philosophy* thus embraces consideration of Constructivism, Mysticism, Nominalism, Radicalism, and Sophistics. In this view, *anti-philosophy’s intellectual* task is to use practically the methodology of love to find that which we understand by wisdom; that which lies beyond ordinary scientific, rational, linguistic or logical discourse concerning knowledge. Here, we hold that “*σοφία*” (“*sophia*”) in its wisdom, and contrary to tradition, is actually courting “*φιλία*” (“*philia*”), the love which lies in wait to be discovered as the ultimate essence of philosophy. In so doing, philosophy overturns itself in revealing wisdom as mere means to a more formidable, *emotional* end. We adopt Lévinas’ (1906 – 1995) definition of philosophy as “The wisdom of love in the service of love” [346]. Here *sophia*, the Platonic love of answers, theories, and paradigms, is seen as providing us with the tools of application, context, experience, perspective, and sense-making, with which we can replace the tyranny of cold, detached, impersonal “*λόγος*” (“*logos*”), with the messy, enchanting joy of living, loving *philia*. Maxwell echoes this with his call to revolutionize the goals and

methodologies of intellectual investigation [347], [348] in order to produce a grass-roots “*Rational Science of Delight and Compassion*” [349] through which we can wisely create values, and thus enhance the world.

5.28: The child-like philosophical spirit is born out of “*neophilia*” – endless curiosity and a deep sense of wonder, amazement and fascination [350]. It emanates boundless energy, visceral enthusiasm, and unrestrained desire [351]. It is inherently driven to explore further, and to engage more fully, with the environment, and to extend the frontiers of consciousness [352]. It breaches the sheltered, sacrosanct barriers of language, social ritual, cultural emblem, public institutions, expert professions, political discourse, collective narratives, private lives and binding emotional relationships [353]. Reality, in contrast, is content with a limited, passive and ultimately insignificant role. It wants to *Be*, not to *Become*, and eschews relationship and transcendence [354]. Philosophy’s intoxicating methodologies demand of us that we cherish lifelong exploration, in which explorer and explored both lose themselves in finding a new unity. Thus, truly creative philosophy enables and frees us, so that we do not to become ensnared in intellectual traps of our own making [355]. In Einstein’s terms, words are but “empty sounds” and alone, “knowledge is dead” [356]. For him, real “human knowledge” is unceasingly made afresh; and individuals create their personalities through hard work. For productive life the generic skills of independent thought and judgement are the appropriate tools for adaptability, change, and progress, not simply the accumulation of detailed knowledge. Here, Simove reminds us that knowledge alone is “flat” and that true creativity comes from making connections [357]. Nithyananda warns us that knowledge of data, facts, and statistics amounts to no more than mere “chattering words” [358]. Whereas the mind encodes and processes knowledge, and struggles discordantly to “calculate” love; the heart, in contrast, feels love, and rejoices in existence as it flows harmoniously. The pursuit of such “externalized” knowledge as a measure of human worth results in alienation from, and objectification of, others. We may either become complacent about the past; or, consumed with fear, greed, and worry for the future. At the same time, we neglect the subjective power of “internalized” knowledge which celebrates the present. Thus we oscillate between joy and misery. For Kimura, wisdom is transformational in its critical intuitive insights which set out the limits and possibilities of knowledge [359]. Wisdom provides the “active awareness” and the “living context” in which feeling, knowing, and willing unite. And so we come to understand along with Grudin that “Excellence of mind itself, rightly conceived, is expertise in beauty; creativity is wise love” [360].

5.29: Buckingham [361] reminds us that the Epicureans’ philosophy [362], [363] celebrated the virtue of friendship, and Lakoff and Johnson [364], [365] tell us that all philosophy is profoundly human-centered, embodied and based in physical reality. Thus the subject matter of philosophy is the messy creative flux at the bloody, beating heart of “real life” – the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of James [240]. It therefore demands a conceptual shift in reasserting the primacy of the knowable-world (“*ontōn*”) over abstract knowledge (“*epistēmē*”) [366] in order properly to perform as an “instrument for the organization and interpretation of experience” [367]. In this sense, Oakeshott (1901 – 1990) opines that philosophers are not simply scholars, and that philosophy is often not simple scholarship; moreover, whereas erroneous historians or scientists might be berated for their ignorance, mistaken

philosophers should rightly be called stupid [368]. Indeed we might say that philosophy's tender lesson is that the ever-elusive "thing-in-itself" ("*noumenon*") [369], [370], [371] is so slippery, *because* it is always-already embodied within the consciousness of the observer [372]. We might thus well recognise this "philosophizing consciousness" as the Sanskrit term "*bodhicitta*" [373], [374] – the "awake-mind" (or "heart-awareness") which unites thought and compassion in an active "embodied loving" rather than in a passive "abstract philosophy" [361]. To paraphrase Adyashanti and vos Savant: whereas "knowledge surrenders to study, wisdom un.masks love" [375], [376]. The true arena of philosophical application is thus the loving exploration of heart-consciousness through the shared acknowledgement and exploration of the emotion, irrationality, and alogicality at the core of human existence. Wise-loving frees us by allowing us to exercise and experience compassion which is always wise, and wisdom which is always gentle [361].

5.30: In its ever-expanding search for fully coherent explanations, philosophy demands and thrives on rigorous and systematic dialogue with all forms of dogma, mysticism, irrationality and misology. Kimura recognizes this self-searching, often paradoxical ideas of the Eastern esoteric "mystico-metaphysical traditions" as being mirrored in the *anti*-philosophical Western "spirito-philosophical impulse" of the *neo*-Platonists Plotinus (c 204 – c 270) and his successors [340], [377]; the German Mystics Hildegard of Bingen (1098 – 1179), Mechthild of Magdeburg (c 1207 – c 1293), Eckhart of Hochheim (c 1260 – c 1327), Jacob Böhme (c 1575 – 1624), and Angelus Silesius (c 1624 – 1677) [378], [379]; the German Idealists Kant (1724 – 1804), Fichte (1762 – 1814), Schelling (1775 – 1854), Hegel (1770 – 1831), Schopenhauer (1788 – 1869), and Hartmann (1882 – 1950) [380], [381]; and the New-thought Transcendentalists Villanovanus (1235 – 1311), Swedenborg (1688 – 1772), Emerson (1803 – 1882), Evans (1817 – 1889), Hopkins (1849 – 1925), and Troward (1847 – 1916) [382], [383]. We could summarise all these teachings as seeking a wise-loving with which to aid *Being* in its evolutionary *Becoming*. Philosophical argument instantly uncovers layers upon layers of thinking, multiplicity and diversity of phenomena, and a myriad of methodological perspectives and outlooks [102]. It initially welcomes, indeed embraces, seemingly illogical notions such as paradox, conundrum, conceptual inconsistency, self-refutation, vicious circle and mutually exclusive juxtaposition – as necessary means to an end [384]. It seeks out the basic assumptions, implicit narratives, undeclared belief-systems, unwritten or unacknowledged subtexts, hidden *meta*-concepts, and the stubborn presence of unexamined principles [385]. Eventually this leads to the central moment of Husserlian "*epochē*" (Greek "*ἐποχή*" – "suspension") the mid-dialogue point where all prior disparate claims regarding "reality" converge and collapse into an inevitable and unavoidable web of contradictions [115], [116], [117], [386]. The core idea is then developed into an invaluable new element in a comprehensive ideational link-up, a logico-philosophical linguistic framework, and a blueprint for expanded explanation [83].

5.31: On this journey philosophy necessarily generates methodologies for the pursuit of knowledge, understanding and precise formulation [387]. It aims to get to the core of things, to follow a reductionist paradigm, to pursue enlightenment and understanding, to bridge the divide between

matter and non-matter, to embrace spectra and continua in their entirety, to address the paradox of “consciousness” as being simultaneously an essential part of reality and its seer-teller [388], [389]. It possesses a horizontal dimension – connecting, linking and bridging across a variety of issues, topics, subject areas, points-of-view, forms of presentation, academic disciplines, intellectual positions, and items of content. It simultaneously stretches along a vertical dimension – emphasizing, highlighting, focusing and zooming-in on the unique essence of the singular, the particular, the specific, the specialized and “the thing” – anything – “in itself.” Eventually, the horizontal and the vertical are united. Singularly expressed ideas and viewpoints, once articulated, embark on a trajectory of expansion, development and reciprocal engagement with one another. They then cross-fertilize and bridge, forming ever-growing *meta*-narratives in which the connecting aspects of apparent dichotomies supersede the apparent divide [390]. The utilization of creative imagination allows aggregation, incorporation, and integration [391]. This identifies, defines, associates, and integrates multi-aspects of reality and mind into a holistic conceptual totality [392]. This allows the reintegration of centre and periphery, foundation and edifice, potential and actual, past and present, hidden and manifest, atom and universe, idiosyncrasy and norm, ridiculous and sublime, transient and permanent [393]. The static, singular, and uniform position “within” blossoms into the dynamic, plural, and diverse realm “inbetween” [394]. Moreover, far from pursuing a convergent path, philosophy seems to go on creating, procreating and reinventing itself exponentially [395]. One might credibly argue that there are simply many, various “philosophies” [396] – in the plural – rather than an overall, overarching singularity [397]. As all of these inter-related, and sometimes competing, schools, methods, and ideologies flourish, mature, and die, the concept of “philosophy” as “wise loving” alone persists, and retains its *meta*-function as the “mother” or “matrix” of them all [398]. And yet it is a critical mother who insists on chastizing her children in their encounters with *Being* and *Becoming* [399], [400]. Whether through the idiom of folklore or street-talk, no aspects of life escape, as they are eventually discussed and digested philosophically [401].

5.32: Life and death; right and wrong; love and sex; art, religion, politics, and science: these are all grist to the philosophical mill [402]. This mission involves constant pursuit, rather than arrival: it is the investigation which counts, not the accumulation of knowledge [403]. In fact, the crux of the philosophical enterprise might be taken as submitting to the loving-wisdom of knowing that we do not know – and that we never can know – everything in a single overarching totality [404]. Nevertheless, the *process* of philosophical discourse offers a powerful ongoing questioning and critique in its overarching and underpinning mission to analyze and to synthesize, to abstract the universal from the particular, to integrate and to differentiate, to aggregate and to juxtapose, to comprehend historical beginnings and conclusions, to instruct and to play, to reconcile the immanent and the transcendent, to comprehend that which persists in the light of that which is shed [405]. Its lifeblood is the constant corruption of answers in the childlike generation of new questions [406]. It teaches us that we must have the courage constantly to fragment and disrupt, in order to rebuild and evolve, in our never-ending search for meaning in life [406].

5.33: Schopenhauer [46] diagnosed a fundamentally horrific antinomy at the heart of human life [407].

For, if one attends only to the most significant features of individuals' lives, against the generic background of their human existence, one sees terrible, miserable, tragedies. However, if one inspects all the particular moments in specific detail, then the lives appears as mocking black comedies. In short, human beings might be said to require a satisfying though sometimes mortally-difficult struggle against diversities in order to avoid *ennui*, to evolve, and to self-create [407]. Schopenhauer denied self-indulgence in the Nietzschean "gods' laughter" and instead urged Humanity to turn to morality to protect itself from the horrors of existence. Nietzsche himself, in contrast, chose to laugh manically with the gods, and urged an attitude of "moral æstheticism" which embraces the horror of existence [55], [407]. The polarity between these two views ties in with Watson's fictional *Xemahoa* people [408], amongst whom youngsters, women, and the senile indulge in weak and despicable Profane Gaiety. Men must choose to perform strong Soul Laughter in order to prevent bad things getting into their mouths past their word-master tongues whilst they are not speaking, and stealing their Soul Words. Women, though, keep their Soul Words within their genitalia, and they are thus safe to chortle with Stupid Gaiety, although they are still banned from magical self-embedding-language ceremonies. We will leave aside for the moment Nietzsche's "monstrous" suggestion [409], and briefly explore the advice of Schopenhauer [407]. In this view, philosophy, as "ethics," is, fundamentally about making sense of living [198], [410], [411]. Its scope thus extends beyond morality, religion, party line, and any other formulation of right and wrong, sacred and profane, just and discriminatory, proper and improper, good and evil. It embraces life in its full glory with all its difficulties, complexities, absurdities, and contradictions in order to access its infinite possibilities. Philosophical morality is based on the understanding and acceptance of human relationships [412]. These are seen as comprising a dynamic social and interpersonal process, originating in deep resentment, and likely repressed emotion, following a series of provocations and breakdowns, storing and building up hostility towards others, and ending up in harmful action [413], [414]. This fatal sequence involves an entropic reciprocity of events that blurs the distinction between cause and effect, and thus dissolves the boundary between perpetrator and victim, which become indistinguishable, and merge [415]. Morality is an enriching process of "passing on" responsibility, which shifts from a unidimensional, simplistic, socioreligious dictum of individual self-responsibility, towards an integrative, circular and systemic notion of reciprocal inter-responsibility [416]. It provides a framework in which to judge deeds and events – either on the basis of intent, or on the basis of outcome. The drama of morality is fully anchored in the "inbetween" [417] in the conflicts arising between minds of different inclinations. Thus only the meeting of minds and the understanding of what this entails provides the compass for an enlightened morality [418], [419].

5.34: From this vantage point we see that philosophy demands that we constantly acknowledge the often undecidable inbetweenness of existence, and that we must therefore constantly make and re-make relationships: between ideas, between things, and between people [420]. Like a virus, philosophy simultaneously moves inwards to invade the core, and outwards to embrace the totality, of these relationships, embedding new ideas in the cultural psyche [421], [422]. It forces us constantly to re-evaluate the fluid relationship between *Self* and *Other*, in the basic human search for congruence

and authentic personal identity [423], [424]. At the very heart of philosophy lies conversational dialogue (as opposed to solipsistic monologue, or to tumultuous polylogue) between a reflectively interacting and relating group of participants [425]. Given “large enough” samples, over “sufficiently long” times, and asking “suitably phrased” questions, opinions solicited will tend to spread along the appropriate statistical distribution curve. This process of solicitation reveals the overall population’s basins of conceptual attraction, spread of opinions, underlying assumptions, modalities of ideation, and outliers from the dominant mental landscape [426]. Such an approach allows theoretical perspectives to be constructed much more easily from a continuum of ideas across the spectrum; and the full glory of difference and variation become the hallmark of such intellectual exchanges [427]. We believe that the very societal developments valorized throughout the past three thousand years have led us to a place of “slavery-through-freedom” [428] *via* our subjugation to the “drive for knowledge” [429] embodied in culture, media, politics, religion, and science [430], [431]. We claim that the only way to escape this tyranny is to dare to engage in robust, powerful, and relentless debate with cherished notions and institutions, in order not merely to destroy, but to enable new growth and expansion of ideas [432].

5.35: We thus come to an understanding of the importance of Existential-Phenomenological Psychology as developed by Binswanger (1881 – 1966) [433], Boss (1903 – 1990) [434], and May (1909 – 1994) [435], in which Existential anthropology is embedded in Phenomenological ontology. In this Heideggerean conceptual framework, the uncanny *Logos* of the psyche’s *Being* self-articulates in answer to the “*Saying*” of Heidegger’s “*Ereignis*” (German – “Appropriation Event”) [61], [436]. In this *Event* meaningful “things” address the dynamic, open psyche, and call it to respond through understanding and action in co-creating new contextualized meanings [437]. *Ereignis* is not a static, reified, factual concept proceeding from a “primal origin” along a timeline; rather it is a dynamic, relational understanding that perpetually evolves [438]. The *Saying* is the “relation of all relations” which shows itself but is always unspoken in human speech [439]. The primal answer to this *Saying of Being*, to which mortal speech is ever silent comes through an anti-philosophy which unites the simultaneously close, and yet divergent, modalities of “thought” and “poetry,” which offer an ontological description of “meaning” as the “fabric” of *Being* [438]. The marvellous poetic singing-saying “lets be” our human wor(l)d in the gods’ (pre)(ab)sence without seeking to ground it or to explicate it, and this begets thinking [438]. The “scarcely definable” act of thinking is the remembrancing of ancient, essential, originary, primordial correspondences [440]. The uncanny, inhuman, and occult *Event of Saying* revealed in the originary thrust of heritage, and the teleological call of destiny is not in itself meaning(ful)(less) but rather provides the “null ground” which precedes and configures all latent meaning. The *Event* mysteriously “bethings” meaning(ful)(less) things by unconcealing and presencing them within a meaning-context [439]. The wondrous saying of poetry which calls us forward to our destiny is symbiotic with the memorial remembrancing of thinking which thrusts us onwards from our heritage in the *Event* of unfettering the wor(l)d-copula. The break-off of the word means the break-up of the world and the break-down of meaning – it inserts an “is” which fragments the wor(l)d, and submerges relationships in silence [439]. It is under these conditions that

we plait the broken threads of our linguistic wor(l)d-dwelling, unknowing of the hidden, uncanny powers at work in the secret depths of our *Being* [75]. Psychic healing occurs as the therapist helps clients in (re)appropriating their previously distorted, disturbed, or hidden inner potentialities [434].

5.36: There are thus many conflicting and competing philosophical views on how to answer questions regarding epistemology (“truth”) and ontology (“being”) and how these relate to logic (“reasoning”) and phenomenology (“experience”). For example, we have Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Hegel’s historico-cultural Dialectic, Hodge’s and Kress’s Social Semiotics [441], Derrida’s Deconstruction, Foucault’s Power-Knowledge Dialogic, and Penrose’s mathematical return to Platonic Idealism [442]. Rorty [443] points out that the Enlightenment Project swept away the ideas of religious theologies based in revealed Truth and invoking an unmeasurable supernatural Reality in favour of secular rationality based in objective Truth and presupposing an actual empirical Reality [444]. However, the achievements of the Enlightenment, allowed to develop without restraint, are seen in the Modern Age [445] to lead to reductive scientific hegemonies, and to the *quasi*-sciences of Communism and Fascism [446]. In the light of all these complicated and often apparently conflicting philosophical ideas, and amidst the onslaught of information thrust at us by media and technology in the 21st Century, Grassby baldly asks the question: “*How Can We Believe Anything?*” [447]. He begins by adopting a position of “Ethnomethodological Constructivism” coupled with “Sociological Positivism” [448], [449] in his view that human beings are genetically and culturally programmed incessantly to seek out, to construct, and to modify patterns and relationships in the biological, physical, socio-cultural, interpersonal, and internal-mental realms. He contends that “truth” (epistemology) and “being” (ontology) are subjective human constructs hardwired into the brain’s structure, mediated by the senses, and shaped by interactions with the cultural and physical environment. Truth is “made” as a practical “implicate” of human being and acting and there is no simple correspondence between “objective reality” and “subjective concepts” (to use Schrag’s terms) [450].

5.37: Grassby goes on by attempting to identify the “true” status of the evolved, universal, innate, instrumental, human “cognitive essence” [447]. In order to find out we can deconstruct Descartes’ “*Cogito*” to reveal: an autonomous Self (“*I*”); an idealized subjectivity (“*think*”); a reasoning faculty (“*therefore*”); and ontological objectivity (“*am*”). But here there is a paradox, for is the “*am*” truly objective, or is it in fact subjectively coupled to the “*I think*”? Kant answered by advocating that the absolutely necessary *a-priori* “subjective conditions” of cognition must be taken as “objectively valid” [369]. Grassby goes on to argue that the emergent, historical and contingent “cognitive essence” consists in: an autonomous core Self; a universal rationality; and a “universal grammar” that generates the “be” which drives both epistemology and ontology [451], [452], [453], [454], [455], [456], [457], [458]. On this basis, rationality is an evolved, universal, innate, instrumental, human, analytical cognitive tool which necessarily yields subjective, human-specific conceptual constructs regarding both epistemology and ontology. It is an *a-priori* for the formation of belief-systems, which to be useful must be rationally coherent, although they are not rationally determined. The *quasi*-Idealist, analytic *a-priori* necessary for conceptualizing independent of empirical experience consists in: rationality, the

ontological “be” of “being,” universality, and autonomy. The *quasi-Realist*, synthetic *a-priori* necessary for conceptualizing dependent on empirical experience consists in: empiricism, the epistemological “be” of “truth,” causality, and spacetime. We here define “knowledge” as rational, *trans-cultural*, universal human-specific information, in which we have confidence, and which has general empirical utility. The combined synthanalytic *a-priori* allows the determination of human-universal knowledge about empirical “facts,” about mathematics, and about science. In this view, human “knowledge” about the *noumenon* (whatever such a thing may be, and if such a thing even exists) is determined entirely through knowledge of the *phenomenon* (that is, phenomenologically), by subjectively contingent perceived experience. In contrast to “knowledge,” we define “belief” as individual, culture-specific, locally-arising, and non-empirically-determined assertions such as those encoded in “social narratives,” which have variable behavioural-instrumental utility. Human knowledge does not have the absolute status of transcendental “truth,” but rather it has the provisional status of empirically, instrumentally, pragmatically, and rationally “workable” belief. The “strongest” knowledge is of “scientific facts” which we observe, test, challenge, and revise. However, knowledge requires conditioning by belief systems in order to achieve purposeful realization in ethics and morals otherwise it is humanly meaningless and valueless. In turn rationality conditions and constrains the belief systems which should be internally and externally coherent and consistent to be of practical use. Beliefs are conditional contingent, pragmatic, and provisional assertions which are subject to constant revision on the basis of changing human expectations, experiences, hopes, and visions. Some beliefs are “more believable” than others in that they are better empirically supported, or more rationally coherent; or they are better fitted to helping in achieving desired goals. Indeed, some beliefs are rational, coherent, *trans-cultural*, and human-universal and can be thought of as arising from the cognitive *a-priori* themselves. These universal beliefs are characterized as anthropocentric, empirical-pragmatic, ethnomethodological, pluralistic, and universalistic. The universal knowledge and universal beliefs combine to form the basis of a “Human Monoculture.” More localized socio-cultures may be seen ideally-dialectically (with Kant’s universal knowledge’s supporting Hegel’s historically-conditioned beliefs); or phenomenologically (with Husserl’s mathematical-scientific logical objects’ coupling with his psychological, subjective consciousness).

5.38: To live creatively and to evolve in the Twentyfirst Century, Grassby urges Humanity towards a properly Postmodern (rather than simply “*post-Modern*”), *quasi-Realist*, *quasi-Idealist*, Relativist, mediated-Rationalist, Anthropocentric Subjectivism which prevents us from falling backwards into barbarism. This stance recognizes the importance of immanent, plural, human truths, beliefs, and values whilst rejecting the lure of The One Transcendental Universal Truth, Belief, and Value. In order to be fully human and to develop the “vision” with which generate culturally appropriate truths, beliefs, and values, it is imperative that we learn to combine left-brain, reductive, rational, and analytic logic with right-brain, creative, arational, and synthetic imagination. Grassby cites in evidence of this “vision” Kant’s “transcendental imagination” – Heidegger’s “forest clearing” – Wittgenstein’s “kicked-away ladder” – and Derrida’s “multiple discourses.” Here we hear echoes of Ellis’s “empty, emotionless reason” calling to “blind, reasonless emotion” in an area where we must integrate

æsthetic Continental psychologizing and scientific Anglo-American ratiocination so that our Heideggerean “life in language” [459] can properly combine *poiēsis* with *mathēsis*. The status of these new truths, beliefs, and values is variable, with some being more empirically and pragmatically useful than others; the rejection of the idea of transcendence prevents us from building unrealistic and potentially very harmful absolutist political, religious, and social fantasies. This Postmodern *Anti*-philosophical “enchantment” of *quasi*-Idealist thinking coupled with *quasi*-Rationalist acting allows us as “Human Becomings” to be our own myth-makers with the freedom to construct our own compelling, constructive, passionate, and secure Grand Narratives, rather than to exist in a desert “Belief Vacuum” at the mercy of ideologues, terrorists, or tyrants.

The next Part of this Series goes on to investigate the Psycho-chaotic Semiotics which underlies the Psycho(a)logical Autopoiesis of human thinking and personality. This combination of these two fields leads to the derivation of the “Ego-sum Endgame” whose motto is “*ego essendi incantator sum*” (in the Frictionless or Conservative Lifepath case); and to the “(H)ero-ego Flux” whose motto is “*ero šamán faciendi ego*” (in the Frictional or Non-conservative Lifepath case).

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